Ronald Lee Schober, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1641

Ronald Lee Schober, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 26, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-21-173

Christina Zauhar, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Angella M. Erickson, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction relief without an
evidentiary hearing, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
appellant’s claims were barred by both State v. Knaffla , 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976)
2
(holding that, “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all
claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for
postconviction relief”) and the law-of-the-case doctrine. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2021, appellant Ronald Schober was charged with third -degree criminal sexual
conduct. He was represented by attorney B.H. Respondent State of Minnesota empaneled
a grand jury and, because appellant had a 1988 sexual -conduct conviction in Washington,
received an indictment that permitted the state to seek a life sentence for “repeat offenders”
under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 4(a)(2) (i), (ii) (2020). Count I alleged that appellant
committed third-degree criminal sexual conduct and had a previous sex-offense conviction
for which he had received an upward durational departure from the sentencing guidelines;
count II alleged that appellant committed third-degree criminal-sexual conduct and that the
present offense involved an aggravating factor, i.e., the offense was committed in a place
where the victim had an expectation of privacy , and appellant had a previous sex -offense
conviction.
At an appearance before the district court in April 2021, B.H. said that he had
received discovery and was reviewing it. Three months later, in July 2021, B.H. asked for
a continuance because he was not able to open some of the electronic discovery. At a
motion hearing in April 2022, the district court said it had asked B.H. to provide a witness
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list prior to the June 14, 202 2, trial date; B.H. never filed a witness list or an exhibit list.
The state moved to admit Spreigl evidence.1
The state told appellant that, in exchange for a guilty plea, the state would agree to
a minimum sentence of 41 months in prison, after which appellant would be eligible for
parole or conditional release, and appellant would still be subject to remaining in custody
for life. The state told him that, if he were convicted at trial, the state would seek a sentence
of more than 57 months. The district court asked appellant if B.H. had provided him with
all the information the state would present at trial and if appellant felt B.H. had done a good
job for him; appellant answered these questions in the affirmative. Appellant answered in
the negative when asked if he had any complaints about B.H. A jury was empaneled on
June 15, 2022. After the jury was empaneled, appellant informed the district court that he
had been given time to discuss the situation with B.H. and had decided to accept the state’s
offer and plead guilty. Appellant again answered in the affirmative when asked if he had
sufficient time to discuss the matter with B.H. and if he was satisfied with B.H.’s
representation of him.
In September 2022, before sentencing, appellant asked the district court to discharge
B.H. and applied for a public defender. His application was denied. In October 2022, he

1 See State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998) (“Other crimes evidence, often
referred to in Minnesota as Spreigl evidence after this court’s decision in State v. Spreigl,
139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965), shall not be admitted in a criminal prosecution unless: (1)
notice is given that the state intends to use the evidence; (2) the state clearly indicates what
the evidence is being offered to prove; (3) the evidence is clear and convincing tha t the
defendant participated in the other offense; (4) the Spreigl evidence is relevant and material
to the state’s case, and (5) the probative value of the Spreigl evidence is not outweighed by
its potential for unfair prejudice.”).
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retained attorney C.Z., who filed a motion to withdraw appellant’s guilty plea on the ground
that, because B.H. had failed to provide adequate representation, appellant’s guilty plea
was not voluntarily and intelligently made.
In January 2023, the district court denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea
and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of 41 months on
count II and dismissed count I. On direct appeal, we affirmed the district court’s “thorough
and well -reasoned order ,” and appellant did not seek supreme court review. State v.
Schober, No. A23-0243, 2024 WL 323337, at *7 (Minn. App. Jan. 29, 2024).
In March 2025, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief with the district
court, arguing that, because he was denied effective assistance of counsel, his guilty plea
was deficient. The district court denied the petition on the ground that the claim was barred
under both Knaffla and the law -of-the-case doctrine. Appellant challenges the denial,
repeating his ineffective-assistance of counsel and deficient-guilty-plea claims and arguing
that recent Minnesota Supreme Court decisions support his position.
DECISION
This court reviews a postconviction court’s summary denial of a petition for
postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422
(Minn. 2018).
Appellant based his March 2025 petition for postconviction relief on his claims that
he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was defective. T wo
months earlier, this court had addressed similar claims in Schober’s first appeal. Schober,
2024 WL 323337, at *4 (stating that “Schober maintains that his guilty plea was not valid
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because he received ineffective assistance of counsel” and “Schober argues that his plea
was unintelligent because his counsel failed to inform him of the consequences of pleading
guilty and that his plea was involuntary based on his attorney’s deficient performance
throughout the representation.”).
Our Schober opinion notes that an ineffective-assistance of counsel claim requires
both “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and
that the defendant suffered “prejudice in the form of a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, [he] would not have pl eaded guilty .” Id. (quotations
omitted). The opinion then discusses the transcript and concludes:
Assuming without deciding that counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Schober
cannot show prejudice. Although Schober initially expressed
unawareness that his conditional release would be for life, after
follow-up questioning by the state, Schober stated that he had
no other questions or additional concerns he needed addressed
and that he understood his lifetime conditional-release term[.]

. . . .

On this record, there is no probability —much less a
reasonable probability—that Schober would not have pleaded
guilty but for his attorney’s alleged failure to advise him about
lifetime conditional release and lifetime predatory -offender
registration . . . because Schober testified to his understanding
that he would be subject to conditional release and predatory -
offender registration upon release from prison.

Id. at *5. Clearly, appellant brought his ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal, and
“[c]laims that were raised on direct appeal . . . are procedurally barred.” Sontoya v. State,
829 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2013).
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“When a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the
basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred.”
Id. Appellant relies on this language to argue that his claim is not barred because: (1) an
ineffective-assistance of counsel claim is not Knaffla-barred if review of the claim requires
consideration of facts outside the trial court record, (2) additional facts on the activities of
B.H. are now available, and (3) attorney C.Z. did not have time to review these facts. But
appellant asserted sufficient facts to support his ineffective-assistance of counsel claim
when he first moved to withdraw his plea after retaining C.Z., and the operative factor in
this court’s affirming the denial of that motion was not what B.H. had done or failed to do,
but rather the fact that appellant could not show that the result would have been different
if his attorney had not been ineffective.2 The exception to Knaffla does not apply because
consideration of facts outside the trial court record was not necessary to review appellant’s
claim, as this court noted in Schober. “Schober confirmed that he understood that the re
was no guarantee that he would be released from prison after 41 months and that he could
remain in prison for the remainder of his life. ” Schober, 2024 WL 323337, at *5. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that appellant’s claim was Knaffla-
barred.
The two post-Schober cases that appellant relies on are distinguishable. The first is
Mason-Kimmons v. State, 26 N.W.3d 858, 874 (Minn. 2025) (holding, inter alia, that the

2 Appellant’s addendum includes 60 pages regarding other cases involved in B.H.’s history
of attorney discipline. While Schober focuses on appellant’s failure to demonstrate that
the result would have been different, appellant continues to focus on the deficiencies of
B.H.’s representation.
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defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient advice to plead guilty to second -
degree intentional murder because counsel was unprepared for trial). Mason-Kimmons
observed that whether a defendant whose counsel had advised him to plead guilty because
counsel was unprepared for trial was prejudiced was
a close question. During his plea hearing, Mason -Kimmons
made a statement indicating that, consistent with his trial
counsel’s advice, he pled guilty because his trial counsel told
him he was unprepared and that, as a result, Mason -Kimmons
would not get a fair trial. We also consider that, before his trial
counsel’s constitutionally deficient conduct, Mason-Kimmons
refused to even consider an offer to plead guilty in return for
precisely the sentence to which he ultimately agreed —even
though he learned, after the initial plea offer, that, among other
things, W.S. [a witness who had previously testified that
Mason-Kimmons was not the shooter] had changed his story
and was now telling the police that Mason-Kimmons was the
shooter. Finally, although there is substantial evidence that
Mason-Kimmons was involved in shooting [the victim], at the
time Mason-Kimmons made his decision to plead guilty it was
possible that the district court would exclude some of the
State’s evidence. Mason -Kimmons also could introd uce
witness testimony describing the shooter (consistent with the
video) in ways that do not match Mason-Kimmons’s
appearance. On these unique facts, we conclude that Mason -
Kimmons was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s constitutionally
deficient performance.

Id. Here, there is no indication that B.H. encouraged appellant to plead guilty because
B.H.’s lack of preparation meant appellant would not get a fair trial. In fact, when appellant
was asked if he felt “pressured or persuaded by the court, [the prosecutor, or B.H.] to enter
into this [plea] agreement[,] or is this your decision to do this?” he answered, “This will be
my decision.” When asked, “[D]o you feel like [B.H.] has done a good job representing
you in these proceedings?,” appellant answered, “Absolutely.”
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In the other case, State v. Jones , the defendant’s testimony that he “was going to
fight this case cuz [he was] not scared of this case and [he] never raped [his] baby momma,
so it will never happen again” negated an element of the offense that was never “cured” or
clarified by further questioning, so the defendant had not admitted all the elements of the
crime. 7 N.W.3d 391, 394 , 396, 399 (Minn. 2024) (citing State v. Iverson , 664 N.W.2d
346, 350 (Minn. 2003) for the proposition that, for a guilty plea to be accepted, any
statement of the defendant that negates an element of the crime must be withdrawn or
corrected). The district court noted that appellant’s reliance on Jones was misplaced
because, in Jones, during his waiver of rights, the defendant’s soliloquy negated an element
of the offense and “ [h]ere, [appellant’s] plea was accurate per State v. Schober.” Neither
Mason-Kimmons nor Jones provides a basis for allowing appella nt to relitigate the issues
decided in Schober.
Because we conclude that appellant’s claims are barred by Knaffla, we do not reach
the issue of whether his claims are also barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine.
Affirmed.