Emily Pedersen, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1643

Emily Pedersen, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Center for Reproductive Medicine,
Defendant,

Advanced Reproductive Technologies,
Respondent.

Filed July 20, 2026
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-22-12513

Scott Wilson, Scott Wilson Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Stuart L. Goldenberg, Goldenberg Lauricella, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellants)

Mark A. Solheim, Kevin T. McCarthy, Scott A. Jurchisin, Patrick H. O’Neill, III, Larson
King, LLP, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Nicole Heringer, Matonich Law, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus curiae
Minnesota Association for Justice)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran , Judge; and Bentley ,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A laboratory under contract to preserve sperm for use in a married couple’s
medically assisted effort to conceive a child destroyed the sperm before the designated
contract termination. The couple sued the laboratory seeking emotional damages for
alleged medical ma lpractice. The district court dismissed the couple’s civil complaint at
summary judgment, determining that the laboratory’s breach of contract cannot as a matter
of law support damages for emotional harm. On appeal, the couple argues that the
laboratory’s premature destruction of the stored sperm breached a medical duty and ,
alternatively, that either destroying their sperm or ending their ability to conceive warrants
emotional damages based on a physical injury or the wanton invasion of their rights.
Because the couple’s theory fails as a matter of law under current precedent, we affirm.
FACTS
This case involves a dispute between married couple Dustin and Emily Pedersen
and Advanced Reproductive Technologies (ART), the company that contracted with the
Pedersens to store Dustin’s semen. Because this appeal arises from the district court ’s
dismissal of a civil complaint on summary judgment, we base our review on the facts
construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving part ies. Doe v. Archdiocese of St.
Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012). We summarize the relevant facts as follows.
The Pedersens were unable to conceive a child naturally because of medical
complications, including Dustin’s azoospermia (an absence of sperm in semen). Dr. Joshua
Kapfhamer of the Center for Reproductive Medicine (CRM) in October 2020 suggested
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three options: in vitro fertilization (IVF), intrauterine insemination (IUI), or reliance on a
sperm donor . Dr. Kapfhamer estimated that the ir chance of conception through IVF was
between 40% and 60% per cycle and that their chance through IUI was between 10% and
15% per cycle. The Pedersens considered Dustin’s brother as a potential sperm donor.
The couple began fertility-improvement treatments. Dustin stopped taking
testosterone, which he had been prescribed after being diagnosed with hypogonadism, and
he and Emily began taking fertility medicine. Dustin then provided semen samples to ART,
an andrology laboratory, to analyze the samples for their sperm count . By late January
2021, Dustin’s sperm count increased to healthy levels.
The Pedersens consulted with Dr. Kapfhamer and decided on three to four cycles of
IUI. Their first attempt a t IUI-assisted conception in mid-January was not successful.
Dustin produced a semen sample in late January that an expert witness for the Pedersens
later described as a “super sample,” viable for conception through either IUI or IVF. Dustin
and ART entered into a “Short Term Storage Agreement” under which ART would freeze
and store that sample for 120 days in exchange for a fee. ART froze the sample on January
29, setting the 120-day discard date as May 29.
Emily told Dr. Kapfhamer that Dustin’s brother, their potential sperm donor , had
scheduled a vasectomy for early March. Encouraged by Dustin’s increased sperm count,
Dr. Kapfhamer indicated that the couple would no longer need a donor. Dustin’s brother
had his scheduled vasectomy.
The couple attempted conception twice more through IUI in March and April, using
new sperm samples. Both attempts failed, but Dustin’s sperm count remained healthy.
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The next month, on May 13, ART laboratory technicians prematurely destroyed
Dustin’s stored semen sample, miscalculating the destruction date by about two weeks.
Two days later Dustin produced another semen sample for a fourth attempt at conception
through IUI. But his sperm count had dropped to a n insufficient level. CRM staff asked
Dustin to return to the clinic to provide another sample, but he directed CRM to instead
use his stored semen. Dr. Kapfhamer contacted ART staff and learned of its destruction.
He relayed the news to the Peders ens.
The Pedersens became emotionally distraught. Emily began therapy for depression
and anxiety rooted in the couple’s fertility difficulties. She began taking Lexapro, and her
weight fluctuate d. The couple ended their reproductive treatment. Dustin resumed taking
testosterone. Emily suffered a series of gynecological issues that may have further reduced
her ability to conceive. Dustin provided a final sample in July 2022, which showed
azoospermia.
The Pedersens sued CRM and ART . They alleged medical malpractice based on
negligent hiring and training, failure to warn, and loss of chance. They also alleged breach
of contract and promissory estoppel.
Emily had a “chemical pregnancy,” which is an early miscarriage shortly after
conception, in December 2022. They did not reinitiate fertility treatment.
The Pedersens agreed to dismiss their claims against CRM with prejudice, and the y
settled their breach-of-contract claim with ART . All that remained unresolved was their
medical-malpractice claim against ART.
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The district court construed the parties’ motions in limine as potentially dispositive
based on the questions of whether A RT owed the Pedersens a medical duty of care and
whether the Pedersens could recover damages for emotional harm. The district court
therefore characterized ART’s motions in limine as a motion for summary judgment . It
then granted summary judgment favoring ART.
The Pedersens appeal.
DECISION
The Pedersens challenge the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment
dismissing their medical- malpractice claim against ART. We review the district court ’s
summary-judgment decision de novo. Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC , 922 N.W.2d 185,
190 (Minn. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate only if, based on the record evidence
construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issue of material
fact prevents judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 189–90. Our de novo review satisfies us
that summary judgment is appropriate.
The Pedersens base their challenge on three arguments. They argue first that their
malpractice claim should survive summary judgment because it stands independent of their
voluntarily dismissed contract claim. They argue second that their loss of ability to
conceive a child and the destruction of the ir sperm sample are p hysical injuries that could
support emotional-harm damages. And they argue third that the district court erred by
concluding that neither of these injuries were “wanton and direct invasions” of their rights
warranting emotional-harm damages. The arguments do not justify reversing.

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I
The Pedersens argue that their medical-malpractice claim stands independent of
their dismissed contract claim. A medical-malpractice claim fails unless the alleged
tortfeasor owed the plaintiff a duty of care recognized by the medical community.
Tousignant v. St. Louis County , 615 N.W.2d 53, 59 (Minn. 2000). And this medical duty
must stand independent of any contractual obligation the defendant owes the plaintiff. See
D & A Dev. Co. v. Butler, 357 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Minn. App. 1984). This is because,
“[w]here a party cannot prove that the duty at issue arose independent of a contract,
Minnesota law precludes that party from recovering in negligence based [on] breach of that
duty.” Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 816 N.W.2d 572, 584 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted). The district court here concluded that the Pedersens failed to meet their burden
to distinguish ART’s duty under their malpractice claim from its duty under the parties’
contract, reasoning that the c ontractual duty and alleged medical duty were one and the
same. The Pedersens would have us treat ART’s duty not to destroy their semen sample as
one arising from a medical duty and not chiefly a contract ual duty. For the sake of
efficiency, we will assume the argument is merited but conclude that, based on the analysis
below, the Pedersens failed to establish the necessary element of damages . T his failure
supports summary judgment even if ART’s duty to the Pedersens stands independent of its
duty under the semen-storage agreement.

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II
We are not convinced by the Pedersens’ next argument, which is that the district
court erroneously concluded that neither their loss of the ability to conceive a child nor the
destruction of their sperm sample constitutes a physical injury supporting emotional-harm
damages. A medical-malpractice claim cannot survive a summary-judgment motion if the
plaintiffs offer no proof that the defendant’s malpractice caused them damages.
Tousignant, 615 N.W.2d at 59. And plaintiffs are entitled to emotional-harm damages only
in three circumstances. Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d
557, 560 (Minn. 1996). The Pedersens maintain that one of these circumstances, when the
defendant’s negligence caused a “physical injury” that results in the plaintiff ’s emotional
distress, see Langeland v. Farmers State Bank of Trimont, 319 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Minn.
1982), applies here. On that basis they contend that the claim meets the damages
requirement and avoids summary judgment . Our decision turns on whether the evidence
construed in the Pedersens’ favor could support a legally valid finding that they suffered a
physical injury.
To assess whether the Pedersens have presented evidence supporting a claim
involving a physical injury, we must first put the issue in its right context. The issue is
rooted in the supreme court’s stated reluctance to allow damages for emotional distress
based on its concern that “claims of mental anguish may be speculative” and rest on
“fictitious allegations,” fostering opportunities for “abuse of the judicial process.” Lickteig,
556 N.W.2d at 560. Although Minnesota precedential caselaw does not define “physical
injury,” Black’s Law Dictionary treats it synonymously with “bodily injury,” which means,
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“Physical damage to a person’s body.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1385 (12th ed. 2024)
(defining physical injury) ; Black’s Law Dictionary 935–36 (12th ed. 2024) (defining
injury). Especially helpful for our review today, we also recall that, two years before
Lickteig, this court predicted and announce d the same rule in more descriptive f orm. We
said that “[a] plaintiff’s right to damages for emotional distress arising from physical injury
to the plaintiff is firmly established” and, more particularly, that “this emotional damage is
so closely related to an objective physical injury [that] its existence is relatively certain and
the requirement of proximate cause is easily satisfied. ” Carlson v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co.,
520 N.W.2d 534, 535–36 (Minn. App. 1994). In other words, we reasoned that the
potentially speculative nature of emotional damages is overcome in cases involving the
sort of objective physical injury that reduces to relative certainty the link between the injury
and the damages.
With that background, we are satisfied that neither the destruction of Dustin’s sperm
sample nor the Pedersens’ consequent loss of their ability to conceive constitutes a physical
injury warranting emotional damages. The link between ART’s negligent destruction of
the sample and the Pedersens’ emotionally distressed reaction to it is a material step
removed from the direct physical link between the injury and the anguish that we
characterized in Carlson and that was implied in Lickteig. The link considered in those
cases is “relatively certain” because it is physical and essentially automatic rather than
attenuated and purely emotional. Id. We do not suggest that the negligent destruction of
Dustin’s sperm sample did n ot lead to the couple’s diminished hope for procreation and
then to genuine emotional distress from that diminished hope. But their distress results only
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indirectly from the negligent act. Our caselaw contemplates instead the kind of physical
harm to a person’s body that leads directly to that person’s physically prompted emotional
anguish. The destruction of the sperm sample here is not that sort of injury.
We are not persuaded otherwise by our understanding that the negligently destroyed
sperm was a living substance within Dustin’s body before it was removed from his body,
stored by ART, and prematurely destroyed. The Pedersens argue that ART’s destruction of
Dustin’s sperm is a physical injury because it is “akin to the destruction of amputated tissue
intended for reattachment.” They characterize it as “an extension of his body” that was
“preserved outside his body . . . to accomplish a bodily function,” specifically, conception
of a child with Emily. The Pedersens ’ proposition is not established under current
Minnesota law, and they cite no case anywhere that has reached the holding they would
have us reach. They offer only secondary sources and non-Minnesota authorities discussing
the emotional impact of the negligent destruction of reproductive material during fertility
treatment. Their argument culminates in their “urg[ing] in good faith that the legal
framework supporting damages for emotional distress should be broadened to include cases
of reproductive negligence.” We understand t he logic of their argument, but it asks too
much of us to extend Minnesota tort law in a manner that exceeds the authority of this
court. It is within only the legislature’s or supreme court’s purview to make material policy
changes or extensions to the state’s common law. See Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d
300, 303 (Minn. 2007) (“It is also the province of the legislature to modify the common
law . . . .”); Lake v. Wal -Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. 1998)
(acknowledging the supreme court’s “power to recognize and abolish common law
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doctrines”); Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N.W.2d 525, 537 ( Minn. 1976) (“[W]e retain the
common-law authority to define torts and their defenses.”). We therefore consider the
argument no further.
III
The Pedersens argue lastly that the district court erred by concluding that ART’s
conduct did not amount to a willful or wanton invasion of their rights entitling them to
emotional damages when reproductive material is “granted an appropriate level of dignity
interest.” It is true that t ort plaintiffs may recover emotional damages if the defendant’s
“willful, wanton, or malicious conduct” resulted in a “direct invasion” of their rights.
Lickteig, 556 N.W.2d at 560 (quotation omitted) . But t he Pedersens do n ot argue that
ART’s alleged breach of its medical duty of care amounted to wanton misconduct. They
argue instead that ART invaded a supposed “dignity interest” in sperm samples “that
should be respected by the law.” The argument stands only if we recognize a novel,
elevated interest in sperm samples intended for assisted reproductive use. The argument
again asks us not merely to apply but to extend Minnesota common law, a task beyond this
court’s reach.
Affirmed.