Jonathan David Fritz, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1653

Jonathan David Fritz,
Respondent,

vs.

City of Rochester,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2026
Reversed
Beane, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-24-6294

Daniel A. McIntosh, Knutson+Casey Law Firm, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Julia C. Kelly, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Beane, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BEANE, Judge
Respondent Jonathan David Fritz fell and was injured while skating at appellant
City of Rochester’s ice rink. Fritz sued the city, alleg ing that the city’s negligent
maintenance of the ice rink caused his fall. The city asserted recreational-use immunity

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
under Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6e (2024), in a motion for summary
judgment. The district court denied the city’s motion, concluding that genuine issues of
material fact exist as to two elements of the trespasser exception to recreational-use
immunity. Because we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to one of
those elements— the city’s actual knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition that caused
Fritz’s injury—we reverse.
FACTS1
The city owns and operates the Rochester Recreation Center, a public facility that
includes two indoor ice rinks —the North Rink and South Rink— used for community
skating and youth hockey. On September 15, 2023, Fritz was coaching a youth hockey
practice on the North Rink. During the practice, Fritz skated near the Zamboni doors and
fell. Fritz testified that the fall felt different from an ordinary skating fall because his right
skate abruptly stopped while the rest of his body continued forward, causing him to twist
and fall. Another coach testified that he saw Fritz skating toward the boards near the
Zamboni doors and that Fritz’s leg appeared to suddenly stop and turn. After Fritz fell, he
was helped from the ice, left the recreation center to seek medical care, and ultimately
needed surgery to repair a broken ankle. The youth hockey practice Fritz had been coaching
continued after he left.

1 Because this is an appeal from an order on a motion for summary judgment, the following
facts are undisputed or are stated in the light most favorable to Fritz , as the nonmoving
party. See Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC, 922 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Minn. 2019).
3
Fritz did not inspect the ice surface by the Zamboni doors on the night he was
injured. Another coach inspected the area where Fritz had fallen and later described seeing
a narrow gap or separation near the ice edge by the Zamboni doors, which he believed
could catch a skate blade. He did not tell the city about the incident, though he told the
youth hockey players to avoid the area of the ice where Fritz had fallen.
In the days following the incident, others observed and documented the condition
of the ice surface near the Zamboni doors on the North Rink. Fritz’s friend, who is also a
hockey coach, took pictures and recorded a short video of the area in front of the open
Zamboni doors one or two days after the incident. Fritz’s brother later took additional
pictures and video of the same general area.
Fritz sued the city, alleging that the city’s negligence in maintaining the ice surface
on the North Rink caused his fall. During discovery, the recreation center’s manager
testified about ice-rink operations and maintenance practices, including routine ice
resurfacing and edging work performed by city staff. She also testified that she had not
received any complaints or reports of a gap in the area where Fritz fell and was not notified
of the alleged condition until a month after the incident. The manager further testified that
a gap in the ice surface capable of catching a skate blade would pose a risk to skaters, and
she agreed that, if such a gap existed, it would be dangerous enough to prompt the city to
close the rink for repairs.
After the close of discovery, the city moved for summary judgment based on
recreational-use immunity under Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6e. The
district court denied the city’s motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact exist
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as to two elements of the trespasser exception to recreational-use immunity: (1) whether
the city had actual knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition and (2) whether the
condition was hidden or concealed.
The city appeals.
DECISION
The city argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for summary
judgment based on recreational-use immunity. An order denying summary judgment based
on an assertion of immunity is immediately appealable. McGovern v. City of Minneapolis,
475 N.W.2d 71, 73 (Minn. 1991).
We review a district court’s summary-judgment decision de novo to “determine
whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there are genuine issues of
material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev.
Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010). A genuine issue of material fact exists
“when reasonable persons might draw different conclusions from the evidence presented.”
DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997). Whether statutory immunity applie s
is a question of law. Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn. 1996).
Under the Minnesota Municipal Tort Claims Act, municipalities are generally liable
for their tortious conduct. Minn. Stat. § 466.02 (2024). Recreational-use immunity is an
exception to that general rule and protects municipalities against liability for the following
claims:
Any claim based upon the construction, operation, or
maintenance of any property owned or leased by the
municipality that is intended or permitted to be used . . . for the
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provision of recreational services, . . . if the claim arises from
a loss incurred by a user of park and recreation property or
services.

Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subds. 1, 6e (2024). But recreational-use immunity is not absolute.
When the municipality’s conduct would entitle a trespasser to damages against a private
person, recreational-use immunity does not apply. Id., subd. 6e; Ariola v. City of Stillwater,
889 N.W.2d 340, 354 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2017).
This so-called trespasser exception renders the municipality liable for injuries
caused by an artificial condition the municipality created or maintained “only if (1) the
artificial condition is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm; (2) the landowner has
actual knowledge of that danger; and (3) the danger is concealed or hidden from the
trespasser.” Lundstrom v. City of Apple Valley, 587 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Minn. App. 1998)
(citing Sirek v. State, 496 N.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Minn. 1993), and Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 335 (Am. L. Inst. 1965)); see also Johnson v. Washington County, 518 N.W.2d 594,
599 (Minn. 1994) (applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335 in a municipal immunity
case). A plaintiff must establish all three elements of the trespasser exception to defeat a
municipality’s immunity claim. Krieger v. City of St. Paul, 762 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Minn.
App. 2009). Consequently, to survive summary judgment on this issue, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial on each element. See
Prokop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 754 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. App. 2008).
Here, the parties do not dispute that the North Rink is a municipal recreation facility
to which recreational-use immunity could apply. Instead, the focus of the parties’ dispute
is whether Fritz can present evidence to establish that the trespasser exception applies. Fritz
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argues that a gap between the ice surface and the closed Zamboni doors caught his skate
blade and that the gap was an artificial condition maintained by the city that was concealed
from skaters but of which city workers must have known. The city disputes that such a gap
existed but argues that, even if it did, the city lacked the requisite knowledge of a dangerous
condition on the North Rink.
As to the requirement that a plaintiff establish a municipality’s knowledge of the
alleged injury-causing condition, we have held that actual— not constructive—knowledge
must be proved. Ariola, 889 N.W.2d at 355- 56 (collecting cases and observing that our
supreme court has not addressed this question); Prokop, 754 N.W.2d at 715 (rejecting
constructive-knowledge argument). Therefore, to establish the trespasser exception, Fritz
must present evidence that the city had actual knowledge of a gap between the ice surface
and the closed Zamboni doors. In doing so, he may rely on direct or circumstantial
evidence. Ariola, 889 N.W.2d at 356-57.
We first observe that no evidence in the record indicates that any city employee was
told about the alleged gap before Fritz fell. The record contains no evidence that the city
received complaints or repair requests related to a gap in the ice surface near the Zamboni
doors on the North Rink. The recreation center manager’s testimony that no one told the
city about the gap until more than a month after Fritz’s injury is uncontradicted. Because
the absence of prior complaints “has been held to be sufficient to demonstrate lack of
knowledge,” Prokop, 754 N.W.2d at 715, the city contends that this should end our
analysis. We disagree with the city’s suggestion that Prokop creates a categorical rule that
a lack of complaints about a hazard necessarily mandates a conclusion that a municipality
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lacked actual knowledge of that hazard. But even so, we ultimately conclude that the other
evidence in the record is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that the
city had actual knowledge.
Fritz argues, and the district court agreed, that two categories of evidence establish
a genuine issue of material fact as to the city’s actual knowledge of a gap in the ice surface
near the Zamboni doors on the North Rink: (1) photos and videos taken of the alleged gap
after Fritz’s fall coupled with testimony that city employees regularly worked in the area
where he fell, and (2) reports of previous, unrelated injuries on the ice rink and past
instances of degraded ice conditions on other parts of the North and South Rinks. For its
part, the city contends this evidence is insufficient because (1) it requires improper
speculation that city employees should have known about the gap, which in any event
establishes only constructive knowledge; and (2) evidence pertaining to conditions on
other parts of the ice is not probative of the city’s knowledge of the specific condition in a
specific location at issue here. We agree with the city.
Even crediting Fritz’s evidence that a gap existed between the ice surface and the
Zamboni doors, the record does not support a reasonable inference that city workers
actually knew about the gap. The record contains no testimony from the city employees
tasked with performing regular maintenance on the North Rink on the date of Fritz’s injury,
so the only available evidence about the work they performed on that date is the recreation
center manager’s testimony about the city’s typical practices. That maintenance work
includes running a Zamboni over the ice between skating sessions and then manually
clearing excess water and snow from the ice surface over the threshold of the Zamboni
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doors and into a drain, all of which is done with the Zamboni doors open. Fritz argues that
the gap was obvious, particularly with the Zamboni doors open, so the city employees
working in that area must have seen the gap. But the specific hazard alleged to have caused
Fritz’s injury is a gap between the ice surface and the closed Zamboni doors. It is
undisputed that when the Zamboni doors are closed, they cover the edge of the ice surface
at the threshold of the Zamboni doors. Even if city workers would have seen a gap between
the ice surface and the threshold of the Zamboni doors with the doors open, Fritz’s
argument that they then should have discovered that the gap extended beyond the closed
Zamboni doors and created a hazard is a constructive-knowledge argument. Our caselaw
establishes that constructive knowledge is inadequate to satisfy the trespasser exception.
Ariola, 889 N.W.2d at 355-56. Fritz’s argument is like the constructive-knowledge
argument we rejected in Prokop, in which the plaintiff claimed that school-district
employees had observed a damaged piece of safety equipment and should have known it
posed an obvious danger. 754 N.W.2d at 715. We cannot reach a different conclusion here.
Fritz also relies on the recreation center manager’s testimony that, if there had been
a gap, the employees working in that area would have noticed it and alerted her. But the
manager was not directly involved in performing maintenance on the ice at the time of
Fritz’s injury, and she further testified that she was unaware of the gap that allegedly
injured him or any other gaps in the ice. At most, this testimony is speculative as to what
other city employees working in the area would have seen. Such speculation is not
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment. Osborne v. Twin
Town Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Minn. 2008).
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Fritz’s reliance on evidence of other unrelated injuries and complaints about ice
conditions on separate parts of the North and South Rinks is also unavailing. The record
includes six years’ worth of injury reports documenting many incidents of injuries , none
of which involved the alleged condition that injured Fritz. The fact that other skaters were
injured on the North and South Rinks on different dates, by different hazards, and in
different locations is not germane to whether the city knew of the hazard alleged to have
caused Fritz’s injury. See Prokop, 754 N.W.2d at 715. Similarly, testimony about degraded
ice conditions on areas of the North Rink other than where Fritz fell and on dates other than
when Fritz was injured is not pertinent here. Even if such testimony would permit an
inference that the city had general knowledge of “ongoing issues with the ice quality,” as
Fritz suggests, it cannot support an inference that the city had actual knowledge of the
specific hazard that allegedly caused Fritz’s injury. The evidence in the record pertaining
to injuries and degraded ice conditions in areas other than where Fritz fell therefore does
not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the city’s actual knowledge of the gap in
the ice that caused Fritz’s fall.
Because the record does not contain evidence from which a reasonable person could
find that the city had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition, the trespasser exception
does not apply. The city is therefore entitled to recreational-use immunity, and we need not
consider the city’s separate argument as to whether the alleged condition was hidden or
concealed.
Reversed.