Khalif A. Spry, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1660

Khalif A. Spry,
Relator,

vs.

Department of Human Services,
Respondent.

Filed May 4, 2026
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge*

Department of Human Services
File Nos. 3878453, 3892235

Khalif A. Spry, Waite Park, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Brian M. Card, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After relator Khalif A. Spry was convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault, the
Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) disqualified him from holding a position

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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involving direct contact with persons receiving services from facilities licensed by DHS or
by the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH). Spry challenged the disqualification on
the basis that he did not pose a risk of harm to such persons, but the commissioner of human
services upheld Spry’s disqualification. Because substantial evidence supports the
decision to deny Spry’s request to set aside his disqualification, the commissioner
considered all mandatory risk-of- harm factors, and the decision was not arbitrary, we
affirm.
FACTS
Two of Spry’s prospective employers —licensed residential mental health
programs—requested that DHS conduct a background study on Spry. As a result of the
background study, which revealed a misdemeanor domestic-assault conviction, DHS
informed Spry that he was disqualified from providing services to persons receiving care
from facilities licensed by DHS or by MDH. See Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.14, subd. 1, 144.057,
subd. 1 (2024) (requiring the commissioner to disqualify an individual from any position
allowing direct contact with persons receiving services if the individual is convicted of, or
admits to, certain crimes).
Spry sought reconsideration of his disqualification on the grounds that he did not
pose a risk of harm to persons receiving services. After reviewing Spry’s submissions and
analyzing the nine risk-of-harm factors as required by Minnesota Statutes section 245C.22,
subdivision 4(b), the commissioner declined to set aside Spry’s disqualification.
Spry appeals by a writ of certiorari.

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DECISION
The Minnesota Department of Human Services Background Studies Act (the act),
Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.01-.34 (2024), is designed “to ensure the safety of the people who use
DHS-licensed facilities.” Jackson v. Comm ’r of Hum. Servs., 933 N.W.2d 408, 411
(Minn. 2019). In furtherance of that purpose, the act provides for disqualification of certain
individuals from providing direct- contact care to persons served by DHS- or MDH-
licensed facilities. Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.03, subd. 1(a)(3), .14, subd. 1, 144.057, subd. 1
(2024). As relevant to this appeal, an individual convicted of misdemeanor domestic
assault is presumptively disqualified from direct-contact care positions for seven years.
Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.15, subd. 4, 609.2242, subd. 1 (2024).
A disqualification may be set aside upon a finding that “the individual has submitted
sufficient information to demonstrate that the individual does not pose a risk of harm to
any person served” by a licensed facility. Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.22, subd. 4(a), .21, subd.
3(a)(3) (providing that the individual seeking reconsideration of their disqualification has
the burden of submitting information that shows that he or she does not pose a risk of
harm).
1 In determining whether to set aside a disqualification on this basis, the
commissioner must consider nine statutory risk-of-harm factors:

1 A license holder may seek a variance from the commissioner to temporarily set aside an
individual’s disqualification when “the commissioner has not set aside a background study
subject’s disqualification, and there are conditions under which the disqualified individual
may provide direct contact services or have access to people receiving services that
minimize the risk of harm to people receiving services.” Minn. Stat. § 245C.30, subd. 1(a).
Here, Spry’s potential employers did not seek a time-limited variance under section
245C.30.
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(1) the nature, severity, and consequences of the event or
events that led to the disqualification;
(2) whether there is more than one disqualifying event;
(3) the age and vulnerability of the victim at the time of the
event;
(4) the harm suffered by the victim;
(5) vulnerability of persons served by the program;
(6) the similarity between the victim and persons served by the
program;
(7) the time elapsed without a repeat of the same or similar
event;
(8) documentation of successful completion by the individual
studied of training or rehabilitation pertinent to the event; and
(9) any other information relevant to reconsideration.

Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 4(b). But while the commissioner must consider all nine
factors, “any single factor . . . may be determinative of the commissioner’s decision
whether to set aside the individual’s disqualification.” Id., subd. 3.
A decision concerning a request for reconsideration of a disqualification is a quasi-
judicial agency decision not subject to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act
(MAPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 14.63-.69 (2024). Anderson v. Comm’r of Health, 811 N.W.2d
162, 165 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2012). We review whether such
a decision “was arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory
of law, or without any evidence to support it.” Id. (quotation omitted).
2 Agency decisions

2 Spry’s argument on appeal references the “arbitrary or capricious” standard of review set
out in the MAPA. See Minn. Stat. § 14.69(f) (permitting a reviewing court to “reverse or
modify” an agency decision that is “arbitrary or capricious”), see, e.g., Citizens Advocating
Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Minn. 2006)
(applying the “arbitrary and capricious” standard to review an agency decision under
MAPA). Because we review the commissioner’s decision under the common law, we
follow the standard set out in Anderson, which references review only for arbitrariness.
811 N.W.2d at 165.
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“enjoy a presumption of correctness” and when reviewing such a decision, we show
deference to the agencies’ special knowledge and expertise.
Stang v. Minnesota Tchrs. Ret. Ass’n Bd. of Trs., 566 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Minn. App. 1997)
(quotation omitted).
Here, Spry sought reconsideration of his disqualification and, after making findings
on all mandatory nine risk-of-harm factors, the commissioner declined to set aside Spry’s
disqualification, concluding that Spry had offered insufficient evidence to prove that he did
not pose a risk of harm. On appeal, Spry argues that we must reverse the commissioner’s
decision for three reasons: (1) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence;
(2) the decision was arbitrary; and (3) the commissioner failed to meaningfully engage with
the nine risk-of-harm factors. Because Spry’s arguments overlap and are substantively
identical, we address them together.
Our review centers on Spry’s assertion that the commissioner’s decision to not set
aside his disqualification was not supported by substantial evidence —and for that reason,
was arbitrary. Substantial evidence means evidence that a reasonable person could accept
as sufficient to support a conclusion and requires more than a scintilla or some evidence.
Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council No. 14 v. County of Ramsey, 513 N.W.2d
257, 259 (Minn. App. 1994). As relevant here, an agency’s decision is considered arbitrary
if it lacks a rational connection to the facts. Sweet v. Comm’r of Hum. Servs., 702 N.W.2d
314, 318 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2005). We review the
commissioner’s analysis of each factor to determine whether it is supported by substantial
evidence.
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1. The nature, severity, and consequences of the event or events that led to the
disqualification
Spry was convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault for committing an act to cause
fear of immediate bodily harm or death, a disqualifying offense under the act.
See Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.14, subd. 1(1), .15, subd. 4, 609.2242, subd. 1(1). In declining to
set aside the disqualification based on the assault, the commissioner noted that “[a]ssault-
related events are of concern to DHS because when dealing with vulnerable populations,
you need to be able to resolve conflict in a calm, nonviolent, nonthreatening manner.” The
commissioner relied on the criminal complaint, which Spry submitted in support of his
request for reconsideration, in finding that Spry, among other things: (1) verbally abused
the victim, the mother of his child; (2) took the victim’s phone and smashed it; (3) grabbed
the victim and held her down in a chair while screaming at her when she tried to leave with
their child; and (4) tried to prevent the victim from leaving by standing in front of her
vehicle. And the commissioner considered Spry’s guilty plea petition, in which Spry stated
that he “physically took the phone away from [the victim] and smashed it and destroyed it
. . . [and] in so doing by how I was acting and what I was saying I put [the victim] in fear
of immediate bodily harm.” Given these records and statements, the commissioner’s
findings regarding the severity and nature of the disqualifying event are supported by
substantial evidence.
2. Whether there is more than one disqualifying event
The parties agree that substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s finding that
there is one disqualifying event—Spry’s misdemeanor domestic-assault conviction.
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3. The age and vulnerability of the victim at the time of the event
The commissioner found that the victim of Spry’s domestic -assault conviction “is
an adult woman with no known vulnerabilities.” Neither party disputes that substantial
evidence in the record supports this finding.
4. The harm suffered by the victim
In the order declining to set aside the disqualification, the commissioner found that
“[t]he victim suffered loss of property, trauma, and fear of immediate bodily harm or
death.” The commissioner also determined it likely that the victim suffered physical harm.
Spry contends that this constitutes error because it mischaracterizes his conviction as one
involving physical harm.
We disagree. In deciding Spry’s request for reconsideration, the commissioner
properly characterized Spry’s conviction as misdemeanor domestic assault for placing the
victim in fear of immediate bodily harm or death. And while the commissioner found that
it was “very likely that the victim did suffer physical harm from [Spry] grabbing her and
shouting in her face,” there is evidence in the record to support this finding. The criminal
complaint provided that, in addition to verbally abusing and threatening the victim, Spry
grabbed the victim to prevent her from leaving her residence, shoved her onto a chair, and
held her down while screaming into her face. Further, police noted a red mark on the
victim’s jaw upon arriving at the scene. The commissioner’s finding that Spry committed
domestic assault by placing the victim in fear of imminent bodily harm and that Spry may
have also physically harmed the victim is supported by substantial evidence.

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5. Vulnerability of persons served by the program
The commissioner found that the persons served by the relevant residential mental
health programs are “vulnerable due to age; physical, intellectual, or developmental
disability; mental illness; or substance abuse disorder.” Spry does not dispute that
substantial evidence supports this finding. In fact, Spry acknowledged in his request for
reconsideration that the clients he serves are vulnerable and often struggle with mental-
health crisis or substance abuse. This factor is especially impactful on the commissioner’s
decision to deny Spry’s request for reconsideration because the act requires the
commissioner to “give preeminent weight to the safety” of the people served through its
licensed programs and facilities. Minn. Stat. § 245C.22, subd. 3.
6. The similarity between the victim and the persons served by the program
The commissioner found that the victim and the persons served by the DHS-licensed
programs were “similar.” Spry argues that the victim is distinguishable from program
participants because the victim is an “adult peer, not a vulnerable adult” and the domestic-
assault incident occurred in the victim’s “private home during a relationship separation.”
We recognize that the commissioner found that the victim was “an adult woman
with no known vulnerabilities” under the third risk-of-harm factor, which differentiates her
from the program participants, who the commissioner found “may be particularly
vulnerable to acts of theft or assault due to age, physical, intellectual, or developmental
disability, mental illness, or substance use disorder.” But substantial evidence supports
that the victim and program participants are alike in other ways. For example, the
residential mental -health programs offer services to women and involve home visits.
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Similarly, the victim is a woman and the domestic-assault incident occurred when Spry
came to her residence. Just as the victim was isolated in her home with Spry and was
endangered by Spry’s poor judgment and crisis-management skills, the program
participants could similarly be isolated and endangered by Spry’s poor judgment and crisis-
management skills. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s finding
that the victim and program participants possess similarities.
7. The time elapsed without a repeat of the same or similar event
The commissioner found that the disqualifying event was “recent” as it occurred
about a year and a half prior and noted that Spry remained on probation for the offense.
The commissioner also acknowledged that since the offense, Spry had “minor speeding
tickets but no major new charges.” Substantial evidence in the record supports these
findings.
8. Documentation of successful completion by the individual studies of training
or rehabilitation pertinent to the event

Spry argues that the commissioner ignored substantial evidence of his rehabilitation
efforts. This argument is unavailing. In analyzing the eighth factor, the commissioner
found that Spry had completed a 36-hour domestic-violence course and an eight- hour
anger-management course and had received professional training in de-escalation and
crisis management. The commissioner acknowledged Spry’s rehabilitation efforts yet
acted within her discretion in “determin[ing] that the evidence of [Spry’s] rehabilitation
was not sufficient to conclude that [Spry] does not pose a risk of harm to individuals with
whom he would have direct contact.” See Sweet, 702 N.W.2d at 319.
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9. Any other information relevant to reconsideration
In analyzing the final risk-of-harm factor, the commissioner considered various
materials Spry included in his request for reconsideration, including: (1) a letter from
Spry’s probation agent stating that Spry was cooperative and low risk; (2) an annual
evaluation from Spry’s employer stating that he met expectations at work; and (3) letters
of support from Spry’s prior football coaches and his mother. The commissioner also
acknowledged Spry’s request for reconsideration itself, wherein Spry claimed that he was
arrested due to “many extremely false allegations made by [the victim],” that he “did not
commit an act of domestic violence” or physically harm the victim, and that he was coerced
into taking a plea deal because if he had gone to trial he would have been required to
register as a sex offender. Based on this evidence, the commissioner determined that Spry
had “ignore[d] the significant trauma that can be inflicted by words alone, let alone by
abusive actions such as taking an intimate partner’s phone and throwing it out a door.”
Accordingly, the commissioner found that Spry refuses to take responsibility for his actions
and blames the victim for his domestic-assault conviction. Substantial evidence supports
the conclusion that Spry’s “extreme minimization and poor insight into [his] own actions
and the effect of [his] actions on other people” call into doubt Spry’s good judgment and
ability to work with vulnerable populations.
The commissioner’s set-aside denial is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Spry was recently convicted of domestic assault by placing the victim in fear of
imminent bodily harm, an offense which carries a presumptive seven-year disqualification
period under the act. Minn. Stat. §§ 245C.15, subd. 4, 609.2242, subd. 1. And following
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his conviction, Spry has repeatedly attempted to minimize the negative impact that his
conduct had on the victim. Spry’s refusal to accept responsibility for his harmful actions
provides substantial support for the commissioner’s decision to deny his reconsideration
request.
To persuade us otherwise, Spry raises three arguments. First, he relies on
Dorsey v. Commissioner of Human Services , for the proposition that the commissioner
failed to meaningfully evaluate all nine risk-of -harm factors. No. A12-0316, 2013 WL
141651 (Minn. App. Jan. 14, 2013). But Dorsey is factually dissimilar to this case. In
Dorsey, this court reversed the commissioner’s decision denying relator’s request for
reconsideration because the commissioner’s findings on the risk-of -harm factors were
“conclusory” and “speculative” and failed to consider evidence of relator’s rehabilitations
efforts. Id. at *3. Unlike Dorsey, the commissioner here engaged with all nine statutory
factors at length and considered Spry’s rehabilitation evidence, including his anger-
management and domestic-violence course completions and his professional crisis-
management training. Spry’s reliance on Dorsey is misguided.
Second, Spry argues that the commissioner erred in stating that Spry’s
disqualification date was July 24, 2024. We agree that the record reflects that Spry was
disqualified on July 24, 2025. However, the commissioner’s misstatement of Spry’s
disqualification date appears to be a harmless clerical error and is immaterial to the
commissioner’s decision to deny Spry’s request for reconsideration. See Minn. R. Civ. P.
61 (requiring that harmless error be ignored); see also Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d
279, 285 (Minn. 2008) (citing this aspect of Minn. R. Civ. P. 61).
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Third, Spry contends that the commissioner erred in relying on factual allegations
made in the criminal complaint because those allegations were “contradicted before trial”
and because Spry “took an Alford plea under duress.”3 This argument fails. Spry submitted
the criminal complaint with his request for reconsideration and does not point to any
authority providing that the commissioner may not consider information submitted by a
disqualified individual in analyzing the risk- of-harm factors. In fact, the act explicitly
requires that the commissioner consider “any . . . information relevant to reconsideration,”
Minn. Stat. § 245C. 22, subd. 4(b)(9), including the “information” the disqualified
individual submitted to show they “do[] not pose a risk of harm,” Minn. Stat. § 245C.21,
subd. 3(a)(3).
In sum, because substantial evidence in the record supports the commissioner’s
decision, we conclude that Spry has not established that a lack of evidentiary support
warrants reversing the commissioner’s decision not to set aside his disqualification. We
therefore conclude that Spry’s argument that the commissioner’s decision was arbitrary
based solely on the lack of sufficient evidentiary support fails for the same reasons.
Affirmed.

3 Nothing in the record supports Spry’s assertion that he entered an Alford plea, in which
“‘an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence’ while not admitting
guilt.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015) (quoting
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970)).