Omar Auquil Muhammad v. State of Minnesota

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1663

Omar Auquil Muhammad, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-17-2274

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kevin Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Assistant
County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Omar Auquil Muhammad appeals the district court’s decision to deny his
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03 motion to correct his sentence. Because we conclude the district

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court did not abuse its discretion when it determined his sentence was authorized by law,
we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts were elicited at a jury trial. C.M. (victim) graduated with a
high-school equivalency when she was 21 years old after completing a special-education
program. Victim lived with her parents until she was around 37 years old. In 2017, victim
was 42 years old and lived alone in a townhome.
That year, Muhammad and victim both worked at a nearby grocery store. The two
began a romantic relationship, and Muhammad moved into victim’s townhome. During
the time they lived together, Muhammad and victim had sexual intercourse. At some point,
victim told Muhammad that she no longer wanted to have sexual intercourse with him .
Muhammad would push, kick, hit, and lay on victim to force her to have vaginal intercourse
with and perform fellatio on him. In May 2017, while at work, victim’s manager noticed
bruising on victim’s arm and called 911. The responding officer observed and documented
multiple bruises on victim’s arms, chest, and back.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Muhammad with first-degree criminal
sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e) (2016) (penetration –
personal injury – force or coercion). The jury found Muhammad guilty. Following
a Blakely trial,1 the jury found the existence of three aggravating factors: particular

1 When departing from the presumptive sentence, “[a] defendant has the right to a jury trial
to determine whether aggravating factors are proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.D.102 (2016); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301
(2004) (stating that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that supports a departure above

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vulnerability, particular cruelty, and multiple forms of penetration. The district court relied
on the jury’s Blakely findings and sentenced Muhammad to 312 months in prison, an
upward durational departure.
On direct appeal, Muhammad challenged his conviction and sentence. See State v.
Muhammad, No. A18-0933, 2019 WL 2332556, *1 (Minn. App. June 3, 2019), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 20, 2019). As relevant here, Muhammad argued the jury’s findings were
inadequate to support particular vulnerability and particular cruelty and that the district
court did not follow the proper procedure for imposing an upward durational departure.
Id. at *5. We concluded the jury’s findings were adequate to support particular cruelty but
not particular vulnerability. Id. at *5-6. Nonetheless, we affirmed Muhammad’s sentence
because the district court properly relied on two aggravating factors that independently
justified the upward departure—particular cruelty and multiple forms of penetration. Id.
at *7.
In June 2025, Muhammad moved to correct his sentence under rule 27.03.
Muhammad argued the district court improperly relied on the particular-cruelty and
multiple-forms-of-penetration aggravating factors because “the facts allegedly supporting
those aggravating factors are elements of the offense.” The district court construed the
motion as a petition for postconviction relief and concluded: (1) the petition was untimely
and Knaffla barred and (2) even if the district court reviewed the issue, the sentence was
authorized by law.

the prescribed statutory maximum “must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt” (quotation omitted)).

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Muhammad appeals.
DECISION
Muhammad raises two arguments on appeal. 2 First, he argues the district court
improperly construed his motion as a postconviction petition. Second, he asserts the
district court abused its discretion when it decided that his sentence was authorized by law.
Assuming without deciding that the district court improperly construed Muhammad’s
motion as a postconviction petition, we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it determined his sentence was authorized by law. See State v. Gutierrez,
667 N.W.2d 426, 439 (Minn. 2003) (declining to address other issues due to resolution of
a dispositive issue); see also Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2016)
(concluding it is improper to construe a rule 27.03 motion as a postconviction petition when
the challenge is to an unauthorized sentence).
We review a district court’s decision to deny a rule 27.03 motion for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Amundson, 828 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. App. 2013). “A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against

2 Muhammad also asserts that the district court erred when it concluded the law-of-the-case
doctrine barred his argument. The law-of-the -case doctrine provides that “when a court
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in
subsequent stages in the same case.” Townsend v. State, 3 N.W.3d 13, 16 (Minn. 2024)
(quotation omitted). The doctrine “bars relitigating an issue resolved earlier in the same
case, even if the issue presented is not precisely the same in all its details.” Id. We agree
with Muhammad that his argument was not barred by the law of the case. While his direct
appeal related to the factual support for the aggravating factors, Muhammad did not make
the specific legal challenge he raises here. Accordingly, while Muhammad’s direct appeal
informs our decision, the district court improperly denied his motion on this basis.

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logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted).
Under rule 27.03, “[t]he court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by
law.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. A sentence is unauthorized if it is “contrary to
law or applicable statutes.” Riley v. State, 26 N.W.3d 594, 602 (Minn. 2025) (quotations
omitted). The sentence must have been unauthorized “at the time it was imposed.” State
v. Meger, 901 N.W.2d 418, 425 (Minn. 2017) (quoting Reynolds, 888 N.W.2d at 133).
“The defendant bears the burden of proving the facts necessary to show that a sentence was
unauthorized.” Hannon v. State, 957 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn. 2021).
Muhammad challenges the district court’s decision to impose an upward durational
departure. A district court can depart from a presumptive sentence under the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines only if the record presents “[s]ubstantial and compelling
circumstances.” State v. McIntosh, 641 N.W.2d 3, 8 (Minn. 2002). Circumstances are
substantial and compelling when they show “that the defendant’s conduct was significantly
more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense in
question.” State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2009). The Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines provide a “nonexclusive list” of aggravating factors that a district
court may use to durationally depart from a presumptive sentence. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.3.b (2016). Here, the district court relied on particular cruelty and multiple
forms of penetration as aggravating factors, which are both established factors to support

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an upward departure.3 See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b(2) (listing “particular cruelty”
as a permissible aggravating factor); Adell, 755 N.W.2d at 774 (providing “multiple forms
of penetration is a valid aggravating factor”).
Muhammad argues the district court imposed an unauthorized sentence because
both reasons for the upward departure were necessarily elements of his offenses. We
review this issue de novo. Dillon v. State, 781 N.W.2d 588, 595 (Minn. App. 2010), rev.
denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). A district court may impose an upward durational departure
if the evidence shows that the defendant committed the offense “in a particularly serious
way.” Ture v. State, 353 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Minn. 1984). But the district court cannot
impose an upward departure if the sentence will punish a defendant twice for the same
conduct. See State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 446 (Minn. 2006). Accordingly, a
“district court may not base an upward departure on facts necessary to prove elements of
the offense being sentenced.” Edwards, 774 N.W.2d at 602; see also State v. Blanche, 696
N.W.2d 351, 378-79 (Minn. 2005) (“The reasons used for departing must not themselves
be elements of the underlying crime.”).
As applicable here, first-degree criminal sexual conduct has four elements: “(1) the
intentional act of sexual penetration, (2) without the consent of the complainant, (3) causing
personal injury to the complainant, and (4) through the use of force or coercion.” State v.

3 Muhammad’s reliance on State v. Thao is misplaced because it involved whether an
unrecognized aggravating factor and other predicate facts justified a departure. See 649
N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2002). Here, both aggravating factors are well established bases for
an upward durational departure. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b(2) (2016); State v.
Adell, 755 N.W.2d 767, 774-75 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2008).

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Epps, 949 N.W.2d 474, 482 (Minn. App. 2020), aff’d, 964 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. 2021); see
also Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e). Muhammad contends that because the jury
necessarily concluded that he penetrated victim and caused victim personal injury, the
district court based the particular cruelty and multiple forms of penetration aggravating
factors upon the same facts necessary to prove the offense. We are not persuaded.
“Personal injury” means “bodily harm as defined in section 609.02, subdivision 7,
or severe mental anguish or pregnancy.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 8 (2016). “Bodily
harm” includes “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2016). The supreme court has concluded that a “minimal
amount of physical pain or injury” satisfies the “bodily harm” definition. State v. Jarvis,
665 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2003) (emphasis added). By contrast, “particular cruelty
involves the gratuitous infliction of pain and cruelty of a kind not usually associated with
the commission of the offense in question,” State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 922 (Minn.
2009) (quotations omitted), and has been applied in first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct
cases related to bodily harm, see, e.g., State v. Yaritz, 791 N.W.2d 138, 144-45 (Minn. App.
2010), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 23, 2011); State v. Grampre, 766 N.W.2d 347, 350-52
(Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 26, 2009). The special verdict form shows
that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Muhammad inflicted more injury than
necessary, caused multiple bruises, and punched and kicked victim multiple times. And
we already concluded in Muhammad’s direct appeal that the jury’s findings were adequate
to support the departure because Muhammad inflicted “more injury than necessary” to

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satisfy the elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. See Muhammad, 2019 WL
2332556, at *5 (quoting State v. Jeno, 352 N.W.2d 82, 85 (Minn. App. 1984)).
As for multiple forms of penetration, the supreme court has repeatedly affirmed that
this aggravating factor is appropriate to consider when sentencing a defendant for a first -
degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. See, e.g., State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257,
270-71 (Minn. 2020); Kilcoyne v. State, 344 N.W.2d 394, 397-98 (Minn. 1984); State v.
Martinez, 319 N.W.2d 699, 700-01 (Minn. 1982); see also Adell, 755 N.W.2d at 774. Here,
the jury found Muhammad penetrated victim’s vagina and her mouth multiple times with
his penis. The record, thus, supports the district court’s determination that the offense
involved facts not necessarily proved for the underlying offense, which required only one
form of sexual penetration.
For these reasons, the district court appropriately denied Muhamma d’s rule 27.03
motion on the basis that his sentence was authorized by law.
Affirmed.