Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1666
Cody J Walker,
Respondent,
vs.
Leah Ann Defoe,
Appellant.
Filed September 14, 2026
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge
Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-FA-24-128
Misty K. Myers, Robinson Duffy, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Leah Ann DeFoe, Keewatin, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Bond ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
Appellant-mother seeks review of a judgment granting respondent-father sole legal
and physical custody with supervised parenting time for appellant. Appellant argues that
the district court made clearly erroneous factual findings and credibility determinations,
erred in its application of the best- interests factors, and erred by awarding her parenting
time that amounts to less than the 25% statutory presumption. We affirm.
2
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s factual findings, the trial testimony
relevant to the issues on appeal, and the procedural history.
Appellant-mother Leah Ann DeFoe and respondent-father Cody J. Walker are the
parents of Z.W., who was born in October 2019. DeFoe and Walker ended their
relationship in August 2023, at which point Z.W. continued to live with Walker when
DeFoe moved out. DeFoe now lives with J.T., her new partner. DeFoe and Z.W. are
enrolled members of the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa.
Z.W. has Down syndrome and receives services on a one-on-one basis because of
his behavioral, health, and educational needs. Z.W. is nonverbal, needs assistance with his
daily needs, and requires a highly structured routine and calm environment.
Walker filed a petition with the district court in January 2024, requesting that the
court (1) adjudicate him as Z.W.’s father, (2) grant him sole legal and physical custody of
Z.W., (3) grant DeFoe supervised parenting time at Walker’s discretion, and (4) grant any
other relief the court deemed just and equitable. DeFoe filed a counterpetition requesting
joint legal and physical custody of Z.W. and parenting time.
After the petitions were filed, DeFoe and Walker began mediation and a temporary
schedule was established in which DeFoe received supervised parenting time with Z.W. in
the afternoons every other weekend. DeFoe was then granted unsupervised parenting time
overnight at her home during the weekends.
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A court trial was held on the petitions in March 2025. Walker testified and presented
exhibits including text messages between him and DeFoe and photos of Z.W. appearing
sick or bruised after returning from DeFoe’s home.
Walker testified that Z.W.’s “safety is . . . a huge priority” for him and that someone
caring for Z.W. “really [has] to keep an eye on him.” Walker described that “it’s very
important for [Z.W.] to be in a structured, safe, compassionate home, because he will get
sick just from stress.” Walker also stated that he is very involved with the services that
Z.W. receives through school, and he meets with the school’s specialists daily. He alleged
that DeFoe had resisted obtaining certain services from a social worker for Z.W.
Walker also spoke of his concerns about DeFoe’s living situation and her ability to
care for Z.W. He stated that DeFoe uses marijuana around Z.W. and was concerned about
the effect it has on her awareness when caring for Z.W. as well as potential exposure to
Z.W. In addition, Walker explained that DeFoe’s partner, J.T., had a criminal history
including assault and possession of controlled substances, and that DeFoe allowed another
individual, R.F., who is a registered predatory offender, to stay at her home. He further
noted that he experienced “some issues” related to domestic violence with DeFoe during
their relationship, including that she threw a remote control at him and used vulgar
language with him.
Walker also described a specific incident that occurred during DeFoe ’s
unsupervised parenting time that led to a child-protective- services report. Walker stated
that, after returning from a weekend with DeFoe, Z.W. would wake up “screaming, shaking
his head no, and doing sign language for ‘all done,’” and Z.W. would be “terrified” each
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time Walker tried to change his diaper. Walker brought him to the hospital where a sexual
abuse nursing examination (SANE) was conducted based on the recommendation of
hospital staff. A report was made with Itasca County Health & Human Services, but it was
screened out for maltreatment.
Before Walker rested his case, he presented additional witness testimony by his
mother, a coworker, Z.W.’s godfather, and R.F.’s former romantic partner. The witnesses
testified that Z.W. is well cared for in Walker’s home.
DeFoe represented herself in the proceedings and introduced a number of exhibits
showing texts between her and Walker, some of which included the two arguing and others
that were just updates about Z.W. On cross-examination, DeFoe stated that she smokes
marijuana daily, but she did not believe it affected her ability to parent. She further testified
that she will “drive while [she’s] high,” including when Z.W. is in her car. With respect to
her living situation, DeFoe stated that J.T.’s criminal history was in the past and “can’t be
used against him,” and that R.F. “[n]ever lived in [her] home” and only stayed over a few
nights.
The district court filed its decision and entered judgment on August 5, 2025. The
court found that “DeFoe uses marijuana on a daily basis” and “will drive while high with
[Z.W.] in the car.” It also noted DeFoe’s testimony that she was “willing to not use, if the
Court ordered her to not use while she is parenting her son.” With respect to DeFoe and
Walker’s relationship, the court found that the two are “argumentative with each other” but
“at times they are able to effectively communicate about [Z.W.].”
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The court concluded that Walker is “presumptively the father of [Z.W.]” Applying
the best-interests factors to determine custody and parenting time, the court determined
that six factors were in favor of Walker, and the remaining six factors favored neither party.
In its analysis, the court expressed doubt about DeFoe’s judgment and her ability to provide
for Z.W.’s needs, particularly given her admission to “driving while high with [Z.W.] in
the vehicle, her association with a predatory offender,” as well as “her disregard of her
current boyfriend’s criminal history.” But the district court also recognized that Z.W.
would still “benefit from having a strong relationship with [DeFoe]” in part because she is
Z.W.’s “connection to his Native American heritage.”
Accordingly, the court concluded that it was in Z.W.’s best interests to award sole
legal and physical custody to Walker, who must “ensure promotion of [Z.W.’s] Native
American culture.” The court also concluded that it was “in [Z.W.’s] best interests to
maintain a highly- structured week” and it was thus “appropriate to limit [ Defoe’s]
parenting time to less than the presumed minimum [25%] to ensure [Z.W.] maintains a
consistently-structured schedule.” The court therefore granted DeFoe supervised parenting
time in the amount of “a minimum of two hours every week,” which could be increased
based on mutual agreement between the parties or become unsupervised at Walker’s
discretion.
DeFoe appeals.
DECISION
DeFoe challenges two main aspects of the district court’s order. First, she argues
that the court’s best-interest analysis contained unsupported factual and credibility findings
6
and erroneous legal conclusions. Second, she argues that the court improperly awarded her
less than the presumed 25% share of parenting time under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(g)
(2024). We address each argument in turn.
I
We first consider DeFoe’s arguments regarding the district court’s application of
the best-interests-of-the-child analysis in reaching its custody determination.
“The guiding principle in all custody cases is the best interests of the child.”
Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Minnesota
Statutes section 518.17 (2024) establishes the 12 best-interests factors relevant to custody
and parenting-time disputes. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd.1(a)(1)-(12). District courts “must
make detailed findings on each of the factors . . . based on the evidence presented and
explain how each factor led to its conclusions.” Id., subd.1(b)(1).
District courts have broad discretion in child custody decisions, Rutten v. Rutten ,
347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984), and there is “scant if any room for an appellate court to
question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.” Vangsness v.
Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000). “Our review is limited to whether
the district court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or
by improperly applying the law.” Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018)
(quotation omitted). We may not reweigh the evidence presented to the district court.
Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). Instead, we defer to the district
court’s credibility determinations and review its factual findings for clear error. Thornton,
933 N.W.2d at 790. Clear error means that the finding is “manifestly contrary to the weight
7
of the evidence as a whole or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”
Kornberg v. Kornberg , 525 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Minn. App. 1994), aff ’d, 542 N.W.2d 379
(Minn. 1996).
We understand DeFoe to challenge three aspects of the district court’s best-interests
analysis. First, she challenges the court’s implicit finding that Walker’s testimony was
credible. Second, she challenges several of the factual findings made by the district court.
And third, she argues that the court legally erred in multiple ways in its application of the
best-interests factors under section 518.17. We now turn to those arguments.
Credibility Determinations
Beginning with the district court’s credibility determinations, DeFoe argues that the
court improperly found Walker “completely credible” and based its findings “almost
solely” on his “uncorroborated” testimony.
We disagree that the court relied on Walker’s testimony alone when making its
findings. There are several examples in the order where the court did not credit his
testimony. For example, the district court did not fully credit Walker’s claim that DeFoe
was abusive towards him based on a lack of sufficient evidence. The court also credited
DeFoe’s assertion that R.F. never lived with her and her description of her marijuana
consumption.
To the extent that the court implicitly credited Walker’s testimony in the remainder
of its findings, the court provided reasonable support for those credibility determinations
by citing specific corroborating details from witness testimony and the evidence submitted.
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Because we detect no clear error here, we defer to the district court’s credibility
determinations. See Thornton, 933 N.W.2d at 790.
Factual Findings
DeFoe next asserts that the district court made factual errors or omissions
throughout its analysis of the 12 best-interest factors, and she provides her own analysis of
each of the 12 factors. Because we may not reweigh the evidence in our review of the
district court’s best-interest analysis, see Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d at 210, we construe her
arguments to be challenging the factual findings that the district court cited in its analysis.
We therefore review the findings that she challenges for clear error. Thornton, 933 N.W.2d
at 790.
DeFoe first challenges the district court’s finding that she “expressed hesitance to
work with a social worker to provide access to more services for [Z.W.].” DeFoe argues
that her hesitation was based on a prior negative experience, and she notes that she later
agreed to the services. But regardless of whether DeFoe later accepted these services, based
on her own admission, she agrees with the district court that she was initially hesitant to
accept them. We understand that she may disagree with the weight that the district court
assigned that fact in its analysis, but this court may not reweigh evidence in that manner.
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. Because the record supports the court’s finding about DeFoe’s
hesitance, we identify no clear error.
Second, DeFoe argues that there is not sufficient evidence to support the district
court’s finding that she “cannot provide the supervision necessary to care for” Z.W. The
court supported that finding with several examples of DeFoe’s parenting-related conduct
9
that it found to be incompatible with caring for a child with Z.W.’s needs, including that
DeFoe uses marijuana daily and drives while high with Z.W. in the car. The court also
discussed Walker’s testimony about Z.W. returning from DeFoe’s home with visible
bruising and appearing unwell , and it noted the photos received into evidence that show
the bruising. These findings are supported by the record, and thus no clear error is apparent.
Third, DeFoe challenges the district court’s findings related to Walker’s sobriety,
arguing that he smoked marijuana “throughout the entirety of our relationship” and that he
had not been recently chemically tested. The court did not make any findings related to
Walker’s alleged marijuana use—the only findings that the court made with respect to
Walker’s substance use is that he “abused alcohol until the fall of 2018.” This finding is
supported by Walker’s testimony, and the record does not contain any evidence of Walker
recently consuming marijuana. This finding is also not clearly erroneous.
And fourth, DeFoe asserts that the district court’s conclusion that she could not
provide ongoing care for Z.W. is not supported by the record because she has maintained
employment, stable housing, and communication about Z.W. since her separation from
Walker. Even assuming those facts are true, the district court’s conclusion was based on
prior conduct that DeFoe testified to at trial, including driving while high with Z.W. in the
car, associating with a predatory offender, and downplaying her partner’s criminal history.
Considering only whether the district court’s findings are supported by the record, as we
must, we again conclude that the court did not clearly err in its findings about DeFoe’s
ability to care for Z.W.
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Legal Arguments
DeFoe next argues that the district court’s order “did not apply the twelve best
interest factors properly according to Minnesota Statute 518.17.” She maintains that the
court made the following legal errors: (1) it did not make detailed findings based on the
evidence; (2) it did not consider that it is in Z.W.’s best interests to promote “safe, stable,
and nurturing relationships with both parents” and that Z.W. would “benefit from having a
relationship with [DeFoe]”; (3) it placed higher significance on other relationships in
Z.W.’s life over her own relationship with him; (4) it should not have considered her use
of marijuana and her relationship with J.T. because neither affects her relationship with
Z.W.; (5) the court neglected to consider that Walker made a false report of child abuse;
and (6) the district court did not apply the rebuttable presumption that joint legal custody
is in the best interests of the child.
We interpret the statutes governing custody and parenting time de novo. Hansen,
908 N.W.2d at 596.
With respect to her first three arguments, the district court’s order meets statutory
requirements. Under section 518.17, subdivision 1(b)(1) through (3), the district court is
required in its best-interests analysis to “make detailed findings on each of the factors,”
consider that it is in a child’s best interests to promote “safe, stable, nurturing relationships
between a child and both parents,” and “recognize that there are many ways that parents
can respond to a child’s needs.” The district court considered and evaluated all twelve best-
interest factors in its order with reference to record evidence. The court specifically noted
in its best-interests analysis that “[Z.W.] would also benefit from having a strong
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relationship with [DeFoe]” because she is his “connection to his Native American
heritage.” And, in addition to his relationships with both parents, the court considered
Z.W.’s other relationships with “significant persons” in his life like his grandmother, as the
best-interests factors require. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(9). We conclude that the
district court’s application of the best -interest factors comports with section 518.17,
subdivision 1(b)(1)-(3).
We also conclude that the district court considered appropriate facts in its analysis.
When applying the best-interests factors, district courts are prohibited from “consider[ing]
conduct of a party that does not affect the party’s relationship with the child.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd.1(b)(4). On this record, the district court properly viewed DeFoe’s
marijuana consumption as relevant to her and Z.W.’s relationship. DeFoe testified that she
drives while high with Z.W. in the car and that she smokes marijuana every day. This
conduct may endanger Z.W., particularly because of the degree of individualized attention
he requires. DeFoe also argues that the court improperly “considered [her] decision to
pursue [her] current relationship as a factor.” We disagree with that characterization of the
court’s order. The district court found that DeFoe’s “disregard of her current boyfriend’s
criminal history” was indicative of DeFoe’s judgment and showed that she lacked the
ability to provide ongoing care for Z.W. The court did not consider her choice of romantic
partner in its analysis but rather considered it as demonstrative of her lack of discernment
and judgment. These facts affect DeFoe’s relationship with Z.W. and were proper for the
district court to consider in its best-interests analysis.
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We also disagree that the district court failed to consider any false reports of child
abuse. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518.17, subd. 1(b)(6) (“The court shall consider evidence of a
violation of section 609.507 in determining the best interests of the child.”), 609.507 (2024)
(criminalizing false reports of child abuse). We understand DeFoe’s argument to relate to
Walker’s request for a SANE of Z.W. after Z.W. returned from an overnight visit with
DeFoe. A report was made at that time to Itasca County, but there is no indication in the
record that Walker knew that his allegations of potential sexual or physical abuse were
unfounded or that he intended to use that report to influence the custody case. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.507 (requiring that the reporter “knows that the allegation is false” and “has the
intent that the information influence a child custody hearing”). Because the record does not
support that a false report occurred, the district court did not legally err in not considering
it.
DeFoe further contends that the district court did not apply the rebuttable
presumption in favor of joint legal custody. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(9) (stating that
a rebuttable presumption exists “that upon request of either or both parties, joint legal
custody is in the best interests of the child”). We conclude that the court implicitly found
the presumption rebutted in its analysis.
Joint legal custody is inappropriate “[w]hen evidence shows that parties . . . are
completely unable to communicate and cooperate.” Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360,
368 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2006). The district court determined
in its best-interests analysis that “[t]he parties have been unwilling to cooperate regarding
parenting time and major decisions regarding [Z.W.]” and, although they “have been able
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to share information about [Z.W.] in the past, . . . there is ample evidence that they become
argumentative.” These findings are supported by the text messages between DeFoe and
Walker admitted at trial, which show argumentative and often negative communication
from both parties. Based on this record evidence, the district court’s finding that Walker
and DeFoe cannot cooperate on parenting time and major decisions about Z.W. is
supported and the presumption of joint legal custody was therefore rebutted.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in its legal analysis under
section 518.17, nor did it clearly err in its factual or credibility findings.
II
DeFoe last argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s
order granting her less parenting time than the 25% share presumed by statute.1
Parenting time is governed by Minnesota Statutes section 518.175 (2024). Under
subdivision 1(a), district courts are directed to “grant such parenting time . . . as will enable
the child and the parent to maintain a child to parent relationship that will be in the best
interests of the child.” But if the court finds that a parent “is likely to endanger the child’s
physical, mental, or emotional health or safety or impair the child’s emotional
development,” the district court may restrict a parent’s allotted time. Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
1 Walker argues that DeFoe failed to preserve this argument for appeal because she did not
raise it before the district court. We disagree. The district court cited the presumption in its
order and made findings showing why it was rebutted. Because the district court considered
the issue, we consider it to be properly before us. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988) (“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record
shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.”
(quotation omitted) (emphasis added)).
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subd. 1(b). “In the absence of other evidence,” district courts must apply a “rebuttable
presumption that a child must receive a minimum of at least 25 percent of the parenting
time with each parent.” Id., subd. 1(g). Parenting-time allocations below the presumptive
25% “can be justified by reasons related to the child’s best interests and considerations of
what is feasible given the circumstances of the parties.” Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d
212, 218 (Minn. App. 2010). An evidentiary presumption may be overcome if sufficient
evidence justifies a finding “contrary to the assumed fact.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We will not reverse the district court’s parenting-time decision absent an abuse of
discretion. Shearer v. Shearer, 891 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn. App. 2017). “Reversible abuses
of discretion include misapplying the law or relying on findings of fact that are not
supported by the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review findings
associated with parenting-time decisions for clear error. Griffin v. Van Griffin, 267 N.W.2d
733, 735 (Minn. 1978).
The district court acknowledged in its order that the 25% presumption exists, but it
found that “it is in [Z.W.’s] best interests to maintain a highly-structured week and ensure
his health and attendance at developmental services.” The court therefore concluded that it
was “appropriate to limit [DeFoe’s] parenting time to less than the presumed minimum to
ensure [Z.W.] maintains a consistently-structured schedule.” This conclusion relates to
Z.W.’s best interests and the feasibility of incorporating more parenting time for DeFoe
into Z.W.’s weekly schedule, which are appropriate justifications for awarding a parenting-
time amount below the 25% presumption. See Hagen, 783 N.W.2d at 218. And the district
court’s conclusion is also supported by record evidence showing that Z.W. thrives on a
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regular schedule and that he requires a multitude of services throughout the week to support
his growth. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
its parenting-time decision.
Affirmed.