Cody Lee, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1667

Cody Lee, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

The Estate of Mark Pasvogel, Jr.,
Respondent,

Mark Elliot Homes,
Respondent,

1 Stop Inc., d/b/a Mark Elliot Homes,
Respondent,

Mike Thomas, et al.,
Respondents,

Nick Reimler,
Respondent,

Malmberg Development Corp. d/b/a RE/MAX Advantage, et al.,
Respondents,

US LBM Operating Co. 3009, LLC, d/b/a Lyman Lumber Co.,
Respondent,

Innovation Painting, Inc.,
Respondent,

Camargo Construction, LLC,
Respondent,

Edgewater Title Group, LLC,
Respondent.

Filed August 3, 2026
2
Affirmed in part, appeal dismissed in part; motions granted
Harris, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CV-24-3392

Carl E. Christensen, Christopher J. Wilcox, Ryan P. Supple, Christensen Sampsel, PLLC,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Thomas J. Lyons, Jr., Consumer Justice Center, P.A., Vadnais Heights, Minnesota (for
appellants)

Kevin F. Gray, Matthew W. Moehrle, Hilary R. Hannon, RGP Law, Ltd., St. Cloud,
Minnesota (for respondent Nick Reimler)

David J. McGee, Natalie R. Walz, McGee Walz, PA , Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondents Malmberg Development Corp. et al.)

Ryan J. Trucke, Craig D. Foss, Brutlag, Trucke & Doherty, P.A., Plymouth, Minnesota
(for respondent US LBM Operating Co.)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and
Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
In this class-action dispute, appellants seek review of the district court’s December
2024 and August 2025 orders compelling and staying arbitration. Appellants argue
that (1) the district court erred in its August 2025 order by granting respondent s’ Lyman
Lumber’s and Edgewater Title Group’s motions to stay arbitration, and (2) this court may
review the district court’s December 2024 order under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate
Procedure 103.04, the inextricably intertwined doctrine, the collateral -order doctrine, and
3
the Eckblad1 analysis. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the part of this appeal seeking
review of the December 2024 order. We conclude that the district court did not err in
staying arbitration in its August 2025 order. But because the December 2024 order
compelling arbitration is not appealable, we dismiss that part of the appeal. Accordingly,
we affirm in part, dismiss in part, and grant respondents’ motions to dismiss.
FACTS
Appellants Cody Lee, et al., are homebuyers who each entered into purchase
agreements with respondent 1 Stop Inc. d/b/a Mark Elliot Homes (MEH) to build new
single-family homes. In August 2024, appellants brought an action against respondents
MEH, the Estate of Mark Pasvogel Jr., Mark Elliot Homes LLC, Mike Thomas, Nick
Reimler, Malmberg Development Corp d/b/a RE/MAX Advantage Plus, Whitney Meester,
Brent Dahl, Eric Malmberg, Nikki Ritter, Anna Dahlby, US LBM Operating Co. 3009 LLC
d/b/a Lyman Lumber Co., Lakes Building Components Inc., Innovation Painting Inc.,
Blackhawk Garage Door LLC, South Suburban Asphalt LLC, Camargo Construction LLC,
and Edgewater Title Group LLC, alleging that they conspired to defraud appellants by
using false representations to induce homebuyers to enter into contracts to purchase new
homes, “failing to perform their obligations under those contracts in a reasonable and
timely manner,” and using fraudulent and deceptive practices to “shake down and coerce
home buyers into paying fabricated price increases.”2

1 See Eckblad v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 371 N.W.2d 78, 80 (Minn. App. 1985).

2 MEH, the Estate of Mark Pasvogel, Jr., Mark Elliot Homes LLC, Mike Thomas, Camargo
Construction LLC, Edgewater Title Group, and Innovation Painting Inc. did not participate
4
In November 2024, respondents Nick Reimler and Malmberg Development Corp.
d/b/a RE/MAX Advantage Plus (RE/MAX)3 filed motions to stay litigation and compel
arbitration. At the motion hearing, appellants argued that Reimler and RE/MAX could not
compel arbitration because they were not signatories to the original purchase agreements.
Appellants asserted that the arbitration clauses, which are governed by the American
Arbitration Association Home Construction Arbitration Rules, stated that the rules “shall
only apply to two party cases involving a homeowner and a home builder.” RE/MAX
argued that the arbitration clause also contemplated adding third parties, “including without
limitation any consultant, contractor, subcontractor, supplier, engineer, architect, or design
professional wh[ose] work[] or service relates to any matters in the dispute.” It asserted
that it could compel arbitration as third-party “consultants.” Reimler argued that while he
was not a signatory to the purchase agreement, he could also compel arbitration because
he was acting as an agent or representative of MEH.
In December 2024, the district court granted Reimler’s and RE/MAX’s motions to
stay litigation and compel arbitration. The district court concluded that because the
respondents were acting on behalf of MEH in furtherance of the purchase agreements, they
were entitled to enforce the arbitration clause, despite not being signatories to the purchase

in this appeal. Additionally, Lakes Building Components Inc., Blackhawk Garage Door
LLC, and South Suburban Asphalt LLC were dismissed from the underlying action.

3 Appellants also name several real estate agents in the amended class action complaint.
The agents are all employed by Malmberg Development Corp. d/b/a RE/MAX Advantage
Plus and are represented by the same attorneys in this case. We collectively refer to
Malmberg Development Corp. and its agents as RE/MAX.
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agreements. Notably, the order erroneously stated that all the respondents, apart from
Edgewater Title Group, brought a motion to compel arbitration when only Reimler and
RE/MAX brought forth motions.
In March 2025, Lyman Lumber, a supplier of lumber and building materials, filed
a letter with the district court opposing the arbitration order. Lyman Lumber pointed out
that Reimler and RE/MAX were the only respondents who brought motions to compel
arbitration, and that it was being forced to participate in arbitration proceedings it never
requested. Lyman Lumber argued that it should not be named as a responding party in the
arbitration proceedings and requested a corrective order stating that the arbitration order
applies only to the appellants, Reimler and RE/MAX. Respondent Edgewater Title Group
filed a similar letter, stating that it never filed a motion to compel arbitration.
Both Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group filed separate motions to stay the
arbitration proceedings . Appellants filed a responsive memorandum opposing the stay
motions, arguing that the stay would force appellants to prosecute their claims involving
the same facts in two separate proceedings. In August 2025, the district court issued an
order staying arbitration proceedings against Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group.
It concluded that it did not need to reach the issue of whether Lyman Lumber and
Edgewater Title Group were agents of MEH because its December 2024 order pertained
only “to th[e] entities that requested arbitration,” and that Lyman Lumber and Edgewater
Title Group would not be compelled because they never requested arbitration. Appellants
appealed from both the December 2024 and August 2025 orders.
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In November 2025, Reimler and RE/MAX filed separate motions with this court,
requesting dismissal of the part of appellants’ appeal challenging the December 2024 order.
Reimler and RE/MAX each argued that the December 2024 order compelling arbitration
was not independently appealable. Appellants conceded that the December 2024 order was
not independently appealable but argued that review of the December 2024 order was
warranted under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.04, which allows this
court to review “any order affecting the order from which the appeal is taken.” A special-
term panel of this court deferred Reimler’s and RE/MAX’s motions to dismiss, concluding
that a merits panel of this court would be in a better position to determine whether the
December 2024 order affected the August 2025 order and whether it would be appropriate
to review the December 2024 order.
DECISION
This appeal requires us to address two related issues arising from the district court’s
orders concerning arbitration. We first consider whether the district court erred in its
August 2025 order granting Lyman Lumber’s and Edgewater Title Group’s motions to stay
arbitration after concluding that neither party had moved to compel arbitration. We next
consider whether appellants’ challenges to the district court ’s December 2024 order
compelling arbitration are properly before this court. In doing so, we determine whether
any exception permits appellate review of that otherwise nonappealable order.

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I. The district court did not err in its August 2025 order granting Lyman
Lumber’s and Edgewater Title Group’s motions to stay arbitration.4

We begin with the narrow question of whether the district court erred in determining
that Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group were entitled to a stay of arbitration. As
an initial matter, most of appellants’ arguments attack the December 2024 order.
Appellants do not make a specific request to reverse the August 2025 order staying
arbitration against Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group.
This court reviews a district court ’s decision to stay arbitration de novo. Local
No. 1119, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO v. Mesabi Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
463 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. App. 1990). However, factual questions are reviewed for
clear error. See Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Digit. Corp., 854 N.W.2d. 750, 757 (Minn.
2014). In conducting a clear-error review, “we examine the record to see if there is
reasonable evidence in the record to support the [district] court’s findings.” Rasmussen v.
Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013). A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when it is either “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963
N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
In its August 2025 order, the district court granted Lyman Lumber’s and Edgewater
Title Group’s motions to stay arbitration. The relevant portion of the August 2025 order
states:

4 The parties agree that the August 2025 order staying arbitration is immediately appealable
under Minnesota Statutes section 572B.28(a)(2) (2024).
8
The Court’s Order filed December 13, 2024, was clearly
regarding those Defendants that have requested arbitration in
this case. Edgewater and Lyman did not request arbitration.
The Court’s Order specifically was regarding Defendants’
requests to stay the litigation in this matter and compel the
parties to refer this matter to arbitration. There was no request
by Edgewater and Lyman to compel arbitration, and the terms
of the December 13, 2024 Order do not pertain to them. In
addition, the Court does not need to even reach the issue of
whether Edgewater and/or Lyman could be construed as
“agents” of Mark Elliot Homes subject to the contract
agreements between Plaintiffs and Mark Elliot Homes because
the Court’s Order was pertaining only to those entities that
requested arbitration. Again, Defendants Edgewater and
Lyman never requested arbitration, were not subject to the
motion to arbitrate, and the Court will not force them into
arbitration.

The district court’s August 2025 order is supported by the record. It is undisputed
that only Reimler and RE/MAX moved to compel arbitration. Likewise, appellants do not
dispute that neither Lyman Lumber nor Edgewater Title Group filed a motion seeking to
compel arbitration. Edgewater Title Group expressly stated in its memorandum in response
to RE/MAX’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings that it took no position
on RE/MAX’s motion to compel arbitration.
Appellants contend that the district court improperly altered its legal analysis
concerning its agency determination in the August 2025 order. We disagree. In its
December 2024 order, the district court determined that Reimler and RE/MAX were agents
of MEH and therefore could enforce the arbitration clause. The August 2025 order did not
revisit, modify, or reject the district court’ s earlier agency analysis. Instead, the district
court clarified that its December 2024 order “was clearly regarding those Defendants that
have requested arbitration in this case” and that “Edgewater and Lyman did not request
9
arbitration.” The district court explained that its earlier order addressed only the motions
filed by Reimler and RE/MAX to stay the litigation and compel arbitration, and because
“there was no request by Edgewater and Lyman to compel arbitration, . . . the terms of the
December 13, 2024 Order do not pertain to them.” Consistent with that clarification, the
district court further explained that it “does not need to even reach the issue of whether
Edgewater and/or Lyman could be construed as ‘agents’” of MEH because the December
2024 order pertained only to the parties that affirmatively sought arbitration. The district
court reiterated that “Edgewater and Lyman never requested arbitration, were not subject
to the motion to arbitrate, and the Court will not force them into arbitration.” The August
2025 order did not alter the district court’s prior legal analysis. It merely clarified that the
agency issue was immaterial as to parties that never sought to compel arbitration in the first
instance.
Accordingly, the record supports the district court’ s determination that the
December 2024 order applied only to those defendants that affirmatively sought to compel
arbitration. Because Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group never moved to compel
arbitration, the district court properly concluded that they were not subject to that order and
could not be compelled to arbitrate based on a motion they never filed. A ppellants have
not demonstrated that those findings are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err in granting Lyman Lumber’s
and Edgewater Title Group’s motions to stay arbitration.

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II. The December 2024 order is not within the scope of our review.

Appellants concede that the December 2024 order compelling arbitration is not
independently appealable. See City of Rochester v. Kottschade, 896 N.W.2d 541, 546
(Minn. 2017) (stating that “we have declined to review orders that compel arbitration”).
Rather, appellants argue that the order is within the scope of this court’s review under four
exceptions: (1) Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.04; (2) the inextricably
intertwined doctrine; (3) the collateral-order doctrine; and (4) the Eckblad analysis. We
address each argument in turn.
A. Rule 103.04

Appellants first argue that the December 2024 order is within the scope of our
review5 under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.04.
Rule 103.04 provides: “On appeal from or review of an order the appellate courts
may review any order affecting the order from which the appeal is taken.” Rule 103.04
also allows this court to “review any other matter as the interest of justice may require.”
See Doe 175 ex rel. Doe 175 v. Columbia Heights Sch. Dist., ISD No. 13, 842 N.W.2d 38,
46 (Minn. App. 2014) (stating that “if appellate review already is established, the interest-

5 In their principal brief, appellants argue that the December 2024 order is “appealable”
under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.04. Appellants conflate
“appealability” and “reviewability.” Appealability and reviewability are two distinct
concepts under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Rule 103.03 provides
that “[a]n appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals” from certain appealable judgments
and orders. In contrast, Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.04 governs
which decisions can be reviewed by an appellate court upon bringing a proper appeal.
11
of-justice provision of rule 103.04 may expand the scope of appellate review to additional
issues”).
Appellants contend that the December 2024 order affects the August 2025 order
because “[t]he December 2024 order conclusively determined the question of agency for
all Defendants.” Appellants assert that review of the district court’s agency determination
is necessary to establish whether the district court correctly stayed arbitration as it relates
to Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group. We disagree.
Prior to the December 2024 order, Reimler and RE/MAX brought separate motions
to stay litigation and compel arbitration. Following a motion hearing, the district court
considered whether Reimler and RE/MAX, non-signatories to the purchase agreements,
had a right to compel arbitration. The district court granted the motions in its December
2024 order. But the court erroneously stated that all respondents moved to compel
arbitration, when only Reimler and RE/MAX filed motions. It concluded that “under
principles of agency and related doctrines, because the remaining Defendants were
allegedly acting on behalf of MEH in furtherance of the Purchase Agreements, the
remaining Defendants are entitled to enforce the arbitration clauses.” The district court
later clarified in its August 2025 order that the December 2024 order “pertain[ed] only to
those entities that requested arbitration”—Reimler and RE/MAX. It further noted that the
December 2024 order was not binding on Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group
because they never requested that the district court compel arbitration.
It is clear from the district court’s August 2025 order that the only parties bound by
the district court’s agency determinations were the entities that requested arbitration.
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Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group did not request that the district court compel
arbitration. Therefore, Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group were never “bound” as
agents of MEH.
Accordingly, because the December 2024 order does not “affect [] the order from
which the appeal is taken,” the December 2024 order is not within the scope of our review
under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.04.
B. Inextricably Intertwined Doctrine
Appellants next argue that the December 2024 order presents issues that are
inextricably intertwined with the August 2025 order, which is properly before us on appeal.
Because the Minnesota Supreme Court has previously applied federal caselaw to
interpret the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, we rely on that body of caselaw
to decide the issue before us. Aon Corp. v. Haskins, 817 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. App.
2012). The United States Supreme Court has held that appellate courts should not accept
review of additional issues “unless the additional issues are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
the issues properly raised” on appeal. Id. (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty Comm’n, 514
U.S. 35, 51 (1995)). An issue is “inextricably intertwined” with an issue properly raised
on appeal “when the appellate resolution of the collateral appeal necessarily resolves the
pendent claim as well, and only if the pendent claim is coterminous with, or subsumed in,
the claim before the court on interlocutory appeal.” Id. at 741-42 (quotations omitted).
Appellants contend that the December 2024 order is inextricably intertwined with
the August 2025 order because it conclusively established an agency relationship among
all respondents, including Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group. Respondents argue
13
that the orders are not inextricably intertwined because the August 2025 order did not
address the courts prior agency determination and does not resolve the issues raised during
the December 2024 order. We agree with respondents.
The issue raised in the December 2024 order was whether Reimler and RE/MAX
could compel arbitration as non-signatories to the purchase agreements between appellants
and MEH. The district court granted Reimler and RE/MAX’s motions to stay litigation
and compel arbitration on the ground that Reimler and RE/MAX “allegedly act[ed] on
behalf of MEH in furtherance of the Purchase Agreements.” The issue raised in the August
2025 order was whether Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group may be forced into
arbitration when they never requested that the district court compel arbitration. The issue
presented by Lyman Lumber and Edgewater Title Group does not necessarily involve the
issues presented by Reimler and RE/MAX in the December 2024 order. Nor is the
December 2024 “coterminous with, or subsumed in” the issues raised in the August 2025
order. Id. at 742. Thus, the December 2024 and August 2025 orders are not inextricably
intertwined.
C. Collateral-Order Doctrine
Appellants argue that the December 2024 order is reviewable under the collateral-
order doctrine. Respondents argue that the collateral-order doctrine does not apply because
an order compelling arbitration is reviewable when an appeal can be taken from the final
judgment entered on the arbitration award.
The Minnesota Supreme Court previously adopted the collateral-order doctrine “as
a clear analytical framework to assess the immediate appealability of an order or judgment
14
not specifically identified in the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.” Kastner v. Star
Trails Ass’n, 646 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Minn. 2002). “For the collateral order doctrine to
apply, the order at issue must (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve
an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. The parties only contest the third
element—whether an order compelling arbitration is reviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.
“Under the third requirement, we must determine whether the right asserted is
‘adequately vindicable’ or ‘effectively reviewable’ after final judgment.” McCullough &
Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights, 883 N.W.2d 580, 587 (Minn. 2016). “The focus is
on the substance of the rights entailed, rather than the advantage to a litigant in winning his
or her claim sooner.” Id. (quotation omitted). “An order compelling arbitration is not
appealable because it is not a final order.” Eckblad, 371 N.W.2d 80. But “appellate review
of the district court’s arbitrability determination is available once final judgment is entered
on an order.” Kottschade, 896 N.W.2d at 548 n.4; see also Minn. Stat. § 572B.28(a)(3), (6)
(2024) (stating that an appeal may be taken from “an order confirming or denying
confirmation of an award,” or “a final judgment”).
Appellants assert that “the December 2024 order is ‘effectively unreviewable’ on
appeal from a final judgment because it evades an effective remedy.” Specifically,
appellants argue that “[i]f arbitration were to proceed without two necessary parties, review
of the final award and judgment would be ineffective because the review “could not remedy
15
the systemic fragmentation” and would produce inconsistent results. We are not
convinced.
Although the district court’s December 2024 order compelling arbitration is not
immediately appealable, appellate review would be available upon a final judgment. And
while appellants would certainly benefit by litigating its claims in one proceeding, the third
element does not hinge on “the advantage to a litigant in winning his or her claim sooner.”
McCullough, 883 N.W.2d at 587. Because the December 2024 order is reviewable on
appeal from a final judgment, appellants have not satisfied the third element.
Therefore, this court may not expand its scope of review of the December 2024
order under the collateral-order doctrine.
D. The Eckblad Analysis
Appellants lastly argue that the December 2024 order is appealable under the
Eckblad analysis.
In Eckblad, the appellant sought to compel arbitration against two uninsured
motorist insurers. 371 N.W.2d at 79. While the motion to compel arbitration was pending,
one of the insurers filed an answer, asking the district court to interpret the insurance
policies. Id. at 80. We reasoned that because the insurer “went beyond the question of
coverage and asked the [district] court to interpret the policies,” the district court and the
parties treated the matter as a declaratory judgment action instead of an action to compel
arbitration. Id. We further concluded that “because this action determined the parties’
rights and liabilities under the insurance policies, it is a final judgment from which this
appeal is properly taken.” Id.
16
Appellants argue that, under Eckblad, an order compelling arbitration “becomes
appealable when it goes beyond the question of arbitrability and determines the parties’
rights.” Under this interpretation, appellants argue that the district court went beyond the
question of whether valid arbitration agreements existed between appellants and MEH by
making agency determinations on behalf of all the respondents. Appellants assert that “this
transformed the proceeding from a non-appealable arbitration matter into substantive
determinations of contractual rights.” We conclude that appellants’ reliance on Eckblad is
misplaced.
Eckblad is distinguishable. Unlike the case before us, the court in Eckblad did not
issue an order compelling arbitration. Eckblad filed a motion to compel arbitration, which
was pending. Id. While Eckblad initially sought to compel arbitration, the district court
and the parties ended up treating the matter as a declaratory judgment action after the
insurer asked the district court to clarify the parties’ rights and liabilities under the
insurance policies. Id . Here, i n the December 2024 order, the district court granted
Reimler’s and RE/MAX’s motions to stay litigation and compel arbitration. There is no
evidence in the record indicating that the district court treated the matter as anything other
than a motion to compel. And orders compelling arbitration are not independently
appealable. Fedie v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 631 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Minn. App. 2001) (“No
statute or case law makes an order to compel arbitration appealable.”) , rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 16, 2001).
17
The appropriate result when an appellant files a notice of appeal from an
unappealable order is dismissal of the appeal. Aon Corp, 817 N.W.2d at 742 (dismissing
an appeal from an unappealable order).
In sum, appellants have not established a basis for appellate review of the district
court’s December 2024 order compelling arbitration. The order does not fall within the
scope of review authorized by rule 103.04, is not inextricably intertwined with the August
2025 order, does not satisfy the collateral-order doctrine, and is not appealable under
Eckblad. Because the December 2024 order remains an unappealable order compelling
arbitration, and appellants have not demonstrated grounds for us to review the order, their
challenges to that order are outside the scope of our review in this appeal. Accordingly,
we dismiss the part of this appeal challenging the district court’s December 2024 order
compelling arbitration.
Affirmed in part, appeal dismissed in part; motions granted.