In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: B.N. and R.H., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1671

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of:
B.N. and R.H., Parents.

Filed May 26, 2026
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge*

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-JV-25-118

Tyler Z. Hedin, Tyler Z. Hedin Law Office, LLC, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant-mother
B.N.)

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Sara Jankofsky, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County Health and Human Services)

Elisa Beyer, Duluth, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Beane, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Brianna Nelson (mother) appeals the termination of parental rights to her
minor child, K.W.N. She argues that the record does not support the district court’s
determinations that: (1) she is an unfit parent; (2) she failed to satisfy the duties of the

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
parent-child relationship; (3) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family; (4) it
is in the child’s best interests to terminate her parental rights; and (5) the child is neglected
and in foster care. Mother also challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to vacate
the default termination of her parental rights. We affirm.
FACTS
The child was born in 2015 with a rare genetic condition and has significant medical
needs.1 The child’s father does not have a relationship with the child. He pays child support,
but otherwise has not participated in, and is not interested in participating in, the child’s
care. In 2016, mother was awarded sole physical and sole legal custody of the child. In
2016 and 2022, mother and the child received voluntary child-protection and case-
management services to assist with the child’s physical, speech, and occupational therapies
and transportation. Mother often missed or at the last minute canceled the child’s medical
appointments, including needed surgeries. The child missed at least two months of school
during the 2023 school year. The child’s doctor expressed concerns about the child’s
medical care to the child’s social worker, noting 19 missed or canceled high-priority
appointments in 2023. And the doctor noted that the child had not been attending physical
therapy and mother had reported that the child had been off all his prescribed medications
for three to four months because no refills remained due to his missed appointments.

1 We draw some of these background facts from the petition for termination of parental
rights to provide more context beyond the district court’s factual findings. To the extent
that we do so, these facts are not disputed by the parties.
3
In October 2023, St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services Department
(the department) filed a Child in Need of Protection (CHIPS) petition. Mother retained
custody of the child, subject to protective supervision of the department. The social worker
assigned to the case submitted regular reports to the juvenile court outlining the child’s
school attendance, mother’s follow-through on medical appointments, and other relevant
details. The child’s school attendance improved, and he attended medical appointments
more often, though some appointments were still canceled or missed. The social worker
was concerned that mother had an active substance abuse problem that was not being
addressed and mother refused to provide random urine analyses (UAs) for social services.
According to the petition for termination of parental rights, in early 2024, the child’s
social worker submitted a report that explained that mother was arrested on an outstanding
warrant for failure to appear on domestic abuse charges. Additionally, the report noted that
though mother had been getting the child to school and appointments “there were concerns
that [mother] would not be doing so if the social worker and Guardian ad Litem were not
in constant contact with [mother] to repeatedly remind her of appointments.” The report
stated that the social worker “observed [mother] to struggle with processing information,
with things needing to be repeated for her several times and her still struggling to grasp
what needed to be done.”
At a pre -trial hearing, mother entered a limited admission to the petition, and the
child was adjudicated in need of protection or services. Mother was ordered to comply with
a plan that required her to:
4
(a) set up all recommended medical appointments for [the
child]; (b) transport and attend all medical appointments for
[the child] ; (c) follow recommendations of all medical
personnel regarding care for [the child]; (d) ensure [the child]
gets to school every day when school is in session; (e) remain
sober and free from any mood-altering chemicals and
demonstrate this by submitting to requested UAs at either
Bethel or Essentia Health; (f) if UAs are positive for substances
other than what she is prescribed, she will submit to a
comprehensive assessment and follow all recommendations;
(g) follow the treatment plan from ClearPath; (h) participate in
a diagnostic/psychological assessment if deemed necessary by
providers and/or professionals; (i) follow all recommendations
of diagnostic/psychological assessment; and, (j) cooperate
with Social Services and the Guardian ad Litem by allowing
them in the home when requested, signing releases when
needed, and keeping them updated regarding any change in
phone number or address.

In July, 2024, the social worker submitted a report noting concerns about mother’s
lack of communication, ability to meet the child’s needs, failure to appear for criminal
matters, and refusal to submit to UAs. Custody of the child was granted to the department
for out-of-home placement. Subsequently, m other was discharged from several treatment
facilities and aftercare programs because of being uncooperative in her treatment. She
completed a couple of comprehensive evaluations but had minimal engagement with
aftercare. Mother refused drug testing for social services, though she submitted UAs to her
probation officer related to a DWI charge; and the previous five UAs had been clean. In
the time that the department had custody of the child, mother had not attended
approximately 90 percent of the child’s appointments.
5
After about eleven months, the department filed a petition seeking termination of
mother’s parental rights (TPR). The district court held a pre-trial hearing, for which mother
failed to appear,2 and the department proceeded by default.
At the hearing, the social worker testified that the child had made progress since
being placed in foster care. For example, his mobility had greatly increased, his liver
enzymes had “drastically reduced,” he had lost around 50 pounds, and had gotten glasses
and was no longer “squinting all the time.” The social worker also testified that, “we are
realizing, even though he is nonverbal, how smart he actually is academically in school.
He communicates through an iPad. He is not the kid I knew a year and a half ago. It is
really very cool to see how well he is doing now.” The social worker also described the
efforts made to assist mother, including offers of transportation, phones, referrals for
services, and coordination with probation and treatment providers, but stated that mother
had not utilized those services. The social worker stated that she did not believe that mother
had made the changes necessary to address the reasons that led to the child’s out-of-home
placement and she believed that the child would not be safe if returned to his mother,
ultimately stating that she believed it is in the child’s best interest for mother’s parental
rights to be terminated.
The child’s Guardian ad Litem testified that the child was “extremely medically
neglected” in his mother’s care, “so much so that I don’t think we realized it until he was
placed in foster care and saw the vast improvement in [the child’s] physical health and his

2 Mother’s attorney was present.
6
mental health and his emotional health.” The Guardian ad Litem stated that termination of
mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests, noting that she believes that the child
would be unsafe in mother’s care based on the child’s multiple medical appointments each
week and his need for “a caregiver that’s paying attention to what’s going on with his
health.”
The district court found that “[t]he conditions that led to the child’s placement have
not been corrected” and that “mother has failed to establish sobriety, demonstrate stability,
or demonstrate that she is able to meet the significant needs of her son.” The court further
found that the department had made reasonable reunification efforts. The court concluded
that the balance of the interests of the child and the parents “overwhelmingly favors
termination.” The district court granted mother’s attorney’s request that the district court
leave the record open for one day to allow mother to voluntarily terminate her parental
rights. Mother did not appear the next day; and the court filed an order involuntarily
terminating mother’s parental rights to the child and voluntarily terminating father’s
parental rights.
Mother subsequently moved for an order vacating entry of default regarding
termination of her parental rights with an accompanying affidavit. In the affidavit, mother
stated that on the date of the hearing, she was:
very ill suffering from withdrawals of [her] prescribed
medication gabapentin. [She] was not thinking clearly,
regularly vomiting, and eventually went to the hospital. . . . As
of September 10, [she] had been at a treatment facility, Fresh
Start, for approximately 5 or 6 days, and there was an issue
between pharmacies/doctors to refill [her] prescription for
7
gabapentin, which resulted in [her] suffering significant
withdrawal symptoms.

The district court denied mother’s motion to vacate the default termination of mother’s
parental rights. The district court noted that mother “failed to produce any evidence that
she has a reasonable defense on the merits of the case, because her motion does not even
discuss the allegations in the Petition.” Additionally, in response to mother’s explanation
for her failure to appear at the hearing, the court noted:
[Mother] has not demonstrated that she had a reasonable
excuse for her failure to appear at the September 10 hearing.
She had actual notice of the hearing, and she was personally
responsible for ensuring her appearance. [Mother]’s factual
claims regarding the reason for her absence are completely
unsupported by the record. But, even assuming [mother]’s
factual claims are true, her failure to proactively communicate
her absence with the Agency, the Staff at Fresh Start, and her
attorney render her excuse unreasonable. . . . Finally, if the
Court were to grant [mother]’s motion and vacate the
termination order, the parties, especially [the child], would
suffer substantial prejudice, because it would further delay
permanency. This case was already well over statutory
timelines when [mother]’s rights were terminated. Vacation of
the final order would further delay permanency by preventing
the Agency from searching for an adoptive home for [the
child].

Mother appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by terminating mother’s parental
rights.

“On review of an order terminating parental rights, this court determines whether
the trial court’s findings address the statutory criteria, are supported by substantial
evidence, and whether they are clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d
8
170, 176-77 (Minn. App. 1997). “We inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to
determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing.” In re Welfare of W.L.P., 678
N.W.2d 703, 709 (Minn. App. 2004). “While we defer to the trial court’s findings, we are
required to exercise great caution in proceedings to terminate parental rights. Indeed,
parental rights may be terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1 (2024), outlines the criteria for
termination of parental rights. A juvenile court may terminate all rights of a parent to a
child if it finds that one or more of the eight conditions enumerated in the statute exist.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b). The conditions relevant here are:
(2) that the parent has substantially, continuously, or
repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon that parent by the parent and child relationship,
including but not limited to providing the child with necessary
food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development, if the parent is physically and financially
able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency
have failed to correct the conditions that formed the basis of
the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore
unreasonable;

(3) that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent and child relationship because of a consistent pattern of
specific conduct before the child or of specific conditions
directly relating to the parent and child relationship either of
which are determined by the court to be of a duration or nature
that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable
future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child. . . .

9
(4) that following the child’s placement out of the home,
reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed
to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement.

. . . .

(5) that a child has experienced egregious harm in the
parent’s care that is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that
indicates a lack of regard for the child’s well- being, such that
a reasonable person would believe it contrary to the best
interests of the child or of any child to be in the parent’s care;

. . . .

(7) that the child is neglected and in foster care.

Id. We review the “determination of whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily
terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children
of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “In
any proceeding under [section 260C.301], the best interests of the child must be the
paramount consideration . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2024).
Mother contends that she missed the pretrial hearing because of illness and chemical
addiction issues, and that she engaged with the case “to the best of her ability” and “was
prepared to proceed to Court Trial on the merits of the Petition to Terminate Parental
Rights.” The department argues that mother’s pattern of failing to bring the child to medical
appointments to meet his medical needs constitutes repeated medical neglect and that
mother failed to demonstrate sobriety and successfully complete chemical dependency
treatment. The department also contends that testimony from the social worker and
Guardian ad Litem provided “ample support” to support the district court’s determination.
10
Mother’s first argument focuses on why she missed the pretrial hearing and does
not argue that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that multiple
statutory factors for termination of parental rights were met. The department’s brief
accurately notes that mother “wholly fails to assert that she has demonstrated an ability to
meet [the child’s] very high needs or that she complied with her court-ordered reunification
plan.” But in other sections of her brief, mother advances arguments that are relevant to
the section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b), considerations outlined above. These arguments
include whether the department made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, whether the
child was “neglected and in foster care,” and whether the child’s placement outside of her
care is in his best interests. Because these arguments are all relevant to whether the district
court abused its discretion by terminating mother’s parental rights, we address them in one
section below. We also note that mother fails to cite the record to support her arguments. 3
A. The department made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
Minnesota Statutes section 260.012(h) (2024) provides that in proceedings under
section 260C.301, the juvenile court “shall make findings and conclusions as to the
provision of reasonable efforts.” In doing so, courts must consider

3 Indeed, Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 128.02, subdivision 1(c), requires
that in formal briefs, “[e]ach statement of a material fact shall be accompanied by a
reference to the record.” A failure to cite to the record violates rule 128.03 and “[a] flagrant
violation of the rules to fail to provide citations to the record may lead to non-consideration
of an issue or dismissal of an appeal.” Brett v. Watts, 601 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. App.
1999) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1999). Although we do not
conclude that mother’s failures to cite to the record are flagrant, the failure to comply with
the rules diminishes the persuasiveness of her brief. See id. (noting that a party’s failure to
comply with procedural rules can “diminish a brief’s persuasiveness”).
11
whether services to the child and family were: (1) selected in
collaboration with the child’s family and, if appropriate, the
child; (2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and
child’s family; (3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well-
being of the child; (4) adequate to meet the individualized
needs of the child and family; (5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible; (7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h).
“‘Reasonable efforts’ at rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of
form so as to include real, genuine assistance. The quality and quantity of efforts to
rehabilitate and reunify the family impact the reasonableness of those efforts.”
In re Welfare of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted),
rev. denied (Mar. 28, 2007).
Mother cites the definition for “reasonable efforts to finalize a permanent plan for
the child” found in section 260.012(e)(2), but that definition is inapplicable here because
the definition relevant to proceedings under section 260C.301 is described in section
260.012(h). Mother also cites an earlier version of the statute that does not include the first
and second factors. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020).
Mother argues that social services “did not create a plan that was specific to the
needs necessary for [her] to succeed,” and did not support her along the way. Mother argues
that social services could and should have done more to ensure a treatment placement that
fit her needs. Mother does not otherwise specify what those efforts should have been or
identify how the plan was not specific enough to her needs, nor does she cite any relevant
case law explaining how the efforts made here are not reasonable efforts.
12
The department responds that it offered “transportation, phones, numerous referrals
for services, coordination with probation and various chemical dependency treatment
providers, random drug testing, coordination for [the child’s] medical appointments and
care, and [Community Access for Disability Inclusion] level foster care.” The department
contends that these were “significant, numerous, tailored, and appropriate reasonable
efforts.” The district court noted that:
[The department] and other providers have made reasonable
reunification efforts through the provision or offer of services
to the parents, and the parents had the ability to use the offered
services. The services offered by the [department] have been
selected in collaboration with the child’s family and, if
appropriate, the child, tailored to the individualized needs of
the child and child’s family; relevant to the safety, protection
and well-being of the child adequate to meet the needs of the
child and fa mily, culturally appropriate, available, and
accessible, consistent and timely, and realistic under the
circumstances. Given the many rehabilitative efforts made by
Social Services and ordered by the Juvenile Court, there are no
additional services or programs which would likely enable
either of the parents to assume custody of the child in the
foreseeable future.

When reviewing a district court’s ruling regarding whether the county made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate a parent and reunite a family, we apply a clear-error
standard of review to the district court’s findings of underlying facts related to what efforts
the county made. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321-23 (Minn.
App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015); J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 899-902. But we
review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s ruling regarding whether efforts it
found the county to have made were, in a particular case, reasonable. See D.L.D., 865
N.W.2d at 321-23 (citing J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 900-01).
13
It is somewhat unclear from the record what support the department provided or
attempted to provide after the child was placed in the county’s custody, however, mother
does not identify a service that she needed that was excluded from her case plan or explain
what was needed to further tailor the plan to her specific needs. Mother does not identify
any of the statutory factors that she believes are deficient (under either the current or the
2020 version of the statute). The record supports that the department offered “real, genuine
assistance” over an extended time. See S.W., 727 N.W.2d at 150. Mother has not adequately
identified any deficiencies in this assistance, and accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify
the family.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the child was
neglected and in foster care.

We now turn to mother’s argument that the child is not “neglected and in foster
care.” Along with section 260C.301, two additional statutes are relevant to determine
whether a child is “neglected and in foster care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301. Minnesota
Statutes section 260C.007, subdivision 24 (2024), defines a child who is “neglected and in
foster care” as a child:
(1) who has been placed in foster care by court order;
and
(2) whose parents’ circumstances, condition, or conduct
are such that the child cannot be returned to them; and
(3) whose parents, despite the availability of needed
rehabilitative services, have failed to make reasonable efforts
to adjust their circumstances, condition or conduct, or have
willfully failed to meet reasonable expectations with regard to
visiting the child or providing financial support for the child.

14
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.163, subdivision 9 (2024), provides factors that courts
must consider, “among other factors,” to determine whether a child is neglected and in
foster care:
(1) the length of time the child has been in foster care;

(2) the effort the parent has made to adjust circumstances,
conduct, or conditions that necessitate the removal of the child
to make it in the child’s best interests to be returned to the
parent’s home in the foreseeable future, including the use of
rehabilitative services offered to the parent;

(3) whether the parent has visited the child within the three
months preceding the filing of the petition, unless extreme
financial or physical hardship or treatment for mental disability
or chemical dependency or other good cause prevented the
parent from visiting the child or it was not in the best interests
of the child to be visited by the parent;

(4) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with
the agency or person temporarily responsible for the child;

(5) the appropriateness and adequacy of services provided or
offered to the parent to facilitate a reunion;

(6) whether additional services would be likely to bring about
lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the child to the
parent within an ascertainable period of time, whether the
services have been offered to the parent, or, if services were
not offered, the reasons they were not offered; and

(7) the nature of the efforts made by the responsible social
services agency to rehabilitate and reunite the family and
whether the efforts were reasonable.

The district court considered these factors. First, the district court found that the
child was in foster care for over 430 days, from July 2024 to September 2025, when
mother’s parental rights were terminated. Second, although the district court acknowledged
15
that though mother had made some efforts, such as attempting treatment, it determined that
mother had not sufficiently addressed the conditions that led to out-of-home placement and
noted that mother “has not demonstrated sobriety, stability, or the ability to meet the child’s
significant needs.” Third, the court noted that mother had attended some visits with the
child but had also missed visits and did not attend most of the child’s medical appointments
after the child was in the county’s custody. Some of these missed visits may be for good
cause given her participation in treatment programs; however, mother does not argue or
otherwise provide evidence about why she missed these visits. Fourth, the department
concedes that mother maintained some contact with the agency throughout the
proceedings. Fifth, the district court found that “[r]easonable efforts have been made to
reunify the family, and those efforts have proved unsuccessful.” The record supports that
the department made reasonable efforts to provide services for mother including attempting
to facilitate her participation in treatment programs. Sixth, it is unclear what additional
services could address the issues that led to the child’s removal from mother’s care, and
mother does not identify any with specificity. Seventh, the record supports the district
court’s conclusion that the department sought to rehabilitate the family by providing
extensive support to mother in her care for the child over almost a year-long period while
the child was still in mother’s custody. Subsequently, the department attempted to connect
mother with treatment and tried to make it more convenient for mother to provide required
UA samples.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the child is
“neglected and in foster care” under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.007, subdivision 24,
16
because the record supports the district court’s findings that the child had: (1) been placed
in foster care by court order; (2) his mother’s circumstances, condition, and conduct are
such that the child cannot be returned to her; and (3) mother, despite the availability of
rehabilitative services, has “failed to make reasonable efforts to adjust [her] circumstances,
condition or conduct, or ha[s] willfully failed to meet reasonable expectations with regard
to visiting the child or providing financial support for the child.”
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that it was in the
child’s best interests to terminate mother’s parental rights.

“In any proceeding under [section 260C.301], the best interests of the child must be
the paramount consideration . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. “Considering a child’s
best interests is particularly important in a TPR proceeding because a child’s best interests
may preclude terminating parental rights even when a statutory basis for termination
exists.” In re Welfare of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation
omitted). “[T]he district court must consider the child’s best interests and explain why
termination is in the best interests of the child.” Id.; see also In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d
623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003) (stating that failure to make a specific finding on the best
interests of the children is reversible error). Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Protection
Procedure 58.04(c)(2) provides that before ordering a termination of parental rights, a court
must analyze: “(1) the child’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the
parent’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing
interests of the child.” We review a district court’s determination of “whether termination
17
is in the child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child of J.H.,
968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021).
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that it was
in the child’s best interests to terminate her parental rights because she has made significant
progress in addressing the issues that resulted in initiation of termination of her parental
rights.4 The department responds that terminating mother’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interests because his health had improved significantly in foster care, including
gaining the ability to walk with assistance where he was previously wheelchair bound.
Additionally, the child’s diabetes and liver tests vastly improved and he lost about fifty
pounds. He now attends school regularly and multiple medical appointments each week.
The district court made explicit findings about the best interests of the child under
Tanghe and rule 58.04. The court noted that mother “has not demonstrated sobriety,
stability, or the ability to meet the child’s significant needs.” The court also noted that “any
interest in preserving the relationship is minimal and would come at significant risk to the
child.” The district court made the required findings relevant to the child’s best interests
and its findings are supported by the record, especially given the child’s extensive medical
needs. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that it was
in the child’s best interests to terminate mother’s parental rights.

4 Mother does not cite Minnesota Rule of Juvenile Protection Procedure 58.04 or otherwise
explicitly discuss the best-interests factors outlined there.
18
D. Other factors
Mother cites to section 260C.301, subsection 1(b)(3)5 and 1(b)(2), seemingly
asserting that the trial court erred by terminating mother’s parental rights on the bases of
mother being unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship or because mother has
“substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon the parent by the parent/child relationship.” That said, mother does not make
any argument that connects her actions to these cited subsections, nor does she explain why
the district court abused its discretion in determining that they applied. Regardless, the
evidence presented at the hearing supports the criteria outlined in section 260C.301,
subsection 1(b)(2) and 1(b)(3). The social worker testified that mother missed 90% of the
child’s medical appointments when the child was in the county’s custody, was discharged
from several treatment facilities for lack of cooperation and did not provide UAs to social
services (though she later complied with probationary UAs). Both the social worker and
the child’s Guardian ad Litem testified that the child would be unsafe in mother’s care and
that his health conditions had improved drastically in foster care. This testimony provides
substantial evidence to support that mother “has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and
child relationship” by failing to care for the child’s physical health. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2). And this testimony provides substantial evidence that mother is “unable, for
the reasonably foreseeable future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,

5 Mother cites to Minn esota Statutes section 260C.301, subd ivision 1(b)(4) but quotes
subdivision 1(b)(3).
19
or emotional needs” of the child, given her consistent inability to follow through with his
medical care. Id., subd. 1(b)(3). Mother does not advance any arguments that she can
support the child’s medical needs. Any one of these conditions on its own is enough to
support the district court’s determination, and together, this evidence substantially supports
the district court’s determination. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by determining that several of the statutory criteria for termination of mother’s parental
rights were met.
II. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
to vacate the default termination of parental rights is not properly before us.

Mother appealed from the September 17 order terminating her parental rights.
Mother’s appeal was filed on October 7, 2025. The district court’s order on mother’s
motion to vacate was not filed until after mother’s appeal. If litigation continues in district
court after the appeal was initiated, the record for an appeal is limited to the documents and
exhibits that were before the district court when it made the ruling(s) at issue on appeal and
any transcript of proceedings. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining the record on
appeal); see In re Nelson, 495 N.W.2d 200, 202, 204 (Minn. 1993) (ruling we should not
have considered a letter sent to district court after that court made the ruling at issue on
appeal). Appellate courts do not base decisions “on matters outside the record on appeal
and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582- 83 (Minn. 1988). Because the appeal was initiated
20
before the district court’s ruling on the motion to vacate, that issue and the record related
to it is not properly before us.6
Affirmed.

6 But even if the argument were properly before us, it fails. Minnesota Rule of Juvenile
Protection Procedure 22.02 permits courts, upon motion, to “relieve a party or the party’s
legal representatives from” a final order, including default order, due to mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, and other reasons justifying relief from the
judgment. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 22.02(a), (e). Mother argues that the finding of default is
“indicative of Social Services support and belief in [mother] that she can do better and
ultimately be in a position to raise her child.” As the department notes, mother’s arguments
do not fully explain her failure to act. Though she alleges that she was withdrawing from
medication on the day of the hearing, the district court noted that besides mother’s affidavit,
there was “no indication in the record that [mother] reported feeling ill to her probation
officer, to her attorney, or to the Agency until after she was discharged from Fresh Start.”
In fact, the social worker’s affidavit directly contradicts mother’s affidavit. Mother has not
shown that she has a reasonable defense on the merits of the case or a reasonable excuse
for her failure to act. Accordingly, if the argument were properly before, we would likely
find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother’s motion to vacate.