Bruce Allen, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1674

Bruce Allen,
Appellant,

vs.

City of Waconia,
Respondent.

Filed May 11, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CV-24-774

Patrick J. Neaton, Neaton & Puklich, P.L.L.P., Chanhassen, Minnesota (for appellant)

Justin L. Templin, Niklaus M. Svendsen, Hoff Barry, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
This case arises from appellant installing landscaping on a city- owned public
right-of-way adjacent to appellant’s property and respondent’s subsequent demand that

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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appellant remove the landscaping. Appellant filed a complaint in district court challenging
both respondent’s resolution finding that the landscaping violated the city code and
respondent’s subsequent demand that he remove the landscaping from the right -of-way.
Appellant’s complaint set forth seven claims. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of respondent on all seven claims. Because there are no disputed issues of material
fact and respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Bruce Allen owns a residential property located in Waconia (the property)
that he purchased in 2022. 1 The backyard of the property abuts a 66-foot-wide public
right-of-way for Old Beach Road. Old Beach Road is no longer used as a roadway but
instead is used as a path for pedestrians and bicycles. The public right-of-way for Old
Beach Road is owned by respondent City of Waconia.
In the 2022-2023 time period, Allen undertook an extensive yard and patio
landscaping project on the property. Some of Allen’s landscaping extended beyond the
property line into the public right-of-way for Old Beach Road. The landscaping that
extended into the public right-of-way included mulch, rocks, and shrubbery.
The city received a complaint from an unidentified individual regarding Allen’s
landscaping extending onto city property. After inspecting the property and confirming
that Allen installed landscaping on public property, the city sent a letter to Allen indicating

1 This recitation of facts is derived from the summary-judgment record, viewed in the light
most favorable to appellant as the non- movant. See Windcliff Ass’n, Inc. v. Breyfogle,
988 N.W.2d 911, 916 (Minn. 2023).
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that the landscaping improvements that extended onto the public right-of-way would have
to be removed. In response, Allen requested an after-the-fact permit to allow the
landscaping to remain in the public right -of-way for Old Beach Road. When Allen
installed the landscaping in the right-of -way, he had no knowledge that the city required
permission for the type of landscaping improvements that he made.
At a city council meeting on June 17, 2024, the city considered Allen’s request for
an after-the-fact permit to keep the landscaping in the public right -of-way for Old Beach
Road. The city denied Allen’s request in a three-to-two vote. Approximately two weeks
later, the city council adopted Resolution 2024-142 formally denying Allen’s request for
an after-the- fact permit. In Resolution 2024-142, the city found that “[a]llowing the
improvements to remain in their current configuration and location is not in the best interest
of the [c]ity” and that Allen’s “approach of ‘asking forgiveness rather than permission’ for
private use of public property is a fundamental alteration from Section 320.01” of the city
code. On July 5, a few days after adopting the resolution, the city sent a letter to Allen
informing him that the city adopted the resolution and stating that he had 30 days “from
the date of this letter to remove all landscap e improvements from the public property and
restore the area to the satisfaction of the Public Services Department.”
After receiving the July 5 letter, Allen sued the city. In his complaint, Allen
included seven counts: (I) Resolution 2024-142 is void and unenforceable; (II ) inverse
condemnation; (III) taking of private property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments; (IV ) excessive fines and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment; (V) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
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(VI) deprivation of civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (VII) injunctive relief
enjoining the city from enforcing its resolution and letter demanding that Allen remove
landscaping from the public right-of-way property. The city moved for summary
judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all counts. After
the district court filed its order, Allen filed a letter requesting leave to bring a motion for
reconsideration. In his letter request, Allen alleged that he was aware of at least three
situations where a landowner installed landscaping on the public right-of-way for a paved
trail and he further alleged that the property owners were not required to obtain a permit
from the city to install the landscaping. In support of his request, he also included
photographs of the three properties with landscaping. The district court denied Allen’s
request to bring a motion for reconsideration , concluding that Allen “has not shown a
compelling circumstance necessitating an opportunity to bring a motion to reconsider.”
Allen appeals.
DECISION
Allen argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of
the city. Allen contends the district court erred when it found the city was entitled to
summary judgment on counts I-V and VII of his complaint. Allen does not challenge the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on count VI (alleging a violation of
section 1983).
We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. City of
Waconia v. Dock, 961 N.W.2d 220, 229 (Minn. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate
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where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01; see also Rygwall v. ACR Homes,
Inc., 6 N.W.3d 416, 427 (Minn. 2024). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when
reasonable minds can draw different conclusions from the evidence presented.” Rygwall,
6 N.W.3d at 427. We view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and resolving all doubts and factual inferences against the moving party.”
Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC, 964 N.W.2d 613, 620 (Minn. 2021). But a party
opposing a summary judgment motion must rely on more than “mere averments.”
Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 172 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
Additionally, appellate courts generally decline to address issues that are
inadequately briefed. State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc.,
558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997); see Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co.,
187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (explaining that “assignment[s] of error based on mere
assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief [are] waived
and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection”). Many of Allen’s arguments challenging the district court’s grant of summary
judgment are unsupported by relevant legal authority or analysis. Arguments are deemed
forfeited when a “brief contains no argument or citation to legal authority in support of the
allegations.” State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002). Nonetheless, even
considering Allen’s arguments on the merits , we conclude that none of the arguments
warrant reversal.
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I. The city’s resolution is neither void nor unenforceable.

The first count of Allen’s complaint seeks an order from the district court declaring
that Resolution 2024-142 is void and unenforceable. Allen contends that the resolution is
void and unenforceable because it relies on section 320.01 of the city code, which Allen
argues is unconstitutionally vague.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on this claim based
on its conclusion that section 320.01 is not unconstitutionally vague but rather
unambiguously provides that it is “unlawful to occupy or otherwise use [a] right-of-way or
public grounds for any purpose without first obtaining a permit” from the city.
On appeal, Allen argues the district court erred in its legal analysis. He contends
that section 320.01, when read in conjunction with section 320.07, is unconstitutionally
vague and ambiguous. He maintains that, at a minimum, there is a fact dispute in this
regard precluding the grant of summary judgment. We are not persuaded.
“The constitutionality of an ordinance is a question of law. ” Hard Times Cafe,
Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 625 N.W.2d 165, 171 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted).
Municipal ordinances are presumed constitutional, and the burden of demonstrating they
are unreasonable “rests on the party attacking [their] validity.” City of St. Paul v. Dalsin,
71 N.W.2d 855, 858 ( Minn. 1955). Courts exercise “extreme caution” before declaring
that an ordinance is void for vagueness. Hard Times Cafe, Inc., 625 N.W.2d at 171. An
ordinance is void for vagueness if it “defines an act in a manner that encourages arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement,” or is so indefinite that people “must guess at its
meaning.” Humenansky v. Minn. Bd. of Md. Exam’rs, 525 N.W.2d 559, 564 (Minn.
7
App. 1994) (citations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995). A person challenging
the constitutionality of an ordinance on vagueness grounds must show the ordinance lacks
specificity as to their particular circumstances. Ruzic v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety,
455 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Minn. App. 1990) (citation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 26,
1990).
Section 320.01, subdivision 2, of the city code provides in relevant part:
Permit required. No person shall occupy or otherwise use any
of the public right-of-way or public grounds in the city for any
purpose, nor install or maintain any sign, gas main, utility
main, wireless facility, or any equipment in any of said public
right-of-way or public grounds, without first having obtained a
permit pursuant to the provisions herein.

Waconia, Minn., City Code § 320.01, subd. 2 (2019). As the district court noted, this
provision unambiguously requires a person to obtain a permit from the city prior to
occupying or otherwise using any public right-of-way or public grounds in the city “for
any purpose.” Here, the undisputed facts show that Allen occupied a portion of the public
right-of-way for Old Beach Road when he installed landscaping in the public right-of-way.
And there is no dispute that Allen installed the landscaping without first obtaining a permit
from the city . Because Allen occupied the public right-of-way by installing the
landscaping without a permit, Allen’s conduct was prohibited by section 320.01,
subdivision 2. There is no ambiguity in this regard.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Allen’s reliance on another provision of the city
code—section 320.07, subdivision 3—to argue that section 320.01, subdivision 2 , is
unconstitutionally vague. Allen asserts section 320.01, subdivision 2, is unconstitutionally
8
vague because “[t]here is inherent ambiguity between” section 320.01, subdivision 2, and
section 320.07, subdivision 3, in its application to the undisputed facts of this case.
Section 320.07, subdivision 3, reads in relevant part:
Duty of property owners to cut grass and weeds and maintain
shrubs and trees. Every owner of property abutting upon any
street shall cut any grass or weeds growing thereon . . . . Every
owner of property abutting on any street shall, subject to the
provisions herein requiring a permit therefor, trim, cut and
otherwise maintain all trees and shrubs from the line of such
property nearest to such street to the center of such street.

Waconia, Minn., City Code § 320.07, subd. 3 (2019). Allen’s argument hinges on his
contention that the requirement under section 320.07, subdivision 3, that property owners
mow or cut grass and weeds on an abutting street is in tension with the requirement to
obtain a permit before “occupy[ing] or otherwise us[ing]” a public right-of-way in section
320.01, subdivision 2. He further contends that there is an issue of material fact as to
whether Old Beach Road is a street under section 320.07, subdivision 3.
Like the district court, we conclude that the language of section 320.07,
subdivision 3, does not create any ambiguity in the language of section 320.01,
subdivision 2. The two provision s govern different conduct. Section 320.07,
subdivision 3, imposes a limited duty of maintenance on property owners. The provision
governs only a property owner’s duty to maintain shrubs and trees and to cut grass and
weeds. Nothing in the plain language of section 320.07, subdivision 3, permits a landowner
to install new landscaping in a public right -of-way. There is no question that the
installation of new landscaping materials is not subject to or permitted by section 320.07,
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subdivision 3. Consequently, we reject Allen’s argument that section 320.01,
subdivision 2, is ambiguous when read in conjunction with section 320.07, subdivision 3.
And, while Allen himself asserts in his brief that he was confused about the
applicability of section 320.01 to his situation, he has not demonstrated how the ordinance
is vague as applied to his situation. His claim of confusion is not sufficient by itself to
preclude the grant of summary judgment. To avoid summary judgment, Allen must show
there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether section 320.01, subdivision 2, is so
indefinite that people of reasonable intelligence “must guess at its meaning.” Humenansky,
525 N.W.2d at 564. Because the language of section 320.01, subdivision 2, is plain and
unambiguous, we discern no basis to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment
based on Allen’s alleged confusion.
Accordingly, because Allen has not demonstrated that section 320.01,
subdivision 2, is unconstitutionally vague, there is no basis to conclude that the resolution
is void and unenforceable on that basis as alleged by Allen. We therefore conclude the
district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city on this claim.
II. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Allen’s takings and
inverse-condemnation claims.

We next consider Allen’s arguments regarding his takings and inverse-
condemnation claims and his related claim for injunctive relief (counts II, III, and VII). In
his complaint, Allen alleged that the city will engage in an unconstitutional taking of
property in violation of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions “[i]n the event the
[city] proceeds to remove or destroy the landscaping improvements that [Allen] has
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installed on the [right-of-way] for Old Beach [Road].” He further alleged that he is entitled
to a writ of mandamus ordering the city to commence condemnation proceedings due to
the alleged taking and injunctive relief. The district court concluded that (1) Allen’s
takings claim is not ripe because there is no evidence that the landscaping has been
removed by the city, and (2) even if the claim is ripe, summary judgment is proper because
Allen does not have a protected property interest in the public right-of -way for Old Beach
Road to support either a takings claim or an inverse-condemnation claim. The district court
also denied Allen’s claims for inverse condemnation and injunctive relief.
Allen argues the district court erred when it concluded that his takings claim is not
ripe and that he does not have a protectable property interest. He seeks reversal of the grant
of summary judgment on counts II, III, and VII on this basis. We are not persuaded.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the taking of private
property by the government without just compensation. The Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Similarly, the Minnesota Constitution
provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use
without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 13.
“The purpose of the Minnesota Takings Clause is to ensure that the government
does not require some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.” Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis,
24 N.W.3d 287, 299 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted). “Under the Minnesota Takings
Clause, a constitutional taking may occur through a physical taking or a regulatory taking.”
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Id. at 300. A regulatory taking may occur “when the government goes too far in its
regulation, so as to unfairly diminish the value of the individual’s property, thus causing
the individual to bear the burden rightly borne by the public.” Wensmann Realty,
Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 632 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). Because
“the Takings Clause in the Minnesota Constitution is similar to the Takings Clause in the
U.S. Constitution, . . . [w]e have therefore relied on cases interpreting the U.S.
Constitution’s Takings Clause in interpreting this clause in the Minnesota Constitution.”
Id. at 631-32 (citations omitted). And while “[t]he Minnesota Constitution provides
broader protections to property owners than does the United States Constitution when
property is taken, damaged, or destroyed for a public or governmental use,” Allen does not
ask us to interpret the Minnesota Constitution more broadly than the United States
Constitution here. Interstate Cos., Inc. v. City of Bloomington, 790 N.W.2d 409, 416
(Minn. App. 2010), rev. granted (Minn. Jan. 26, 2011), and appeal dismissed (Minn.
Apr. 27, 2011).
Assuming without deciding that Allen’s takings claim is ripe, his takings and
inverse-condemnation claims nonetheless fail as a matter of law. To prevail on a takings
claim, Allen must demonstrate that (1) he has a protectable property interest in the subject
property and (2) there has been a taking of that property by the government. Hall v. State,
908 N.W.2d 345, 352 (Minn. 2018) (explaining that an appellant alleging a takings claim
“must show that: (1) they have a property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment;
(2) the government took the property interest; (3) the property interest was taken for public
use; and (4) just compensation was not paid” ). Further, to be entitled to an award in an
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inverse-condemnation proceeding, Allen must show that the city has “interfered with
ownership, possession, or enjoyment of a property right.” Oliver v. State ex rel. Comm’r
of Transp., 760 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 29, 2009),
and appeal dismissed (Minn. Nov. 16, 2009). While Allen asserts he has property rights
in the landscaping materials that he installed on the public right-of -way for Old Beach
Road, there is no evidence in the record that the city seeks to take or destroy the landscaping
materials as alleged by Allen in his complaint. Rather, it is undisputed that the city required
Allen to remove the materials himself and that he can retain those materials. In addition,
it is undisputed that the right- of-way for Old Beach Road where Allen installed the
landscaping materials is public property. Consequently, Allen fails to present any evidence
to support his claim that the city has engaged in taking of his private property in violation
of either the state or federal constitutions by requiring him to remove the landscaping from
the city’s right-of-way. See Hagen, 963 N.W.2d at 172 (noting that “the nonmoving party
must do more than rest on mere averments to create a genuine issue of material fact that
precludes summary judgment” (quotation omitted)).
The only case that Allen cites to support his takings and inverse- condemnation
claims is Vern Reynolds Const., Inc. v. City of Champlin , 539 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Minn.
App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1995). This case is inapposite. Vern Reynolds
involved a question of whether a subsequent landowner had standing to bring an
inverse-condemnation claim against a municipality for construction of storm water
facilities on private property. Id. The case did not address a situation like this one where
a property owner installed landscaping materials on public property. Id. Allen points us
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to no other legal authority to support his takings and inverse-condemnation claims. We
therefore conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment on Allen’s
takings and inverse-condemnation claims as well as his related claim for injunctive relief.
III. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Allen’s claim that
the city’s actions constitute “cruel and unusual” punishment.

Allen next challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his claim
that the city’s actions denying Allen’s after-the-fact permit request and requiring Allen to
remove the landscaping from the right-of-way amounts to an “excessive fine” and “unusual
punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Count IV). In granting summary
judgment on this count, the district court explained that the city’s actions requiring removal
of the landscape materials do not constitute punishment because removal of the materials
“is remedial–not punitive.” And the district court further explained that, even if the Eighth
Amendment is applicable to the landscaping dispute, Allen’s claim fails because he has not
demonstrated that removal of the materials would be “grossly disproportiona l” to the
offending conduct of installing the landscaping.
“Identical clauses in the United States and the Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the
state from imposing excessive fines.” Thigpen v. Best Home Care LLC, 29 N.W.3d 205,
211 (Minn. 2025); see also U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Minn. Const. art. I, § 5. The Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 5 (“Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.”). “[T]he Eighth
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Amendment does not limit an excessive fines challenge to criminal proceedings
exclusively.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 656 N.W.2d 547, 552 (Minn. 2003).
Civil sanctions may implicate the excessive-fines clause of the Eighth Amendment
“when the sanction cannot fairly be said to serve a solely remedial purpose but rather can
only be explained as serving either retribution or deterrent purposes as well.” Id. at 553.
A fine “violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it imposes a fine that is ‘grossly
disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.’” Thigpen, 29 N.W.3d at 213
(quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)). The Minnesota Supreme
Court has explained that the “‘touchstone’ of the Excessive Fines Clause inquiry ‘is the
principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to
the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.’” Id. (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
at 334).
Allen asserts that the city’s demand that he remove the landscape materials from the
right-of-way and restore the area is (1) “punishment” and (2) “clearly disproportionate” to
the offense in question. His argument fails. Allen provides no legal or evidentiary support
for his contention that the demand for removal of landscaping materials is a “punishment”
within the scope of the Eighth Amendment, and not a “purely remedial” measure. Id. at
212. We agree with the district court that the city’s demand does not constitute punishment
because it simply requires Allen to restore the city property back to its original condition.
Additionally, there is no support in the record for Allen’s insistence that the remedy
is “clearly disproportionate.” Allen makes passing reference to the fact that returning the
city’s property back to its original state “would clearly diminish the value” of his property.
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Allen does not support his assertion with any evidence in the summary-judgment record.
Nor does he explain how restoring the public right-of-way to its original state makes the
remedy clearly disproportionate to his violation of the city code. Therefore, we conclude
that the district court properly granted summary judgment on his claim under the Eighth
Amendment.
IV. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Allen’s
equal-protection claim.

Lastly, Allen argues that summary judgment on his equal-protection claim was
inappropriate. In his complaint, Allen alleged the city violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by selectively enforcing
section 320.01, subdivision 2, against him. The district court concluded that Allen’s
equal-protection claim failed as a matter of law because Allen did not identify any similarly
situated property owner whom the city treated more favorably than Allen.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires “that all similarly situated individuals shall be treated alike. ”
Vermillion State Bank v. Tennis Sanitation, LLC, 969 N.W.2d 610, 631 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted). A litigant bringing a claim under the Equal Protection Clause typically
must identify a protected class of which they are a member. Id. The Equal Protection
Clause also permits a litigant to assert that they are a “class of one.” See In re Brown,
28 N.W.3d 486, 505 (Minn. App. 2025) (recognizing that “equal-protection claims may be
brought by ‘a class of one’”). But without a showing that “similarly situated persons
16
have been treated differently,” an equal-protection claim fail s. State v. Cox,
798 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Allen argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because
there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the city treated Allen differently than
other similarly situated landowners. In support of his argument, he points to photographic
evidence of other properties in the city. Based on our review, we agree with the district
court that “none of those photographs or properties discussed appear to involve a situation
where a property owner had installed landscaping or other improvements on public
property.”
Allen draws this court’s attention to one home in particular that he argues is the
“most compelling ‘identical’ situation’” where there is landscaping “right up to the outer
edge of the paved walking trail—without obtaining [c]ity permission.” Even regarding this
example, there is no basis to conclude from the photograph alone that the landscaping
extends onto public property. And Allen did not provide any evidence of a survey or an
affidavit from the homeowner to support his assertion that the landscaping at this home
extends past the homeowner’s property line and into the public right-of-way. Because
Allen has not provided evidence of any other private property owner who has installed
landscaping on public property, much less that the city treated a similarly situated
landowner differently than Allen, there is no disputed issue of material fact precluding
summary judgment in favor of the city on Allen’s equal-protection claim. Consequently,
we conclude Allen’s equal-protection claim fails as a matter of law and the district court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city on this claim.
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Conclusion
In sum, because there are no disputed issues of material fact and the city is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on Allen’s claims challenged on appeal, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city.
Affirmed.