Michael Adam Davis v. State of Minnesota

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1679

Michael Adam Davis, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 6, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Dodge County District Court
File No. 20-CR-19-245

Michael Adam Davis, Rush City, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Paul Kiltinen, Dodge County Attorney, Mantorville, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Harris,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

HARRIS, Judge

In this appeal from an order denying postconviction relief without an evidentiary

hearing, appellant argues that his claims for ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel were not procedurally barred and entitled him to an evidentiary hearing. Because

we discern no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

FACTS

In 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Michael Adam Davis by

amended complaint with four counts of criminal sexual conduct, including two counts of

first-degree criminal sexual conduct while in a position of authority over a victim between

13 and 16 years of age, and one count of indecent exposure in the presence of a minor. The

matter proceeded to a jury trial at which victim D.T testified, and Davis testified on his

own behalf. The following is from Davis’s petition and the transcripts of the underlying

criminal proceedings. We include only those details necessary to understand the issues on

appeal.

Victim D.T. lived with his mother, A.M.T.; his father, T.J.T.; and sister in Dodge

Center. A.M.T. was a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, where

she later met Davis. At the time, Davis was a “leader” within the church. One day, after

service, Davis told A.M.T. that he would be a “good mentor” for D.T. At the time, A.M.T.

thought it was a good idea because D.T. would have another male “to look up to.” A.M.T.

understood that Davis and D.T. “were going to do Bible study.”

D.T. first went to Davis’s home in late December of 2018 and when D.T. returned

home, A.M.T. learned that they did not do Bible study. Instead, D.T. and Davis played

video games and nerf guns, played with Davis’s rabbits, and talked.

D.T. testified about his visits to Davis’s home. D.T. arrived early in the morning

and spent the entire day with Davis. Davis stayed home most of the day and prepared food

2

for D.T. After Christmas break, Davis gifted D.T. a cell phone and a pair of cowboy boots.

D.T. testified that Davis gave him a key to enter his home and, on two or three occasions,

D.T. spent the night at Davis’s home.

D.T. also testified about the instances of sexual abuse by Davis. He testified that he

and Davis would wrestle, and Davis would touch him inappropriately, groping his butt and

penis. After the first incident of inappropriate touching, Davis asked D.T. to come over

because he wanted “to show [him] a magic trick.” D.T. testified that he was on the couch

when Davis instructed him to close his eyes and open his mouth, at which point Davis “put

his penis in [D.T.’s] mouth.” D.T. described that this lasted “[f]ive minutes, but it felt like

an eternity” and that Davis placed his penis “all the way” in his mouth. On a separate day,

Davis ordered D.T. to the upstairs bedroom, locked the bedroom door, and told D.T. to get

on the bed. Davis removed his and D.T.’s pants and unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate

D.T.’s anus with his penis.

In February 2019, A.M.T. attended church with D.T., her daughter, and her mother-

in-law. After the service, A.M.T. was approached by other church members who shared

concerns about D.T.’s well-being. Following that conversation, the church’s president

scheduled a meeting with D.T. and Davis. After that meeting, A.M.T. was going to bring

D.T. home but he got angry and instead wanted to leave with Davis. A.M.T. relented and

let him leave with Davis, but she told Davis that he needed to bring D.T. “straight home.”

A.M.T. left church with her daughter and mother-in-law. After A.M.T. had been home for

a while, she realized that Davis should have already arrived with D.T. at her home. T.J.T.

3

drove to Davis’s home to see if D.T. was there, but before he reached Davis’s home, he

discovered that law enforcement had stopped Davis a few blocks away.

The responding police officer testified that he observed D.T. move from the “center

seat inside the vehicle over to the passenger seat,” which indicated that he was not wearing

a seatbelt. When the officer ran Davis’s license and registration, he learned that Davis was

a convicted sex offender in the State of Utah, 1 and he questioned whether Davis could have

contact with D.T. Approximately 30 minutes into the traffic stop, A.M.T. arrived and the

officer informed her that Davis was a convicted sex offender in Utah.

A jury found Davis guilty as charged. The district court convicted Davis on two

counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of second-degree criminal

sexual conduct and sentenced him to concurrent prison sentences of 234 months for

count 1, 360 months for count 2, and 70 months for count 3.

In February 2023, Davis filed a direct appeal, arguing that (1) the district court

erroneously admitted evidence, (2) the state’s discovery violations entitled him to a new

trial, (3) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (4) the evidence was insufficient

to prove that he was in a position of authority, and (5) the district court erroneously

calculated his criminal-history score. This court affirmed his convictions and sentence.

1
In September 2006, the State of Utah convicted Davis of two counts of attempted forcible
sex abuse: the first count occurred “on or about June 15, 2005,” and the second occurred
“during 2004,” with both counts involving the same victim. These convictions would be
considered fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes section
609.345, subdivision 1 (2004).

4

See State v. Davis, No. A23-0308, 2024 WL 2814441 (Minn. App. June 3, 2024), rev.

denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2024).

In June 2025, Davis filed a petition for postconviction relief. Davis asserted

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel on several grounds: (1) failing to

develop the record; (2) failing to call a particular witness; (3) failing to raise prosecutorial

misconduct; (4) failing to provide alibi evidence; (5) failing to adequately prepare Davis to

testify on his own behalf; (6) failing to use exculpatory evidence and “beneficial rulings”;

(7) failing to challenge the state’s “potentially unlawful investigation”; and (8) failing to

challenge the sentencing order. Davis also alleged ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel for failing to argue prosecutorial misconduct, calling a witness, and preventing him

from contributing to his own appeal.

The district court denied Davis’s petition without a hearing. It determined that his

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were Knaffla-barred 2 because each of his

claims were known to him at the time of the direct appeal but not raised. As it relates to

his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the district court determined that

they were not Knaffla-barred but that Davis failed to allege facts that, if proven by a fair

preponderance of the evidence, would entitle him to a new trial.

Davis appeals.

2
See State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (holding that when a direct
appeal has been taken “all claims known but not raised[] will not be considered upon a
subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”).

5

DECISION

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Davis’s
petition for postconviction relief.

Under the postconviction statute, a defendant who has been convicted of a crime

may petition the district court for postconviction relief “to vacate and set aside the

judgment . . . or make other disposition as may be appropriate.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01,

subd. 1 (2024). But a “petition for postconviction relief after a direct appeal has been

completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the

conviction or sentence.” Id.; see also Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741.

“We review the summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse

of discretion.” El-Shabazz v. State, 984 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. 2023). “A

[postconviction] court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an

arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made

clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). The postconviction court’s

factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

Id. However, “[b]ecause claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions

of law and fact, we review the postconviction court’s legal conclusions on such questions

de novo.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013).

Davis challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief,

arguing that (1) his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were not Knaffla-barred,

(2) he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and (3) the district court erred

in the process of evaluating his claims. We address these arguments in turn.

6

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant “the

right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn.

2016) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To succeed on an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Davis needed to satisfy the two-pronged

Strickland test. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn.

2020) (applying Strickland test to a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel). Under this test, Davis must show that (1) “his attorney’s performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “a reasonable possibility exists that

the outcome would have been different, but for counsel’s errors.” State v. Mosley, 895

N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). If one of these prongs is not satisfied,

we may dispose of the claim without considering the other prong. Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at

372.

“Once a direct appeal has been taken, all claims raised in that appeal, all claims

known at the time of that appeal, and all claims that should have been known at the time

of that appeal will not be considered in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007) (citing Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741).

The Knaffla bar “applies even in postconviction proceedings raising constitutional issues

of criminal procedure.” Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Minn. 2006).

In his petition for postconviction relief, Davis argued that his trial counsel was

ineffective because he failed to (1) present alibi evidence, (2) properly challenge the state’s

witnesses, (3) prepare Davis to testify on his own behalf, (4) use exculpatory evidence and

7

beneficial rulings by the court, and (5) offer evidence of innocence. But these arguments

were not raised in Davis’s direct appeal. See Davis, 2024 WL 2814441, at *6. As it relates

to trial counsel’s failure to call a witness and challenge the state’s witnesses, Davis

conceded in his petition that these claims were known at the time of the direct appeal, but

he argued that more evidence was required to properly raise the issue. His argument is

unavailing.

“Decisions about which witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to

the jury are questions of trial strategy that lie within the discretion of trial counsel.” Leake,

737 N.W.2d at 539. As a reviewing court, we generally will not second guess the trial-

strategy decision of which witnesses to call. See id.

Davis also argues that his trial counsel failed to adequately prepare him to testify at

trial. According to Davis, this was due to “inattention” and “neglect,” and he asserts that

his trial counsel “neglected to even inform [him] of the upcoming trial.”

The district court concluded that this claim was known, or should have been known,

to Davis at the time of the direct appeal, but because he did not raise it then, it declined to

consider it on a petition for postconviction relief. But even if it was not Knaffla-barred,

the district court concluded that Davis “knowingly and intelligently waived his right to

testify in his own defense.” This is supported by the record. In the waiver of his right to

testify at trial, Davis stated that his trial counsel informed him of his rights and

8

responsibilities, that he understood the consequences of not testifying, and that he was

thinking clearly. 3

In short, Davis’s assertions of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were known to

him at the time of his direct appeal, but because he failed to raise them, they are barred by

Knaffla.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Davis next argues that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

because appellate counsel prevented Davis from contributing to his own appeal, failed to

call a witness, failed to develop the record, failed to argue prosecutorial misconduct, and

failed to challenge the district court’s sentencing order. We address each argument in turn.

1. Preventing Davis’s Contribution to his own Appeal

In his petition, Davis asserted that appellate counsel prevented him from

contributing to his own appeal. He states that he sent appellate counsel a 27-page letter

“detailing all of the issues [he] could think of that he wanted to be addressed in the direct

appeal.” He sent another letter addressing issues relating to the sentencing order. Davis

contends that appellate counsel did not respond to any of his letters, did not provide a copy

of the trial transcripts, and did not send a copy of the appellate brief before filing. The

3
In his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel argument, Davis seems to also argue that his
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this argument. We disagree. Davis’s
appellate counsel had no obligation to raise this argument on appeal simply because Davis
wished him to do so. See Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Minn. 2016) (stating
appellate counsel “has no duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only
the most meritorious claims to the court”); see also Wright v. State, 765 N.W.2d 85, 91
(Minn. 2009) (“Counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel
could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”).

9

district court determined that under Strickland, Davis failed “to show that there [was] a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the outcome of the appeal

would have been different.” The district court did not err.

As previously stated, appellate counsel is not required to “raise all possible claims

on direct appeal, and a claim need not be raised if appellate counsel could have legitimately

concluded that [it] would not [prevail].” Leake, 737 N.W.2d at 536 (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, appellate counsel was not obligated to advance every argument at Davis’s

insistence.

2. Failing to Call a Witness

Davis also argues that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of

counsel because he failed to raise an issue regarding trial counsel’s failure to call a

particular witness. In his petition, Davis contended that he told appellate counsel

“everything th[e] witness could have testified to and why that witness was so necessary to

the defense.” The reason why appellate counsel did not raise the issue, according to Davis,

was because “it was not part of the trial record, and so [a]ppellate [c]ounsel thought that

information [was] off-limits to him.”

The district court relied on this court’s opinion affirming Davis’s convictions,

stating, “The Court of Appeals found that trial counsel’s performance was within the

objectively reasonable standard and specifically addressed the alleged failure to call a

witness. Therefore, the court will not address that issue again.” On appeal, Davis claims

that the district court failed to consider the merits of his arguments. We are not convinced.

10

“Decisions about which witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to

the jury are questions of trial strategy that lie within the discretion of trial counsel.” Leake,

737 N.W.2d at 539; see also Anderson v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2013) (noting

that the decision to call exculpatory witnesses falls within trial strategy and is not generally

reviewable on appeal); Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 26-27 (Minn. 1992) (finding no

merit in the claim that a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial

counsel failed to call three potential defense witnesses). In his principal brief and petition,

Davis does not explain what the witness would have testified to, or how that witness would

have changed the outcome of his trial.

On this record, Davis does not show how appellate counsel’s failure to argue the

issue of trial counsel’s failure to call a particular witness was below the objective standard

of reasonableness under Strickland. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

3. Failing to Develop the Record

Davis’s argument that his appellate counsel failed to develop the record relates to

the argument in his first appeal that trial counsel failed to conduct a pretrial interview with

D.T.

Matters of trial strategy “lie within the discretion of trial counsel and will not be

second-guessed by appellate courts.” Leake, 737 N.W.2d at 536; see also Zumberge v.

State, 937 N.W.2d 406, 414 (Minn. 2019). Matters of trial strategy include which

witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to the jury. Allwine v. State, 994

N.W.2d 528, 538-39 (Minn. 2023). The Minnesota Supreme Court has “cautioned against

second-guessing decisions of trial counsel in hindsight simply because of an unfavorable

11

result to a defendant.” Id. at 538. Generally, we will not review an attorney’s investigation

into a particular defense because it is considered trial strategy. Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d

414, 421 (Minn. 2004). However, an attorney’s conduct in not investigating a defense may

constitute unreasonable representation if the failure was due to “inattention or neglect.”

Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 218 (Minn. 2016). Thus, if under the circumstances, the

attorney gave due consideration and reasonably declined to conduct further investigation,

then a decision not to further investigate is objectively reasonable. See id.

In his direct appeal, Davis argued that his trial counsel, as part of its defense strategy,

should have investigated “when D.T. learned that Davis was a registered sex offender.”

Davis, 2024 WL 2814441, at *6. This court rejected Davis’s argument, concluding that

trial counsel’s decision not to conduct a pretrial interview with D.T. was not attributed to

“inattention or neglect.” Id. at *6. This court determined that Davis’s trial counsel

attempted to investigate further by moving to compel the state to allow him to conduct a

pretrial interview, but the district court denied the motion. Id. Therefore, Davis’s trial

counsel’s conduct in not investigating further did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness.

In his petition, Davis argued that appellate counsel raised the wrong argument.

According to Davis, rather than arguing “when” D.T. learned of Davis’s sex-offender

status, appellate counsel should have argued “how” D.T. learned of his status. This

argument is not persuasive.

First, Davis does not show how his appellate counsel’s performance fell below the

objective standard of reasonableness or how he was prejudiced. As it relates to D.T.

12

learning of Davis’s sex-offender status, it is not apparent that the “when vs. how”

distinction would have affected the verdict. Second, even if we assume that his appellate

counsel did raise the specific argument that Davis desired—the how—it is unlikely that

this court would have considered the argument because to do so would have required

reliance on evidence outside the appellate record. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (“The

documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any,

shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.”); Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83

(Minn. 1988) (stating appellate courts “may not base its decision on matters outside the

record on appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence

below.”).

4. Failing to Argue Prosecutorial Misconduct

Davis next argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to

raise 26 allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. He generally claims that the prosecutor

vouched for D.T.’s credibility, mischaracterized the evidence, and made arguments

unsupported by the record evidence.

Davis’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were unobjected-to at trial. When

the defendant fails to object during trial, prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed under a

modified plain-error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under

this standard, Davis must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects his

substantial rights. Id. Davis carries the burden of establishing error that is plain, but upon

doing so, the burden shifts to the state to prove that there is no reasonable likelihood that

the absence of the misconduct would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict. Id.

13

“A prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misconduct when he violates clear or established

standards of conduct . . . by a district court, or clear commands in this state’s case law.”

State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

Here, Davis does not show how any of the prosecutor’s remarks constituted plain

error or how they affected his substantial rights. He claims that several of the prosecutor’s

statements during closing argument were not true, but he pointed to no record evidence in

support. For example, in his petition, Davis claimed that the prosecutor’s “major

argument” during closing was when he stated:

Under the guise of being a mentor is how Mr. Davis
gained access to [D.T.]. And there’s even more of that; in fact,
it’s very specific. Because remember, aside from the other
presents, aside from everything that he did with this child and
for this child, bought him a cell phone that his parents didn’t
know about. Counsel is simply incorrect about the data in
making phone calls. Both [D.T.] and Captain Brumfield
corrected him on that. He’s wrong on that.
But most importantly, there was one gift and one
present and the timing of that is incredibly, incredibly
important and indicative of how Mr. Davis had used his
position of authority and abused that relationship with this
child.

(Emphasis added.)

Davis described this statement as the prosecutor’s “most egregious lie and

misconduct.” In his principal brief, Davis takes issue with the prosecutor’s use of the

phrases, “very specific,” “most importantly,” and “the timing of that is incredibly,

incredibly important” because they “were used to convince the jury” that certain evidence

was critical for a conviction.

14

But prosecutors are permitted to use “dramatic devices” and argue in a “persuasive

fashion” to “make reasonable inferences from the record.” State v. Rucker, 752 N.W.2d

538, 552 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008). Indeed, the supreme court

has stated that “[a] prosecutor’s closing argument need not be colorless, so long as it is

based on the evidence or reasonable inferences from that evidence.” State v. Jones, 753

N.W.2d 677, 691-92 (Minn. 2008).

The prosecutor’s closing argument referenced evidence produced at trial and relied

on the reasonable inferences from that evidence. While Davis may disagree with many of

the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument, he has not shown that the prosecutor

committed plain error or how the alleged error affected his substantial rights. Because

Davis provides no legal support for his argument and has failed to demonstrate any

misconduct, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying

Davis’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim.

5. Failing to Challenge Sentencing Order

Davis alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the

district court’s sentencing order, specifically regarding how the district court calculated his

criminal-history score. This argument is unpersuasive.

Davis’s appellate counsel challenged the district court’s sentencing determination,

arguing that Davis’s two Utah convictions should not have been counted as separate

convictions because they arose from the same behavioral incident. See Davis, 2024 WL

2814441, at *8. This court determined that “Davis pleaded guilty to two separate offenses

15

for two separate instances of criminal sexual conduct committed against the same victim,

which took place in two different years—June 2005 and 2004. Id. at *9.

In his postconviction relief petition, Davis conclusory mentions that he received

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because he “chose to make an argument that was

known to be ineffective (since trial counsel already tried it).” But he does not identify what

arguments appellate counsel should have but did not make, or how they would have made

a difference. The postconviction court rejected this argument, reasoning that Davis “failed

to show how the outcome of the appeal would have been different under different

representation.” Davis fails to show why appellate counsel’s sentencing argument on direct

appeal was objectively unreasonable or would have changed the outcome of his appeal.

In sum, Davis has not alleged facts that show that his appellate counsel’s

performance was objectively unreasonable or that the asserted errors by appellate counsel’s

performance could reasonably have affected the outcome. The petition and record

therefore conclusively show that Davis is not entitled to relief on this claim, and the district

court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying the claim. See Minn. Stat.

§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2024).

6. Failing to “Liberally Construe” the Petition for Postconviction
Relief.

Davis lastly argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to “liberally

construe” his petition for postconviction relief. He contends that the district court did

“everything in [its] power to minimize, misconstrue, ignore, and dispose of the petition.”

This argument lacks merit.

16

“In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required, a postconviction court

considers the facts alleged in the petition as true and construes them in the light most

favorable to the petitioner.” Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn. 2017).

Moreover, the petitioner must provide “more than argumentative assertions without factual

support.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Davis does not show how the district court minimized, misconstrued, or ignored his

petition. Because the state did not file a response, it is not clear what or how the district

court is “liberally construing” anything in favor of the state.

To this end, Davis contends that the state’s failure to file a response to his petition

for postconviction relief “interfered” with the adversarial process and his due-process

rights. He reasons that because the state never submitted a response, the district court

“volunteer[ed] arguments on behalf of the state and then decide[d] in the state’s favor.”

We are not persuaded.

Davis does not explain how he was prejudiced by the absence of the state’s decision

not to file a response. Despite his assertion that the district court “volunteered” arguments

on behalf of the state, the district court simply evaluated his petition under the applicable

standards of review.

II. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Davis’s
postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.

A postconviction court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a petition for

postconviction relief “[u]nless the petition, files, and record from the proceeding

conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1;

17

see also Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 671 (Minn. 2020) (“A district court need

not hold an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, even if true, are

legally insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief.”). “The postconviction court must

hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes that are material to determining the

legal issues raised in the postconviction petition when those factual disputes were not

resolved in the proceedings resulting in a conviction.” Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d 295,

303 (Minn. 2021). However, “the factual dispute must be material.” Id. When determining

whether the petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court is

required to consider the facts alleged in the petition as true and construe them in the light

most favorable to the petitioner. Henderson v. State, 906 N.W.2d 501, 507 (Minn. 2018).

“[T]he burden is on a petitioner to show facts entitling the petitioner to relief.” Allwine,

994 N.W.2d at 541. “We review the ultimate decision by the postconviction court to grant

or deny an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.” Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d

766, 770 (Minn. 2014).

To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, Davis must allege such facts that, “if proved

by a fair preponderance of the evidence,” would entitle him to the requested relief. Chavez-

Nelson, 948 N.W.2d at 671 (quotation omitted). But the record supports the postconviction

court’s denial of Davis’s request for a hearing because even if Davis’s allegations were

proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, he has not demonstrated that he is entitled

to his requested relief. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Davis’s request for

an evidentiary hearing.

18

In sum, Davis’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims are barred by Knaffla

because the issues were known, or should have been known, to him at the time of his direct

appeal. And his postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are

largely based on ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims that were rejected by this

court in his first appeal. See Davis, 2024 WL 2814441, at *5-9. Because the postconviction

court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying Davis’s postconviction claims, we

affirm.

Affirmed.

19