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Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).*

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1681**

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Lee Edmondson,
Appellant.

**Filed September 8, 2026
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge***

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-23-1159

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

KIRK, Judge

In this direct appeal from convictions for second-degree intentional murder and unlawful possession of a firearm, appellant argues (1) that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a justifiable-use-of-force jury instruction; (2) that the district court also abused its discretion when it excluded testimony about the victim's previous violent acts; and (3) that the district court erred in determining that appellant's prior conviction for aiding-and-abetting second-degree murder was a heinous crime for sentencing purposes. In a self-represented supplemental brief, appellant further contends that the district court provided a plainly erroneous duty-to-retreat jury instruction. Because we discern no errors or abuse of discretion by the district court, we affirm.

FACTS

The following facts derive from a jury trial. On February 25, 2023, appellant John Lee Edmondson attended a repass gathering in the community room of an apartment building in St. Paul.¹ The gathering was attended by approximately 50 family members and friends, including victims T.K. and L.J.

Later in the afternoon as the repass was winding down, T.K. and another attendee began arguing in the community room, and their conflict spilled out into the building's parking lot. Witnesses reported seeing one of the individuals grab a gun or otherwise

¹ A repass is a get-together held after a funeral to offer support and a meal to the family of the individual who passed away.

hearing that someone was getting a gun. A number of attendees were standing in the parking lot, including L.J.

Edmondson was getting into his car with his mother and niece to leave the repass, unaware of the altercation. As Edmondson drove through the parking lot, Edmondson's mother testified that she saw L.J. "standing there with the gun" and told Edmondson to stop the car. Witnesses described that they then saw Edmondson jump out of his car and shoot L.J. twice in the back of the head and neck. L.J.'s sister testified that she attempted to administer aid to L.J. and, at the same time, pulled a pistol out of L.J.'s waistband and tossed it away.

After Edmondson fired the two shots, other armed attendees in the parking lot began to shoot at Edmondson, who returned fire. T.K. was shot at some point during the shootout, but amidst the chaos, it was unclear who had shot him. Before leaving the scene, some witnesses recalled hearing Edmondson say, "If anybody else wants it, they can get it, too." L.J. died from his injuries in the parking lot. T.K. also succumbed to his injuries after being driven to the hospital.

Edmondson was arrested at a hotel several days later in connection with both deaths. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Edmondson with first-degree premeditated murder of L.J., in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2022); first-degree intentional murder of L.J. while committing a felony, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2022); two counts of second-degree intentional murder for L.J. and T.K., in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2022); second-degree unintentional felony murder of

T.K., in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2022); and unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022).

Trial

A jury trial was held between March 26 and April 14, 2025. The state presented dozens of witnesses, including responding and investigating officers, forensic scientists, and eyewitnesses who attended the repass and saw the events transpire in the parking lot. The state also presented numerous exhibits, including photos taken at the scene, diagrams of the parking lot, and surveillance video of different portions of the repass and ensuing gunfight. The defense presented testimony from Edmondson and several other eyewitnesses.

At trial, Edmondson argued that he acted in defense of others by shooting L.J. To support that defense, Edmondson sought to introduce testimony about L.J.’s general reputation for violence and prior violent acts. The district court allowed reputation evidence to be admitted into evidence but prohibited Edmondson from introducing any testimony about L.J.’s specific violent acts unless Edmondson had personal knowledge of them. Later in the trial, defense counsel alerted the court that Edmondson did have personal knowledge of one such specific instance in which L.J. shot a man “eight times around 2020 or 2021.” Counsel argued that, based on L.J.’s reputation for violence and Edmondson’s knowledge of the prior shooting, Edmondson made the decision to shoot L.J. in order to protect “[e]verybody that was standing out there” in the parking lot. The district court still excluded the testimony but did not elaborate on its reasoning.

Edmondson testified at length during the trial. Edmondson described that L.J.'s reputation meant that "[y]ou just don't want to be playing with him," but at the time of the repass, he had a good relationship with L.J. and there was "[a]bsolutely not" any friction between the two.

Edmondson also provided his own narrative of the incident. He stated that he had seen L.J. standing in the parking lot with a "gun behind his back," which L.J. then cocked. Edmondson stated that he felt "shocked" and he "just jumped out the door" and "moved real fast . . . in front of [L.J.]." Edmondson stated that he saw L.J. begin to raise the gun at a bystander, and he tried to grab the gun but "[L.J.] wouldn't give it to [him]." Edmondson then "just shot twice," which he described as more of a reaction than a conscious choice. Immediately after, "all of the shots start[ed] coming" from elsewhere in the parking lot, and so Edmondson "just turned and defended [himself]."

On cross-examination, the prosecutor pushed Edmondson to admit that he intended to kill L.J. or premeditated it. The following exchange occurred:

Q: And you shot without aiming is your testimony?

A: Well, I shot towards here (indicating), yes. Towards his neck, yes. I guess, yes.

Q: And you shot more than once?

A: Yes, I shot twice.

Q: Shot the second time to make sure he was dead?

A: (No audible response.)

Q: Right?

A: I wouldn't say that.

Q: You didn't shoot him in the back of his head?

A: No.

Q: Okay.

A: Back of his head? I thought he got shot in the neck.

Q: Neck, head, general area, do you agree you shot him in the back of the neck or head?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that was to make sure you killed him?

A: I wouldn't say that. It was just a reaction, and I just shot the gun.

Based on that testimony, Edmondson's counsel requested to include a general justifiable-use-of-force jury instruction in addition to the specific justifiable-taking-a-life instruction already included.² The district court denied the request because Edmondson did not give a "complete denial" to the question about whether he intended to kill L.J., and so the justifiable-taking-of-life instruction was more apt. The final jury instructions related to the charge of second-degree intentional murder of L.J. therefore stated:

The Defendant asserts the defense of justifiable taking of life in defense of others. Again, no crime is committed when a person intentionally takes the life of another if the person's action was taken in resisting or preventing an offense that the person reasonably believed exposed another person to death or great bodily harm.

The instructions also noted that the defense-of-others defense is available "only to those who act honestly and in good faith" and "only if the person was not the aggressor and did not provoke the offense."

² The general justifiable-use-of-force instruction is appropriate when a defendant's actions taken in self-defense or in defense of others unintentionally resulted in another's death. 10 *Minnesota Practice*, CRIMJIG 6.10 (2025). In contrast, the justifiable-taking-a-life instruction applies when the defendant intentionally took another's life but argues it was justified to protect themselves or others. 10 *Minnesota Practice*, CRIMJIG 6.12 (2025).

The jury found Edmondson guilty of second-degree intentional murder of L.J. and unlawful possession of a firearm. Edmondson was acquitted of the remaining charges.

Sentencing

Prior to sentencing, the state moved for a 40-year mandatory minimum sentence to be applied to Edmondson’s second-degree murder conviction based on his prior conviction for a “heinous crime”—aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder—under Minnesota Statutes sections 609.106 and 609.107 (2022). Edmondson’s counsel filed a responsive brief arguing that aiding and abetting an offense did not fall under the definition of a “heinous crime.”

At the sentencing hearing the district court agreed with the state, determining that Edmondson’s prior conviction was a heinous crime and that the mandatory sentence applied. The district court sentenced Edmondson to 480 months’ imprisonment for second-degree murder and a concurrent 72 months’ imprisonment for unlawful possession of a firearm.³

Edmondson appeals.

DECISION

Edmondson makes four arguments on appeal. First, Edmondson argues that the district court abused its discretion at trial by rejecting his requested general justifiable-use-of-force instruction. Second, he asserts that the court also abused its discretion by excluding

³ Edmondson later filed a preliminary application to vacate his aiding and abetting second-degree intentional felony murder conviction, which the district court summarily denied. He challenges the denial of that application in a separate appeal.

testimony about L.J.’s prior act of violence. Third, Edmondson maintains that his prior conviction for aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder was not a heinous crime under Minn. Stat. § 609.106 (2022). And fourth, Edmondson argues in his self-represented brief that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the duty to retreat. We consider each argument in turn.

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by omitting the general justifiable-use-of-force instruction.

Edmondson first challenges the district court’s omission of his requested jury instruction for general justifiable use of force, and inclusion of only the specific justifiable-taking-a-life instruction, as related to the defense of others.

District courts have “considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions.” *State v. Peltier*, 874 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2016). We review the district court’s decision to deny a jury instruction request for an abuse of discretion. *State v. Carridine*, 812 N.W.2d 130, 142 (Minn. 2012). “It is an abuse of the district court’s discretion to refuse to give an instruction on the defendant’s theory of the case if there is evidence to support it.” *State v. Baker*, 13 N.W.3d 401, 408 (Minn. 2024) (quotations omitted). If a district court erred in its instructions, appellate courts then consider whether the error was “harmless,” meaning that, “beyond a reasonable doubt, the instruction had no significant impact on the verdict rendered.” *State v. Larson*, 787 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2010).

Under Minnesota law, there are certain circumstances in which one may use reasonable force to defend others. *State v. Pollard*, 900 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. App. 2017). A person may generally use “reasonable force” when “resisting or aiding another to

resist an offense against the person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2022). This general authorization, however, does not permit the intentional taking of a life. Minn. Stat. § 609.065 (2022). Instead, a person may only intentionally take the life of another “when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the [person] reasonably believes exposes . . . another to great bodily harm or death.” *Id.* This is known as the justifiable-taking-of-life defense. *Pollard*, 900 N.W.2d at 179.

It is appropriate for a district court to instruct the jury on justifiable taking of life “where the defendant *admits* that the killing was intentional but claims that it was justified.” *State v. Malaski*, 330 N.W.2d 447, 453 (Minn. 1983) (emphasis added). When a defendant claims that the victim’s death was “not the intended result,” it is error to provide a specific justifiable-taking-of-life instruction, and a general justifiable-use-of-force instruction should be given instead. *Pollard*, 900 N.W.2d at 179.

Edmondson asserts that, because he did not admit that he intended to kill L.J. and he was “just reacting in the moment,” the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a general justifiable-use-of-force instruction. We are not persuaded. Edmondson was only entitled to the general instruction if it was supported by the evidence. *Baker*, 13 N.W.3d at 408; *see also State v. Hare*, 575 N.W.2d 828, 833 n.6 (Minn. 1998) (“Obviously, when the record before the trial court does not contain evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the death was unintentional, the use of [the general instruction] is not required.”). Edmondson testified that he intentionally shot L.J. twice and he aimed “[t]owards his neck.” And, as the district court pointed out, Edmondson did not fully deny that he intended to kill L.J.—instead, when the prosecutor asked whether

Edmondson meant to “make sure [he] killed [L.J.],” Edmondson only answered that he “wouldn’t say that.” Little evidence supports the conclusion that Edmondson lacked the intent to kill sufficient to justify including a general justifiable-use-of-force instruction.

We are further convinced that the district court acted within its discretion here when viewing these facts in comparison with other murder cases where courts have provided the general justifiable-use-of-force instruction to the jury. For example, in *Baker*, the supreme court held that Baker was entitled to a general justifiable-use-of-force instruction with respect to defense of others after Baker reacted to an armed carjacking by shooting one of the assailants eleven times, killing him. 13 N.W.3d at 405-06, 411-12. The supreme court stated that there was “sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the degree of force used was reasonable,” and so a new trial was appropriate. *Id.* at 411-12. Similarly, in *State v. Valdez*, a general defense-of-others instruction was given when Valdez shot and killed a man who was choking his stepbrother and who had already been struck over the head with a pool cue but had remained undeterred in his attack. 12 N.W.3d 191, 194-95, 201 (Minn. 2024). Edmondson, by contrast, was not involved in any ongoing altercation with L.J. as in *Baker*, nor did he witness L.J. in an active altercation with anyone else like *Valdez*. Even accepting Edmondson’s version of events as true, he instead inserted himself into the situation and almost immediately reacted with deadly force. In light of the facts in *Baker* and *Valdez*, Edmondson’s argument that he was entitled to a general justifiable-use-of-force instruction is not persuasive.

Although a general justifiable-use-of-force instruction is typically required when a defendant does not claim intent to kill, *see Pollard*, 900 N.W.2d at 179, here, there is

insufficient evidence to support that Edmondson did not intend to kill L.J. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to instruct the jury only on justifiable taking of a life.⁴

II. The district court’s exclusion of testimony about L.J.’s prior act of violence was harmless.

Edmondson next argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding relevant and admissible testimony about L.J. previously shooting a man in 2020 or 2021. Edmondson further argues that the exclusion of this evidence was not harmless because the jury was deprived of hearing all evidence necessary to consider Edmondson’s defense.

Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,” which includes presenting witness testimony to support a defense. *State v. Penkaty*, 708 N.W.2d 185, 201 (Minn. 2006); *see also* U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. Appellate courts review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

⁴ Indeed, we are not convinced that Edmondson was entitled to any defense-of-others instruction under these facts. Edmondson unlawfully brought a gun to a gathering where he knew others were likely armed. Then, based on the mere sight of L.J. holding a gun, Edmondson leapt from his car and shot L.J., instigating a shootout in a busy parking lot that resulted in multiple casualties. Not only could Edmondson be viewed as the aggressor of this conflict, but his actions also represent the type of unnecessary escalation that courts aim to discourage under longstanding public policy related to self-defense claims. *See, e.g., State v. Shippey*, 10 Minn. 223, 232 (1865) (“Where the party has not retreated from or attempted to shun the combat, but has as in this case unnecessarily entered into it, his act is not one of self-defense.”); *State v. Devens*, 852 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Minn. 2014) (declining to extend the castle doctrine where it “might encourage, rather than discourage, unnecessary and potentially deadly confrontations”); *State v. Blevins*, 10 N.W.3d 29, 37 (Minn. 2024) (“[W]e have described the public policy interests underlying the judicially created duty to retreat . . . to include avoiding potentially deadly confrontations.” (quotation omitted)). Although a self-defense claim is not at issue here, defense-of-others claims nevertheless “parallel[]” self-defense, *Valdez*, 12 N.W.3d at 197, and so Edmondson’s actions still ought to be discouraged under the same general policy.

discretion “even when . . . the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” *State v. Zumberge*, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). Reversal is appropriate “only if the exclusion of evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.*

A defense-of-others claim requires the defendant to establish four elements: (1) the defendant was not the aggressor, (2) the defendant held an “actual and honest belief that . . . another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm,” (3) that belief was reasonable, and (4) there was no “reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid danger.” *Id.* The defendant has the burden to present evidence supporting each element, and the prosecution has the burden to disprove at least one element beyond a reasonable doubt. *See id.*

Prior-acts evidence may be relevant and admissible to show that the defendant reasonably apprehended death or great bodily harm. *Penkaty*, 708 N.W.2d at 202; *see also State v. Matthews*, 221 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Minn. 1974) (“[E]vidence of a specific act of violence is admissible in the discretion of the trial court where commonsense indicates that these acts could legitimately affect a defendant’s apprehensions.”). But even if evidence is relevant to show reasonable apprehension, the rules of evidence may still provide reason to exclude it. *Penkaty*, 708 N.W.2d at 203.

Edmondson asserts that the district court improperly excluded testimony about L.J.’s prior act—which Edmondson claimed to have personal knowledge of—because that testimony was relevant, admissible, and highly probative. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

Minn. R. Evid. 401. But relevant evidence may still be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.

It is difficult to fully discern the relevance and the potential probative value of L.J.’s prior act because Edmondson provided scant details about the act and his knowledge of it. The testimony was proffered in a sidebar at trial, and Edmondson’s attorney even said that he “presume[d]” the testimony was “not coming in.” The evidence may have corroborated Edmondson’s argument that he acted in defense of others and reasonably apprehended harm, suggesting that it was relevant and admissible. *Cf. Penkaty*, 708 N.W.2d at 203 (concluding that a district court abused its discretion by excluding specific acts testimony that would have corroborated the defendant’s defense-of-others claim). But without additional information about the testimony, the district court was limited in its ability to weigh the testimony’s probative or prejudicial value, or to assess whether the testimony made it more probable that Edmondson believed that L.J. posed an imminent danger to others. *See* Minn. R. Evid. 401, 403.

Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence, we nevertheless are convinced that the exclusion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We “may consider the strength of each party’s evidence when determining whether admitting excluded evidence would have led to a different result.” *Zumberge*, 888 N.W.2d at 697. The state presented compelling evidence that Edmondson did not reasonably or honestly believe that L.J. posed an imminent danger to others in the moments before the shooting, and it therefore made a strong case to disprove two elements

of Edmondson's defense. *See id.* at 694 (listing elements of a defense-of-others claim). During cross-examination of Edmondson, the state elicited testimony that L.J. had not fully raised his gun when Edmondson shot him, and that there was "[n]othing about . . . previous interactions [with L.J.] that caused [Edmondson] any concern that day." Edmondson also had no knowledge of the conflict that broke out at the end of the repass, as he left prior to the argument starting. Additionally, several of the state's witnesses cast doubt on Edmondson's account of the shooting, testifying that L.J. was not holding a gun when he was shot.

Moreover, Edmondson did not provide strong evidence proving the other elements of his defense—namely, that he was not the aggressor and that there was no reasonable possibility of retreat. As we have already discussed, Edmondson inserted himself into this situation, fired the first shot, and testified that he and L.J. had no problems at the repass. The only other evidence Edmondson presented to support his defense theory was that L.J. had a reputation as someone you did not want to be "playing" with and that L.J. was raising a gun, which was disputed by other witnesses. Taken together, these facts do not strongly support all four elements of a defense-of-others defense. Even if Edmondson's testimony about L.J.'s prior act was admitted, we are persuaded that the state's strong case against Edmondson would have still led the jury to reject Edmondson's defense. We conclude that the exclusion of Edmondson's testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

III. The district court did not err in determining that Edmondson’s prior conviction was a “heinous crime” under Minn. Stat. § 609.106.

Edmondson next maintains that the district court erroneously concluded that his prior conviction for aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder was a “heinous crime,” resulting in the court wrongfully sentencing Edmondson to the maximum sentence duration under Minnesota Statutes section 609.107. Edmondson specifically argues that aiding and abetting is not a “heinous crime.”

We review statutory interpretation questions de novo. *State v. Holl*, 966 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Minn. 2021). A defendant convicted of second-degree intentional murder must be sentenced to the “statutory maximum sentence for the offense” if they were “previously convicted of a heinous crime as defined in section 609.106.” Minn. Stat. § 609.107. A “heinous crime” means “a violation or attempted violation of section . . . 609.19,” which includes second-degree felony murder. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.106, subd. 1(a)(1), .19, subd. 2(1) (2022). Edmondson was convicted of aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder in 1994. *See State v. Edmondson*, No. C0-94-1708, 1995 WL 254354, at *2-3 (Minn. App. May 2, 1995), *rev. denied* (Minn. June 29, 1995).

In *Browder v. State*, this court recognized “a long-standing precept of statutory criminal law, which is that there is no distinction between a principal offender and an accomplice who aids and abets the principal’s crime.” 899 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. App. 2017), *rev. denied* (Minn. Aug. 22, 2017). The statutory language interpreted in *Browder* to encompass aiding-and-abetting crimes mirrors the language of the “heinous crime” statute, and so we are convinced that the same precept applies. *Id.*

Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2012) (imposing a ten-year conditional-release period for “a violation of” an enumerated offense); *with* Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd. 1(a)(1) (defining as a heinous crime “a violation of” an enumerated homicide offense). We conclude, as the district court did, that Edmondson’s prior conviction for aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder therefore meets the definition of a “heinous crime.”⁵

IV. The district court’s duty-to-retreat instruction was not plainly erroneous.

In a *pro se* supplemental brief, Edmondson last argues that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the duty-to-retreat element of his defense-of-others defense.

Edmondson objected to the jury instruction during sentencing but not during trial. We review unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error. *State v. Milton*, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012). “Under our plain-error test, we consider whether the jury instructions contained an (1) error (2) that was plain and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” *Id.* If all three prongs are met, we then consider “whether we must address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” *Id.* (quotation omitted).

⁵ Edmondson also requested that, if this court concludes that his prior conviction was a heinous crime, we also specifically preserve his ability to request resentencing. We note that Edmondson is entitled to seek a sentencing correction “at any time” under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, and no specific permission is required from this court to do so. And we note that Edmondson’s other appeal in *Edmondson v. State*, __N.W.3d __ (Minn. App. Aug. 24, 2026), that was released on August 24, 2026, would only impact our opinion if the conviction at issue in that case is vacated on remand following the remand ordered by this court.

Edmondson argues that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the persons in peril that he sought to defend “had a duty to retreat before Edmondson could defend them.” The jury instruction stated: “Fourth, the Defendant must have reasonably believed, based on the information available to the Defendant at the time the Defendant acted, that the person or persons the Defendant sought to defend had no reasonable possibility of safely retreating from or avoiding the danger.” This instruction plainly required that the persons in peril “had no reasonable possibility of safely retreating,” not that they must retreat. This wording is accurate to the rule recently stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court regarding the duty to retreat in a defense-of-others claim, which is that “the person in peril must not have had a reasonable possibility of safe retreat.” *Valdez*, 12 N.W.3d at 199 (emphasis omitted). The instruction given at trial accurately stated the rule and was not erroneous.

Edmondson also argues that, under *Baker*, people in peril have no duty to retreat when firearms are involved. But *Baker* does not provide any broad exception to the duty-to-retreat. Rather, the supreme court determined under the specific facts of that case that the individuals in peril did not have a reasonable possibility of retreating because they were in a car and within an armed assailant’s line of fire. 13 N.W.3d at 411. Because *Baker* simply applied the *Valdez* duty-to-retreat rule, we again identify no error in the district court’s instruction.

In sum, we detect no error, let alone plain error, in the district court's duty-to-retreat instructions. We therefore do not reach the remaining prongs of the plain-error test. *State v. Brown*, 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn. 2012) ("If we conclude that any prong of the plain error analysis is not satisfied, we need not consider the other prongs.").

Affirmed.