Kristin Harner, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1694

Kristin Harner, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

FBL Financial Services, Inc., et al.,
Respondents,

Guy J Dawson,
Defendant.

Filed May 26, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CV-23-2730

Brock P. Alton, Hellmuth & Johnson PLLC, Woodbury, Minnesota (for appellants)

Louise A. Behrend t, Tony R. Krall, Joel M. Muscoplat, Meagher + Geer, P.L.L.P.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellants-insureds challenge the summary judgment granted to respondents -
insurers, arguing that the district court erred by (1) not reforming appellants’ policy to
comply with Minn. Stat. § 65A.01 (2024), (2) and instead concluding that the policy’s plain
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language clearly did not provide fire coverage for one of appellants’ buildings, and (3)
concluding that an expert opinion would be required to establish the relevant standard of
care. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 10, 2020, appellants Kristin and Steven Harner (the Harners), owners of
a property that included their home and three other buildings, met on their property with
an insurance agent and an underwriter from respondents FBL Financial Services, Inc.,
Farm Bureau Financial Services, and Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Company
(collectively, FBL) to get a quote. One building, known as the Frame Shop, was assessed
at a replacement cost of $128,156.87 and an actual cash value of $35,076.49. An on-site
evaluation stated that the Frame Shop could not be insured for fire because it contained a
wood stove that was not approved and did not have the correct insulation.
On March 26, 202 0, Kristin Harner emailed two questions to the insurance agent:
(1) if the wood stove were placed at an adequate distance outside the Frame Shop, could
the Frame Shop have fire coverage; and (2) if a fire were to start in shavings in the summer,
would the Frame Shop have coverage. The insurance agent forwarded the questions to the
underwriter, who answered that (1) the Frame Shop could obtain fire coverage if the stove
were outside and at an acceptable distance, and (2) if fire/lightning co verage could not be
offered on a structure, no other fire coverage could be offered on that structure.
The Harners purchased a n FBL Member’s Choice Policy with effective dates of
April 7, 2020, to April 7, 2021. The coverage limit for the Frame Shop was $32,100 with
a deductible of $2,500. Under the Frame Shop heading were the words “Actual Cash
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Value,” and “Extended (2 -10) – No Fire or Lightning.” The Frame Shop coverage limit
was increased to $108,800 in the amended declarations in June 2020. In the renewal
declarations for 2021-2022, the Frame Shop coverage limit was increased to $115,700; in
the renewal declarations for 2022-2023, it was increased to $127,300. As with the original
policy, the words “Actual Cash Value,” and “Extended (2-10) – No Fire or Lightning” were
under the Frame Shop heading.
On April 18, 2022, the Frame Shop and personal property inside it were damaged
by a building fire. Kristin Harner called the FBL insurance agent to report the incident.
On August 4, 2022, FBL sent Kristin Harner a disclaimer of coverage because the policy
provided no coverage for any Frame Shop losses caused by fire. The Harners filed a
complaint against FBL, asserting claims for declaratory judgment, breach of contract,
negligence, and reformation. FBL filed an answer, then a motion for summary judgment
seeking dismissal of all appellants’ claims. Appellants filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, asking the district court (1) to order reformation of the policy to provide fire
coverage and/or to find that the policy did not preclude such coverage and (2) to enter
judgment of $127,300, their current policy’s coverage limit, for appellants against FBL .
Steven Harner filed a declaration stating that they had built an inferior replacement for the
Frame Shop for $309,395.15 and that replacing it with an equivalent would cost them
$402,227.17.
After a hearing on the parties’ motions, the district court granted FBL’s motion for
summary judgment and denied the Harners’ motion for partial summary judgment. The
Harners’ appeal, arguing that the summary judgment granted to FBL should be reversed, a
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grant of partial summary judgment of $127,300 for the Harners and against FBL should be
entered, and the matter should be remanded “for further proceedings on the question of
negligence in setting insurance limits, for which [the Harners] are entitled to [a] jury trial.”
DECISION
On appeal from summary judgment, this court examines de novo whether any
genuine issues of material fact prevent summary judgment and whether the district c ourt
erred in applying the law. STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P. , 644 N.W.2d 72,
76-77 (Minn. 2002). Both the interpretation of an insurance policy and whether a policy
provides coverage in a particular situation are questions of law that we review de novo.
Depositors Ins. Co. v. Dollansky , 919 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Minn. 2018) . “[I]n an action to
determine coverage, the insured must establish a prima facie case of coverage.” Eng’g &
Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L. H. Bolduc Co., 825 N.W.2d 695, 705 (Minn. 2013)
(quotations omitted).
1. District court’s failure to reform policy
The Harners argue that FBL was required to provide fire insurance for the Frame
Shop. The district court determined that:
In this case, the Policy provisions state that the
Declarations control what coverage each individual property
item has. . . . The Declarations specifically omit coverage for
fire or lightning for the Frame Shop. This specific omission of
fire coverage has been included in every iteration of the
Declarations.

The Harners do not refute this, but argue that “the Standard Fire Policy [set out in
Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd.1] explicitly contemplates that as it relates to losses by fire, its
terms are applicable where other risks are also covered.” To support their position, the
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Harners rely on a footnote in Henning Nelson Const ruction Co. v. Fireman’s Fund
American Life Insurance Co., 383 N.W.2d 645, 651 n 8. (Minn. 1986). But as the district
court explained, Henning actually holds that “the provisions of the [Minnesota] Standard
Fire Insurance Policy apply only to fire losses, not nonfire losses, under an all-risk policy.”
Henning does not hold that all-risk policies are required to provide fire coverage pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 65A.01. See id. The district court went on to quote General Mills, Inc. v.
Gold Medal Insurance Co., which states “[R]ecovery under an ‘all -risk’ policy will, as a
rule, be allowed for all fortuitous losses not resulting from misconduct or fraud, unless the
policy contains a specific provision expressly excluding the loss from coverage. ” 622
N.W.2d 147, 152 (Minn. App. 2001) (emphasis added and quotations omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 17, 2001 ). Here, the policy had specific provisions excluding fire and
lightning loss from the coverage for the Frame Shop.
The Harners also argue that the policy “must be reformed because it does not comply
with the terms of the statute.” But they misread Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd. 1. It provides
that, if a policy provides coverage for fire damage that does not employ the statutory
language, it must “afford the insured all the rights and benefits of the Minnesota standard
fire insurance policy and such additional benefits as the policy p rovides.” Minn. Stat.
§ 65A.01, subd. 1. The statute does not provide either that a policy must provide fire
coverage or that, if a policy provides fire coverage for any of the property insured, it must
provide fire coverage for all the property insured. See id. The Harners’ arguments that the
policy must be reformed to comply with the statute fail . We therefore conclude that the
district court did not err in declining to reform the policy.
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2. Failure to exclude fire coverage
The Harners argue that “FBL failed to exclude fire coverage on the Frame Shop
under the plain language of [its] very own policy ” or “[a]t the very least FBL created
ambiguity in its effort to do so, and that ambiguity must be read in favor of [the insureds].”
Specifically, they argue that the term “Extended 2-10” used before “No Fire and Lightning”
was confusing because the only causes of loss in the policy are “Named” and “Special”;
there is no “Extended ” category, and the term “Extended” is not defined . The term “No
Fire and Lightning” therefore failed to remove fire and lightning coverage. The district
court rejected this argument: “[T]he phrase connected to ‘Extended (2-10)’ explicitly states
‘No Fire or Lightning.’ . . . While . . . FBL . . . could have used more consistent wording,
the Court will not read an ambiguity into the Policy so as to provide coverage to [the
Harners].” The District Court went on to state: “In the Policy, the Frame Shop specifically
has a limitation in the Declarations stating “Extended (2-10) – No Fire or Lightning.” We
agree.
Moreover, the Harners do not refute the district court’s reliance on Kristin Harner’s
deposition that she “ acknowledge[ed] receipt of the March 2020 email chain where [the
FBL underwriter] states no fire/lightning coverage is being offered for the Frame Shop”
and “explain[ed] that she saw there was no fire or lightning coverage for the Frame Shop
and was following up with [the agent] for clarification regarding why only the Frame Shop
was excluded from coverage.” The deposition transcript supports the district court’s
determination. For example, Kristin Harner was questioned about the time before the
Harners signed the policy:
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Q. [Y]ou understood that [FBL was] saying there’s no
coverage for fire and lightning because of the presence
of the stove and you and your husband were trying to
figure out why . . . it says no coverage for fire and
lightning, . . . and does that make sense [,] and [you]
want[ed] some more clarifications?

A. We continued to ask for clarification.

Q. Because there wa s no coverage for fire and lightning,
and that triggered your questions?

A. It triggered a lot of questions because we . . . never heard
[of] this type of situation.

Q. You’re saying to yourself, as I understand it, why are
they excluding fire and lightning and that led to a bunch
of other questions?

A. Correct . . . .

. . . .

Q. [The underwriter replied in answer to your question
about a fire that did not involve the stove by saying that]
unfortunately, when [FBL is] not offering fire/lightning
coverage on a structure, there is no fire coverage of any
kind offered on the structure. Did that not clarify for
you that no matter what the scenario was, even if the
wood stove is not involved, there’s no fire coverage of
any kind?

A. So as you stated, the date on here is March 27th.

Q. Prior to the issuance of the policy.

A. And we continued to ask questions . . . because . . . this
made no sense.

Q. . . . what you’re saying is , sure, we saw that there’s no
coverage there, but it made no sense to us?

A. It still doesn’t make any sense.

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Q. But, I mean, is what I said the way you two were looking
at it.

A. Correct . . . .

In light of this testimony, t he Harners cannot claim either that their policy did not
exclude fire and lightning coverage or that they did not know it excluded fire and lightning
coverage for the Frame Shop when they purchased it. Thus, the district court did not err in
determining that the policy excluded fire coverage as to the Frame Shop.
3. Dismissal of Negligence Claim
The Harners argue that, because they spent $309,395.15 building a replacement for
the Frame Shop and an exact replacement would have cost $402,227.17, FBL was
negligent in assessing the value of the Frame Shop. The district court determined that “the
standard of care regarding valuation of property for purposes of establishing appropriate
insurance coverage is beyond the general knowledge and experience of lay persons. It
would be speculative for a factfinder to decide the issue of negligence in this matter without
expert testimony.” No expert testimony was provided, and the district court therefore
correctly dismissed the Harners’ negligence claim. Because there was no fire coverage,
there were no damages, and the negligence claim therefore fails.
We conclude that the district court did not err in granting FBL’s motion for summary
judgment dismissing the Harners’ claims and in denying the Harners’ motion for partial
summary judgment.
Affirmed.