Fredric A. Wilson, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1701

Fredric A. Wilson,
Relator,

vs.

Jerry’s Enterprises, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed May 26, 2026
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51240808-6

Fredric A. Wilson, St. Paul, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

Jerry’s Enterprises, Inc., Edina, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Melannie Markham, Keri Phillips, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Frisch , Chief Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Respondent Jerry’s Enterprises, Inc., discharged relator Fredric A. Wilson for
repeated absences from scheduled shifts without advance notice. Wilson subsequently
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applied for unemployment benefits . Respondent Minnesota Department of Employment
and Economic Development (DEED) determined that Wilson was ineligible for benefits.
Wilson appealed DEED’s determination, and an unemployment-law judge (ULJ)
determined that Wilson was ineligible for benefits because his employer discharged him
due to employment misconduct. On a writ of certiorari to this court, Wilson argues that
the ULJ erred by (1) failing to fully develop the record and (2) determining that Wilson’s
absences constituted employment misconduc t. Wilson also argues that (3) the ULJ’s
decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2024, Wilson began working at Cub Foods, which is owned by Jerry’s
Enterprises, Inc. During orientation, Wilson was informed that employees are expected to
work their scheduled shifts and must notify Cub Foods in advance of any absences.
In the six months that Wilson worked at Cub Foods, he missed thirteen shifts. Cub
Foods discharged Wilson on October 8, 2024, after he missed four shifts in a row. Wilson
missed two scheduled shifts on October 4 and 5 to attend a funeral and had notified Cub
Foods in advance consistent with the policy. But Wilson did not notify Cub Foods before
he missed a scheduled shift on October 6 or before he missed another scheduled shift on
October 7. Wilson was discharged the next day.
Wilson applied for unemployment benefits. DEED determined that Wilson was
ineligible for benefits because he was discharged for employment misconduct. Wilson
appealed DEED’s determination of ineligibility.
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At a remote hearing, a ULJ heard conflicting testimony from Wilson and the Cub
Foods assistant store director and admitted numerous exhibits into evidence. The ULJ
continued the hearing to allow Wilson time to submit additional evidence explaining some
of his absences. Wilson failed to provide any of the supplemental evidence that the ULJ
had requested. When the ULJ reconvened the hearing, Wilson did not appear. The ULJ
then summarily dismissed Wilson’s appeal.
Wilson requested reconsideration of the ULJ’s summary dismissal of Wilson’s
appeal. The ULJ denied Wilson’s request for reconsideration. Wilson petitioned this court
for a writ of certiorari. DEED filed a motion for an order to remand for further proceedings,
which we granted.
On remand, the ULJ held another hearing. The ULJ heard testimony from Wilson,
Wilson’s significant other, the Cub Foods assistant store director, and a Cub Foods human
resources manager. The ULJ also admitted more exhibits into evidence.
The ULJ found that Wilson was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he
was discharged as a result of employment misconduct. The ULJ found that Cub Foods had
a reasonable policy that employees were expected “to work their scheduled shifts and [to]
notify Cub prior to their shift if they were going to be absent.” The ULJ also found that
Wilson was aware of this policy and violated it due to “a chronic pattern of being absent
without notification.” The ULJ specifically credited the assistant store director’s testimony
and found Wilson’s testimony to be not credible.
Wilson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to seek review of the ULJ’s decision.
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DECISION
We review the ULJ’s findings of fact “in the light most favorable to the decision”
and we will not “disturb those findings as long as there is evidence in the record that
reasonably tends to sustain them.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315
(Minn. 2011). “Whether an employee engaged in conduct that disqualifies [them] from
unemployment benefits is a mixed question of fact and law.” Id. (quotation omitted). We
view the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision.
Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006). But whether a
particular act “constitutes employment misconduct is a question of law, which we review
de novo.” Id.
I. The ULJ adequately developed the record.

Wilson argues that the ULJ erred by failing to develop the record as required by
Minnesota Administrative Rule 3310.2921 (2025), which provides that a ULJ “must assist
all parties in the presentation of evidence” and must “ensure that all relevant facts are
clearly and fully developed.” We conclude that the ULJ satisfied and complied with the
requirements of the rule.
The ULJ asked fair questions of witnesses on both sides. The ULJ also continued a
hearing to allow Wilson to submit documents to explain his absences , but Wilson did not
submit any of the requested material. Based on this record, the ULJ fulfilled the obligation
of developing the record to ensure a fair hearing.
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II. The ULJ did not err in determining that the employer discharged Wilson due
to employment misconduct.

Wilson argues that the ULJ erred in concluding that the employer discharged
Wilson due to employment misconduct. We disagree.
An applicant is ineligible for unemployment benefits if they were discharged due to
employment misconduct. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2024). “Employment
misconduct” is defined as “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct . . . that is a
serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably
expect of the employee.” Id., subd. 6(a) (2024).
The ULJ determined that Cub Foods discarged Wilson because of his extensive
absences. Whether absenteeism constitutes employment misconduct is a case-specific
inquiry. Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 316. The ULJ found that Cub Foods had a reasonable
policy that required employees to work their scheduled shifts and provide notice before a
shift starts if they will be absent. The ULJ found that Wilson was aware of this policy, but
his “behavior showed a serious violation of the employer’s reasonable expectations.”
The ULJ did not err in determining that Wilson knew about Cub Foods’ reasonable
policy, and that Wilson’s behavior of absenteeism constituted misconduct. Id. at 317
(concluding that an employee’s absences constituted employment misconduct where the
employer “had an absenteeism and tardiness policy of which [the employee] was aware”).
As the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated, “refusing to abide by an employer’s
reasonable policies and requests amounts to disqualifying misconduct.”
Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002).
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Wilson contends that because the assistant store director testified that Wilson
provided Cub Foods notice before his absences on October 4 and 5, that “negates the
culpable mental state required for misconduct.” But this argument fails for two reasons.
First, Cub Foods did not assert that Wilson failed to provide notice of his absences on
October 4 and 5. The absences on those dates did not factor into the ULJ’s decision.
Second, the statutory definition of employment misconduct does not require a culpa ble
mental state. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a). Instead, employment misconduct includes
“any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct.” Id. Thus, the ULJ did not err in
determining that Wilson’s absences constituted disqualifying misconduct.
III. The ULJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, Wilson argues that the ULJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. Again, we disagree.
Substantial evidence is “(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more
than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its
entirety.” Dourney v. CMAK Corp., 796 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation
omitted). We defer to the ULJ’s weighing of the evidence. Whitehead v. Moonlight
Nursing Care, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. App. 1995).
When the credibility of a witness “has a significant effect on the outcome of a
decision, the [ULJ] must set out the reason for crediting or discrediting that testimony.”
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2024). Such credibility determinations are in the
province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed on appeal. Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 345.
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Here, the ULJ’s decision is supported by the testimony and exhibits demonstrating
Cub Foods’ policy, Wilson’s awareness of the policy, and Wilson’s attendance record. In
addition, the ULJ found that the assistant store director’s testimony was credible and that
Wilson’s testimony was not credible. As required by statute, the ULJ provided sufficient
reasons for its credibility determinations. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a).
Therefore, we defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations. Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d at 345.
The ULJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Affirmed.