State of Minnesota v. Vontrez Trevon Phelps

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1710

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Vontrez Trevon Phelps,
Appellant.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-24-408

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Ale xandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Evan Ottaviani, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his sentence for felony driving while impaired, arguing that
the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a downward-dispositional
sentencing departure. We affirm.

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FACTS
In January 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Vontrez Trevon
Phelps with two felony-level alcohol-related offenses: driving while impaired (DWI) and
refusal to submit to a chemical test. The state alleged that , on January 20, 2024, police
were called to the scene of a motor-vehicle accident at the intersections of St. Clair Avenue
and Milton Street in St. Paul. Officers spoke to J.N. who reported that he was heading west
on St. Clair when he saw an Audi bearing “whiskey plates” fail to stop at a stop sign on
Milton Street. J.N. tried to stop but could not avoid hitting the Audi.
Phelps was in the driver’s seat of the Audi. When the police spoke to him, his
speech was slurred and he smelled of alcoholic beverages. When the police asked Phelps
for his insurance, he was confused and asked the officers where they were. The police
removed Phelps from his vehicle and requested field sobriety testing. Phelps declined.
Then, Phelps ran from the officers , but he fell after running ten feet. The police arrest ed
Phelps and took him to a hospital.
The police obtained a search warrant authorizing them to obtain a blood or urine
sample from Phelps, but Phelps refused to allow a nurse to draw a blood sample. He also
refused to provide a urine sample. Phelps had to be removed from the emergency room
for causing a disturbance.
In April 2025, Phelps pleaded guilty to the felony DWI charge, and the state
dismissed the test-refusal charge.

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At the time of sentencing, Phelps was 34 years old. His criminal history spanned
from 200 5 to 2025, and it included delinquent adjudications and convictions for the
following offenses (listed in chronological order):
• Felony third-degree assault
• Misdemeanor trespass
• Misdemeanor disorderly conduct
• Felony terroristic threats
• Misdemeanor underage drinking and driving
• Felony domestic assault
• Misdemeanor DWI
• Misdemeanor false information to police
• Felony fifth-degree controlled-substance crime
• Misdemeanor disorderly conduct
• Gross-misdemeanor DWI
• Misdemeanor assault
The district court placed Phelps on probation for all but three of those offenses. The
district court gave him credit for time served for the false-information-to-police conviction
and sentenced him to prison for the felon y-terroristic-threats and felony-domestic-assault
convictions. However, the district court imposed those prison sentences around the same
time that it revoked Phelps’s probation for felony third-degree assault, executed his stayed
prison sentence, and sent him to prison for 86 months.
Phelps also had several other criminal charges pending at the time of sentencing in
this case. Those offenses allegedly occurred between 2022 and 2025, and included the
following charges (listed in chronological order):
• Gross-misdemeanor DWI1

1 The pending gross misdemeanor DWI charge included in presentence investigation report
shows that the state charged Phelps with five separate counts based on that incident. These
included: two counts of gross misdemeanor DWI, two counts of driving after revocation,

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• Gross-misdemeanor financial transaction card fraud
• Felony second-degree burglary
• Misdemeanor obstructing legal process
• Felony fifth-degree controlled-substance crime
• Gross-misdemeanor domestic-abuse no-contact-order violation

The district court received a presentence investigation report (PSI) indicating that,
based on Phelps’s criminal history and the severity -level of his new felony DWI offense,
the presumptive sentence was 54 months in prison.
Phelps moved for a downward -dispositional departure, seeking another chance on
probation and arguing that he was particularly amenable to probation. As support, Phelps’s
attorney filed the following documents with the district court : (1) a sentencing
memorandum written by the attorney’s dispositional advisor; (2) letters of support from
Phelps’s mother, grandmother, and four football coaches 2; (3) a letter verifying his
satisfactory participation in an out -patient treatment program to address his chemical use
and mental health; (4) a sample schedule from that treatment program; and (5) sentencing
data from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission indicating that , from 2018-
2022, 55% of the offenders who faced a presumptive prison commitment for the underlying
felony DWI offense under Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2018) received a downward-
dispositional departure.
In arguing for a departure at sentencing, P helps’s attorney referr ed to information
in the documents that were filed in support of a departure. In addition, Phelps addressed

and one count of obstructing legal process. These charges are in addition to Phelps’s other
pending charges listed in the PSI.
2 The record indicates that Phelps played college and semi -professional football and that
he coached youth football.

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the district court on his own behalf. He apologized to the court and said that he had prayed
for the victim in this case. He also said he had gone to treatment “five days a week for
almost four hours a day for over five months.” Finally, he said that he had not relapsed.
He referred to the football coaching that he had done in the community and encouraged
everyone in the courtroom to attend one of his games and see what he really does in his
community, because the negative information that had been submitted to the court did not
reflect who he is. He said that he was attending AA meetings, that they inspired him, and
that he is “going to be great in this community.” He acknowledged his additional pending
criminal cases, but he asserted that he was “absolutely innocent” in some of them.
Phelps ended his remarks as follows:
I’m asking you for an opportunity to continue to let me
learn about myself, learn about my mental [health], learn about
my triggers, learn about my alcohol addiction, and learn
about—I’ve been learning about the traits that my parents
passed on to me. It’s so much that I’ve learned, and it just—
these five months, and I got a long way to go. I got a long
way to go. I’m not saying I’m there yet. But I’m willing to
do whatever I gotta do to be the man. I’m 34. I’ve got five
kids. It’s not about me no more.

The state argued against Phelps’s motion for a downward -dispositional departure,
noting that the PSI indicated that he had not done well on probation and had not completed
his probation requirements. The state also noted that Phelps had been charge d with six
new offenses while the underlying case was pending and thus had engaged in “continuing
ongoing criminal behavior.”

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The district court determined that Phelps was not particularly amenable to probation
and denied Phelps’s motion for a downward -dispositional departure. The district court
explained its reasoning as follows:
I did review [your probation officer’s] comments on probation
and I get the impression that she does like you, but she does
not agree with your assessment of how you ’re doing on
probation.

When you say that you’ll take probation seriously, I also
have to note you’ve been on probation at least seven times with
a history of probation violations for not following through. . . .

[Probation says] you haven ’t done well on probation.
You’re on probation on four files in Ramsey and one in
Washington. The report from Washington is you struggled to
complete requirements. You continue to pick up new charges.
That’s concerning. It’s not like you to miss a probation
appointment, but you just did right before this hearing, [at] the
end of June. . . . [A]nd the fact that you continue to pick up
charges does not give me particular faith that you are going to
be particularly amenable to probation.

This was an event that occurred in January of 2024, and
you have been out on bail since that time; but it was more than
a year later before you got into treatment, just before the plea
in this hearing. It’s not clear to me whether that actually
reflects a genuine intent for treatment, since it took that long,
or whether it’s trying to limit a consequence. I also note—and
this is not a conviction, it’s a charge—for drug possession just
last month, for a drug you admitted using as recently as
February, does not enhance an impression of a genuine intent
for treatment.

The district court entered judgment of conviction for felony DWI and sentenced
Phelps to serve 46 months in prison.
Phelps appeals.

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DECISION
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for criminal
offenses and seek to “maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability
in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2024). “Consequently, departures from the
guidelines are discouraged and are intended to apply to a small number of cases.” State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). A district court may depart from the
presumptive sentence only when there are “identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2023).
If substantial and compelling circumstances exist, the district court has broad
discretion to depart, and we generally will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). This court will reverse the district court’s
refusal to depart from the presumptive sentence only in a “rare” case. Id. “[A]s long as
the record shows the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information
presented before making a determination ,” we will not reverse the district court ’s refusal
to depart. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
When considering a dispositional departure, the district court focuses “more on the
defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him
and for society.” State v. Heywood , 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). A defendant’s
particular amenability to probation can justify a downward -dispositional departure from a
presumptive sentence. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014). The requirement
of particular amenability ensures that “the defendant ’s amenability to probation
distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial and

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compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Id. at 309 (quotation
omitted).
Relevant factors for determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to
probation include the defendant’s age, prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation, attitude
in court, and support of friends and family. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
Even if there is evidence that the defendant would be particularly amenable to probation, a
district court is not required to grant a dispositional departure. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d
662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009).
We review the district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. Soto,
855 N.W.2d at 307-08. “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v.
Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
Phelps contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a downward -dispositional departure. He relies on State v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262
(Minn. App. 1984) and State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. App. 1985). In Curtiss,
we held that , in exercising its sentencing discretion, the district court “must consider
circumstances supporting a downward duration al departure from the presumptive
sentence.” 353 N.W.2d at 262. In Van Ruler, we said that a “reviewing court may not
interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion, as long as the record shows the
sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before
making a determination.” 378 N.W.2d at 80-81.

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Phelps asserts that the district court’s ruling is inconsistent with Curtiss and Van
Ruler. Specifically, he argues that:
• The record does not demonstrate that the district court deliberately evaluated all of
the information supporting his departure motion, noting that the court “never stated
on the record that it reviewed this information” and that “none of the statements [it]
made at the sentencing hearing would reasonably indicate that this information was
carefully evaluated.”
• Unlike the circumstances noted in multiple nonprecedential decisions from this
court, the district court here “did not list or otherwise mention the documents it
reviewed,” and although it is evident that the court reviewed the PSI, “nothing in
the sentencing transcript demonstrates that the court considered the documents
submitted by the defense.”
• Like the circumstances in Curtiss, “the record here shows that there were legitimate
reasons to depart in this case,” yet “ [i]nstead of considering those reasons . . . the
district court abandoned the departure inquiry in favor of a short discussion of
Phelps’s past performance on [probation].”
• Phelps’s “statements and the many supportive letters in the record, including from
his treatment provider, indicated that he had begun to address his problematic
thinking patterns in the five months he had been in treatment in a way that led to
demonstrable change.”
None of these arguments persuades us that the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing Phelps to a presumptive prison sentence. When addressing the district court at

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sentencing, Phelps and his attorney reiterated the contents of some of the documents that
were submitted in support of a departure. There is no rule or precedent that requires the
district court to make a record of all the information it considered in rejecting a departure
request. The lack of such precedent is not surprising given that “an explanation is not
required when the court considers reasons for departure b ut elects to impose the
presumptive sentence.” Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d at 80. Thus, the lack of such a record
would rarely lead us to conclude that the district court did not consider all the information
presented when making its decision.
We say “rarely” because there could be a case in which the district court’s failure to
acknowledge substantial and compelling circumstances could lead us to remand for
resentencing. Of course, even if substantial and compelling circumstances exist, the district
court is not required to depart from the presumptive sentence. Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d
775, 781 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014). Again, “it would be a rare
case which would warrant reversal of the refusal to depart.” Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
Curtiss was one such case. But the circumstances of Curtiss are nothing like the
circumstances here. Curtiss “entered a breezeway attached to a house and removed a case
of beer.” Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d at 263. He was charged with a felony -level burglary and
pleaded guilty to the offense. Id. The presumptive sentence for that offense was a 33 -35
month term of imprisonment. Id. The district court denied Curtiss’s request for a
downward-durational departure and a reduced prison term of 1 8-months.3 Id. Instead, it

3 “The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines define two types of sentencing departures:
dispositional and durational. ” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. “A dispositional departure

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sentenced him to serve 33 months in prison. Id. We “remanded for a hearing on sentencing
and for reconsideration of the departure question.” Id. at 264. In doing so, we explained:
The record suggests factors for departure which should
be deliberately considered. The court erred in putting aside
arguments for departure rather than considering them
alongside valid reasons for non-departure. This is not that rare
case where we interfere with the exercise of discretion, but a
case where the exercise of discretion has not occurred.
Consideration of compelling circumstances is central to the
scheme of the sentencing guidelines, and the practice will
avoid sentencing that is either mechanical or callous.

Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
Our decision in Curtiss was based on the existence of compelling reasons to depart.
We stated:
Legitimate reasons for departure did exist. In fact, they were
significant. The defendant was 18 years of age. He faced his
first sentence to an adult correctional facility. His offense
involved taking 16 bottles of beer from the breezeway of an
occupied house, without other intrusion, barely within the
scope of the serious charge of burglary in the first degree. His
prior felony involved driving an older model pickup until it
was out of gas. The trial judge noted: “I personally
feel . . . that 34 [sic] months may be too much.”

Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
The circumstances here are very different from those in Curtiss. Phelps is 34 years
old and has a significant criminal history as an adult. He was imprisoned for 86 months
after violating probation. He had not been successful on probation and had been charged

places the offender in a different setting than that called for by the presumptive guidelines
sentence.” Id. “By contrast, a durational departure is a sentence that departs in length from
the presumptive guidelines range.” Id.

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with new offenses while the underlying case was pending. Unlike the circumstances in
Curtiss, “legitimate” and “significant” reasons for a downward departure are not apparent
in this case. We therefore are not left with a concern that the district court failed to consider
“factors for departure [that] should be deliberately considered.” Id. at 264.
The documents and statements submitted on Phelps’s behalf are encouraging. We
hope that Phelps continues to address his chemical -use and mental-health issues and that
he can become the community leader he aspires to be after his release from prison. But
those submissions do not suggest substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a
sentencing departure. They simply do not show that Phelps was particularly amenable to
probation at the time of sentencing.
In conclusion, the record shows that the district court reviewed the presentence
investigation report and that the court was aware of Phelps’s criminal history, his pending
charges, his probation history, his chemical- and mental- health issues, his recent successful
participation in treatment, his family and community support, and his desire s to maintain
sobriety, to remain law-abiding, and to be a leader in his community . On this record, we
are satisfied that the district court considered the arguments for departure. Thus, this is not
a rare case in which we would reverse the district court ’s imposition of a presumptive
sentence.
Affirmed.