Meaghan Witthaus, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1712

Meaghan Witthaus, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

William Barnes,
Appellant.

Filed May 18, 2026
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-24-10272

Erik F. Hansen, Kiley Adams, Mariah Glinski, Burns & Hansen, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents)

John E. Mack, New London Law, P.A., New London, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Rasmusson, Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s default judgment in favor of respondents,
appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
vacate the judgment and reopen the case, arguing that the district court erroneously
determined that he failed to establish all of the applicable factors. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondents Meaghan Witthaus and Michelle Walker brought this action seeking
the return of personal property belonging to their late father that was in the possession of
appellant William Barnes.1 Respondents’ possessory claims to their late father’s personal
property were supported by a decree of descent that they sought and received in different
proceedings before a probate court. A decree of descent is a court order that distributes the
property, or any interest therein, of a deceased person. See Minn. Stat. § 525.31 (20 24).
Any interested party may seek a decree if the decedent has been dead for more than 3 years
and no probate proceeding has been commenced. Id. Respondents attached a copy of the
decree of descent to their complaint. The complaint in this case alleged five claims: breach
of contract, replevin, conversion, civil theft, and unjust enrichment.
Respondents served Barnes with the summons and complaint and filed the action in
district court in December 2024. After Barnes failed to answer the complaint, respondents
moved for default judgment and summary judgment o n February 18, 2025. An affidavit
in the record reflects that Barnes was served with the notice of this motion on the same day
via first class mail. Barnes disputes receipt of the notice of the default motion. The district
court set a hearing on respondents’ motion for March 18, 2025. Barnes failed to appear at
the motion hearing.

1 Respondents also sought various economic damages.
3
On April 1, 2025, while the district court’s decision on the motion for default
judgment was pending, Barnes filed an answer and counterclaim to respondents’
complaint. On April 8, 2025, the district court filed a default judgment in favor of
respondents and ordered that the disputed property be surrendered to respondents ;
judgment was entered the following day. Barnes filed a motion to vacate the default
judgment and reopen the case based on excusable neglect. The district court determined
that Barnes sought relief under rule 60.02(a) and denied the motion, concluding that Barnes
failed to satisfy the four factors necessary for relief.2
Barnes appeals.
DECISION
Barnes challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate the default
judgment.
Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a), the district court may relieve a party from
judgment on the basis of “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Relief
should be granted “where the movant affirmatively satisfies four requirements” —the
Finden factors—which are:
(1) a reasonable defense on the merits or . . . a debatably
meritorious claim; (2) a reasonable excuse for his or her failure
or neglect to act; (3) that he or she acted with due diligence
after learning of the error or omission; and (4) that no
substantial prejudice will result to the other party.

2 Barnes does not dispute the district court’s determination that he sought relief under rule
60.02(a).
4
Cole v. Wutzke, 884 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted); see also
Finden v. Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964). “To warrant relief, the movant must
establish all four factors.” Safeco Ins. Co. v. Holmgren Bldg. Repair, Inc., 946 N.W.2d
638, 645 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 15, 2020). And the burden to satisfy
the factors is on the moving party. Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016).
“The decision whether relief is warranted under [r]ule 60.02 is committed to the
sound discretion of the district court and is based upon all the surrounding circumstances
of each case.” Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 637. We will therefore reverse “only when there has
been a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. “A district court abuses its discretion by making
findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a
decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d
502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
In denying Barnes’s motion to vacate, the district court determined that Barnes
“failed to make a showing or meet all of the Finden factors.” Although the district court
found that Barnes “arguably show[ed] that he acted with due diligence after learning of the
error,” the district court found that Barnes failed to show a reasonable defense on the merits
or a debatably meritorious cla im, failed to show a reasonable excuse for his failure or
neglect to timely answer the complaint, and failed to show that respondents would not
suffer substantial prejudice.
Barnes contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to vacate.
Specifically, he argues that the district court erroneously determined that he failed to satisfy
the first, second, and fourth Finden factors—a reasonable defense on the merits, a
5
reasonable excuse for his failure or neglect, and substantial prejudice.3 Because the district
court did not err by determining that Barnes failed to satisfy the first Finden factor, we
discern no abuse of discretion. See Safeco Ins. Co., 946 N.W.2d at 645 (holding that the
movant must satisfy all four Finden factors to warrant relief under rule 60.02(a) for
excusable neglect).
“A reasonable defense on the merits is one that, if established, provides a defense
to the plaintiff’s claim.” Palladium Holdings, LLC v. Zuni Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006- OA1,
775 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27,
2010). And a debatably meritorious claim is one that, if established, presents a cognizable
claim for relief. Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 638. For either, the movant generally must provide
specific information that clearly demonstrates the existence of the claim to satisfy this
factor. Id. at 638; Palladium Holdings, 775 N.W.2d at 174. But “[c]onclusory allegations
in moving papers are ordinarily insufficient.” Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 638.
Barnes argued in district court that he satisfied the first factor because the decree of
descent was unlawfully obtained and that the estate of the decedent should have been
probated so that Barnes would have been able to assert his claims as a creditor of the
decedent. However, the district court found that the decree of descent unambiguously
assigned that property to the respondents, Barnes did not refute possessing that property,
and Barnes did not dispute refusing to return the property. The district court also explained
the decree of descent was obtained in different proceedings than this case and, therefore,

3 Barnes agrees with the court’s analysis of the third Finden factor—that he exercised
reasonable diligence once learning of the mistake.
6
the district court was “unable to grant [Barnes] relief from that” order of the probate court.4
The district court thus determined that Barnes failed to show a reasonable defense on the
merits or debatably meritorious claim.
On appeal, Barnes argues that the district court erred because, at the time
respondents filed this case in the district court, he was actively negotiating with them about
the “possession of the property and payment of his claim” and that “as a creditor in
possession he had a right to a claim against the property at any time not just during the time
period of probate.” He further asserts that respondents essentially attempted to circumvent
probate by obtaining a decree of descent and thereby preventing Barnes from “claim[ing]
his possessory lien.” And he argues that “it is not clear why” the district court determined
that he failed to satisfy the first Finden factor. We disagree.
The default judgment in this case was based on respondents’ claims of breach of
contract, replevin, conversion, civil theft, and unjust enrichment, which sought the return
of certain items of personal property belonging to respondents’ deceased father. As the
district court observed, the decree of descent unambiguously assigned that property to
respondents, Barnes did not refute possessing the property and did not dispute refusing to
return the property. These findings are supported by the record. And crucially, as the

4 Nevertheless, the district court also observed that even if Barnes were permitted to
challenge the decree of descent in this case, he would likely have been unsuccessful
because nothing in the record suggested that respondents failed to comply with the law,
there is a one-year statute of limitations for claims of creditors after a decedent’s death
under Minn. Stat. § 524.3-803 (2024), and the court was unaware of any indication that
Barnes filed a demand for notice in regards to the decedent’s estate under
Minn. Stat. § 524.3-204 (2024).
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district court also explained, the decree of descent was obtained in probate court—not in
these proceedings.
Indeed, “[i]f a probate court has jurisdiction over a matter, its ruling ‘is not subject
to collateral attack.’” Greer v. Professional Fiduciary, Inc., 792 N.W.2d 120, 127, 129,
131 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting Bengtson v. Setterberg, 35 N.W.2d 623, 629 (Minn. 1949)
(holding that the district court did not err by dismissing some of the appellant’s claims
because they were an improper collateral attack on a judgment from a different probate
court matter, and noting that the appellant could have brought a motion to vacate the
underlying order of the probate court in those proceedings). “A collateral attack is an attack
on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal.” Aaron Carlson Corp. v. Cohen,
933 N.W.2d 63, 71 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Whereas a “direct attack on a
judgment attempts to annul, amend, reverse, or vacate a judgment or to declare it void in
an appropriate proceeding instituted initially and primarily for that purpose, an
impermissible collateral attack similarly attacks the validity of a judgment, but the attack
is purely secondary or incidental.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Barnes’s apparent defenses or claims here either primarily or incidentally attack the
validity of the decree of descent, which assigned respondents the rights to their father’s
personal property. For that reason, Barnes’s claims in these proceedings are an improper
collateral attack on the probate court’s judgment. See id. Accordingly, Barnes did not
clearly demonstrate the existence of a defense to respondents’ action or a cognizable claim
in this case. See Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 638; Palladium Holdings, 775 N.W.2d at 174. As
8
such, Barnes failed to carry his burden to show a reasonable defense on the merits or
debatably meritorious claim. See Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 620.
We therefore discern no error in the district court’s determination that Barnes failed
to satisfy the first Finden factor. Because the district court did not err in determining that
Barnes failed to satisfy the first Finden factor, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying his motion to vacate under rule 60.02(a), a nd we decline to address the
remaining Finden factors. See Safeco Ins. Co., 946 N.W.2d at 644-47 (affirming the
district court’s denial of a rule 60.02(a) motion where the district court concluded that the
movant failed to satisfy only one Finden factor).
Affirmed.