In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1727

In the Marriage of:

Steven John Engman, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Kristine Elisabeth Engman,
Respondent.

Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Ross, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-FA-23-6989

Amber Lamers, Dittrich & Lamers, LLP, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori L. Nelson, Klampe Law Firm, LLC, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bentley ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
The district court’s judgment and decree dissolving Kristine and Steven Engman’s
marriage ordered Steven to pay spousal maintenance and directed the parties to jointly file
their 2024 income taxes and split any refund evenly. On appeal, Steven challenges the
spousal-maintenance award and the requirement to treat the tax refund as marital property.
2
We reverse in part and remand for additional proceedings because we conclude that the
district court’s spousal-maintenance calculation may have improperly included expenses
for an adult child , failed to include necessary findings on Steven’s expenses , and
erroneously treated the anticipated tax refund as marital property.
FACTS
Kristine and Steven Engman married in 1996 and had four children. Steven
petitioned the district court to dissolve the marriage in 2023. Two of the children, M.E., a
minor, and E.E., an adult, lived with Kristine at the time of the divorce. The parties agreed
to a valuation date of November 9, 2023, and the district court tried the dissolution issues
in December 2024. At trial, both parties testified to their current and future expenses .
After the close of evidence, the parties stipulated to some matters but left the issues
of spousal maintenance and the division of any future income -tax refund to the district
court’s consideration. They stipulated that Kristine is entitled to a n equalizer payment in
the division of property and that Steven would make a prejudgment payment of
$542,549.95 of the amount due s o Kristine could secure housing during the proceedings.
After deducting that anticipated prepayment and making other adjustments, the parties
agreed that Kristine would owe Steven $4,652.17, which Steven agreed to waive .
The district court issued its judgment and decree dissolving the marriage and
ordering Steven to pay monthly spousal maintenance of $3,610. The decree also ordered
the parties to jointly file their 2024 income taxes and divide any refund equally. Steven
moved the district court to amend the findings or order a new trial.
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The district court issued a n amended jud gment and decree but did not change its
spousal-maintenance award or tax -refund requirements. It based the maintenance
calculation in part on an accountant’s report estimating Kristine’s monthly expenses to be
$9,142, consisting of $8,352 for Kristine individually and $790 for expenses for E.E. and
M.E. The district court found that Kristine’s gross monthly income was $4,290 from
working 24 hours weekly as a nurse and that her position at only 60% full time was not the
result of voluntary underemployment. It so found in part on a report by Dr. Justin King, a
vocational evaluator who opined that Kristine needed to include part-time positions in her
job search and on Kristine’s testimony that a position at 60% full time was currently the
closest to full-time work available in her field. The district court found Steven’s monthly
income to be $61,398 and concluded that he can meet his own “budgetary needs while also
meeting” Kristine’s deficit with spousal maintenance. It also ordered Steven and Kristine
to file their 2024 income-tax return jointly and to divide any tax refund equally.
Steven appeals.
DECISION
Steven challenges the district court’s spousal -maintenance award and requirement
to divide the 2024 tax refund. He raises six arguments challenging spousal maintenance.
He argues that the district court err oneously included Kristine’s expenses for their ad ult
child in her budget. He maintains that the district court improperly found Kristine’s budget
credible, wrongly found that she is not voluntarily underemployed, fail ed to reduce the
spousal-maintenance amount based on Kristine’s marital-property award , failed to make
necessary findings on Steven’s budget, and award ed retroactive maintenance during a
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period when he had already covered her expenses. He argues against the requirement to
divide the 2024 tax refund equally because the refund includes only his nonmarital
property. We discuss each argument in turn.
I
Steven contest s the amount and length of his spousal-maintenance obligation.
District courts must conduct a two- step analysis when a party to a dissolution proceeding
requests spousal maintenance. Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 695 (Minn. App.
2019). The party requesting maintenance must first make a “showing of need” by
demonstrating that her employment and investment income do not cover her reasonable
expenses under her marital standard of living. Id. (quoting Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d
249, 252 (Minn. 2016)). The district court may award spousal maintenance in the amount
and for the duration that it “deems just . . . after considering all relevant factors.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2024). We review the d istrict court’s decisions on the award and
length for abuse of its broad discretion. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn.
1982). It abuses this discretion if its decision rests on fact findings that lack record support,
it erroneously applies the law, or its legal conclusions fail logic and the record. Dobrin v.
Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997) . Under this standard, we conclude that two of
Steven’s arguments warrant reversal in part.

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The district court abused its discretion by calculating spousal maintenance based in
part on Kristine’s expenses for an adult child without explanation.
Steven argues th at th e district court misinterpreted the statutory requirement to
consider the “reasonable needs of the spouse” by including living and travel expenses for
an adult child, E.E. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(a) (2024). Although Steven presents
the issue as a question of statutory interpretation affording de novo review, the issue instead
leads us to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in its
spousal-maintenance award by considering an inappropriate factor—the “ needs of the adult
children”—in its calculations. See Musielewicz v. Musielewicz , 400 N.W.2d 100, 103
(Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 1987). When the record is unclear as to
“what extent, if any,” of a spouse’s proposed expenses are made up of contributions to
adult children, remand is appropriate. Reif v. Reif, 410 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Minn. App.
1987).
We must reverse the district court’s spousal-maintenance order because it rests in
part on expenses for E.E., an adult, as reflected in K ristine’s stated budget . The district
court credited Kristine’s estimate d expenses of “an additional $790 to support [E.E.]
residing with her full -time, and [M.E.] halftime .” But it did not distinguish between what
portion of the $790 supports the adult E.E. and what portion supports the minor M.E. And
while the district court’s order recites Kristine’s opinion testimony that E.E. cannot support
herself because of mental-health challenges, it does not credit this testimony or otherwise
find that E.E. is incapable of self -support. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 5 (2024)
(defining “child” to include “an individual who, by reason of physical or mental condition,
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is incapable of self -support” and one who is younger than 20 years old and still attending
secondary school); see also id., subd. 1 (2024) (applying this definition to chapter 518).
Kristine’s counsel conceded at oral argument that she is not contending on appeal that E.E.
qualifies as a child. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by including
expenses for the adult child in its spousal -maintenance award.
Kristine asks for a different conclusion on two theories. The first is that cases
faulting the district court for including adult expenses, like Musielewicz, 400 N.W.2d at
103, and Reif, 410 N.W.2d at 416, involved adult expenses in the calculation of expenses
of the spousal-maintenance obligor, not the obligee. The distinction is not meaningful, as
the controlling statute requires the district court to consider both parties’ budgets, not just
the obligor’s. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subds. 1, 2(a) (2024). Kristine ’s second theory is
that any error here is merely “de minimis” under Wibbens v. Wibbens, 379 N.W.2d 225,
227 (Minn. App. 1985). We decline to treat an indefinite monthly obligation of up to $790
as too insignificant for correction. O n remand, the district court must make specific factual
findings as to which portions of the parties’ proposed budgets constitute expenses for an
adult child and, unless it identifies a legal justification to includ e those expenses, calculate
spousal maintenance without them.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by crediting Kristine’s budget over
other record materials or by awarding her any speculative expenses.
We are not convinced by Steven’s contention t hat the district court erroneously
credited Kristine’s stated budget as her actual budget. A district court must calculate
spousal living expenses based on evidence rather than on speculative amounts that a spouse
7
may incur in the future. Rask v. Rask , 445 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Minn. App. 1989). Steven
contests the particulars of Kristine’s budget. He asks us essentially to credit his proposed
budget, not Kristine’s, as it regards her cellphone, waste removal, groceries, clothing,
shoes, doctors, counseling, gasoline, oil, car washes, licensure, car maintenance, vacations,
entertainment, art, sports, and gifts . But we do not reweigh or reconcile conflicting
evidence on appeal. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221–22 (Minn.
2021). We only determine whether the district court’s findings as to expenses have support
in the record and are not clearly erroneous. Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923
(Minn. App. 1992). The district court received competing testimonial or documentary
evidence sufficient to support its findings, and we will not disturb those findings in this
appeal.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Kristine indefinite
maintenance because its finding that she is not currently voluntarily underemployed
is supported by the record.
Steven maintains too that the district court abused its discretion by awarding
indefinite spousal maintenance because the purportedly “unrefuted expert testimony” of
Dr. King proves that Kristine is voluntarily underemployed. A district court may reduce a
spousal-maintenance obligation to account for a n obligee’s voluntary underemployment.
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(b); Passolt v. Passolt , 804 N.W.2d 18, 25 (Minn. App.
2011), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2011). But the district court’s finding that Kristine is
not voluntarily underemployed is supported by the record and therefore not clearly
erroneous. The record includes evidence showing that Kristine’s securing of part -time
employment in her field could position her to apply for full -time opportunities that were
8
not available at the time she was seeking employment. D r. King, for example, encouraged
her to apply for part-time positions to set herself up for an internal promotion to full time.
And the district court credited Kristine’s trial testimony that she broadened her search in
reaction to Dr. King’s report and that her only offer was the one she accepted. We
understand the district court’s maintenance amount and duration to rest on the current
circumstances at the time of the decision , including the expectation that full -time
employment opportunities would become available. And for that reason, we see no abuse
of discretion in basing maintenance on the income Kristine receives from her part -time
employment.
The district court acted within its discretion by refusing to factor Kristine’s marital -
property award into its spousal-maintenance calculations.
We are not persuaded by Steven’s argument that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to explicitly consider how Kristine’s marital-property award should
affect her spousal -maintenance award. District courts must consider “marital property
apportioned to the party” when determining the amount and duration of a spousal -
maintenance award. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a). Failing to consider how a prudently
invested, sizeable marital-property award affects a spouse’s income can constitute an abuse
of discretion. Rask, 445 N.W.2d at 853–54. But the district court ’s decree acknowledged
the parties’ marital-property stipulation and credited a cash -flow projection for Kristine ,
which includes an estimation of her “[n]et investment income,” prepared after she was
apportioned her share of the marital property. Because the district court considered how
she would reasonably invest her marital -property award, it did not abuse its discretion. It
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remains within the district court’s discretion to determine how its consideration of the
property award factors into its maintenance decision.
The district court abused its discretion by failing to make findings on Steven’s
expenses.
We are persuaded by Steven’s assertion that the district court abused its discretion
by failing to make a specific finding as to his budget that incorporates the totality of the
evidence on his expenses. The district court must consider the obligor spouse’s ability to
meet his and the obligee spouse’s needs when determining the amount and duration of
spousal maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(f) . If a district court fails to make
findings as to either spouse’s expenses, effective appellate review is precluded and remand
for further findings is necessary. Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989). This is
so even if the record would support the district court’s decision. Stevens v. Stevens, 501
N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. App. 1993). On this standard, the district court’s findings are
inadequate. It discussed Steven’s monthly expenses and made a finding on his monthly
earnings, but it never made the required finding of his expenses. It is true, as Kristine
argues, that the district court need not make a precise finding as to each item in a party’s
budget. See id.; Stich, 435 N.W.2d at 53. But a bottom-line finding as to expenses and the
ability to pay maintenance remains necessary. See Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 177
(Minn. App. 2020) (observing the importance of identifying baseline circumstances
regarding spousal maintenance ). On remand, the district court must make the proper
findings and base any spousal-maintenance award on them.

10
The district court permissibly acted within its discretion to credit Kristine’s budget
as it applied to possible retroactive maintenance .
Steven unconvincingly maintains that the district court abused its discretion by
allowing Kristine to claim expenses on her budget that he testified to covering during the
dissolution proceedings and failing to factor in a period of employment training where she
worked at 80% f ull time rather than 60% full time . The district court’s award reflects its
decision to credit Kristine’s proposed budget over Steven’s testimony. It is true, as Steven
asserts, that the district court ’s original judgment and decree recognized that he paid these
expenses. But Steven moved for amended findings, after which the district court found
facts differently from its prior decree and implicitly drew different inferences from them.
The district court need not limit its amendments to those requested by the party who moved
for amended findings. McCauley v. Michael, 256 N.W.2d 491, 499–500 (Minn. 1977). We
will not reweigh the evidence leading to the district court’s amended findings.
II
The district court mis applied Minnesota Statutes section 518.003, subdivision 3b
(2024), by ordering the parties to jointly file their 2024 taxes and equally divide any
consequent refund. Based on our review of the record, we reject Kristine’s contention that
Steven failed to preserve the issue on appeal. And w e review this legal issue de novo. Gill
v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2018). Steven bases his argument on his assertion that
a refund would not be marital property subject to division. He is correct. Tax refunds are
property, not income, in the dissolution context. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115,
120–21 (Minn. App. 2001). And property acquired by a spouse after a dissolution
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proceeding’s valuation date is nonmarital property. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b. The
parties’ November 9, 2023 valuation date preceded any income that would have been
withheld and the subject of a tax refund on the 2024 tax return. The record does not suggest
that the district court appl ied an alternate valuation date or intended to invade Steven’s
nonmarital property. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subds. 1, 2 (2024). Kristine ’s
counterargument that the district court’s property division was equitable misses the point
that “[a] court must first classify property as ‘marital property’ before valuing and dividing
[it] between spouses.” Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 302. If the tax refund included nonmarital
property, it cannot be divided as marital property. We reverse the district court’s order
requiring division of nonmarital property.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.