

*This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).*

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1736**

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alujonae Sherar Fowler,
Appellant.

**Filed August 17, 2026
Affirmed
Worke, Judge**

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-24-7218

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Irene Kao, St. Paul City Attorney, Keiran Bleich, Steven Heng, Assistant City Attorneys,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Alujonae Sherar Fowler, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Connolly,
Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WORKE, Judge

Appellant challenges her conviction of violating a harassment restraining order (HRO), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she knowingly violated the HRO. We affirm.

FACTS

In October 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Alujonae Sherae Fowler with violating an HRO. *See* Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(b) (2022).

At Fowler’s jury trial, T.S. testified that she knew Fowler because “at one point [they] were dating” the same man. T.S. obtained an HRO against Fowler because Fowler made threats and knew where T.S. lived. The HRO prohibited Fowler “from being within two city blocks or one-fourth of a mile in all directions of [T.S.]’s home.” The HRO identified T.S.’s street address and apartment number. A police officer testified that he served Fowler with the HRO, and she acknowledged service.

T.S. testified that, on July 6, 2024, she placed an order with a food-delivery service. She let the delivery person in from downstairs and the person knocked on her door. When she opened the door, Fowler was “standing there with her feet shoulder width apart, arms crossed over her . . . chest, and she said, ‘What’s up,’ with a smirk.” T.S. “jolted back,” slammed the door, and called the police.

T.S. testified that her apartment building is clearly marked and “a person would know where they are.” She also testified that the “buzzer box” that a delivery person uses to be permitted into the building “says [her] name and apartment number.” T.S. testified that the delivery application selects a nearby driver, and a driver has the option to cancel.

Fowler testified that she does not receive a customer’s information until after she picks up an order. She testified that, after she picks up an order, she receives the customer’s first name, last initial, and address for the delivery.

Fowler testified that, on July 6, the order generated an address, and she entered the address in her GPS not thinking that it was T.S.'s address. She testified that she followed someone inside the building, went to the apartment, and dropped the bags at the door. Fowler testified that T.S. "peeked around the corner of the door, slid the bags into the house, and closed the door." Fowler stated: "[W]hen I noticed that it was her, I left immediately. I looked at her and went on about my business. I wasn't there on intentional purposes."

On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Fowler if she took the order to the address identified in the HRO. She replied: "That's correct." The prosecutor asked: "And you knew . . . this [HRO] . . . prohibit[ed] you from being within a quarter mile of that address; correct?" She replied: "Correct." The prosecutor asked: "[Y]ou continued to drive to that address having knowledge that this [HRO] was still in full effect?" Fowler replied: "Correct."

The jury found Fowler guilty of violating the HRO. The district court sentenced Fowler to 90 days in jail, stayed for one year while she was on supervised probation. This appeal followed.

DECISION

Fowler argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she knowingly violated the HRO. When considering an insufficient-evidence claim, this court analyzes the record to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

conviction, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.¹ *State v. Ortega*, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). This court “will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” *Id.*

Fowler claims that she did not know that the address belonged to T.S., and that she left as soon as she realized that she was at the prohibited address. She asserts that nothing in the record shows that she intentionally sought out T.S.’s residence and claims that the state was required to prove that she knew about the HRO *and* that she *knowingly* violated the terms of the HRO.

But Fowler was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of an HRO. The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) an order existed, (2) the prohibited person knew of the order, and (3) the prohibited person violated the order. *See* Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 6(b). The district court properly instructed the jury on these elements. Fowler incorrectly asserts

¹ Fowler’s admissions on cross-examination are direct evidence supporting her conviction. She claims, however, that we should analyze her claim under the two-step circumstantial-evidence test. *See State v. Firkus*, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026) (stating that in reviewing circumstantial evidence, this court resolves questions of fact in favor of verdict, which provides circumstances proved; this court then decides whether the circumstances proved allow for a reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt). Even if we were to apply the circumstantial-evidence test, it sustains Fowler’s conviction. As an initial matter, we are not persuaded that Fowler’s claim that she did not realize that the apartment was the victim’s is part of the circumstances proved because it is not consistent with the verdict. But if we accept Fowler’s claim, the evidence still establishes (1) that Fowler knew of the HRO, which included the victim’s address; (2) her input of the address into the GPS; (3) her use of the buzzer box bearing the victim’s name and apartment number; and (4) Fowler’s stance in greeting the victim when the victim opened the door. This evidence allows for no reasonable inference other than Fowler knew that she was at the victim’s apartment in violation of the HRO.

that the offense includes an additional knowledge element requiring proof that she knowingly violated the HRO. *See State v. Gunderson*, 812 N.W.2d 156, 160-61 (Minn. App. 2012).

For the misdemeanor offense, the jury had to find only that Fowler knew of the HRO and that she violated a term. T.S. testified that the delivery person (Fowler) used the buzzer box, which showed her name and apartment number, for access to the building. T.S. let the delivery person in from downstairs, and when she opened the door, Fowler was standing outside the door, smirking. On cross-examination, Fowler admitted to knowing she was restricted from the address indicated in the HRO and admitted to going to the restricted address. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Fowler violated the HRO.

Affirmed.