Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1739
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Brady Alex Albertson,
Appellant.
Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-24-1362
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Jessica E. Hockley, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge;
and Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Appellant Brady Alex Albertson challenges his 72-month sentence for third-degree
criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
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motion for a downward dispositional departure and imposing a sentence within the
presumptive range. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged Albertson with three counts of
third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Albertson agreed to plead guilty to one count of
third-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1a(b)
(2022). In exchange, the state dismissed the remaining two counts and pending charges in
separate files.
During the plea hearing, Albertson admitted to penetrating a 15-year-old child’s
vagina with his penis at a residence in Stearns County. Albertson admitted to providing
the child with alcohol and knowing that the child was drunk during the commission of the
offense. The district court ordered the completion of a presentence investigation (PSI) and
a psychosexual evaluation.
Shortly before sentencing, Albertson moved through counsel for a downward
dispositional departure , arguing that he is particularly amenable to probation. At the
sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it had reviewed all the submitted materials,
including memoranda submitted by the defense, a victim impact statement, the PSI, the
psychosexual evaluation, and a handwritten letter from Albertson. The prosecutor read the
child’s victim impact statement into the record.
Albertson’s counsel argued that Albertson met “most, if not all, of the Trog factors.”
See State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (stating that factors “relevant to a
determination whether a defendant is particularly suitable to individualized treatment in a
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probationary setting” include the defendan t’s age, prior record, remorse, cooperation,
attitude in court, and support of friends and family). Albertson’s counsel asked the district
court to stay execution of the presumptive guidelines sentence and place Albertson on
supervised probation for not more than 15 years.
In response, the state argued that the PSI and psychosexual evaluation portray
Albertson as a person who “does what he wants when he wants regardless of the
consequences.” The state referenced Albertson’s 33 misdemeanor convictions in the
preceding five years, that Albertson continu ed to drive without a valid license, and
Albertson’s “sporadic work history.” The state continued:
[Albertson] drank in violation of his conditions of
release, continued to drive without a license. He used
OnlyFans in violation of his conditions in Benton County and
that was recently, last week. He didn’t get his license
reinstated, he has not paid off any of his citations, he did not
get employed until it appears recently, he delayed completing
his psychosexual evaluation, he has not started sex offender
treatment, he hasn’t started therapy. He’s had a year and a half
and has done absolutely nothing except exactly what he wanted
to do, continue with his own hobbies. None of these things
distinguish him from others. None of these make him
particularly amenable to probation.
The state asked the district court to impose the maximum guidelines sentence of 72 months.
Albertson addressed the district court and expressed his remorse. He stated that he
had started a job one month before the sentencing hearing , was working toward license
reinstatement, and completed the paperwork to begin therapy.
Ultimately, the district court denied Albertson’s motion for a downward
dispositional departure, relying on the Trog factors. The district court noted that, while
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Albertson was only 23 years old, that in “that short period of time” he had “accumulated
quite a history” and shown “a general disregard for law-abiding behavior.” The district
court also stated: “I do not believe you show true remorse. I think your remorse is you got
caught.” Regarding Albertson’s cooperation, the district court noted that, while Albertson
appeared at scheduled hearings, he did not follow court orders or show cooperation. The
district court acknowledged the support of Albertson’s friends and family but noted “that
support obviously has not changed the pattern of behaviors you exhibited.” Finally, the
district court stated:
Based upon the nature of this offense, the facts, [and]
the method in which it was carried out, I will be sentencing you
to top of the box, 72 months. That is the most I can give you.
Had the box allowed more, I would have given consideration
for more. Your behavior is reprehensible.
Albertson appeals.
DECISION
On appeal, Albertson seeks reversal of his 72-month sentence and remand for
resentencing.
District courts have a great deal of discretion in their sentencing decisions. State v.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2014). However, that discretion is limited by the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, which prescribe a sentence that is “presumed to be
appropriate for the crimes to which they apply.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp.
2023). A district court may exercise its discretion to depart from the presumptive sentence
only when there are “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a
departure.” Id.
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“Whether to depart from the sentencing guidelines rests within the district court’s
discretion, and the district court will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”
State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011) (citing State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d
85, 88 (Minn. 1999)). A reviewing court will reverse the imposition of a presumptive
sentence only in a “rare case.” State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
Here, Albertson requested a downward dispositional departure from the
presumptive guidelines sentence, which in this case is an executed sentence of between 51
and 72 months. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.B (Supp. 2023). A downward dispositional
departure “places the offender in a different setting than that called for by the presumptive
guidelines sentence.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). When
considering a dispositional departure, a district court focuses “more on the defendant as an
individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him and for society.”
State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). The Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines provide a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors that may justify a downward
dispositional departure, including that “[t]he offender is particularly amenable to
probation.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7) (Supp. 2023). The requirement of
particular amenability ensures that “the defendant’s amenability to probation distinguishes
the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial and compelling
circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309
(quotation omitted). Relevant factors for determining whether a defendant is particularly
amenable to probation include the defendant’s age, prior criminal record, remorse,
cooperation, attitude in court, and support of friends and family. Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31.
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Albertson argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for a downward dispositional departure because substantial and compelling circumstances
warranted the departure. We disagree.
The record reflects that the district court carefully evaluated the information and
argument submitted at sentencing and exercised its independent discretion in imposing a
guidelines sentence. The district court stated that it had reviewed memoranda submitted
by the defense, the PSI, the psychosexual evaluation, and a handwritten letter from
Albertson. The district court heard statements from the victim and from Albertson. And
even though a district court need not give its reasons for imposing a sentence within the
guidelines range, see State v. Van Ruler, 387 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. 1985), the district court
here explained—on the record—why each Trog factor did not support a finding that
Albertson was particularly amenable to probation.
The district court’s findings are supported by the record. The district court
concluded that Albertson’s extensive criminal history accumulated over a short period of
time, evidencing that he is not particularly amenable to probation. The district court
referenced its own observations of Albertson and information set forth in the PSI in
concluding that Albertson did not demonstrate remorse. We “must defer to the district
court’s assessment of the sincerity and depth of the remorse and what weight it should
receive in the sentencing decision” considering that “the district court has an opportunity
to actually observe the defendant throughout the proceedings.” State v. Sejnoha, 512
N.W.2d 597, 600 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 1994). And the district
court relied on Albertson’s failure to comply with his conditional-release terms in support
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of its conclusion that Albertson was not cooperative. In short, the record reflects that the
district court carefully considered circumstances for and against departure, deliberately
exercised its discretion, and as a result, we will not interfere with the district court’s
exercise of that discretion. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255; see also Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d at
80-81.
To convince us otherwise, Albertson offers only one argument on appeal: his own
analysis of the Trog factors. Albertson asks us to reevaluate the record and substitute our
judgment for that of the district court—a task well outside the province of this court. See
Sejnoha, 512 N.W.2d at 601 (“We emphasize that, as a reviewing court, it is not our role
to substitute our own judgment for that of the district court, but to determine whether the
[moving party] has shown an abuse of discretion in the sentence.”). Accordingly,
Albertson has failed to establish that this is such a “rare case” that warrants our interference
with the district court’s refusal to depart. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
Affirmed.