State of Minnesota v. Darrius Lamar Plummer

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1745

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Darrius Lamar Plummer,
Appellant.

Filed August 31, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-24-1067

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Timothy C. Rank, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his second-degree murder conviction, arguing that (1) the
prosecutor committed misconduct , and (2) the district court erroneously calculated his
criminal-history score. We affirm appellant’s conviction, but because the evidence is

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insufficient to support inclusion of appellant’s out-of-state convictions in calculating his
criminal-history score, we remand for further development of the record.
FACTS
On April 11, 2024, appellant Darrius Lamar Plummer went to a bar with a friend.
After the bar closed, people congregated outside, including Plummer, his friend, and C.M.
Plummer knew C.M. because she had dated his friend. A confrontation ensued between
Plummer and C.M., and C.M. attempted to punch Plummer. Plummer grabbed C.M.,
pushed her, and pinned her against a wall.
At one point, Plummer commented to a man standing with C.M. that she “wasn’t
worth the trouble.” Another confrontation ensued. The bar’s bouncer saw Plummer pull
a knife while saying he would stab anybody who ran up on him. The bouncer urged
Plummer to put the knife away. C.M. lunged at Plummer. Plummer reached around the
bouncer and stabbed C.M. C.M. collapsed on the sidewalk and died from the stab wound.
A bystander chased Plummer and knocked him to the ground by hitting him in the head
with a pistol. Plummer got back up and continued running.
In June 2024, Plummer was apprehended in Detroit. Respondent State of Minnesota
charged Plummer with second-degree unintentional murder, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2022).
At Plummer’s jury trial, the state presented testimony from several witnesses,
including the bouncer, law-enforcement officers, and the medical examiner who conducted
C.M.’s autopsy.

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Plummer testified that he pulled the knife in self-defense because people were
threatening him. Plummer testified that he did not see who he was physically fighting and
did not know that it was C.M. who swung at him. Plummer further testified that he did not
see C.M. before he stabbed her because he was focused on a man in a white t-shirt who
threatened him.
The following exchange occurred during cross-examination when the prosecutor
questioned Plummer about retreating from potential danger:
Q: And you did not try to go into the bar when you were scared
for your life of the people with guns outside?
A: Because I never seen those doors open.
Q: Sounds like you didn’t see a lot?
A: I’m paying attention to everything that’s in front of me, the
people that’s approaching me.

The prosecutor next questioned Plummer about the man in the white t-shirt:
Q: From where you are back here by the door, you’re saying
you can see past [the bouncer], [another employee], the 400 -
pound man, around the corner to this white t-shirt guy?
A: Yes. I . . . kept my eyes on him the whole time.
Q: You - - okay. So you could bend your eyesight to see him
around that corner?
A: It wasn’t bending. It was like the way everybody’s
standing, I could see this person.

The following questions were asked about Plummer’s perception of C.M. before the
stabbing:
Q: And it sounds like, conveniently, you can’t see her ever
again after you first address her when you walk out of the bar?
A: She wasn’t being the main aggressor at that point, . . . I’m
paying attention to the main person that said, “I will shoot this
b----h up.”
Q: You conveniently can’t see her ever again?

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A: I was paying attention - - it’s a lot of chaos going on, so
I’m paying attention to the main aggressor. I’m looking
around, but I’m paying attention to the main aggressor at that
point.

At the end of cross-examination, the prosecutor returned to what Plummer did or
did not see before the stabbing:
Q: And you never yelled to [your friend] to help you?
A: How am I going to yell through a building?
Q: Through the open doors?
A: I never seen those doors open, like I told you before.
Q: Sounds like there was a lot of things you didn’t see. So you
didn’t see the doors open?
A: It was behind me.
Q: And you never saw [C.M.]?
A: In the initial contact.

The jury found Plummer guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Plummer
to 225 months in prison. This was a presumptive sentence calculated using Plummer’s five
criminal-history points that included points for out-of-state convictions. This appeal
followed.
DECISION
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Plummer first argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct. Plummer did not
object at trial. Unobjected-to claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under a
modified plain-error standard. State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Minn. 2023). Under
the modified plain-error test, Plummer must show that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted
error that was plain. See id. If Plummer shows plain error, “the burden shifts to the [s]tate
to demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.” See i d.

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(quotation omitted). Even if the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, this court
will not grant relief “unless [the] failure to do so will cause the public to seriously question
the fairness and integrity of [the] judicial system.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347,
359 (Minn. 2022).
Cross-Examination
Plummer argues that, while questioning him relevant to his self-defense claim, the
prosecutor impermissibly injected her personal opinion and inflamed the passions of the
jury.
It is improper for a prosecutor to give their own opinion about the credibility of a
witness during cross-examination. State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 786 (Minn. 2006);
see also State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 375 (Minn. 2005) (“Prosecutors must not
interject their personal opinions into a case.”). But a prosecutor is allowed to argue that
there is no merit to a particular defense based on the evidence, so long as the prosecutor
does not “belittle that defense either in the abstract or by suggesting that the defendant
raised the defense because it was the only one with any hope for success.” State v. Peltier,
874 N.W.2d 792, 804 (Minn. 2016). Prosecutors are also allowed a wide range of inquiry
on cross-examination, particularly when “there is a sharp conflict in the evidence,” and the
credibility of the defendant is critical. State v. McDaniel, 534 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn.
App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 20, 1995).
Plummer challenges four exchanges on cross- examination in which he claims that
the prosecutor interjected her personal opinion about his testimony and, by extension, his
credibility.

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First, Plummer argues that the prosecutor’s statement—“[s]ounds like you didn’t
see a lot?”—when questioning him about the possibility of retreating through the bar doors
was not a question. Plummer responded that he was paying attention to the situation in
front of him. Gauging the tone from a transcript alone is difficult , but it is a reasonable
inference that the prosecutor asked a question because the court reporter included a
question mark in the transcript and Plummer answered the question. In addition, the line
of questioning highlights inconsistencies in Plummer’s testimony about not seeing the
doors open when other evidence shows the doors open multiple times during the incident.
Surveillance footage also shows Plummer talking to people standing in the doorway while
the door is held open . The prosecutor’s questions highlight the evidence that made
Plummer’s defense implausible and did not interject the prosecutor’s own opinion.
Therefore, there was no misconduct.
Second, in response to Plummer stating that he kept his eyes on a man in a white
t-shirt “the whole time,” the prosecutor asked Plummer if he could “bend [his] eyesight to
see [the man in the white t-shirt] around [a] corner?” As Plummer contends, the prosecutor
could have asked how he could see the man in the white t-shirt instead of asking if he could
bend his eyesight. But in asking the latter, the prosecutor did not express their personal
opinion.
Third, Plummer argues that the prosecutor’s “text and . . . tenor” when asking him
about not paying attention to, and not seeing, C.M. while outside, expressed her opinion
about his credibility. But Plummer’s testimony is strongly contradicted by the surveillance
footage showing the altercation with C.M. and testimony from other witnesses. This “sharp

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conflict in the evidence” and Plummer’s testimony—which was critical to Plummer’s self-
defense claim—allowed a wide range of inquiry during the prosecutor’s cross-
examination. See id.
Fourth, Plummer argues that the prosecutor expressed her personal opinion by
stating: “Sounds like there was a lot of things you didn’t see. So you didn’t see the doors
open?” The prosecutor’s question here, again, addressed Plummer’s testimony that was
contradicted by other evidence. A prosecutor’s questions “need not be colorless” if they
are tied to the evidence. See State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 682-83 (Minn. 2007) (stating
prosecutor calling defendant’s testimony “preposterous” was not belittling the self-defense
claim and, while the arguments were “expressed in colorful terms,” they were not error and
did not involve misconduct). The prosecutor’s questions, while at times colorful, were
connected to the evidence and the reasonableness of Plummer’s belief that he was in
imminent danger from C.M., the reasonableness of his use of force, and his failure to
retreat—which were all directly tied to the credibility of Plummer’s self-defense claim.
See State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014) (stating self-defense claim requires
evidence of defendant’s honest belief of imminent danger, use of reasonable force to resist
danger, and inability to retreat). Moreover, Plummer’s version of events differed
significantly from that presented by the state’s witnesses, which allowed the prosecutor “to
explore discrepancies in testimony and the possible prejudice or bias of all witnesses,”
including Plummer’s. See McDaniel, 534 N.W.2d at 293. Therefore, the prosecutor’s
questions are not error and thus do not involve misconduct.

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Closing Argument
Plummer also argues that, during closing argument, the prosecutor improperly
shifted the burden of proof on his self-defense claim. The state has “the right to present to
the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and
to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584,
589 (Minn. 1996). To determine whether the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing
argument, this court examines “the closing argument as a whole, rather than just selective
phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” State v.
Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 1993).
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that Plummer “want[ed] so badly for
this to be a self-defense case.” Plummer argues that this statement impliedly shifted the
burden of proof, forcing Plummer to prove his innocence. See State v. McDaniel ,
777 N.W.2d 739, 750 (Minn. 2010) (stating misstatement of burden of proof is “highly
improper” and prosecutorial misconduct). But Plummer’s argument ignores that,
immediately after this statement, the prosecutor explained the elements that needed to be
met for Plummer’s self-defense claim to succeed. The prosecutor then discussed the
evidence that disproved Plummer’s self-defense claim. By taking the closing argument as
a whole, rather than selecting just this one sentence, the prosecutor did not improperly shift
the burden and, therefore, did not commit misconduct. See Walsh, 495 N.W.2d at 607.
1

1 Because we conclude that there was no error and, thus, no misconduct, we need not
address Plummer’s substantial-rights argument.

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Sentence
Plummer argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the state failed to prove
that his out-of-state convictions could be included in his criminal-history score. While
Plummer did not raise the issue with the district court, “a defendant may not waive review
of his criminal history score calculation.” State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Minn.
2007). Appellate courts review a district court’s criminal-history-score calculation for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Oreskovich, 915 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Minn. App. 2018). A
sentence based on an incorrect criminal-history score must be remanded for resentencing.
State v. Woods, 945 N.W.2d 414, 416-17 (Minn. App. 2020).
“The state has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts
necessary to justify consideration of out-of-state convictions in determining a defendant’s
criminal history score.” State v. Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d 349, 355 (Minn. App. 2008)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 15, 2008). An unsubstantiated list of prior
convictions on a sentencing worksheet is insufficient to prove that the convictions should
be applied to a defendant’s criminal-history score. State v. Maley, 714 N.W.2d 708, 711
(Minn. App. 2006). T o include an out-of-state conviction in a criminal-history score, the
district court must determine “the equivalent Minnesota offense based on the elements of
the prior non- Minnesota offense.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.5.b (2024). The district
court must also consider “the sentence imposed” and “whether the offense is defined as a
felony, gross misdemeanor, or targeted misdemeanor in Minnesota.” Id.
Plummer was sentenced with a criminal-history score of five. The following felony
offenses were listed: (a) unarmed robbery, one point; (b) forgery, one-half point;

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(c) second-degree drug sale, one and one-half points; and (d) possession of firearms by a
prohibited person, one and one- half points. Three of these are out-of-state convictions:
Michigan (unarmed robbery and firearm possession) and Illinois (forgery). Plummer
asserts, and the record reflects, that the out-of -state convictions were unsubstantiated by
any other documentation or testimony. The state concedes that the district court’s
determination appears to rely solely on the presentence investigation report and that the
report alone does not establish the facts necessary to justify the inclusion of the out-of-state
convictions. See State v. Johnson, 31 N.W.3d 566, 575 (Minn. App. 2026).
Therefore, we reverse and remand for resentencing, allowing the state the
opportunity “to further develop the sentencing record so that the district court can
appropriately make its determination.” Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d at 356.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.