State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1748

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Gregory Allen Halfhill,
Appellant.

Filed May 11, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Wilkin County District Court
File No. 84-CR-24-296

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Derek Ganzhorn, Wilkin County Attorney, Breckenridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock , Presiding Judge; Connolly , Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to revoke his probation and
execute his prison sentence. Appellant also argues that the district court erred by entering
convictions for both counts of driving while impaired (DWI) of which he was found guilty
2
because the offenses are based on different subsections of the same criminal statute and
both offenses arose from the same behavioral incident. We affirm the district court’s
revocation of appellant’s probation, but we reverse in part and remand to the district court
to correct the warrant of commitment to reflect a conviction for only one of count of DWI.
FACTS
In July 2024, r espondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Gregory Allen
Halfhill with felony DWI in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (Supp. 2023)
(count I), and felony DWI in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (Supp. 2023)
(count II). Following a trial on stipulated evidence pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26.01, the district court found appellant guilty as charged. The district court
then sentenced appellant to 57 months in prison with five years of conditi onal release on
count I but stayed execution of that sentence and placed appellant on probation. The
warrant of conviction, however, states that appellant was convicted of both counts of DWI.
In July 2025, approximately five months after sentencing, a probation -violation
report was filed alleging that appellant failed to comply with the following conditions of
his probation: (1) inform ing appellant’s probation officer of law -enforcement contact
within 72 hours; (2) completing treatment programming as recommended; and
(3) refraining from alcohol use. The report alleged that, on July 3, 2025, appellant
contacted his mother because he was “feeling extremely sick.” Law enforcement was
dispatched to appellant’s residence where appellant was observed to be “significantly
impaired, and unable to speak clearly.” Appellant was then transported to the hospital
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where he admitted to consuming alcohol, and a breath test revealed an alcohol
concentration of .18.
The probation-violation report alleged that the responding police officer believed
that, in addition to alcohol, appellant “may have been under the influence of other
substances, due to the level of impairment.” The report also alleged that appellant was
discharged from his treatment program due to this incident. And the report noted that, after
appellant had been sentenced in this matter, it was discovered that appellant had pending
charges in North Dakota “for a domestic assault he had been charged with, while under the
influence of alcohol.” The report stated that this incident occurred in February 2025, that
appellant did not report this incident to the district court prior to sentencing, and that
appellant “was not honest about his sobriety at sente ncing, as he had claimed sobriety”
since July 2024. The report recommended revoking appellant’s probation and executing
his prison sentence due to appellant’s “blatant dishonesty with the [c]ourt, along with his
ongoing struggles with use of alcohol and abuse of his prescription drugs.”
At the probation-violation hearing, appellant admitted the alleged violations. The
district court then found “a sufficient factual basis” for the alleged violations, that the
violations “were intentional and inexcusable,” and that “the need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation.” The district court, therefore, revoked
appellant’s probation and executed his prison sentence. This appeal follows. 1

1 Respondent did not file a brief in this matter and we ordered that the case be determined
on the merits pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
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DECISION
I.
Appellant first challenges the district court’s decision to revoke his probation and
execute his prison sentence. District courts have broad discretion in determining whether
there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation, and appellate courts reverse an order
revoking probation only if the district court clearly abused its discretion. State v. Austin,
295 N.W.2d 246, 249 -50 (Minn. 1980) . “A district court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the fac ts in the
record.” State v. Fortner , 989 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted).
Whether a district court made adequate findings to revoke probation under Austin is a
question of law that we review de novo. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn.
2005).
When a defendant violates a condition of probation, the district court may revoke
probation and execute the previously stayed sentence. Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subds. 1(a),
3(1) (2024). Before revoking a defendant ’s probation and executing the stayed sentence,
the district court must “designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated”
and find “that the violation was intentional or inexcusable” and “that need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. District courts
“should not assume that they have satisfied Austin by reciting the three factors and offering
general, non -specific reasons for revocation.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608. Rather,
district courts must “create thorough, fact -specific records ” and “seek to convey their
substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.” Id. This process ensures
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that district courts “balance the probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest in
insuring his rehabilitation and the public safety.” Id. at 607 (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that , in revoking his probation, the district court committed the
following errors: (A) finding a violation for not completing treatment programming as
recommended without a factual basis; (B) finding a violation that was not alleged;
(C) “[r]elying on two violations that [the district court] did not find were intentional or
inexcusable”; (D) “[f]inding that the policies favoring probation were not outweighed by a
need for confinement”; and (E) “[r]evoking probation where rehabilitation had not failed.”
Appellant contends that “[a]ny of these errors alone requires reversal, ” but that, “[e]ven if
a single error does not, the cumulative effect of the multiple errors” shows that the district
court abused its discretion in revoking his probation.
A. The district court did not err in finding that appellant failed to complete
treatment as recommended.

Probation violations must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 27.04, subds. 2(1)(c)(b), 3(1). The clear and convincing standard “is met when
the truth of the facts sought to be admitted is highly probable.” State v. Miller, 754 N.W.2d
686, 701 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that the district court erred in finding that he violated the condition
of his probation that he complete treatment as recommended because there “was no
evidence in the record to establish” that he violated this condition. But appellant
specifically admitted at the probation -violation hearing that he violated that condition.
Although appellant later clarified that he “read something in the report that there was a
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discharge forthcoming,” he agreed that his consumption of alcohol “would have been a
violation of the terms of that treatment program.” Moreover, the probation-violation report
stated that, upon receiving information that appellant was hospitalized after consuming
alcohol, the treatment center “discharged” appellant “effective” July 9, 2025. Appellant’s
admission at the violation hearing, in conjunction with the probation -violation report,
establish that it was “highly probable” that appellant violated the condition that he complete
treatment as recommended. As such, the district court did not err in finding that appellant
violated this condition of his probation.
B. The district court did not find a violation that was not alleged.
Appellant also contends that he was deprived of due process because the district
court found that he violated a condition of his probation that was not alleged to have been
violated. We disagree. The district court stated on the record that appellant’s “failure to
stay in contact with [his] probation agent is intentional and inexcusable.” Although
appellant is correct that respondent did not allege that appellant failed to stay in contact
with his probation agent, the district court’s statement was clea rly referring to the alleged
violation that appellant failed to notify probation within 72 hours if appellant had contact
with law enforcement. Indeed, the record reflects that, earlier in the hearing, the district
court specifically discussed the three a lleged violations with appellant, none of which
alleged that appellant failed to stay in contact with probation. And the record reflects that
appellant admitted to each of the three alleged violations. The district court then accepted
appellant’s admissions, and found that, in addition to the other two alleged conditions that
were violated, appellant “violated Condition 3, requiring [him] to tell [his] probation
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officer within 72 hours if [he] has contact with law enforcement.” Therefore, on this
record, the district court did not find a violation that was not alleged by respondent.
C. The district court found all of appellant’s violations to be intentional and
inexcusable.

Next, appellant argues that the “district court erred by revoking [his] probation when
it only found that one of the three violations were intentional or inexcusable.” But this
argument misconstrues the record. As addressed above, the district court specifically found
that appellant admitted violating conditions 3, 11, and 12 of his probation. The district
court then found that the “ violations in this matter were intentional and inexcusable.”
(Emphasis added.) The plural form of “violations” demonstra tes that the district court
found that all three violations were “intentional and inexcusable.”
D. The district court did not err in finding that the need for confinement
outweighed the policies favoring probation.

Appellant challenges the district court’s determination with respect to the third
Austin factor. Under this factor, district courts must balance “the probationer ’s interest in
freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public safety.” Austin,
295 N.W.2d at 250 . To make a finding on th e third Austin factor, the district court
considers three “ Modtland subfactors”: whether (1) “confinement is necessary to protect
the public from further criminal activity by the offender”; (2) “the offender is in need of
correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined”; or (3) “it
would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.”
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted). Only one of the Modtland subfactors
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is necessar y to support revocation. State v. Smith , 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App.
2023), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023).
In addressing the three Modtland subfactors, the district court found that it
“strongly” believed that the need for appellant’s confinement outweighs the policies
favoring probation. The district court found first that “confinement is necessary to protect
the public from further crimina l activity, especially in light of the fact that there has been
criminal activity that has occurred in this matter that was unknown to the Court.” The
district court also found that it did not believe that appellant is “am enable to probation
based on [his] long history and the current failure to be successful.” And the district court
found that it “believe[d] that it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if
probation was not revoked.”
Appellant argues that the “record does not establish that confinement was necessary
to protect the public from further criminal activity” by appellant because the district court
based its reasoning related to this subfactor on “criminal activity from [app ellant’s] past”
and “there was no allegation or evidence presented at the probation revocation hearing that
[appellant] had been involved in any new criminal activity.” But a district court may
support this subfactor by finding that probation “was not an effective or reliable deterrent
of further criminal activity.” Id. at 321; see also Upchurch v. State, 184 N.W.2d 607, 608
(Minn. 1971) (contextualizing deterrent effect of probationary condition prohibiting
alcohol use).
Here, we acknowledge that appellant was not charged with any new criminal
offenses related to his probation violation. But a condition of appellant’s probation was
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that he abstain from alcohol use, and appellant admitted that, within a few months after his
sentencing, he consumed enough alcohol to register an alcohol concentration of .18. The
record also indicates that, in addition to consuming alcohol, appellant wa s abusing
prescription drugs. As such, the record clearly reflects that appellant’s probationary
condition that he refrain from alcohol use and drugs was not an effective deterrent.
Moreover, the record reflects that appellant has a history of drug -and-alcohol-
related offenses. And the district court’s reference to the North Dakota offense indicates
that the district court was concerned about appellant’s lack of honesty throughout th e
proceedings. Appellant’s excessive alcohol consumption, abuse of prescription drugs, lack
of honesty to the court, and criminal history related to drugs and alcohol support the district
court’s determination that the need for confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity. And because only one of the Modtland subfactors is necessary to
support revocation, we need not address appellant’s arguments with respect to the other
two Modtland subfactors. See Smith, 994 N.W.2d at 320.
E. The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant’s
probation.

Finally, appellant argues at length that the “district court abused its discretion by
revoking [his] probation without finding that rehabilitation had failed.” We are not
persuaded. At the probation -revocation hearing, t he district court noted its initial
reluctance to grant appellant a downward dispositional departure because the court was
“very concerned” that he would not be successful. And the district court found that, despite
receiving a downward dispositional departure , appellant committed multiple probation
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violations in a short amount of time since his sentence. See State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d
319, 331 (Minn. App. 2015) (noting that the district court properly considered a grant of
downward dispositional departure when deciding to revoke probation) , aff’d, 883 N.W.2d
790 (Minn. 2016).
Moreover, appellant was offered treatment in conjunction with his dispositional
departure but was discharged from treatment due to his continued use of alcohol. Indeed,
the district court found that appellant violated his condition of probation that he co mplete
treatment. See Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (affirming decision to revoke probation where
the defendant “ha [d] been offered treatment but . . . failed to take advantage of the
opportunity or show a commitment to rehabilitation”). The district court u ltimately
determined that, in light of his violations, failed attempt at treatment, and criminal history,
appellant is not “amenable to probation.” The district court’s findings are supported by the
record and demonstrate that appellant’s attempts at rehabilitation failed. Therefore, on this
record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant’s probation and
executing his prison sentence. See Fleming , 869 N.W.2d at 325 (affirming the district
court’s decision to revoke probation after the district court found that a defendant was not
amenable to probation because he nearly exhausted all “relevant programming
opportunities”).
II.
Appellant also argues that the district court erred by entering convictions for both
counts of DWI. Under Minnesota law, a criminal defendant “may be convicted of either
the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1
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(2024). The supreme court has interpreted this section “to bar[] multiple convictions under
different sections of a criminal statute for acts committed during a single behavioral
incident.” State v. Jackson, 363 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1985). We have applied this rule
to hold that multiple convictions are barred when they are based on different subsections
of section 169A and the offenses were committed during the same behavioral incident.
State v. Bonkowske, 957 N.W.2d 437, 443-44 (Minn. App. 2021).
Following a trial on stipulated facts, the district court found appellant guilty of both
charged counts of DWI. Although the district court stated on the record that it would “not
be entering a sentence on Count II as it is the same incident ,” the warrant of commitment
states that appellant was convicted of both counts.
We “may look to the official judgment of conviction in the district court file as
conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated.” Spann v. State,
740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). Because the warrant of
commitment here erroneously states that appellant was convicted of both counts of DWI,
we reverse in part and remand to the district court to vacate one of the DWI convictions.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.