Sean William Roulo, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1769

Sean William Roulo, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 29, 2026
Affirmed
Beane, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-20-1977

Sean William Roulo, Duluth, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Jon D. Holets, Deputy County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Beane , Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BEANE, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order summarily denying postconviction
relief, appellant Sean William Roulo argues that the district court erred by concluding that
his petition for postconviction relief was procedurally barred and abused its discretion by
denying his petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2021, a jury found Roulo guilty of three counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct. Roulo filed a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, and we
affirmed. State v. Roulo, No. A21-1223, 2023 WL 126425, at *5 (Minn. App. Jan. 9, 2023),
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2023).
Our opinion affirming Roulo’s conviction on direct appeal outlined the underlying
facts of this case. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Roulo based on reports from his
two adult stepdaughters, S.H. and B.H., that he had sexually abused them when they were
younger. The original complaint alleged two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
for conduct against S.H. (counts 1 and 2, respectively) and one count each of second-degree
and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct for conduct against B.H. (counts 3 and 4,
respectively). At the start of trial, the state moved to amend the date ranges for counts 2
and 3 and to replace the charge of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in count 4 with a
charge of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court granted the motion as
to counts 2 and 3 but denied the motion as to count 4. The state then withdrew the proposed
amendment as to count 3 and dismissed count 4.
3
During the trial, S.H. and B.H. each testified to specific incidents in which Roulo
sexually abused them. After calling nine other witnesses, the state then moved to amend
the complaint to conform the charges to S.H.’s and B.H.’s testimony. Specifically, the state
sought to amend counts 1 and 2 to allege second-degree criminal sexual conduct, rather
than first-degree criminal sexual conduct, consistent with S.H.’s testimony that Roulo had
engaged in sexual contact but not penetration. And the state sought to renumber count 3 to
count 4 and to allege a new count 3 as a single, specific act of sexual contact involving
B.H., consistent with her trial testimony. Over Roulo’s objection, the district court granted
the state’s motion to amend the complaint (the mid-trial amendment). After hearing
testimony from three other witnesses, including Roulo, the jury found Roulo guilty of the
charges in counts 1, 2, and 3, but not guilty of the charge in count 4. The district court
convicted and sentenced Roulo.
With the assistance of counsel, Roulo filed a direct appeal. Roulo’s appellate counsel
filed a principal brief raising two issues: (1) that the district court erred by allowing the
mid-trial amendment to add new count 3, and (2) that the district court erred by imposing
two sentences on counts 1 and 2.
The appellate proceedings then stalled. Roulo’s appellate counsel withdrew, citing
“an impasse” between her and Roulo as to case strategy, and Roulo proceeded pro se. Roulo
then requested multiple extensions of time to complete and file his pro se supplemental
brief. Altogether, he received nearly five months’ worth of extensions. During this time,
Roulo filed various motions, a partial pro se supplemental brief, and several reply briefs
following the state’s response to his principal brief.
4
Ultimately, we denied Roulo’s final request for an extension of time to complete his
pro se supplemental brief. Because Roulo never filed a complete pro se supplemental
brief, we considered only the two issues raised in the brief filed by appellate counsel. Roulo,
2023 WL 126425, at *2. With respect to Roulo’s argument that the mid-trial amendment to
add new count 3 was contrary to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.05, we
concluded that the amendment was within the district court’s discretion because new
count 3 was not an additional or different offense, and because the amendment did not
prejudice Roulo. Id. at *2-4. And with respect to his argument that the district court erred
by imposing two sentences on counts 1 and 2, we determined that separate sentences were
not prohibited because counts 1 and 2 did not arise from a single behavioral incident. Id. at
*4-5. The Minnesota Supreme Court denied further review.
In 2025, Roulo filed a petition for postconviction relief that is more than 200 pages
long and raises 74 “claims.” Those claims fall into three categories: (1) assertions of
various errors and alleged misconduct at trial by the district court, trial counsel, and the
state, mostly related to the mid-trial amendment; (2) contentions that Roulo received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his trial counsel failed to raise various
arguments in opposition to the mid-trial amendment; and (3) assertions that Roulo received
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, mostly because his appellate counsel failed to
raise meritorious arguments related to the mid-trial amendment. The district court denied
the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Roulo appeals.

5
DECISION
Roulo argues that the district court erred by summarily denying his postconviction
petition. We review a summary denial of a postconviction petition for abuse of discretion.
Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Minn. 2021). A district court abuses its discretion
if it misapplies the law or makes clearly erroneous factual findings. Reed v. State, 793
N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010).
Under the postconviction statute, a defendant may petition the district court for
postconviction relief “to vacate and set aside the judgment . . . or make other disposition
as may be appropriate.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2024). Unless the petition and record
“conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief,” the district court must set an
evidentiary hearing on the petition. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024); see also Chavez-
Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 671 (Minn. 2020) (“A district court need not hold an
evidentiary hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, even if true, are legally
insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief.”).
I.
We first consider Roulo’s arguments that the district court erred by concluding that
his 55 claims related to the mid-trial amendment and ineffective assistance of trial counsel
are procedurally barred by Knaffla and the law-of-the-case doctrine.
“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims
known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction
relief.” State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 1 (codifying the same rule for “grounds that could have been raised on direct
6
appeal”).1 The Knaffla bar “applies even in postconviction proceedings raising
constitutional issues of criminal procedure.” Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 445
(Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). And “[a] claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
that can be decided on the basis of the trial court record must be brought on direct appeal
and is procedurally barred when raised in a postconviction petition.” Torres v. State, 688
N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 2004).
Roulo’s 55 claims related to rulings at trial and the conduct of participants in the
trial are procedurally barred by Knaffla. Twenty-five of Roulo’s trial-related claims are
arguments that the district court erred in allowing the mid-trial amendment. These
arguments include, among others, asserted violations of various constitutional provisions,
challenges to the district court’s personal and subject- matter jurisdiction, and allegations
of prosecutorial misconduct and judicial bias. Roulo’s 30 remaining trial-related claims
assert that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to raise these arguments
before the district court when opposing the mid-trial amendment. Because all these claims
pertain to Roulo’s contention that the mid-trial amendment was impermissible —an issue
raised and decided in Roulo’s direct appeal—they either were or could have been raised on
direct appeal and are barred by Knaffla.
2

1 Roulo does not argue that either of the two exceptions to the Knaffla bar—novelty and
interests-of-justice—applies here. See Davis v. State, 880 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn. 2016)
(noting the two common-law exceptions to Knaffla). We therefore do not analyze the
applicability of either exception.

2 The district court also concluded that Roulo’s claims pertaining to the mid-trial
amendment are barred by the law-of -the-case doctrine because we affirmed the mid-trial
amendment in Roulo’s direct appeal. See Lynch v. State , 749 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn.
7
Moreover, Roulo has not identified any facts supporting these claims that needed
further development at an evidentiary hearing. To the contrary, it is plain from Roulo’s
postconviction petition and the record that his trial-related claims are procedurally barred.
Consequently, Roulo has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
summarily denying the claims in his postconviction petition related to events that occurred
during trial.
II.
We next address Roulo’s 19 claims that he received ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. The district court concluded that Roulo’s claims of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel are also Knaffla-barred because they could have been raised in his
supplemental brief on direct appeal. The state endorsed this argument. But “claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal are not barred by the Knaffla
rule in a first postconviction appeal because they could not have been brought at any earlier
time.” Onyelobi v. State, 932 N.W.2d 272, 280 (Minn. 2019) (emphasis omitted) (quotation
omitted). Thus, Roulo’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims are not barred
by Knaffla.
“Although the overarching standard of review of a district court’s summary denial
of a postconviction petition is abuse of discretion, we review the merits of any underlying
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo.” Berry v. State, 33 N.W.3d 683, 693

2008) (applying the law-of-the-case doctrine, in part, to affirm the denial of a petition for
postconviction relief). We need not address the extent to which the law-of-the-case doctrine
would also bar Roulo’s claims because we conclude that all his claims pertaining to alleged
trial errors and ineffective assistance of trial counsel are procedurally barred by Knaffla.
8
(Minn. 2026). Claims that appellate counsel was ineffective are subject to the two-prong
Strickland test. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To
establish Strickland’s first prong (the performance prong), a petitioner must show that
“counsel’s performance was deficient when judged against an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id. (quotation omitted). Appellate counsel need not raise every possible
issue to satisfy the performance prong. Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Minn. 2016).
Instead, counsel may focus on the “most meritorious” arguments, omitting claims unlikely
to succeed. Id. When a defendant and counsel disagree about which issues to raise on
appeal, “counsel has no duty to include claims which would detract from other more
meritorious issues.” Black v. State, 560 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted).
“[W]e employ a strong presumption that appellate counsel exercised reasonable
professional judgment in selecting which issues to raise.” Berry, 33 N.W.3d at 693 -94
(quotation omitted).
The petitioner must also demonstrate prejudice (the prejudice prong): “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Peltier v. State, 946 N.W.2d 369, 373 (Minn. 2020) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In other words, “a defendant must show that counsel’s errors
actually had an adverse effect.” Leake v. State, 767 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Minn. 2009) (quotation
omitted). We may analyze the prongs in either order and “dispose of a claim on one prong
without considering the other.” Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372 (quotation omitted).
Against that backdrop, we consider Roulo’s claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. Here, Roulo’s petition primarily alleges that appellate counsel failed to
9
raise issues he believes had greater merit than the issues counsel raised in Roulo’s principal
brief. “Thus, we need only decide whether appellate counsel’s failure to—or decision not
to—bring these claims is ineffective assistance as a matter of law.” Berry, 33 N.W.3d
at 693. To overcome the presumption that appellate counsel’s strategic choice was
reasonable, Roulo “must establish that appellate counsel improperly concluded that waived
or unraised arguments would be unsuccessful on appeal.” Chavez-Nelson, 948 N.W.2d
at 674.
Roulo has not made this showing. Roulo asserts through his 19 claims—nearly all
of which relate to the mid-trial amendment— that there was “no plausible strategic reason
for omitting” his preferred arguments in the direct appeal. After thoroughly reviewing all
of Roulo’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we cannot conclude that
appellate counsel acted unreasonably in deciding against asserting Roulo’s preferred
arguments. Roulo tends to summarize the law he believes supports his argument and then
assert that appellate counsel was wrong not to raise it. In other words, he merely rehashes
his disagreement with appellate counsel ’s strategic choices without demonstrating that
those choices were unreasonable. But “[b]ecause effective appellate advocacy often
involves weeding out weaker claims, counsel may reasonably decline to raise an issue
precisely because she does not believe it has a reasonable probability of success.” Berry,
33 N.W.3d at 694 (quotation omitted). Roulo understood that he had the right to raise
additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief if he had a different opinion from his
appellate counsel as to what issues should be raised on appeal. His failure to do so does not
render his attorney’s strategic decisions unreasonable. See Case v. State, 364 N.W.2d 797,
10
800 (Minn. 1985). Thus, Roulo has not demonstrated that appellate counsel’s decision not
to raise his preferred arguments would fall below Strickland’s objective standard of
reasonableness.3
Separate from Roulo’s contention that appellate counsel failed to raise his preferred
arguments, he asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective because she excluded him from
preparing the principal brief; misstated whether a trial transcript could be corrected;
delayed mailing him the trial transcripts, leaving him with less than a month to prepare his
supplemental brief; and filed a “secret brief” that conceded guilt against his wishes.4 In our
review of the record, we discern no basis to conclude that appellate counsel’s performance
was deficient. But even if appellate counsel’s performance was deficient in the ways he
identifies, Roulo has not made any plausible argument as to how the outcome of his direct
appeal would have been different if not for appellate counsel’s performance. Roulo had
every opportunity to raise any issues he wished in the direct appeal, including any alleged
deficiencies in the trial record, and was afforded several months of additional time to do

3 Because Roulo cannot satisfy the performance prong, we need not analyze the prejudice
prong of the Strickland test. See Peltier, 946 N.W.2d at 372.

4 We understand Roulo’s contention that appellate counsel “filed a secret brief conceding
guilt against [his] wishes” to relate to appellate counsel’s decision to argue that Roulo
should be resentenced because he was sentenced for two offenses that arose from a single
behavioral incident. But contrary to Roulo’s suggestion, appellate counsel did not concede
his guilt by arguing for resentencing. Instead, a resentencing argument concerns whether
the sentence imposed complied with the law after guilt has already been determined. It is
common for appellants to challenge both the legality of their sentence and the underlying
conviction in the same appeal. See, e.g., State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2020)
(addressing arguments that convictions should be reversed and that a sentence was
unlawful because it exceeded the statutory maximum).
11
so. His failure to timely file a completed pro se supplemental brief on direct appeal cannot
reasonably be attributed to any aspect of his appellate counsel’s performance.
Because Roulo’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims fail as a matter
of law, the district court did not err by summarily denying his postconviction petition.
III.
Roulo mentions several other factual issues that he believes required further
development in an evidentiary hearing. He argues that an evidentiary hearing would
establish (1) the dates of his library access to show that he “did not inexcusably or
deliberately ‘choose’ to miss the . . . filing deadline” for his pro se supplemental brief in
his direct appeal, (2) that appellate counsel incorrectly advised him that “no authority
existed to correct the [trial] transcript,” (3) that this court erroneously denied his motion to
stay the appeal to pursue postconviction relief, and (4) that he did not receive an order from
this court. We disagree. Even if Roulo’s allegations were proved true, our analysis of his
claims demonstrates that these alleged facts are legally insufficient to entitle him to
postconviction relief. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Roulo’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.