State of Minnesota v. Ryan Michael Fiecke

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1774

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ryan Michael Fiecke,
Appellant.

Filed August 17, 2026
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-24-327

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ryan Hansch, McLeod County Attorney, Steven R. Ott, Assistant County Attorney (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Andrew C. Wilson, Special Assistant Public Defender, Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rasmusson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A McLeod County jury found Ryan Michael Fiecke guilty of motor-vehicle theft
based on evidence that he used a vehicle for approximately one week without the owners’

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permission and despite their requests to return it. We conclude that the district court did
not err by denying his motion in limine to suppress evidence of text messages that the
prosecutor disclosed only two days before trial. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In February 2024, D.W. and S.R. reported to the McLeod County sheriff’s office
that their 2009 Volkswagen Routan minivan had been stolen. D.W. and S.R. explained
that an acquaintance, G.G., had offered to help them sell the minivan by showing it to a
potential buyer. But G.G. did not return the minivan and ignored their telephone calls and
messages.
A couple weeks later, a Hutchinson police officer was on patrol when his squad
vehicle’s license-plate reader spotted the minivan because it had been reported as stolen.
The officer conducted a traffic stop. The officer learned that the driver of the minivan,
Fiecke, did not have a valid driver’s license because his license had been cancelled as
inimical to public safety. Fiecke was arrested and transported to the Hutchinson police
station. In an interview there, Fiecke admitted that the minivan had been in his possession
for approximately one week, that he had communicated with the owners, and that he knew
that the owners wanted either payment or the return of the minivan.
The state charged Fiecke with motor vehicle theft, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.52, subd. 2(a)(17) (2022), and driving after cancellation, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 171.24, subd. 5 (2022).
After several continuances, the district court scheduled a jury trial for April 30,
2025. Two days before trial, the prosecutor disclosed to Fiecke’s attorney 66 documents

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consisting of and relating to text messages between Fiecke and S.R. or D.W. That same
day, Fiecke filed a motion in limine to suppress evidence that the state had not disclosed
by April 22, 2025, including the recently disclosed text messages . The district court
considered the motion at a hearing the next day. Fiecke argued that the state knew about
the text messages since March 11, 2024, when a police officer interviewed S.R. He argued
that admission of the additional text messages would prejudice the defense and requested
that the district court exclude the text messages as a sanction for a discovery violation.
In response, the prosecutor stated that a deputy sheriff spoke with S.R. and D.W.
when a theft was first reported, that S.R. and D.W. mentioned text messages, that the
deputy asked S.R. and D.W. to provide text messages, and that they provided text
messages, which were disclosed to the defense soon thereafter. The prosecutor stated that
a person in the county attorney’s office spoke with S.R. on April 24, 2025, to prepare for
her testimony at trial and that S.R. referred to text messages exchanged between Fiecke
and D.W. or her. The prosecutor explained that he then “got the impression that there were
more messages than what she had originally provided.” The prosecutor stated that he asked
S.R. to share the additional text messages with a police officer, which she did on April 25
and 28, 2025. The prosecutor further stated that he promptly disclosed the additional text
messages to Fiecke’s attorney on April 28, 2025, after receiving them from the police
officer. The district court denied Fiecke’s motion, reasoning that the additional text
messages were not in the prosecutor’s possession or control until April 25 and 28, 2025.
The case was tried to a jury on two days in April and May of 2025. The state called
five witnesses, including D.W. and S.R. The state introduced 14 exhibits consisting of text

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messages between and among Fiecke, S.R., and D.W., approximately five of which, it
appears, were among the late-disclosed text messages. In addition, S.R. testified about the
content of several text messages. Before the case was submitted to the jury, Fiecke pleaded
guilty to driving after cancellation. The jury found Fiecke guilty of motor-vehicle theft.
The district court imposed a sentence of 18 months of imprisonment and ordered Fiecke to
pay restitution in the amount of $3,200. Fiecke appeals.
DECISION
Fiecke argues that, for two reasons, the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence of the additional text messages that were disclosed to the defense shortly
before trial.
A.
In a felony prosecution, the state has an obligation to make certain disclosures to the
defendant, either voluntarily or in response to a request by the defendant. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 9.01. The state’s discovery obligations “extend to material and information in the
possession or control of members of the prosecution staff and of any others who have
participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly report,
or with reference to the particular case have reported, to the prosecutor’s office.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1a(1) (emphasis added). If the state fails to comply with its
discovery obligations, a district court has discretion to exclude evidence as a sanction. See
State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489-90 (Minn. 2005). This court applies a de novo
standard of review to a district court’s determination that a discovery violation has occurred

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and an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s decision concerning a
sanction. Id. at 489.
In the district court, Fiecke argued that the state had an obligation to disclose the
additional text messages on the ground that S.R. was within the group of persons “who
have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly
report, or with reference to the particular case have reported, to the prosecutor’s office.”
See Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1a(1). The district court rejected that argument ,
reasoning that an alleged victim of an alleged crime is not an agent of the prosecution for
purposes of rule 9.01, subdivision 1a(1).
On appeal, Fiecke renews his argument that a prosecutor has a duty to disclose
evidence in the possession or control of an alleged victim. Fiecke does not cite any caselaw
for the proposition that an alleged victim is an agent of the prosecution for purposes of rule
9.01, subdivision 1a(1), merely by reporting a crime and supplying information to
investigating officers. We are not aware of any such authority. Furthermore, Fiecke’s
argument is inconsistent with the text of the rule. It may be true, in a sense, that S.R.
“participated in the investigation . . . of the case” by meeting with an investigating officer,
answering questions, and supplying information. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1a(1).
But there is no indication in the record that S.R. “either regularly report[s], or with
reference to the particular case ha[s] reported, to the prosecutor’s office.” See id. To be
clear, there is no evidence in the record that S.R. ever has been employed by the county
attorney’s office or by any other office of the county or state that investigates reports of
crimes. Accordingly, the state did not violate its discovery obligations by not disclosing

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additional text messages in S.R.’s possession or control before she mentioned them to the
prosecutor during the week before trial.
B.
Fiecke also argues, in the alternative, that the state violated a duty imposed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
“‘[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. ’” State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 234
(Minn. 1999) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). Consequently , “‘the
state has an affirmative duty to disclose evidence that is favorable and material to the
defense.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). This obligation extends
not only to evidence known by the prosecutor but also to “‘any favorable evidence known
to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.’” Id. at
235 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)).
Fiecke contends that the state committed a Brady violation on the ground that the
police officer who interviewed S.R. in March 2024 “knew that [Fiecke] communicated
with D.W. and S.R. via text message” and “had a duty to follow up with S.R. and D.W.
before the eve of trial to determine whether they possessed other text messages that were
relevant to the case ” but did not do so. In response, the state contends that there was no
Brady violation because the alleged victims were not acting on the state’s behalf and
because the additional text messages were not favorable to Fiecke.

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To resolve Fiecke’s Brady argument, it is sufficient to reason that the additional text
messages disclosed to the defense shortly before trial were not favorable to the defense. At
the pre-trial hearing, Fiecke did not specifically identify any late-disclosed text message
that is favorable to the defense. At trial, Fiecke did not seek to introduce any late-disclosed
text messages that were not introduced by the state. The five text messages that the state
introduced are not favorable to Fiecke because they show that D.W. and S.R. told Fiecke
that he did not have permission to use their minivan and demanded that Fiecke pay for the
minivan or return it. On appeal, Fiecke does not argue that any late-disclosed text message
is favorable to him. Accordingly, Fiecke has not demonstrated that the state committed a
Brady violation.
In sum, the district court did not err by denying Fiecke ’s motion to suppress
evidence of the additional text messages that were disclosed to the defense shortly before
trial.
Affirmed.