State of Minnesota v. Troy James Bonkowske

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1777

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Troy James Bonkowske,
Appellant.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-24-946

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Aaron P. Welch, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Evan Ottaviani, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Rasmusson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction following a court trial for fifth -degree assault-
fear, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to cause the victim
to fear immediate bodily harm, the state’s mischaracterization of the charge at trial

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deprived him of a fair trial, and the district court erred by determining that he knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In his pro se supplemental brief,
appellant raises additional arguments challenging his conviction and the district court’s
handling of the proceedings. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant owns property on West Bay Road in St. Louis County, Minnesota. S.T.,
a neighbor, must use West Bay Road to access her recreational cabin property. On the
evening of June 24, 2024, S.T. and D.H. decided to go on a walk. They encountered
appellant on West Bay Road. He was sitting in a lawn chair, partly on the road across from
his property and partially on another neighbor’s property. His truck was parked on the
opposite side of the road, partly on the roadway, requiring S.T. and D.H. to pass b etween
appellant and his truck.
Appellant testified that he was sitting outside to watch his “small dog” play with
other neighborhood dogs and that he held a pebble from the gravel road in his hand to
throw in case he needed to break up a fight between the dogs. As S.T. and D.H. approached
appellant, S.T. said “hi” or “hello.” S.T. testified that appellant became “irritated and
agitated,” waiving his hands in the air, saying that S.T. and D.H. were disturbing and
harassing him by walking by his property. S.T. began taking photographs with her phone
to use as evidence. S.T. testified that appellant called her a profane name, said he “would
get [her], and gave [her] the finger.”
S.T. testified that appellant picked up gravel from the road and threw it at her, that
it struck her below the waist, and that this made her feel disappointed, upset, and afraid.

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After being hit, she stated, “I am calling 911.” Both S.T. and appellant testified that the
911 operator could hear appellant in the background telling S.T. to get away from him. At
the 911 operator’s instruction, S.T. and D.H. returned to their cabin and locked their door.
By the time law enforcement arrived, appellant had picked up his chair and driven away in
his truck.
Appellant’s testimony differed. He testified that, o nce he saw S.T. and D.H.
walking down the road, he assumed they would be “smiling and gloating and mocking
[him] as they walked by” because of prior conflicts between him and S.T. He believed
they were taking photos of him and his license plate to try to get him arrested for sitting on
a private road and for having expired license plate tabs. Appellant acknowledged, “words
were said . . . [he] called her names and gave her the finger and told her to get away from
[him].” Appellant testified, “at no time did I pick up a pebble to throw at her or the one
pebble that I did have in my hand trying to get her away from me, it didn’t hit her, and it’s
an absolute lie if she says I threw – picked up and threw three pebbles at her.” On cross -
examination, appellant confirmed that he was “absolutely” upset because S.T. was taking
unwanted photographs, and that he threw the pebble because he was “frustrated” that S.T.
was “coming at” him as he kept “telling her to get away from [him].” He answered the
question, “[a]nd because you were upset, you threw that pebble at her?” with, “[y]es, cause
she was coming at me.”
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with one count of misdemeanor
Fifth Degree Assault –Fear of Bodily Harm or Death, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.224,
subd. 1(1) (2024) (assault -fear). The complaint alleged that appellant intended to cause

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S.T. fear of bodily harm by throwing small rocks at her as she walked by him on the road.
At a hearing, a public defender was appointed to represent appellant, and appellant stated
that he did not understand why he was being charged with assault.
At a later hearing, appellant discharged his public defender and orally waived
counsel in three pending matters, including this case. When the district court asked
appellant about his right to have an attorney and the potential disadvantages of representing
himself, appellant indicated he understood and did not think he would be disadvantaged by
not having an attorney. He also stated that he wanted to obtain a transcript of a recent
harassment restraining order (HRO) hearing. The district cour t stated that the HRO
proceeding was a separate civil matter with a different burden of proof, asked whether the
transcript issue affected appellant’s decision to discharge counsel, and appellant confirmed
it did not. The court found that appellant had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
right to an attorney and concluded there was no prejudice. At three subsequent pretrial
hearings, appellant affirmed his desire to proceed without counsel. The district court
confirmed that appellant understood an attorney could assist in preparing the case,
presenting evidence, and cross -examining witnesses, and requested that he file a written
petition to proceed pro se before trial.
Appellant signed and submitted a Petition to Proceed as Pro Se Counsel for this case
and another pending file, on which he indicated that he understood he was charged with
“the crime(s) of Harassment alleged to have occurred on or about Aug. 10th, 2024, in St.
Louis, County, M innesota.” On the same day, the district court held a court trial for the
assault-fear charge, after confirming that appellant waived his right to a jury, waived his

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right to counsel, and declined advisory counsel. Regarding the waiver of counsel, the
district court noted it did not have “any concerns about [appellant’s] ability to understand
what’s taking place” and confirmed with appellant that , if he changed his mind about
counsel, he would make it known.
In his opening statement, the prosecutor referred to the charge as “fifth degree
assault – attempting to inflict bodily harm” (assault -harm) and repeated this reference
during closing argument. In his opening statement, appellant did not discuss the elements
of the crime or indicate confusion as to the nature of the charge against him. During cross-
examination, appellant attempted to impeach S.T. by using an HRO petition signed by her
husband. The district court stated: “Well, that’s not a way to cross examine or impeach a
witness with somebody else’s prior testimony.” Appellant later asked if he could call D.H.
and stated he did not subpoena D.H. because he thought D.H. would be the state’s witness.
Because D.H. had not been subpoenaed, the district court proceeded without D.H.
testifying. Following the trial, the district court took the matter under advisement.
The district court issued a written order finding appellant guilty of fifth -degree
assault-fear, as charged in the complaint, finding that “[t]hrowing rocks was an intentional
act. The motivation behind the act was anger. . . . [S.T.] testified that she w as afraid for
her safety.” The district court concluded that “[t]he State ha[d] proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that [appellant] committed an act with intent to cause [S.T.] to fear immediate bodily
harm or death.” When the district court asked appellan t if he would like an attorney for
sentencing, appellant replied that he would. The court appointed counsel and released him
with conditions. Appellant was sentenced to 90 days in jail , stayed for one year with

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supervised probation, following the recommendations of the presentence investigation
report. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant raises several arguments in the primary brief and a pro se supplemental
brief. In his primary brief, appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support
a finding that he intended to cause S.T. fear of immediate bodily harm, (2) t he State’s
characterization of the charge as assault -harm during trial deprived him of a fair
opportunity to defend against the charged offense of assault-fear, and (3) the district court
clearly erred by finding that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right
to counsel. In his pro se supplemental brief, appellant raises additional challenges to his
conviction and the district court’s handling of the proceedings. We address each argument
in turn.
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at a court trial, our
review “is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to allow the [fact-
finder] to reach the verdict” that it did. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, this
court must assume that the fact-finder disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Palmer,
803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011). “The verdict will not be overturned if the fact-finder,
upon application of the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proving an

7
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant guilty of
the charged offense.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016).
The standard of review depends on whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.
While direct evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and
that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption,” circumstantial evidence is
“evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute exist ed or did
not exist.” State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted).
Circumstantial evidence “always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not
required with direct evidence.” Id.
When reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove an element of
the offense, this court uses a two -step analysis. The first step is to identify the
circumstances proved. State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026) . In identifying
the circumstances proved, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict and defers to the fact -finder’s acceptance of evidence consistent with the verdict
and rejection of conflicting evidence. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn.
2013). The circumstances proved therefore include only facts consistent with the verdict.
Id. The second step is to determine whether “the reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated facts,
are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478 (quotations omitted). No
deference is given to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable inferences. State v. Fox,
868 N.W.2d 206, 223 (Minn. 2015).

8
Appellant argues that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove
that he intended to cause S.T. fear of bodily harm when he threw a pebble at her on the
evening of June 24. Under Minnesota Statutes section 609.224, subdivision 1(1), fift h-
degree assault -fear occurs when a person “commits an act with intent to cause fear in
another of immediate bodily harm or death.” This formulation makes assault -fear a
specific-intent crime: the state must prove that the defendant not only voluntarily
committed the act but also acted with the additional intent to cause fear of immediate bodily
harm or death in another. State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012). The focus
is on the defendant’s intent, not on the actual effect on the victim. State v. Ott, 189 N.W.2d
377, 379 (Minn. 1971). The fact-finder determines whether the requisite intent exists and
may take into account the ordinary effect of the act. Id. The specific intended harm is fear
itself, which is distinct from an intent to cause physical injury or death. State v. Spann ,
986 N.W.2d 205, 215 (Minn. 2023). Therefore, the evidence must be sufficient to prove
that appellant threw the pebble with intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm.
An inferential step is required to determine appellant’s objectives in throwing the
pebble at the victim. Intent can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances proved,
including the defendant’s conduct, the nature of the assault, and the events l eading up to
and immediately following the crime . State v. Barshaw , 879 N.W.2d 356, 364 (Minn.
2016). The state argues that, because appellant testified to his general state of mind at trial,
his intent was not proved solely by circumstantial evidence. But appellant testified to his
frustration and agitation at S.T. and D.H. during their interaction, not to his intent when
throwing the pebble. Because no witness testified from personal knowledge that appellant

9
intended to cause S.T. fear of bodily harm, the two -step circumstantial -evidence test
applies to the intent element.
The first step in the two -part analysis is to identify the “circumstances proved” by
“winnow[ing] down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in
favor of the . . . verdict.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478. Here, S.T. had a legal right to be on
West Bay Road. As S.T. and D.H. passed by and said “hi” or “hello” to appellant, he
became “angry by what he perceived to be [S.T.’s] harassing conduct.” The record shows
that S.T. was using the camera feature on her phone to take photographs of appellant.
Appellant called S.T. a profane name, testified he became frustrated, and co ntinually told
S.T. and D.H. to “get away.” He threw the pebble in his hand at S.T. The district court
found that S.T. observed appellant pick up more pebbles, so she turned and called 911. She
was hit on the back of her legs, was scared, and returned to her cabin and locked the door.
Although appellant’s intent, not the impact on S.T., is the focal point, the ordinary effect
of a man yelling, using profanity, and throwing a pebble can be considered to determine
intent. See Ott, 189 N.W.2d at 379. Taken together, these are the circumstances proved
for the purposes of the first step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis.
The second step of the circumstantial -evidence test requires examination of all
inferences that may be drawn from the circumstances proved as a whole. Harris, 895
N.W.2d at 602. Appellant contends that, although the circumstances proved support a
rational inference that he threw the pebble with intent to cause S.T. fear of immediate
bodily harm, they also support a reasonable inference that he threw the pebbl e only to get
S.T. to “leave him alone.” But on this record, appellant’s asserted purpose of making S.T.

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leave does not provide a rational hypothesis inconsistent with guilt. The question is not
whether he wanted S.T. to leave him alone; the question is whether the circumstances
proved permit a rational inference that he sought to accomplish that purpose wit hout
intending to cause fear of bodily harm. Here, the circumstances proved show that appellant
was agitated, yelled profanities, repeatedly told S.T. to get away, threw a pebble at her
while she was near him, hit her, and then caused her to call 911 and return to her cabin to
lock the door. Under those circumstances, the ordinary effect of throwing the pebble was
to make S.T. fear what would happen if she did not leave. Thus, appellant’s stated desire
to get S.T. away is not inconsistent with an intent to cause fear; it supports the inference
that fear was the means by which he intended to make her leave.
Therefore, the circumstances proved are inconsistent with the hypothesis that
appellant threw the pebble to simply make S.T. leave him alone without intending to cause
fear of bodily harm. Sufficient evidence supports the district court’s finding that appellant
acted with the requisite intent under Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(1).
2. The State’s Mischaracterization of the Charged Offense
When a criminal charge is misstated, mischaracterized, or contains an erroneous
statutory citation in the charging instrument, this court applies a harmless -error test to
determine whether the defect invalidates a conviction . State v. Gruber , 864 N.W.2d 628,
635 (Minn. App. 2015). A conviction following a fair trial will not be reversed unless the
defendant shows actual proof that they were in fact misled as to the charge brought against
them, to their prejudice. Id.

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Here, the complaint charged appellant with fifth-degree assault-fear, but in opening
and closing statements, the state referred to the charge as fifth -degree assault-harm and
identified the elements of that charge. Assault -fear is a specific -intent crime because it
requires proof that the defendant intended to cause fear, whereas assault-harm is a general-
intent crime. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 312. In its written order, the district court found that
the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed an act with intent to
cause S.T. to fear immediate bodily harm. On appeal, the parties agree the misnaming of
the charge at trial is reviewed under the harmless -error test. Therefore, appellant must
show that he was actually misled to his prejudice by the mischaracterization. See State v.
Clark, 134 N.W.2d 857, 867 (Minn. 1965).
Appellant argues that he was unable to prepare an adequate defense because the
state misnamed the charge. He states that his argument is supported by two facts. First,
appellant wrote “harassment” as the charge on his petition to proceed pro se. Second,
appellant argues that his defense, including his opening and closing statements and his
decision to testif y, responded to the elements that the state identified for assault -harm.
However, reversal is warranted only if appellant shows actual proof that he was misled
about the charge, to his prejudice. See id.
The complaint filed on September 4 identified the charge as “Assault -5th Degree-
Fear of Bodily Harm or Death.” Additionally, it described appellant’s alleged conduct
underlying the charge: “yelling expletives at [S.T.], calling her derogatory names, and
throwing rocks at her.” It stated that S.T. was afraid of appellant and of what he might do
to her, and that the 911 operator noted S.T. “sounded scared and ‘shaken up.’” Although

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appellant wrote “harassment” on his petition to proceed pro se, the complaint, not the pro
se petition, informs a defendant of the charge brought against them. Further, the pro se
petition was completed for both the assault -fear file (69VI-CR-24-946) and another then-
pending harassment -related file (69VI -CR-24-882). Because the complaint named and
described the assault -fear charge, it was sufficient to inform appellant of the assault -fear
charge brought against him. The petition’s reference to harassment does not show that
appellant was actually misled to his prejudice.
The charges of assault -fear and assault -harm are distinct theories with different
intent requirements. See Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 312. But the prejudice inquiry turns on
whether appellant was actually misled in a way that affected his ability to defend against
the charged offense. At trial, appellant decided to testify. On the stand, he provided his
perspective of the June 24 incident, including that he threw the pebble in his hand toward
S.T. On cross-examination, appellant confirmed he was “upset,” and “frustrated,” and that
he “threw that rock at [S.T.] to get her away from [him].” His testimony therefore
addressed the same factual question relevant to the charged offense: what he intended when
he threw the pebble. His testimony that he threw the pebble because he was upset and
wanted S.T. to get away did not prevent him from defending against assault-fear. Instead,
it provided the factual basis for his defense that he did not intend to cause fear of b odily
harm. He has failed to show how the charge named in the state’s opening statement
impacted his decisions at trial and prejudiced him. The district court found that the state
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed assault -fear. The fact-finder
applied the correct legal standard despite the state’s misstatement. Thus, although the state

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referred to the charge as assault-harm, that error did not prejudice appellant’s right to a fair
trial.
Therefore, the complaint was sufficient to apprise appellant of the specific acts and
the crime he was prosecuted for: assault -fear. Furthermore, although the state incorrectly
referred to assault -harm during opening and closing statements, appellant has not shown
actual proof that he was misled about the charge, to his prejudice. Accordingly, the error
was harmless and does not warrant reversal.
3. Waiver of Counsel
Appellant alleges error in the district court’s acceptance of his waiver of counsel.
A defendant may waive the right to counsel, but the waiver must be knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. State. v. Worthy , 583 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Minn. 1998). In determining
whether a waiver is valid, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including the
defendant’s background, conduct, possible sentencing, and understanding of the
consequences of self-representation. Id.; see also State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 265
(Minn. 1990) (holding that defendant who showed he fully understood the gravity of the
charges against him and was aware of possible dangers made an informed decision). We
review a district court’s finding that a defendant validly waived the right to counsel under
the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Jones , 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009) ; see
also State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 2012). Thus, the question is whether
the district court clearly erred by finding that appellant knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived counsel. See Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504; Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 276.

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Appellant argues that the district court’s waiver was inadequate because his question
about using materials from a related HRO proceeding revealed confusion that the district
court did not resolve, and that issue reappeared at trial. The state responds that the district
court adequately advised appellant of his right to counsel and the disadvantages of self -
representation, and that the court was not required to i nstruct him on impeachment
methods.
The district court did not clearly err in finding that appellant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The record shows that at the
September 30, 2024, hearing, the district court questioned appellant about his right to
counsel and the drawbacks of self-representation. He indicated he understood those rights
and wished to discharge the public defender’s office. When appellant asked about using
statements from a related civil hearing, the district court explained that the civil matter
involved a different burden of proof, asked whether the issue affected his decision to
discharge counsel, and asked whether he had any questions. Appellant answered “no” and
then confirmed that he wished to discharge counsel in all three pending matters, including
this case.
The record as a whole and the totality of the circumstances also support the district
court’s findings. The record shows appellant understood the nature of the proceedings; he
participated in multiple pretrial hearings and confirmed his desire to proceed pro se. The
district court repeatedly confirmed that appellant was waiving counsel, explained that an
attorney could assist with preparing the case, presenting evidence, and examining
witnesses, asked whether he wanted advisory counsel, and received his signed waiver. The

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court stated appellant understood the proceedings and could still request counsel.
Furthermore, appellant’s conduct at trial—his ability to testify, cross-examine, and present
argument—demonstrated his understanding of the process. Although appellant lat er had
difficulty attempting to impeach S.T. with materials from an HRO proceeding and failed
to subpoena D.H., those difficulties do not show that his waiver was invalid. The waiver
inquiry required the district court to determine whether appellant under stood the
significance and consequences of self-representation; it did not require the court to instruct
him on specific evidentiary or impeachment techniques. See Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 276.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s finding that appellant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel is supported by the record and was not clearly
erroneous.
4. Arguments Raised in Appellant’s Pro Se Supplemental Brief
Appellant appears to raise two arguments in his pro se supplemental brief: (1) his
conviction and sentencing were “based on civil rights abuses conducted” by the district
court, not sufficient evidence; and (2) the district court was biased “toward a femal e
victim.” However, no legal authority or argument is presented for either assertion. “An
assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or
authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Mod. Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d
770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997) (quotation omitted). Appellant’s citation of State v. Chauvin,
No. 27-CR-20-12951, 2020 LEXIS 443 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 21, 2020) for the statement
that “during the hearing was the fact Ms. T and her ex -husband could’ve exercised de -

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escalation of tensions on their walk past me” is not relevant to this assertion. Pro se
arguments lacking relevant legal authority will not be considered on appeal. See State v.
Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22-23 (Minn. 2008) (holding that appellate courts will not consider
pro se arguments lacking in supportive arguments and/or legal authority).
We conclude that appellant forfeited the assertions stated in his pro se supplemental
brief because they are unsupported by developed argument or relevant legal authority.
Affirmed.