State of Minnesota v. Keneisha Sharonese Gilmer

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1778

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Keneisha Sharonese Gilmer,
Appellant.

Filed August 31, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-23350

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Andrew Draper, Maple Grove City Prosecutor, Marquelle Haviland, Assistant City
Prosecutor, Maple Grove, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julia Q. Brady, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and

Rasmusson, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

CONNOLLY , Judge

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for misdemeanor disorderly

conduct, appellant argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her

attorney failed to prepare adequately for trial, that the district court erred by admitting

screenshots of Facebook posts into evidence, and that the district court erred by ordering

her to pay travel fees for an out-of-state witness. Because appellant fails to demonstrate

that counsel’s performance prejudiced her, and because admission of the Facebook posts

was not an abuse of discretion, we affirm. But because the district court improperly

imposed prosecution costs, we reverse and remand that issue.

FACTS

In October 2023, a fight broke out in a Spirit Halloween store in Maple Grove.

According to the criminal complaint, appellant Keneisha Sharonese Gilmer started the fight

when she attacked the victim, D.P., from behind. Respondent State of Minnesota charged

Gilmer with one count of disorderly conduct—brawling or fighting, in violation of

Minnesota Statutes section 609.72, subdivision 1(1) (2022), and one count of fifth-degree

assault in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.224, subdivision 1(2) (2022).

The state informed Gilmer that, if her case proceeded to trial and there was a

conviction, it would request prosecution costs for the travel of an out-of-state witness—

Spirit Halloween’s loss-prevention manager. Gilmer’s case proceeded to trial.

In August 2025, the state filed exhibit and witness lists. The state’s exhibit list

indicated that it intended to introduce body-worn-camera footage from two responding

police officers, the surveillance video from the Spirit Halloween store, photos of the

damage done to the store, and two Facebook posts, allegedly posted by Gilmer. The state’s

witness list indicated that it intended to call D.P., two police officers, and the loss

prevention manager as witnesses. The witness list also contained a list of D.P.’s prior

convictions.

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Following opening statements, Gilmer objected to the admission of the two

Facebook posts into evidence on the basis that the posts lacked sufficient foundation and

could not be properly authenticated, even through D.P.’s testimony. The district court

reserved ruling on Gilmer’s objection until the exhibits were formally offered into

evidence.

Gilmer then informed the district court that, while she had not filed a formal notice,

she was asking the district court to admit several of D.P.’s prior convictions—two felony

and one gross-misdemeanor—for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. The state

objected to this request on the basis that Gilmer did not provide the state with notice or

certified copies of the conviction records. The district court denied Gilmer’s request,

reasoning that, because she had not provided certified conviction records, there was not

“sufficient proof before [the district court] to know that this person was actually convicted

of what, on what date, in what court.”

The state’s first witness was Spirit Halloween’s loss-prevention manager. He

testified that the store was equipped with surveillance cameras and that he could access

this footage remotely. He explained that the store contacted him regarding the fight and

he pulled the video footage of the incident, which was later provided to the police. The

video was played for the jury.

The state’s next witness was D.P. She testified that she had been assaulted inside

the Spirit Halloween store on the date in question and identified Gilmer as the individual

who committed the assault. D.P. was shopping when someone approached her from behind

and began hitting her. Initially, she did not know who had attacked her but later identified

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Gilmer as her attacker. D.P. knew Gilmer because Gilmer was dating the father of her

child. D.P. identified herself as the individual in the video wearing a “[b]londe wig,” “tan

hat, tan purse, and a black jacket.” D.P. then identified Gilmer as the individual in the

video wearing a “blue t-shirt with a yellow smiley face and a long jacket.” D.P. explained

that, inside the store, she and Gilmer had no interaction prior to the fight. Since the assault,

Gilmer had tried to contact D.P. via text and Facebook.

D.P. further testified that she had a Facebook account and that her name on

Facebook was “Peaches.” D.P. had personal knowledge that Gilmer had a Facebook

account, and that Gilmer’s name on Facebook was “QueenKay Jackson.” D.P. has had

direct interaction with Gilmer through Facebook via Facebook Messenger and Facebook’s

tagging feature. D.P. recognized the Facebook posts as images from Gilmer’s Facebook

account and stated that they were accurate screenshots of the posts and messages. After

this testimony, the state attempted to enter the screenshots into evidence, but Gilmer

objected due to lack of foundation. The state then resumed questioning D.P. about the

posts. D.P. testified that she had seen the screenshots prior to her testimony, and that she

sent the screenshots to the state. D.P. had also seen several other pictures and posts on the

“QueenKay” Facebook account that confirmed the account belonged to Gilmer. After this

testimony, the state moved again to admit the screenshots. Over Gilmer’s objection, the

district court admitted the screenshots into evidence, finding there was sufficient

foundation provided through D.P.’s testimony.

The district court later explained:

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[D.P.] testified that she received these text messages from
a person she knew before the assault as [QueenKay Jackson];
that she received text messages, posts, and pictures from
[QueenKay Jackson], who she knew as the girlfriend of her
baby daddy; and she knew her name as Keneisha, but she did
not know her full name.
Since [D.P.] testified Exhibits 2 and 3 were sent to her and
then she provided those texts to the prosecutor, the Court found
there was sufficient foundation to admit Exhibits 2 and 3.
[D.P.] was the owner of the phone or computer that she
received these texts and post stories on; recognizes the
messages, exhibits, as though she received; and then forwarded
them and provided them to the State.

D.P. read the contents of the posts into the record, and the posts were shown to the

jury. The first screenshot was a post from the “QueenKay Jackson” account, which stated:

Why I just go to court and seen the video of me whooping
Peaches head in I can’t believe mfs said I jumped ha none of
my cousins touch her but why my cuz Lori pushing tf outta
Shanika big 4head a$$ 5 times cause she keep tryna to grab&
kick me She got all that mouth but the scariest one You might
be NEXT ho3[.]

The second screenshot had a photo of a post from a different account, with text

overlaid on the photo from the “QueenKay Jackson” account, which stated: “Nobody

denying they got beat up tho !! And since I’m delusional ima drop the video as soon as I

get it. I gotta take a plea deal anyways [emoji] & stop tryna send ho3$ to shop with me I’ll

scrap they a$$ too[.]”

On cross-examination D.P. explained that, at the time of the assault, she did not

know “QueenKay’s” real name. D.P. did not initially know who was attacking her because

she was attacked from behind. But during the fight, D.P. recognized her attacker as

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“QueenKay,” which is how she identified Gilmer to police after the assault. D.P. now

knows that her attacker’s name is Keneisha Gilmer.

The final witnesses called by the state were the two police officers who were

dispatched to the scene. The first officer testified that he stopped two women that had been

identified by his partner and store staff and who were attempting to leave the store. The

women said they had been involved in the fight but did not have identification on them.

One of the women wrote her name, Keneisha Gilmer, on a notepad, and stated that her

middle name was “Sharon.” The officer identified Gilmer on the record as the individual

he spoke with in the store. The officer’s body-worn-camera footage was received into

evidence and played for the jury.

On cross-examination, the officer testified that he compared the information he had

been given, which included a date of birth, with Gilmer’s Minnesota driver’s license. He

acknowledged that Gilmer’s middle name came back as “Sharonese,” and that the date of

birth he had been given did not match the driver’s license.1 Finally, the officer

acknowledged that he did not conduct any follow-up with the individuals on the scene and

did not ask Gilmer to give a statement.

The second officer testified that he spoke with D.P. at the scene. The officer tracked

down a copy of the store’s surveillance footage that was played for the jury. After

reviewing the surveillance footage, the officer was able to determine that Gilmer “was the

1
The testimony establishes that the officer wrote down Gilmer’s date of birth as February
27, 1995. But in the body-worn-camera footage, Gilmer tells the officer her birthdate is
“04-25-97.” The officer acknowledged on re-direct that it was possible he made typos in
his report when recording the date of birth he had been provided.

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primary and sole aggressor in the incident.” The officer did not “see anything in the video

that appeared to be a mutual interaction between the two” and noted that it “appeared to be

an unprovoked assault.” As a result, the officer issued a citation to Gilmer. The officer

also took photos of the damage that was done to the store, which were shown to the jury.

Gilmer testified in her own defense. She stated that she does not have any

nicknames, that she does not know D.P., that she has never had a Facebook account, and

that she was not in the Spirit Halloween store on the day in question. She explained that

her identity had been stolen on two prior occasions and that on one of these occasions, she

was charged with a crime that was later dismissed due to identity theft. She explained that

in this situation, someone she did not know had used her name to identify themselves to

police after the assault. Finally, she denied that the individual in the video was her.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. The district court sentenced

Gilmer on the second count of fifth-degree assault to 90 days in the workhouse, suspended

for one year. The district court also imposed two days of local jail time and granted the

state’s motion for prosecution costs in the amount of $806.95 to cover the out-of-state

witness’s travel expenses.

Gilmer appeals.

DECISION

On appeal, Gilmer argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because

her attorney failed to prepare adequately for trial, that the district court erred by admitting

screenshots of Facebook posts into evidence without proper authentication or foundation,

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and that the district court erred by ordering her to pay travel fees for an out-of-state witness

for the state.

I. Gilmer’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails on the merits.

Gilmer argues that she is entitled to a new trial because she received ineffective

assistance of counsel. Gilmer asserts that her attorney “failed to adequately prepare for

trial, which resulted in her not being able to impeach the state’s key witness with the

witness’s prior convictions.”

“Generally, an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should be raised in a

postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal, because an evidentiary

hearing, if granted, provides the district court with additional facts to explain the parties’

decisions.” State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2017). But “[w]hen

a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the basis of the trial

record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10

(Minn. 2013).

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of

counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; see State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d

823, 842 (Minn. 2003). When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is properly raised

in a direct appeal, we examine the claim under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d at 535 (citing Andersen,

830 N.W.2d at 10). Under the two-prong Strickland test, a defendant must show that “(1)

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a

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reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s

errors.” Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10.

Appellate courts “need not address both the performance and prejudice prongs if

one is dispositive.” Id. “Under the second prong, a defendant must show that, but for

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding probably would have been different. The

reviewing court considers the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury in making a

determination of prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted).

Gilmer contends that her attorney’s performance “was deficient because she failed

to adequately prepare for trial by gathering and submitting the necessary documentation”

that would have allowed her to use some of D.P.’s prior convictions for impeachment

purposes. Gilmer asserts that her attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness because this failure “was not a strategic decision, and because D.P.’s

credibility was so central to the state’s case, it impacted Gilmer’s fundamental right to

present a complete defense.” Gilmer further asserts that, “[b]ut for her attorney’s deficient

performance, [she] would have effectively undermined D.P.’s credibility and the outcome

of the trial would have been different.”

Here, we need not decide whether Gilmer’s attorney’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness because Gilmer has failed to demonstrate that, if her

counsel had produced adequate documentation of D.P.’s prior convictions to impeach her,

the result of Gilmer’s trial would have been different. See Berry v. State, 33 N.W.3d 683,

694 (Minn. 2026) (noting that appellate courts may analyze the Strickland prongs “in either

order,” and that, if the factual allegations “do not satisfy either the performance prong or

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the prejudice prong, [the court] may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering

the other”) (quotation omitted). Gilmer’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim appears

to rest on the premise that the district court would have admitted the convictions had

certified copies been produced. But the record demonstrates that the state intended to

oppose admission of the convictions offered for impeachment purposes. And the district

court would have needed to rule, over the state’s objection, that the convictions offered

were admissible before such convictions could have been admitted. See Minn. R. Evid.

609. Because the district court’s admission of the convictions for impeachment purposes

was speculative, Gilmer has failed to prove prejudice. See Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558,

563 (Minn. 1987) (holding that prejudice may not be based on speculation).

Moreover, Gilmer’s claim also fails because the evidence of her guilt at trial was

overwhelming. The surveillance video of the assault was played for the jury, which

showed two women shopping inside the store with no interaction, when one woman

suddenly begins to attack the other. Multiple state witnesses identified Gilmer (who at that

time was present in court) as the perpetrator of the assault, including D.P. and both

responding officers. One of the officers testified that Gilmer “was the primary and sole

aggressor in the incident,” that there was not a “mutual interaction between the two

[women], and that it “appeared to be an unprovoked assault.” Body-worn-camera footage

from one of the responding officers was also played for the jury. In the footage, a woman

identified herself as Gilmer and admitted to being involved in the fight. Furthermore, the

state highlighted the physical similarities between the individual depicted in the video and

Gilmer at trial. As such, the strength of the state’s evidence demonstrates that Gilmer

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cannot show prejudice. See id. at 563 (explaining that defendant had not shown prejudice

in part because the “evidence of defendant’s guilt was very strong”).

In sum, when considering the totality of the evidence, Gilmer has not shown a

reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had her attorney produced

adequate documentation of D.P.’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes.

Accordingly, Gilmer’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails. Gilmer is not entitled

to a new trial.

II. Admission of the Facebook posts was not an abuse of discretion.

Gilmer argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted two

screenshots of Facebook posts into evidence. Gilmer asserts that D.P.’s testimony did not

establish sufficient foundation and that the exhibits were not properly authenticated.

“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district] court and will

not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. On appeal, the appellant has the burden

of establishing that the [district] court abused its discretion and that appellant was thereby

prejudiced.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003) (citation omitted). An

abuse of discretion occurs when a district court’s decision is based on an incorrect view of

the law or is against logic and the facts in the record. State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d

730, 736 (Minn. 2020).

For evidence to be admitted at trial, it must be authenticated. Minn. R. Evid. 901(a).

The evidentiary requirement for authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility is

met only if the evidence is “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is

what its proponent claims.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(a). Authentication may occur via

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testimony of a witness with knowledge “that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” Minn.

R. Evid. 901(b)(1).

D.P. provided extensive testimony regarding the Facebook posts before they were

admitted into evidence. This testimony included that D.P. had a Facebook account, that

she had personal knowledge that Gilmer had a Facebook account, that Gilmer’s name on

Facebook was “QueenKay Jackson,” that D.P. had seen other pictures and posts on the

“QueenKay” Facebook account that confirmed the account belonged to Gilmer, that D.P.

had direct interaction with Gilmer through her “QueenKay Jackson” Facebook account,

that she recognized the Facebook posts as images from Gilmer’s Facebook account, that

the screenshots of the posts were accurate, that D.P. had seen the screenshots prior to her

testimony, and that she sent the screenshots to the state. This testimony was sufficient to

establish that the screenshots were what the state claimed them to be—screenshots of

Gilmer’s Facebook posts—and satisfied the authentication requirement through D.P.’s

testimony as a witness with personal knowledge. See Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(1).

Moreover, to obtain relief on appeal, Gilmer “must prove there is a reasonable

possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State

v. Smith, 940 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). Some of the factors that

an appellate court considers to determine whether a reasonable probability exists includes:

“(1) the manner in which the party presented the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was

highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who offered the evidence used it in closing

argument, and (4) whether the defense effectively countered the evidence.” Id. Strong

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evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence. State v.

Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011).

In considering these factors, there is no reasonable possibility that the screenshots

of the Facebook posts significantly affected the verdict. The two Facebook posts here were

limited in significance due to the other evidence presented by the state, which included

over sixteen minutes of combined footage between the store surveillance video and the

officer’s body-worn-camera footage. While the state discussed the Facebook posts in

closing argument, Gilmer testified and denied that she had ever had a Facebook profile, or

that she had a profile under a different name. Furthermore, evidence of Gilmer’s guilt at

trial was overwhelming, which undermines the persuasive value of the Facebook posts.

See id. As previously discussed, the surveillance video of the assault was played for the

jury. Multiple state witnesses identified Gilmer as perpetrator of the assault. One of the

officers testified that Gilmer “was the primary and sole aggressor in the incident,” that

there was not a “mutual interaction between the two [women],” and that it “appeared to be

an unprovoked assault.” The body-worn-camera footage shows a woman, who identified

herself as Gilmer, admitting to being involved in the fight. Finally, the state highlighted

the physical similarities between the individual depicted in the video and Gilmer at trial.

On this record, there is no reasonable possibility that the photos substantially affected the

verdict.

To convince us otherwise, Gilmer raises a number of arguments. First, Gilmer

argues that “the district court’s ruling rested on a misunderstanding of what Exhibits 2 and

3 actually depicted and applied the wrong legal framework,” because the district court

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referenced the screenshots as “text messages” and incorrectly stated that they were sent to

D.P. But as explained, any error in the admission of the Facebook posts was harmless.

Second, Gilmer argues that D.P. did not present any testimony that “the pictures she saw

were of Gilmer or that the chats contained any information that would otherwise indicate

Gilmer was the author.” But this argument is contradicted by D.P.’s testimony. Third,

Gilmer argues that it is “entirely plausible to conclude . . . that QueenKay attacked D.P.,

[that] Gilmer was dating the father of D.P.’s child, and that QueenKay and Gilmer are two

different people.” But this theory was already presented to and rejected by the jury during

Gilmer’s trial.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting screenshots

of the Facebook posts into evidence.

III. The district court improperly imposed prosecution costs.

Gilmer argues that the district court improperly imposed prosecution costs to cover

the out-of-state witnesses’ travel expenses. We agree.

“Review of the criminal prosecution costs statute involves a question of law subject

to de novo review.” State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1999). “If the

particular costs sought are recoverable under the criminal prosecution costs statute, a trial

court’s award will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.

Minnesota Statutes section 631.48 (2022) provides that, “[i]n a criminal action,

upon conviction of the defendant, the court may order as part of the sentence that defendant

shall pay the whole or any part of the disbursements of the prosecution.” Such costs are

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only allowed if they are either “expressly provided for in the statute or analogous to costs

taxable to the prevailing party in a civil action.” Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W.2d at 293.

Minnesota Statutes section 357.22 (2022) covers the statutory reimbursement for

witness testimony and travel costs. The statute provides that fees can be recovered “for

travel to and from the place of attendance, to be estimated from the witness’s residence, if

within the state, or from the boundary line of the state where the witness crossed it, if

without the state.” Minn. Stat. § 357.22, subd. 2.

In Lopez-Solis, the supreme court reviewed the imposition of travel costs for the

transportation of out-of-state witnesses. 589 N.W.2d at 295-96. The court observed that

Minnesota Statutes section 357.22 “clearly does not authorize the payment of travel

expense to a nonresident witness for travel outside the state of Minnesota.” Id. at 296

(quotation omitted). The supreme court explained that “[w]hile the legislature has afforded

[district] courts discretion in awarding expert witness fees and costs, no such provision

exists for lay witnesses.” Id. Thus, the supreme court reversed the imposition of travel

costs for the out-of-state lay witnesses but upheld the imposition of travel costs for out-of-

state expert witnesses. Id.

Similarly, in State v. Alvarez, the supreme court reviewed the imposition of travel

costs for an out-of-state witness. 820 N.W.2d 601, 624 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d sub

nom. State v. Castillo-Alvarez, 836 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2013). The supreme court

determined that the witness at issue “testified mainly as an expert witness,” and affirmed

the district court’s imposition of out-of-state travel costs. Id. at 625.

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Here, the witness at issue testified to the authenticity of the surveillance video from

Spirit Halloween. He testified that the store where the fight occurred was equipped with

surveillance cameras, that he was able to access this footage remotely, and that, after being

contacted regarding the fight, he pulled the surveillance footage of the incident, which was

later provided to the police. This testimony does not rise to the level of an expert witness.

See id. (noting that “an expert witness [is] one who is admitted to testify from a peculiar

knowledge of some art or science, a knowledge of which is requisite or of value in settling

the point in issue”) (quotation omitted). Moreover, when discussing the final jury

instructions with the district court, the state noted that it did not have any experts testify at

trial and stated that the district court could remove the jury instruction on expert testimony.

Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by imposing prosecution costs

related to the out-of-state travel of the loss-prevention manager who testified as a lay

witness at trial. See Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W.2d at 296; Alvarez, 820 N.W.2d at 625.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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