A25-1854 A25-1856

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1786
A25-1854
A25-1856

Randy Kabe,
Respondent,

vs.

Beth Ann Celander,
Appellant,

Beth Ann Celander,
Appellant,

vs.

Randy Kabe,
Respondent.

Filed July 27, 2026
Affirmed
Rasmusson, Judge

Faribault County District Court
File Nos. 22-CV-25-590, 22-CV-25-459, 22-CV-25-460

Silas Danielson, Margaret Sheely, Blethen Berens, Mankato, Minnesota ( for respondent)

Beth Ann Celander, Okabena, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Rasmusson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RASMUSSON, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appellant-tenant challenges the district court’s order
denying her tenant-remedies action , order requiring release of escrow funds to
respondent-landlord, and eviction judgment. Because appellant fails to demonstrate
reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Beth Ann Celander rented property owned by respondent Randy Kabe
beginning in May 2019. Celander’s tenancy converted into a month-to-month lease after
one year. She received rental assistance through a Section 8 program .
In April 2025, Cel ander informed Kabe of potential mold in the house. Ka be
repaired a leak in the roof . On July 15, Celand er again contacted Kabe about potential
mold in the house. Kabe advised Celander that a “handyman” would be coming to the
residence to address the mold issue and might have to cut into the ceiling. Celander
responded that she wanted a certified technician to complete removal and repair in the same
day, using containment barriers and air scrubbers. Kabe told Celander that the person
coming to the house is not certified “but has done several houses,” adding that the mold
remediation could be done without certification if “ [they] use[d] the proper method.”
On Ju ly 16, Celander responded , stating, “I have to insist that the ceiling not be
opened up today until we can have a full plan in place including the air filters and properly
sealing off the rest of the house.” At Celander’s insistence, Kabe did not complete repairs
that day , and he later responded to Celander that he had someone ready to handle the
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problem in a “safe and proper procedure.” The parties continued to exchange text messages
over the next several days, disputing the best manner to address the suspected mold issue.
The record suggests that Celander eventually did allow entry on July 23. Celander also
reported the mold issue to the Minnesota Department of Health and to Human Services of
Faribault & Martin Counties.
On July 25, Kabe sent Celander a notice to quit , stating that he “no longer wish[ed]
to rent [her] the house” and that she was to vacate the house within the next 30 days.
Shortly thereafter , Celander brought a tenant -remedies action requesting that the district
court declare the notice to quit retaliatory and unenforceable, compel Kabe to make
necessary repairs, allow her to remain in the residence during the legal proceedings, and
award damages. That same day, Celander filed a rent-escrow petition, requesting that the
district court allow her to deposit her rent with the court under the rent -escrow statute.
While the petitions were pending, Kabe informed Celander that repairs could be completed
on August 5. Celander responded that she did not consent to any entry for repairs.
Following a hearing on the petitions, the district court filed orders denying the
requested relief. Regarding the tenant -remedies action, the district court determined that
Celander unreasonably refused Kabe entry to the house to address the mold issues and that
Kabe provided a nonretaliatory reason—that Celander violated his rights as a landlord by
not permitting him to enter the property—for issuing the notice to quit. The district court
offered much of the same reasoning in ordering that the escrowed rent be released to Kabe.
Celander filed a motion for amended findings, which the district court characterized
as a motion for reconsideration and denied .
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On September 22, Kabe filed an eviction complaint, alleging that Celander failed to
vacate the property within 30 days of the notice to quit. Following a hearing, the district
court entered an eviction judgment .
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Before addressing Celander’s arguments, we begin by giving an overview of
relevant eviction, tenant -remedies, and rent -escrow law.
A party may terminate a month-to-month lease, also known as a tenancy at will, by
giving written notice to the other party, the time of which must be at least as long as the
interval between the time rent is due or three months, whichever is less . Minn. Stat.
§§ 504B.001, subd. 13, .135 (2024). “[A]n eviction is a summary proceeding to determine
an individual’s possessory rights to real property.” Nationwide Hous. Corp. v. Skoglund ,
906 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn. App. 2018) (citing Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2016))
(other citation omitted) , rev. denied (Minn. Ma r. 28, 2018). A landlord may pursue an
eviction if a tenant at will remains at the property after termination of the tenancy pursuant
to written notice. Minn. Stat. §§ 504B.285, subd. 1(a) (3) (2024), .135. If a district court
finds for the plaintiff, it must “immediately enter judgment that the plaintiff shall have
recovery of the premises” and “immediately issue a writ of recovery of premises and order
to vacate.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.345, subd. 1(a) (2024). “On review of a district court order
in an ev iction action, we defer to the district court ’s findings of fact, and those findings
will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.” Cuate v. Cuate-Dominguez, 12 N.W.3d
742, 746 (Minn. App. 2024) (quotation omitted). We also “correct erroneous applications
5
of law but defer to the district court’s ultimate conclusions, which we review for [an] abuse
of discretion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
A tenant -remedies action allows a tenant to seek redress from a “violation” of
certain statutes, codes, or agreements related to housing or tenant rights , as defined in
Minnesota Statutes section 504B.001, subd ivision 14 (2024). Minn. Stat. § 504B.395,
subd. 1 (2024). A landlord can defend against a tenant -remedies action by showing that
the violations do not exist or have been remedied; the violations have been caused by “the
willful, malicious, negligent, or irresponsible conduct” of the tenant; or the tenant “ has
unreasonably refused entry to the landlord or the landlord ’s ag ent to a portion of the
property for the purpose of correcting the violation, and that the effort to correct was made
in good faith.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.415 (2024).
Relatedly, a rent-escrow action allows a tenant alleging a violation to deposit rent
with the court administrator, provided the tenant complies with the statutory notice
requirement. Minn. Stat. § 504B.385, subd. 1 (Supp. 2025). If the district court finds,
following a hearing, that no violation exists, “it shall order the immediate release of the
rent to the landlord.” Id., subd. 10 (2024).
We review the district court’s findings for clear error and the interpretation and
application of the statutes de novo. Bass v. Equity Residential Holdings, LLC, 849 N.W.2d
87, 91 (Minn. App. 2014); Murphy v. Aeon, 24 N.W.3d 679, 686 (Minn. App. 2025), rev.
denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 2025).
Celander argues that the district court erred by (1) improperly shifting the burden of
proof onto her, (2) mischaracterizing her motion for amended findings as a motion for
6
reconsideration, (3) accepting a post hoc justification that could not have served as a
nonretaliatory reason for the notice to quit, (4) relying on a materially altered lease and
unadjudicated pleadings regarding subsidy status, and (5) failing to determine that the
landlord waived termination of the tenancy. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not improperly shift the burden of pro ving retaliation to
Celander.

A tenant may not be evicted in retaliation for the tenant’s “good faith attempt to
secure or enforce rights under a leas e or contract” or “good faith report to a governmental
authority of the [landlord’s] violation of a health, safety, housing, or building code or
ordinance.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 2 (2024). A tenant usually bears the burden of
proving retaliation by “a fair preponderance of the evidence.” Id. However, when a notice
to quit is served within 90 days of a tenant’s good -faith report of a violation or attempt to
secure rights under a lease, the landlord bears the burden of proving that the notice was
nonretaliatory. Id. Because Celander contacted Kabe about the mold issues and made a
report to two government entities within 90 days of the notice to quit, Kabe must prove the
notice to quit was not retaliatory.
The district court addressed the merits of the retaliation issue in its tenant -remedies
and rent -escrow orders. 1 In the orders, the district court determined that Kabe met the
burden of proving the notice to quit was not retaliatory based on Celander’s refusal to allow

1 In its eviction judgment, the district court referenced its previous analysis of the retaliation
issue in explaining that retaliation did not occur.
7
entry to the property, preventing him from addressing the mold issues. The district court
additionally explained that Celander, as the tenant, cannot choose the repair method.
We do note that the district court’s orders stated that “Celander failed to prove her
retaliation defense .” Upon examining the full context of this statement, we are not
convinced that the district court misapplied the statutory burden. T he district court
acknowledged that Kabe issued the notice to quit within the 90-day period. The district
court then found that Kabe’s proffered reason for eviction is nonretaliatory because
Celander did not permit him to enter the property to address the mold issue. In this analysis,
the district court implicitly acknowledged that the burden shifted to Kabe, and he met his
burden of offering a nonretaliatory reason for issuing the notice to quit.
The district court’s explanation is consistent with Parkin v. Fitzgerald , which
explained that “[a] nonretaliatory reason is a reason wholly unrelated to and unmotivated
by any good -faith activity on the part of the tenant protected by the statute,” such as
“nonpayment of rent, other material breach of covenant, continuing damage to premises by
tenants, or removal of housing unit from market for a sound business reason.” 240 N.W.2d
828, 832- 33 (Minn. 1976). Similarly, here, the district court reasoned tha t Celander’s
failure to permit entry impeded Kabe’s ability to repair the property. The district court
accordingly did not misapply the statutory burden.

8
II. Celander’s argument regarding her motion to amend findings fails on the
merits.

We assume without deciding that Celander’s argument is properly before us on the
merits. We review the denial of a motion for amended findings for an abuse of discretion.
Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 365 (Minn. App. 2006) , rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 14,
2006). “When considering a motion for amended findings, a district court must apply the
evidence as submitted during the trial of the case and may neither go outside the record,
nor consider new evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted). A motion for amended findings that
essentially repeats arguments made previously to the district court is a motion to
reconsider. Lewis v. Lewis , 572 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. App. 1997) (describing
appellant’s motion for amended findings that did no more than repeat arguments previously
raised to the district court as “incomplete, and, therefore, improper”) , rev. denied (Minn.
Feb. 19, 1998).2 On appeal, Celander “must show that the district court was compelled to
make the requested findings and failed to do so.” Zander v. State, 703 N.W.2d 845, 857
(Minn. App. 2005).
In her motion for amended findings, Celander argued that the district court omitted
a finding that she allowed entry on July 23 and that it mischaracterized her August 5 refusal
to allow entry as unreasonable. She additionally requested that the district court reconsider

2 Madson v. Minnesota Mining & M anufacturing Co., 612 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 2000),
overruled Lewis in part, but Lewis remains good law for the necessary components of a
motion for amended findings. State by Fort Snelling State Park Ass’n v. Minneapolis Park
& Recreation Bd., 673 N.W.2d 169, 178 n.1 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Mar.
16, 2004).
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the retaliation finding and take into account newly scheduled medical testing related to
mold exposure.
In denying the motion, the district court explained that the substance of the requests
in Celander’s motion for amended findings is a request for reconsideration. It noted that,
under Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 115.11, “[m] otions to reconsider are prohibited except by
express permission of the court, which will be granted only upon a showing of compelling
circumstances.”3 And i t referenced an advisory-committee comment to this rule
suggesting that compelling circumstances are only likely to occur where “intervening legal
developments have occurred” or “the earlier decision is palpably wrong in some respect.”
Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 115.11 1997 comm. cmt. The district court also discussed the
mold-related medical testing , which had not yet been scheduled when it made its initial
decision.
The district court acted within its discretion by denying Celander’s motion for
amended findings. Celander’s reference to future medical testing in her motion for
amended findings appears to be an attempt to request that the district court consider new
evidence, which is impermissible in a motion for amended findings. Zander, 720 N.W.2d
at 365. The record does suggest that Celander permitted inspection on July 23, as alleged
in her motion. T he district court’s order , however, explained that “[t]he July 23, 2025,
entry is irrelevant to the Court’s decision” because Kabe already met his burden of proving
the notice to quit was not retaliatory. The July 16 refusal supports this aspect of the district

3 We do not read Celander’s brief as arguing that she made a proper motion for
reconsideration.
10
court’s analysis. The remaining portions of Celander’s motion, which argue that the
August 5 refusal of entry was not unreasonable and that the retaliation finding should
otherwise be reconsidered, function as requests that the district court reconsider arguments
that it already addressed. The district court did not mischaracterize Celander’s motion.
Accordingly, it acted within its discretion by denying Celander’s motion for amended
findings.
III. The district court did not improperly rely on a refusal -of-entry theory that
postdated the notice to quit nor is the July 23 entry material to our decision.

We next address Celander’s argument that the district court , in determining that
Kabe demonstrated that Celander refused entry, erred by relying on an August 5 refusal
that postdated the notice to quit and failing to recognize that she allowed entry prior to the
notice to quit. For a landlord to meet the burden of showing a nonretaliatory reason for an
eviction when the retaliation presumption applies, the nonretaliatory reason must “aris[e]
at or within a reasonably short time before service of the notice to quit.” Parkin , 240
N.W.2d at 832.
The district court noted that Kabe “arranged a contractor to inspect on July 16 with
the goal to begin repairs on July 17” and that Celander refused entry on July 16. 4 The

4 In her reply brief, Celander appears to challenge as clearly erroneous the district court’s
finding that she refused entry on July 16. She contends that her message merely reflects a
discussion about how repairs would be conducted. In the relevant message, Celander stated
that she has “to insist that the ceiling not be opened up today until we can have a full plan
in place including the air filters and properly sealing off the rest of the house.” Because
Celander indicated that she did not want to have Kabe’s handyman complete the repair
work in the manner and on the date outlined by Kabe, it was not clearly erroneous for the
district court to have interpreted this message as a refusal to permit entry. See In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (explaining that a finding is
11
district court’s orders indicate that Celander ’s refusal on July 16 created a sufficient
nonretaliatory reason to issue the notice to quit. The notice to quit was issued on July 25,
a reasonably short time after the refusal . Because the July 16 refusal establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the notice to quit was not retaliatory based on
Celander’s interference with Kabe’s ability to repair the property, the alleged allowance of
entry on July 23 and refusal on August 5 does not impact our ana lysis.
IV. Celander has not established reversible error relating to an alteration in the
lease or an error in the complaint.

We turn to Celander’s argument that the district court erred by relying on a
materially altered lease. A box near the top of the lease includes language in black ink that
the lease period is from May 1, 2019 to April 30, 2020. In the middle of the lease, there is
a separate line that additionally describes the term, stating that the lease shall commence
on May 1, 2019. Next to that line, there is handwritten language in blue ink saying that the
term is “through April 30th, 2020.” Below that language, a box was checked in black ink
that the lease converts to a month -to-month lease after the expiration of the rental period.
Assuming, without deciding, that Celander is correct that the language in blue ink
and the checked box were added after she signed the lease, she fails to demonstrate that
this language materially altered the lease. The top of the lease indicates that the initial
period was to expire on April 30, 2020, which is consistent with the language in blue ink.
Even if Celander is correct that the checked box indicating that the lease is to convert into

clearly erroneous only if an appellate court is “left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed” (quotation omitted)).
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a month-to-month tenancy is not binding, she continued to reside at Kabe’s property after
the initial lease period expired. Minnesota law provides that “no tenancy for any period
other than the shortest interval between the times of payment of rent under the terms of the
expired lease shall be implied.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.141 (2024). Because the lease
provided that Celander was to pay monthly rent, her tenancy would have converted to a
month-to-month tenancy irrespective of whether the box was checked.
Celander next argues that the district court erroneously relied on a provision in the
lease that indicated that her rent was not subsidized. She appears to point to language in
the eviction complaint stating that her tenancy “is not affected by a federal or state housing
subsidy program,” including “the Section 8 program.” She concedes that she did not object
to this statement during the district court proceedings. Because Celander failed to present
this argument to the district court, we do not reach th is issue. See Thiele v. Stich , 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A reviewing court must generally consider only those
issues that the record shows were presented [to] and considered by the trial court in
deciding the matter before it.” (quotation omitted)). And even if error occurred, Celander
fails to adequately brief how it deprived her of statutory protections or that a refusal to
correct the error is “inconsistent with substantial justice ,” as required by Minn. R. Civ. P.
61. See Brodsky v. Brodsky , 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (explaining that a
party waives an argument by failing to adequately brief it).

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V. The district court did not err by concluding that Celander failed to prove Kabe
waived termination of the tenancy.

We last address Celander’s argument that Kabe waived termination of the tenancy
by accepting a subsequent rent payment . A landlord may waive a notice to quit “by any
conduct sufficiently manifesting such intention.” Arcade Inv. Co. v. Gieriet , 109 N.W.
250, 250 (Minn. 1906). A landlord’s acceptance of rent, however, “does not necessarily
manifest any intent to waive the notice of termination.” Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency
v. Powell , 352 N.W.2d 532, 534 (Minn. App. 1984). Celander bears the burden of
demonstrating waiver. See Pollard v. Southdale Gardens of Edina Condo. A ss’n, 698
N.W.2d 449, 453 (Minn. App. 2005) (providing that the “party alleging waiver” bears the
burden of establishing that waiver) (quotation omitted)). Waiver is generally a question of
fact. Id. Appellate courts review a district court’s factual findings for clear error.
Cimarron Vill. v. Washington, 659 N.W.2d 811, 817 (Minn. App. 2003); Minn. R. Civ. P.
52.01.
Celander argues that Kabe waived termination of the tenancy by retaining rent for
September 2025. The record reflects that Celander paid September rent in June 2025, prior
to the notice to quit and eviction action. The district court did not directly address the
retention argument but rather determined that waiver did not occur because Kabe did not
deposit any payments received after the notice to quit. Assuming without deciding that
Celander’s argument is properly before us, we conclude that it fails on the merits. Even if
Kabe retained this June 2025 payment for September rent, it does not follow that retention
constitutes waiver of the eviction action. Kabe’s conduct does not demonstrate that he
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sought to waive his intent to pursue the eviction action, as evidenced by filing an eviction
complaint in September , continuing litigation of the eviction dispute , and not depositing
any subsequent rent payments until the eviction dispute was resolved. Accordingly, the
district court did not clearly err by determining that waiver did not occur.
Affirmed.