Allen Peterson v. Edward R. Shaw, PA, Department of Employment and Economic Development

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1797

Allen Peterson,
Relator,

vs.

Edward R. Shaw, PA,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51791460-3

Allen Peterson, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (attorney pro se)

Edward R. Shaw, PA, Brainerd, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Melannie M. Markham, Keri A. Phillips, Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
On certiorari review, relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge
(ULJ) that he was ineligible for unemployment benefits because he committed aggravated

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employment misconduct. Relator argues that we should reverse the ULJ’s decision because
it is (1) unsupported by substantial evidence and (2) the result of unlawful procedure that
excluded relevant witness testimony offered by relator. We conclude that the ULJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and that the ULJ did not abuse their discretion
when they excluded witness testimony. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the ULJ’s written factual findings and decision, which
were filed after an evidentiary hearing, along with the relevant record evidence and
procedural history.
In February 2020, r elator Allen Peterson began working as an attorney for a
Brainerd law firm. He “clashed with” another attorney in the community, E.P., and spoke
of her in derogatory terms to his coworkers, often commenting about “killing” E.P.
Peterson’s coworkers “initially believed that Peterson was joking.” In November 2024,
Peterson’s girlfriend broke up with him, and “his behavior subsequently became erratic
and unstable.” After the breakup, Peterson “showed up” at his former girlfriend’s home
“three times uninvited” and sent her “a letter telling her how dangerous he could be.”
In early 2025, Peterson exhibited aggressive behavior toward coworkers and made
more comments about killing E.P. Peterson said he knew where E.P. lived and her home’s
layout. Peterson also “began grasping” two female paralegals “by the neck unexpectedly
and without provocation.” He told coworkers that he wanted to kill his former girlfriend,
the father of his former girlfriend’s children, and his former girlfriend’s new boyfriend.

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In March 2025, Peterson shared a video with the same two paralegals; the video
recorded Peterson in the woods shooting at clothed target along with the message, “When
I f-cking murder my enemies.” He mentioned E.P.’s name in the video and asked for
“donations of long dark hair” to add to the target.
On April 21, 2025, Peterson told one paralegal that he “was going to take her behind
the office and shoot her in the back of the head,” and the next day, he “stated that he ‘needed
two body bags.’” Both paralegals were “increasingly uncomfortable and convinced that
Peterson’s threats were serious.” On April 23, the two paralegals reported their fears to the
law firm’s owner, E.S., who reported Peterson’s conduct to the local police.
A police investigator took statements from both paralegals and spoke with other
law-firm employees, who corroborated the paralegals’ statements. The investigator also
spoke with Peterson’s former girlfriend, who stated that Peterson “had many firearms at
his current residence, in his truck, and at family members’ homes.”
Later that day, law-enforcement officers arrested Peterson at his office. Officers
found a loaded firearm and ammunition in Peterson’s desk and other firearms and body
armor in Peterson’s pickup truck. Officers petitioned for an extreme-risk protection order,
which the district court granted on April 24. The State of Minnesota charged Peterson with
two counts of felony stalking and two counts of felony threats of violence. Charges were
pending at the time of the hearing before the ULJ.
Peterson received an employment termination letter while he was in jail. In
June 2025, Peterson applied for unemployment benefits. Respondent Minnesota
Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED) determined that

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Peterson was ineligible for benefits because he was discharged for aggravated employment
misconduct. Peterson appealed that determination. In July, the ULJ conducted a hearing at
which Peterson and E.S. testified. The parties stipulated to the admission of 11 exhibits,
including the probable -cause statement that was filed with the state’s criminal charges
against Peterson.
The probable-cause statement identified the two paralegals as “employee A” and
“employee B” and stated that they “reported physical assaults by Peterson while working
at the law office”—specifically, “choking.” Employee A reported that Peterson “would
walk up to [her] and grab her by the throat without warning,” that “[t]his happened at least
ten times,” and that Peterson told her, “I want to choke you until you die.” She also reported
that Peterson made “specific threats” to kill his former girlfriend and her new boyfriend.
Employee B stated that Peterson “repeatedly talks about killing people and reports being
serious about it.” She also reported that Peterson “choked” her “until she could not
breathe.” Both paralegals described the video in which Peterson shot at a target resembling
E.P.
At the outset of the hearing, Peterson told the ULJ that he sought to offer testimony
from five witnesses, four former clients and an employee who was terminated before
Peterson. Peterson explained that the proposed testimony would impeach E.S.’s credibility.
The ULJ indicated that the witness testimony would not be allowed if it was not relevant.
E.S. testified that he terminated Peterson’s employment as an associate attorney
because Peterson demonstrated “repeated threatening and violent behavior against
employees” and “fellow attorneys outside the office.” During cross-examination, Peterson

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referred to a lost-wages claim against E.S. and started to question E.S. about whether he
had returned fees to a former law-firm client whom Peterson had identified as a witness.
The ULJ interjected and asked Peterson to explain the relevance of this line of questioning.
Peterson responded that he sought to impeach E.S.’s credibility. The ULJ replied:
[T]he issue of [E.S.’s] credibility is pretty limited here because
as far as . . . the reasons that you were discharged, and what he
was aware of and when he became aware of it, he has a very
limited role in going to law enforcement. I mean, he initially
reported, but the whole investigation and everyone that law
enforcement interviewed, their credibility would be more at
issue than [E.S.’s]. So, I don’t think it’s worth the time and
attention to attack [E.S.’s] credibility when the reasons you
were discharged really doesn’t hinge on his credibility.

At one point in the hearing, Peterson asked to call former clients as witnesses and seemed
to imply that a continuance might be appropriate. The ULJ denied Peterson’s request to
call the witnesses, reasoning that the proposed testimony was not relevant to Peterson’s
eligibility for unemployment benefits.
During his testimony, Peterson acknowledged sharing the shooting video with the
two paralegals. Peterson explained that coworkers “would complain about [E.P.] often.”
He also testified that he was “clearly kidding” when, in a text message, he asked the
paralegals for “donations” of hair for his shooting target. Peterson denied threatening or
intending to harm either E.P. or his former girlfriend; he also denied choking the paralegals
or any coworker. Peterson explained that his behavior “was a Darth Vader force grab,
which, like in the movies, was done from some amount of distance.” Peterson suggested
that E.S. and his coworkers may have fabricated the allegations about him because he had
“plans to quit and take [his] clients with [him].”

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The ULJ filed written findings of fact and a decision, concluding that Peterson was
ineligible for unemployment benefits. The ULJ determined that Peterson’s testimony that
“all these individuals are lying” was “simply not believable.” The ULJ found the
individuals interviewed in the police investigation were credible and “expressed a genuine
fear of Peterson.” The ULJ also reasoned, “The individuals interviewed knew about
Peterson’s arsenal of firearms. It is unlikely that they would make such serious allegations,
placing their safety in jeopardy, if there were not truths to their allegations.”
The ULJ concluded that “a preponderance of the evidence established that Peterson
was charged with four felonies stemming from actions he committed in and outside of the
workplace during his employment” with the law firm. The ULJ also determined that,
“[b]ecause Peterson’s actions toward coworkers seriously violated [the law firm’s]
reasonable expectations and substantially interfered with his employment, aggravated
employment misconduct occurred.”
Peterson filed a request for reconsideration, arguing that the ULJ’s decision rested
on insufficient evidence, the ULJ erred in refusing to allow his witnesses to testify, and the
ULJ was biased. Peterson submitted an addendum with several pages that described errors
in the ULJ’s determination as well as provided evidence to support Peterson’s claims,
including affidavits from the witnesses he had sought to call during the hearing. Peterson
filed a letter asking that the Chief ULJ review his request for reconsideration.
The Chief ULJ filed an order affirming the ULJ’s decision. The Chief ULJ’s order
stated that they had reviewed the proceeding and determined that the ULJ “did not
demonstrate bias” against Peterson. The Chief ULJ’s order also discussed the proposed

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testimony of each witness whom Peterson identified and explained that the proposed
testimony was not relevant and would not have changed the decision’s outcome. The Chief
ULJ concluded that Peterson “fails to identify any factual findings in the decision that are
not supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record” and therefore affirmed the
ULJ’s decision as “factually and legally correct.”
Peterson petitioned for certiorari review.
DECISION
When reviewing a ULJ’s eligibility decision, this court may affirm or remand for
further proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2024). Alternatively, this court may
reverse or modify a ULJ’s decision if, among other things, it is “unsupported by substantial
evidence,” exceeds the ULJ’s statutory authority, or is based on “unlawful procedure.” Id.,
subd. 7(d)(2), (3), (5). “Substantial evidence is (1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of
evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence
considered in its entirety.” Dourney v. CMAK Corp., 796 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn. App.
2011) (quotation omitted).
An individual who is discharged for aggravated employment misconduct is not
eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(2) (2024).
Whether an individual committed employment misconduct is a mixed question of law and
fact. Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011). We view “the ULJ’s
factual findings in the light most favorable to the decision, giving deference to the
credibility determinations made by the ULJ,” and we “will not disturb the ULJ’s factual

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findings when the evidence substantially sustains them.” Ward v. Delta Airlines ,
973 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 21,
2022).
But we review de novo whether those facts show that an individual engaged in
employment misconduct. Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 315. And we review the ULJ’s evidentiary
rulings for abuse of discretion. CUP Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557,
566 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that evidentiary rulings in administrative proceedings are
reviewed for abuse of discretion), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2001).
Peterson raises two issues on appeal. First, Peterson argues that the ULJ’s
determination of aggravated employment misconduct is not supported by substantial
evidence because it is based on the probable- cause statement, which is hearsay evidence,
and, according to Peterson, is “directly contradicted by [Peterson’s] sworn firsthand
testimony.” Second, Peterson argues that the ULJ’s decision rests on unlawful procedure
and the ULJ breached their duty to assist parties with the presentation of evidence when
they excluded testimony by Peterson’s witnesses. We address each issue in turn.
I. Substantial evidence supports the ULJ’s determination of aggravated
employment misconduct.

Aggravated employment misconduct is the “commission of any act, on the job or
off the job, that would amount to a gross misdemeanor or felony . . . if the act had a
significant adverse effect on the employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6a(a) (2024).
“A criminal charge or conviction is not necessary to determine aggravated employment
misconduct,” but “[i]f an applicant is convicted of a gross misdemeanor or felony, the

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applicant is presumed to have committed the act.” Id. Peterson acknowledged at the hearing
that his criminal charges were pending, and the record does not show whether Peterson was
ultimately convicted. Thus, no presumption applies to the ULJ’s decision. We therefore
consider whether substantial evidence supports the ULJ’s determination that Peterson
committed aggravated employment misconduct.
Peterson makes two arguments, which we discuss in turn. First, Peterson argues that
the ULJ’s findings rest on “inherently unreliable” hearsay evidence, specifically, the
probable-cause statement. DEED counters that the probable-cause statement was reliable
hearsay because it “contains detailed statements from [the witnesses], and corroborating
interviews with other office employees,” as well as “statements about the witnesses’
demeanor.”
Peterson’s arguments about the probable- cause statement are unavailing for three
reasons. First, Peterson did not challenge the admissibility of the probable-cause statement
during the ULJ’s hearing; the exhibit was received by stipulation and with no objection
from Peterson. Peterson therefore is raising this issue for the first time on appeal. We
generally do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988);); Peterson v. Ne. Bank –Minneapolis, 805 N.W.2d
878, 883 (Minn. App. 2011) (applying Thiele to an unemployment -benefits appeal and
declining to decide an issue that “was not raised before the ULJ”).
Second, even if we consider the admissibility of the probable-cause statement,
Peterson cites no binding authority to support his position that a ULJ may not rely on
hearsay evidence or that the probable-cause statement is unreliable evidence. Peterson cites

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Biretz v. SatCom Marketing, LLC , to argue that “uncorroborated hearsay that is directly
contradicted by a Relator’s sworn, firsthand testimony does not constitute ‘substantial
evidence.’” No. A11-579, 2011 WL 6141650 (Minn. App. Dec. 12, 2011). But Biretz is a
nonprecedential opinion and does not bind this court. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01,
subd. 1(c) (stating that nonprecedential opinions “are not binding authority” but “may be
cited as persuasive authority”). More importantly, Biretz does not support Peterson’s
position. In Biretz, the ULJ credited the relator’s sworn firsthand testimony over hearsay
evidence. 2011 WL 6141650, at *1-3. This court reversed, explaining that “the ULJ’s
credibility determination that . . . Biretz’s testimony was more persuasive [than hearsay
evidence] is not substantially supported by the record.” Id . at *4. We concluded that
“[s]ubstantial evidence in the record supports a finding that Biretz was terminated for
employment misconduct.” Id. at *3.
Third, the ULJ has discretion to rely on hearsay evidence and need not adhere to the
Minnesota Rules of Evidence, which allow the admission of hearsay evidence under certain
circumstances. The unemployment-benefits statutes provide, in part, that the rules
governing evidentiary hearings before a ULJ “need not conform to common law or
statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 1(b) (2024). Under DEED’s rules adopted pursuant to that statutory authority, a ULJ
“may receive any evidence that possesses probative value, including hearsay, if it is the
type of evidence on which reasonable, prudent persons are accustomed to rely in the
conduct of their serious affairs.” Minn. R. 3310.2922 (2025) (emphasis added). We

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conclude that the ULJ acted within their discretion in relying on the probable-cause
statement—a detailed summary of witness accounts of Peterson’s conduct.
Second, Peterson contends that the ULJ erred by rejecting Peterson’s own “sworn
firsthand testimony.” We understand Peterson’s second argument to challenge the district
court’s credibility findings because he urges us to credit his testimony. Peterson also
maintains that the ULJ “failed to legally reconcile” credibility conflicts “as required by
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a,” and that Peterson’s “firsthand testimony should have
outweighed all other forms of evidence.” DEED contends that the record supports the
ULJ’s credibility determinations.
This court defers to the ULJ’s credibility determinations, Ward, 973 N.W.2d at 651,
and does not reweigh record evidence on appeal, see Vargas v. Nw. Area Found. ,
673 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Minn. App. 2004) (“When parties have presented conflicting
evidence on the record, appellate courts must defer to the [fact -finder]’s ability to weigh
the evidence; they may not weigh that evidence on review.”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30,
2004).
We are mindful that, when the credibility of a witness testifying at a hearing
significantly affects the outcome of a decision, the ULJ must state the reasons for crediting
or discrediting that testimony. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2024) (“When the
credibility of a witness testifying in a hearing has a significant effect on the outcome of a
decision, the unemployment law judge must set out the reason for crediting or discrediting
that testimony.”).

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Here, the ULJ discredited Peterson’s testimony and gave specific reasons, stating
that it was “simply not believable” that all the witnesses against Peterson would lie and
that it “is unlikely that [the witnesses] would make such serious allegations, placing their
safety in jeopardy, if there were not truth to their allegations.” We conclude that the ULJ
satisfied their obligation to “set out the reason ” for discrediting Peterson’s testimony. Id.
We therefore defer to the ULJ’s determination that Peterson’s testimony was not credible
when he denied the conduct described by coworkers and summarized in the probable-cause
statement.
Finally, we consider whether the record evidence supports the ULJ’s determination
that Peterson committed aggravated employment misconduct. While Peterson disputes the
ULJ’s decision to rely on the probable-cause statement, he does not contend that the facts
in the probable-cause statement are not substantial evidence of aggravated employ ment
misconduct. Based on our review, we conclude that the record includes substantial
evidence to support the ULJ’s determination that Peterson committed aggravated
employment misconduct when he threatened and assaulted others , including coworkers,
another attorney in the community, and his former girlfriend.
II. The ULJ fairly conducted the e videntiary hearing and satisfied their duty to
assist parties with the presentation of evidence.

Peterson argues that the ULJ’s decision relied on “unlawful procedure” and that the
ULJ failed in their duty to assist parties by denying Peterson’s request to call witnesses
who, he argues, would have eroded E.S.’s credibility. T he ULJ excluded Peterson’s
proposed witness testimony, explaining that E.S.’s credibility had limited relevance to

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determining whether Peterson committed aggravated employment misconduct. The
Chief ULJ affirmed this ruling, reviewing each proposed witness’s testimony and
concluding that the witness testimony offered by Peterson was not relevant and, assuming
error, that the proposed testimony would not change the outcome of the ULJ’s decision.
A ULJ has a duty to “assist all parties in the presentation of evidence” and to “ensure
that all relevant facts are clearly and fully developed.” Minn. R. 3310.2921 (2025). DEED
argues that, while Peterson was self-represented, he was also “an attorney trained in the
law.” We disagree with DEED’s implied argument that the ULJ had no duty to assist
Peterson. Although Peterson is an attorney and presumably is trained to present evidence,
the rule setting out a ULJ’s duty to assist parties in presenting evidence does not
differentiate between represented, self-represented, or attorney self-represented parties. Id.
As for the ULJ’s decision to exclude Peterson’s proposed witness testimony, a ULJ
“is not bound by statutory and common law rules of evidence,” but may use the “rules of
evidence . . . as a guide in determining the quality of evidence offered.” Minn.
R. 3310.2922. A ULJ has discretion to “exclude any evidence which is irrelevant,
immaterial, unreliable, or unduly repetitious.” Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless Servs., Inc.,
726 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Minn. App. 2007) (quoting Minn. R. 3310.2922). Relevant
evidence is evidence having “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401.
We conclude that the ULJ acted within their broad discretion in excluding
Peterson’s proposed witness testimony. The ULJ stated that E.S.’s credibility had “limited”

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relevance because his testimony played a minor role in the proceedings. The record
supports the ULJ’s reasoning. E.S. reported the two ’paralegal s’ statements about
Peterson’s conduct to law enforcement, which initiated an investigation later summarized
in the probable-cause statement. The ULJ based the factual findings relevant to whether
Peterson committed aggravated employment misconduct on the probable- cause
statement—a detailed summary of the law-enforcement investigation and witness
statements—not E.S.’s testimony.
The Chief ULJ also examined this issue and explained that the ULJ “only credited
parts of [E.S.’s] testimony,” such as when E.S. testified that he heard Peterson threaten
E.P. and saw the video of Peterson shooting in the woods. E.S.’s testimony about E.P. and
the shooting video was corroborated by other witnesses whose interviews were
summarized in the probable-cause statement. The Chief ULJ considered Peterson’s
proposed witness testimony for each witness, based on the witness’s affidavit, and
determined that the proposed testimony was not relevant and, if admitted, would not have
changed the outcome of the hearing.1
We agree with the Chief ULJ’s analysis of this issue. We do not grant relief on
appeal for harmless error in the admission or exclusion of evidence. See Plowman v.

1 Specifically, the Chief ULJ reasoned that (1) the former employee whom Peterson sought
to call was “not a current employee of [the law firm] when the events leading to Peterson’s
termination occurred”; (2) three former clients would have testified about a legal matter
that “was not relevant to whether Peterson committed employment misconduct”; and
(3) the proposed testimony “would not have shown that [E.S.’s] testimony during the
appeal hearing was likely false.” The Chief ULJ also explained that another former client’s
testimony was irrelevant because the “allegations involving [that client] would not be
considered against” Peterson.

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Copeland, Buhl & Co., 261 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Minn. 1977) (concluding that the
unemployment-appeal tribunal’s error in excluding exhibits was harmless because the
exhibits were “not necessarily proof of the facts in issue” and the “decision would be
affirmed even if the disputed documents were considered”); Ywswf, 726 N.W.2d at 530
(concluding that the ULJ’s failure to receive a college transcript into evidence did not
prejudice the relator and was harmless).
Even assuming the district court erred in excluding Peterson’s proposed witness
testimony, any error was harmless. The record includes substantial evidence, from sources
other than E.S., that Peterson committed aggravated employment misconduct by
threatening and assaulting others. Peterson acknowledged sharing the shooting video. And
Peterson’s proposed testimony was not relevant to determining whether Peterson
committed aggravated employment misconduct for the reasons stated by the Chief ULJ.
Thus, even if the district court erred in excluding this evidence, Peterson was not prejudiced
because the outcome of the proceeding would be unchanged.
In sum, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ULJ’s decision that
Peterson committed aggravated employment misconduct because he threatened and
assaulted others, including coworkers, another attorney, and his former girlfriend. These
are serious violations of the standards of behavior an employer has a right to expect.
Affirmed.