State of Minnesota v. Keng Cha

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1798

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Keng Cha,
Appellant.

Filed September 8, 2026
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-23-5783

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max B. Kittel, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
In this appeal from the judgment of conviction for two counts of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct following a guilty plea, appellant argues that the district court

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abused its discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure and
imposing a sentence within the presumptive range. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Keng Cha
with one count of first -degree criminal sexual conduct (count one), in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(f) (2022), and one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
(count two), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1a(h)(I) (2022). The complaint
alleged that Cha, a 29-year-old high school volleyball coach, had a sexual relationship with
a minor student on the team. The state later amended the complaint to add a second count
of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (count three).
In February 2025, Cha pleaded guilty to counts two and three. As to potential
sentences, the parties agreed that the presumptive guidelines sentence for third-degree
criminal sexual conduct for a person who, like Cha, had a criminal- history score of zero,
was 48 months in prison. The plea agreement provided that, in exchange for pleading
guilty, Cha would receive consecutive sentences totaling 90 months in prison, the state
would dismiss count one, and Cha could move for a downward dispositional departure; if
the district court grant ed Cha’s departure request, Cha would receive a stayed 96-month
prison term.
At the plea hearing, Cha admitted that, while working as a high school volleyball
coach in 2022, he began a sexual relationship with the victim, who was a 14-year -old
student on the team. Cha admitted that he engaged in sexual penetration with the victim
on multiple occasions and that he was in a position of authority and in a prohibited

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occupational relationship with the victim. The district court ordered the preparation of a
presentence investigation (PSI) and a psychosexual evaluation, noting their importance to
the ultimate sentencing decision.
Before the sentencing hearing, Cha filed a motion for a downward dispositional
departure and accompanying legal memorandum, arguing that he is particularly amenable
to probation based on his age, lack of prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation with the
court, participation in Project Pathfinder, Inc., a sex -offender treatment program, and
support from family and friends. Cha submitted other supporting documents, including a
report of his honorable discharge from the national guard, sex-offender treatment progress
reports, and letters of support from his former cultural wife, her sister, and his employer.
Cha also complied with the psychosexual evaluation and participated in the PSI , which
ultimately recommended the presumptive sentence.
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the parties clarified that the plea agreement
provided for either an 86-month executed sentence or a 90- month stayed sentence. The
district court then heard oral arguments from defense counsel and the prosecutor, and Cha
gave a statement in allocution. The district court denied Cha’s request for a dispositional
departure, reasoning as follows:
The Court will put on the record I have read that
presentence investigation report, as well as the psychosexual
evaluation report that was filed into this case that was
conducted by . . . [a] licensed psychologist, that was filed back
on 6/15 of 2025, as well as her recommendations. The Court
also read a number of documents filed by the Defense on behalf
of Mr. Cha, namely a letter from Project Pathfinder dated
7/23/2025 by his therapist. I should put on the record all those
documents were filed confidentially, consistent with the rules,

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and [are] nonpublic as medical records. They will be
maintained as such, including the psychosexual evaluation.

The Court also read the Defense’s memorandum in
support of his motion for departure from the guidelines, filed
7/25/2025, and a number of letters and affidavits, one of which
includes a letter from his cultural wife, and . . . a sister of his
cultural wife, . . . along with other letters and/or progress
review notes and updates supporting Mr. Cha’s request for a
dispositional departure.

First, I want Mr. Cha to know that I can appreciate that
you have lack of criminal history, and typically that is a good
sign that someone will do well on probation. However, what
the Court cannot overlook is the significant age gap, as well as
the significance of your role. Your role in this case was such
that you were entrusted to be a volleyball coach to the young
victim and a number of girls. As you indicated yourself, in one
of the reports, they trusted you. You have violated, to the core,
the trust of this young victim and her parents. Being in a
position of trust, the authority and the responsibility of this
young woman is perhaps one of the most grave violations of
one’s sense of personal safety, and emotional and physical
well-being. Additionally, it involved the most egregious
violation of both vaginal, oral, and other penetration, and while
the Court can appreciate all the supporting documents of your
active engagement in treatment, because of the seriousness of
the offense, and the seriousness of the consequences of your
conduct, this is what the Court will do.

The district court sentenced Cha to concurrent prison terms of 48 months on count
two and 86 months on count three. Pursuant to the plea agreement, count one was
dismissed.
Cha appeals.
DECISION
Appellate courts afford the district court great discretion in sentencing and review
sentencing decisions for an abuse of that discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08

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(Minn. 2014). Only in a “rare case” will an appellate court reverse a district court’s
imposition of the presumptive sentence. State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn.
2006) (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish the presumptive disposition and
duration of a sentence depending on the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’ s
criminal history. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.A, 2.C.1 (2022). While district courts
have discretion to depart from the presumptive sentence if “identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances” exist, Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2022), departures “are
discouraged and are intended to apply to a small number of cases” because “[t]he
sentencing guidelines seek to maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and
predictability in sentencing of felony crimes,” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623
(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Cha moved for a downward dispositional departure on the ground that he is
particularly amenable to probation. A dispositional departure “occurs when the
presumptive guidelines sentence calls for imprisonment but the district court instead stays
execution or imposition of the sentence.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. When considering
a dispositional departure, a district court focuses “more on the defendant as an individual
and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him and for society.” State v.
Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983).
A defendant’s particular amenability to probation is a mitigating circumstance that
may support a downward dispositional departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7)
(2022); Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d at 668. A defendant’s mere amenability is not sufficient;

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instead, the district court must find the defendant particularly amenable. Soto, 855 N.W.2d
at 308. “By requiring a defendant to be particularly amenable to probation . . . we ensure
that the defendant’s amenability to probation distinguishes the defendant from most others
and truly presents the substantial and compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify
a departure.” Id. at 309 (quotation omitted). In determining whether a defendant is
particularly amenable to probation to justify a downward dispositional departure, the
district court may consider, among other factors, the defendant’s age, criminal record,
remorse, cooperation, attitude while in court, and the support of family and friends. See
State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
Cha argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for
a downward dispositional departure. Cha asserts that multiple factors demonstrate his
particular amenability to probation, including his young age, lack of prior criminal history,
remorse, acceptance of responsibility, cooperation in the prosecution and attitude in court,
and his participation and demonstrated progress in sex-offender treatment. See id. Cha
cites the PSI report, psychosexual evaluation, and his allocution at sentencing as evidence
of his acceptance of responsibility.
Cha’s argument is unavailing. Even when there is evidence in the record that a
defendant would be particularly amenable to probation, a district court is not required to
grant a dispositional departure. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn. App.
2009). We will not reverse a district court’s refusal to depart “as long as the record shows
the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before
making a determination.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011)

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(quotation omitted). Here, the district court “carefully evaluated” all the evidence
presented before denying Cha’s motion for a downward departure. See id. The district
court considered the facts in the record and stated that it had reviewed the PSI, the
psychosexual evaluation, Cha’s memorandum in support of his motion for departure, Cha’s
letters of support, and “a number of [other] documents filed by the Defense on behalf of
Mr. Cha.” The district court also heard oral arguments from counsel, Cha’s allocution, and
the prosecutor’s statement on behalf of the victim requesting prison time.
Cha argues that the district court abused its discretion by “fail[ing] to weigh Cha’s
valid reasons for a dispositional departure against reasons to not grant a departure, ” citing
State v. Curtiss. 353 N.W.2d 262 (Minn. App. 1984). In Curtiss, the district court denied
the defendant’s motion for a downward durational departure and imposed the presumptive
sentence because it found that “there were no legitimate reasons for departure.” Id. at 263.
This court remanded for resentencing, concluding that there were “[l]egitimate reasons” in
the record to support a downward departure and that the district court abused its discretion
by failing to consider those reasons and weigh them against the reasons to not grant a
departure. Id. at 263-64.
Unlike in Curtiss, the record in this case demonstrates that the district court carefully
evaluated the information presented by both parties and weighed the factors supporting a
departure and the reasons not to depart before ruling on Cha’s departure motion. The
district court reviewed the documents Cha submitted in support of his sentencing motion,
heard arguments from defense counsel about the factors supporting a downward
dispositional departure, and considered Cha’s allocution. The district court acknowledged

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Cha’s lack of prior criminal history, noting that it is “typically . . . a good sign that someone
will do well on probation.” See Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31 (stating that a defendant’s lack of
criminal history can support a particular amenability for probation). And although a district
court is not required to explain its decision to impose a presumptive sentence, the district
court here did so. See State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating
that if district court “considers reasons for departure but elects to impose the presumptive
sentence,” an explanation for denying the departure is not required). In denying Cha’s
request for a downward dispositional departure, the district court reasoned that Cha’s lack
of criminal history and positive participation in sex-offender treatment were outweighed
by the severity of the offenses, the “significant age gap” between Cha and the victim, the
abuse of his role as an authority figure in a position of trust, and the “grave violation” of
the victim’s personal safety and emotional and physical well-being.
Cha also argues that, in denying his downward dispositional departure, the district
court inappropriately centered its analysis on the offense conduct, which is the focus of a
durational departure analysis. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 624 (explaining that a downward
durational departure “is justified only if the defendant’s conduct was significantly less
serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense” (quotation omitted)).
But when considering a motion for a downward dispositional departure, “a district court
may consider both offender- and offense-related factors.” State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d
463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018). Cha is therefore not entitled to reversal of his sentence
because the district court considered, among other factors, the nature of the offense when
denying his downward-dispositional-departure motion.

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In sum, we conclude that because the district court carefully considered the record,
the arguments of counsel, and the reasons supporting a departure, the court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Cha’s motion for a downward dispositional departure. See Pegel,
795 N.W.2d at 255; Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d at 80-81.
Affirmed.