Mai Vu Vang, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1835

Mai Vu Vang, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 27, 2026
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-30436

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Eder Castillo, Andrew Markquart, Senior
Assistant County Attorneys, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of her request to withdraw
her 2020 guilty pleas to multiple counts of felony theft by swindle. We affirm.

2
FACTS
In 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Mai Vu Vang with six
counts of felony theft by swindle, alleging that between 2012 and 2014 she orchestrated an
investment-fraud scheme and convinced members of the Hmong community to invest in a
Ginseng farm that she allegedly owned in Wisconsin.
In May 2020, 1 the district court held an omnibus hearing in Vang’s case . The
prosecutor indicated that if Vang’s charges were “ Hernandized,”2 then she would face a
57-month prison term on the “top count.” The prosecutor also indicated that there were
grounds to s eek an upward sentencing departure based on the amount stolen. The
prosecutor stated that “the final theft in this instance . . . was $239,000” and that “between
the position of trust and the fact that this was a huge amount, above 35,000, the State would
have reason for an upward departure.”
In June 2020, Vang pleaded guilty to four of the six charges, and the remaining
charges were dismissed. In setting forth the terms of the agreement, defense counsel stated
that Vang would “waive her right to a jury trial on the aggravated circumstances, t hat this
is a major economic offense.” Defense counsel also stated that the parties had agreed to
“a 54-month commit to the Commissioner of Corrections, which is somewhat above what
[the] sentence would be ” if the convictions were “Hernand[ized] or sentence d
consecutively.”

1 The state was unable to locate Vang for several years, and she was ultimately extradited
from Georgia.
2 In State v. Hernandez, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue of sentencing a
defendant for multiple convictions on the same day. 311 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. 1981).
3
Vang pleaded guilty, submitted a signed petition to plead guilty, and demanded
execution of her sentences. The plea petition stated that the prosecutor was seeking an
upward durational departure because the offense s constituted a “major economic crime”
and that Vang waived her right to a jury trial on the existence of that aggravated sentencing
factor. The plea petition also stated —albeit incorrectly—that the agreed-upon 54-month
sentence constituted an upward durational departure.
In accordance with the plea agreement, the district court sentenced Vang to
concurrent sentences resulting in 54 months’ imprisonment, a sentence within the
presumptive sentencing range. Vang completed her executed prison term and the
supervised-release portion of that term in October 2024. Vang has not satisfied her
outstanding restitution obligation; she still owes her victims nearly one-half million dollars.
In March 2025, Vang petitioned for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw her
guilty pleas. She asserted that she “entered her guilty pleas based on the understanding
that she risked receiving a double upward durational departure if she went to trial.” She
also asserted that the state failed to provide timely notice of its intent to seek an aggravated
sentence, that there was no basis for an untimely notice of intent to seek an aggravated
sentence, and that, therefore, “the state would have been foreclosed from seeking an
aggravated departure.” Vang claimed that “she did not understand the direct consequences
of her guilty pleas, rendering her guilty pleas unintelligent.” Alternatively, she claimed
that her “guilty pleas were rendered involuntary because she was coerced into pleading
guilty by the false threat that if she went to trial, she risked an aggravated sentence.”
4
In March 2025, the case came before the postconviction court for an evidentiary
hearing. Vang did not appear at the hearing because she was in custody on a federal
Immigration and Customs Enforcement hold. Neither Vang nor her trial attorney3 testified
at the hearing, and Vang did not submit an affidavit in support of her petition. Yet the state
did not oppose Vang’s petition. Instead, Vang’s postconviction attorney and the
prosecutor4 agreed to the following “factual” stipulations—among others—in support of
what essentially had become a joint request for plea withdrawal:
The state did not before the [omnibus] hearing file a
notice that it would seek an aggravated sentencing departure as
required under criminal procedure rule 7.03.

Ms. Vang’s trial counsel advised her that, if she were to
proceed to trial, she would face a possible, if not probable
upward departure based on the aggravating factor of major
economic offense.

Ms. Vang informed her trial counsel that she wished to
plead guilty to four counts of theft by swindle in exchange for
dismissal of the remaining two counts and to avoid the risks
involved with going to trial, including the possibility of an
upward departure.

. . . .

The petition [to plead guilty] provided that, “[t]he
prosecutor is seeking an aggravated sentence of [u]pward
departure based on major economic crime. Defendant waives
right of jury trial on the aggravated circumstances of major
economic crime.”

3 Consistent with the language in the parties’ stipulations, we refer to the attorney who
represented Vang at her plea hearing as her “trial attorney.”
4 Although the document was titled “Parties’ Stipulation of the Facts,” only the attorneys
signed the document. Vang did not sign it.
5
The petition further indicated that “the parties agree[d]
to [a] 54 -month commit to DOC – which is an upward
durational departure.”

. . . .

Ms. Vang completed that sentence, including her
supervised release term, on or about October 11, 2024.

. . . .

On March 21, 2025, the state filed an answer to Ms.
Vang’s petition. In it, the state affirmatively waived the two -
year statute of limitations. It additionally conceded: 1) the
state could not have sought an aggravated sentencing departure
at sentencing had Ms. Vang been found guilty at trial because
timely notice was not give[n] pursuant to rule 7.03; 2) the state
did not have good cause to file a late 7.03 notice following Ms.
Vang’s May 18, 2020 omnibus hearing; and 3) Ms. Vang’s
guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and
she is entitled to plea withdrawal.

The postconviction court rejected Vang’s assertion that her guilty pleas were
unintelligent and involuntary, and it denied her petition seeking plea withdrawal.
Vang appeals.
DECISION
Under Minnesota’s postconviction statutes, a person convicted of a crime may seek
relief by filing a petition claiming that the conviction “violated the person’s rights under
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
1(1) (2024). When reviewing a postconviction court ’s decision to grant or deny relief,
issues of law are reviewed de novo. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007).
Under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure , “[a]t any time the court must
allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to the
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satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State
v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea
must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. “A defendant bears the burden of
showing [her] plea was invalid.” Id. Whether a plea is valid is a question of law that we
review de novo. Id.
Vang contends that she is entitled to plea withdrawal because her pleas were neither
intelligent nor voluntary. For its part, the prosecution concedes—as it did in district
court—that Vang is entitled to plea withdrawal. That concession is immaterial; we have a
responsibility to decide cases in accordance with the law. State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d
668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990). We therefore turn to the merits of Vang’s request.
“The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges
against [her], the rights [she] is waiving, and the consequences of [her] plea.” Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 96. “Consequences refers to a plea’s direct consequences, namely the maximum
sentence and fine. ” Id. (quotation omitted). Vang argues that her guilty plea s were
unintelligent because her defense attorney misinformed her that if she were found guilty of
the charged offenses at trial, she could be sentenced to more than 68 months in prison, “that
is, to an aggravated departure from the presumptive prison term.” She further argues that
due to her attorney’s “misadvice,” she “was not properly informed about the direct
consequences of going to trial, and for that reason, she did not make an informed and
deliberate decision about whether to accept the state’s plea offer.”
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“The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to
improper pressure or coercion.” Id. at 96. “Whether a plea is voluntary is determined by
considering all relevant circumstances. ” Id. Vang argues that her guilty pleas “were
coerced by the false threat that she could be sentenced to up to twice what the [sentencing]
guidelines allowed.” See Johnson v. State , 925 N.W.2d 287, 288 (Minn. App. 2019)
(“When a defendant enters a guilty plea in consideration of the state ’s threat of a sentence
unauthorized by law, the plea is coerced and therefore involuntary and invalid.”).
Vang’s arguments that her guilty pleas were unintelligent and involuntary rest on
the assumption that, because the state did not file notice of intent to request an upward
durational departure before Vang’s omnibus hearing, a departure was not possible. Again,
the state stipulated that it “could not have sought an aggravated sentencing departure at
sentencing had Ms. Vang been found guilty at trial because timely notice was not give[en]”
and that “the state did not have good cause to file a late . . . notice.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.03 provides that “[t]he prosecutor must give written notice at
least seven days before the Omnibus Hearing of intent to seek an aggravated sentence.”
However, the rule also provides that “[n]otice may be given later if permitted by the court
on good cause and on conditions that will not unfairly prejudice the defendant.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 7.03 . “We review the interpretation and application of the rules of criminal
procedure de novo.” State v. Chavez-Nelson, 882 N.W.2d 579, 586 (Minn. 2016).
We are not aware of any precedent supporting Vang’s assertion that an untimely
departure notice automatically precludes a departure. Indeed, Vang does not cite
precedential authority supporting that assertion, and she acknowledges that “[t]he rule itself
8
does not indicate whether failure to comply with the rule precludes the state from seeking
an aggravated departure.” Vang relies only on a nonprecedential decision of this court,
State v. Langner, No. A20-0110, 2021 WL 317970 (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2021), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 28, 2021).
Nonprecedential opinions of this court are not binding, but they “may be cited as
persuasive authority.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). The postconviction court
soundly distinguished Langner and rejected its application here. The postconviction court
first noted that, unlike this case, the prosecutor in Langner requested an upward durational
departure and the district court granted that request, even though the state’s notice of its
intent to seek a departure was untimely. 2021 WL 317970, at *1, 4. Second, the
postconviction court noted that we reversed Langner’s sentence because the district court
granted the state’s departure motion after reviewing submissions regarding the untimely
notice without making “a finding of good cause for the state ’s untimely submission.” Id.
at *3. We concluded that , “[b]ecause the district court did not make the required good -
cause finding, the district court erred by permitting the state to proceed on its late notice.”
Id.
The postconviction court accurately summarized the limited persuasive value of
Langner as follows: “Langner is a reminder to district courts to make determinations when
filings are offered after the deadlines found in the Rules,” but Langner “does not create a
blanket ban on late notices related to seeking an upward departure.”
Although our review is de novo , we agree with the postconviction court’s careful
consideration of the unique circumstances of this case and its ultimate rejection of Vang’s
9
request for plea withdrawal. We first note, as did the postconviction court, that the parties
“presented a stipulation rather than presenting evidence for the Court to evaluate” and that
“stipulation relied on very limited information compared to the complete record.” As the
postconviction court explained, “[m]ost importantly, the State agreed to [Vang’s] state of
mind at the time of the plea despite her not being available for cross examination” and
“[n]either side presented evidence from [Vang’s] trial attorney.” Thus, the parties deprived
the postconviction court of the opportunity to judge the credibility of Vang’s allegations
regarding her state of mind at the time of her guilty pleas and her attorney’s advice
regarding the plea . See Miles v. State , 840 N.W.2d 195, 201 (Minn. 2013) (“The
postconviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility and so we defer
to the court’s credibility determinations.”).
The parties also attempted to limit the postconviction court’s analysis of the legal
issues. As the postconviction court noted, “[t]he attorneys stipulated that the State could
not have sought an upward departure in this case because notice had not been filed in
writing before the not guilty pleas were entered . . . .” The postconviction court rejected
that assertion for several reasons, including that Minn. R. Crim. P. 7.03 does “not prohibit
late filing,” it “require[s] the judge to make findings if the filings are late.”
Like the postconviction court, we are not persuaded that the Hennepin County
Attorney would not have filed a request for an upward durational departure if Vang had
rejected the plea agreement in 2020 .5 Indeed, the record indicates th at the assigned

5 A new Hennepin County Attorney assumed the office in January 2023, over two years
after Vang pleaded guilty in this case.
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prosecutor intended to do s o. Again, at the May 2020 omnibus hearing, the prosecutor
informed the district court and Vang that there was a basis to seek an upward sentencing
departure, stating: “the final theft in this instance . . . was $239,000,” and “between the
position of trust and the fact that this was a huge amount, above 35,000, the State would
have reason for an upward departure.” And, Vang’s June 2020 petition to plead guilty
recognized the prosecutor’s intent , noting that the prosecutor was seeking an “upward
departure based on [a] major economic crime” and that Vang was waiving her “right to [a]
jury trial” on the existence of that “aggravated circumstance of major economic crime.” In
sum, the record shows that Vang had actual notice that the state intended to seek an upward
durational departure if the case did not settle.
Also like the postconviction court, we will not ignore the entire record based on the
attorneys’ stipulations in this case.6 See Abendroth v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas.
Co., 363 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Minn. App. 1985) (“Where parties do not stipulate that the
court is bound to consider only evidence permitted under the stipulation, and where the
record is replete with other evidence, such other evidence may be considered.”). T he
record as a whole does not foreclose the possibility that in 2020, the Hennepin County

6 Again, the stipulation is titled “Parties’ Stipulation of the Facts.” Although many of the
stipulations are factual, others are not. For example, the state conceded that “Ms. Vang’s
guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and she is entitled to plea
withdrawal.” Whether “Ms. Vang’s guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent” such that “she is entitled to plea withdrawal” is an issue of law. See Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 94 (stating that whether a plea is valid is a question of law that we review
de novo). If we, as an appellate court, are not bound by the district court’s conclusion on
that issue, we do not discern a reason why we—or the district court —are bound by the
state’s concession of that legal issue.
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Attorney would have filed a late notice of intent to seek an aggravated sentence if Vang
had not pleaded guilty. And there is no reason to think that the Hennepin County Attorney
would not have offered a showing of good cause and lack of prejudice in an attempt to
secure an aggravated departure. Ultimately, whether or not good cause existed to justify
untimely notice would have been a determination for the district court to make—not the
lawyers.
As to that issue, several months before Vang pleaded guilty, the supreme court filed
its decision in State v. Barthman and indicated that failure to strictly comply with rule 7.03
is not a basis to reverse if the defendant was not prejudiced by the failure. 938 N.W.2d
257, 268-69 (Minn. 2020). The Barthman court held “that the State’s failure to include a
summary of the factual basis for the aggravating factors listed in its notice of intent to seek
a sentencing departure was not reversible error” because defendant did not show that he
was “prejudiced by the lack of a factual summary in the notice of aggravating factors that
he was given.” Id. at 269. Given that caselaw and a record showing that Vang had actual
notice of the state’s intent to seek an aggravated sentence and the grounds on which the
state would rely, it is likely that the district court would have allowed a late notice in this
case.
In conclusion, the attorneys’ stipulations—filed nearly five years after Vang’s guilty
pleas—do not compel a conclusion that the filing and allowance of a late notice of intent
to seek an aggravated sentence was not possible in 2020. That possibility eliminates the
underpinning for Vang’s claims that her guilty pleas were unintelligent and involuntary.
We therefore agree with the postconviction court’s assessment of Vang’s request for plea
12
withdrawal: Vang was not misled because the state could have pursued an aggravated
sentence had she not pleaded guilty . Because Vang’s guilty pleas were neither
unintelligent nor involuntary, we affirm.
Affirmed.