State of Minnesota v. Jimmy Alexander Gogoi

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1853

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jimmy Alexander Gogoi,
Appellant.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-24-9651

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rasmusson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Stearns County jury found Jimmy Alexander Gogoi guilty of unlawful possession
of a firearm and ammunition based on evidence that he possessed a loaded nine-millimeter
handgun in his vehicle. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Gogoi’s

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conviction and that the district court did not plainly err by excluding evidence offered by
Gogoi. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
During the evening of November 30, 2024, Gogoi was driving his vehicle in the city
of St. Cloud, with a front-seat passenger, S.G. Officer Priebe conducted a traffic stop after
noticing that the license plates on Gogoi’s vehicle were registered to a vehicle of a different
make and model. While questioning Gogoi, the officer learned that Gogoi did not have a
valid driver’s license. Because it was a cold evening, Officer Priebe asked Gogoi to move
to the squad vehicle while he conferred with his partner. Gogoi asked to remain standing
by his own vehicle, which the officer allowed so long as Gogoi relinquished the key to his
vehicle. Gogoi complied by pointing to a carabiner that was clipped to the headrest of the
front passenger seat and hanging behind the seat. Attached to the carabiner were numerous
keys, including the key fob for Gogoi’s vehicle.
Another officer asked S.G. to step out of the vehicle. While conducting a pat search,
that officer found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on her person. S.G. informed
officers that she was a confidential informant with a law-enforcement task force. Law -
enforcement officers later determined that S.G. was not assisting the task force at the time
of the traffic stop. Nonetheless, the charge filed against her for possession of
methamphetamine later was dismissed because of her assistance as a confidential informant
in other cases.
After methamphetamine was found on S.G., officers searched Gogoi’s vehicle,
where they found a locked gun case under the front passenger seat, which was secured by

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a cable to the frame of the seat. The locked gun case could not be removed without being
unlocked. Officers found the key to the gun case on the carabiner that Gogoi earlier had
provided to Officer Priebe. Inside the gun case was a nine-millimeter handgun, loaded
with six rounds of ammunition. Because Gogoi previously had been convicted of a drug
crime, he was ineligible to possess a firearm or ammunition.
The state charged Gogoi with two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm or
ammunition by an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2)
(2024). The case was tried to a jury on two days in May 2025. The state called four
witnesses on the first day of trial. O fficer Priebe testified about the traffic stop and the
search of Gogoi’s vehicle. Three other witnesses testified about DNA testing of the
handgun, which was inconclusive.
On the second day of trial, Gogoi called four witnesses. A police officer employed
by the city of Willmar testified that he is a member of a drug-gang task force that has used
S.G. as a confidential informant. The Willmar officer testified that, in exchange for her
services as a confidential informant, S.G. has received financial compensation and has had
criminal charges dropped. The Willmar officer also testified that he was not in
communication with S.G. on the evening of November 30, 2024, and did not know that she
was with Gogoi. Gogoi also called three St. Cloud police officers, two of whom testified
about the pat search of S.G. Gogoi did not testify.
In closing arguments, Gogoi’s attorney argued that the handgun belonged to S.G. ,
who intentionally planted it in Gogoi’s vehicle so that she could receive financial
compensation or credit against other criminal charges. The jury found Gogoi guilty of both

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charges. The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months of imprisonment. Gogoi
appeals.
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Gogoi’s primary argument is that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he possessed the loaded handgun that was found under the front
passenger seat of his vehicle.
A.
To determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, this court
ordinarily undertakes “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient. ” State
v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 187 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). This court “carefully
examine[s] the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn
from them would permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters,
929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “We assume that the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Friese, 959
N.W.2d 205, 214 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
The above- described standard of review applies so long as a conviction is
adequately supported by direct evidence. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016).
Direct evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that,
if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592,

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599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is
“evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did
not exist.” Id. (quotation omitted). A conviction necessarily depends on circumstantial
evidence if proof of the offense, or a single element of the offense, is based solely on
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 307 (Minn. 2014). In
this case, the parties do not dispute that the conviction depends on circumstantial evidence.
Accordingly, we apply the standard of review applicable to circumstantial evidence. See
State v. Ulrich, 3 N.W.3d 1, 11 (Minn. 2024).
If a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, this court applies a heightened
standard of review with a two -step analysis. State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn.
2026); State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). At the first step of the
circumstantial-evidence analysis, we “identify the ‘circumstances proved.’” State v. Isaac,
9 N.W.3d 812, 815 (Minn. 2024) (quoting State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn.
2021)). The first step requires this court to “‘winnow down the evidence presented at trial
by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict,’ which results in ‘a subset
of facts that constitute the circumstances proved.’” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478 (quoting
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600). The winnowing-down process “protects the well-established
legal principle that the jury is in a unique position to determine the credibility of the
witnesses and weigh the evidence before it.” Id. at 479 (quotation omitted).
At the second step of the analysis, this court “consider[s] whether the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and
not as discrete, isolated facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty

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and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. at 478 (quotations
omitted). At the second step, this court independently examines the reasonableness of the
inferences drawn from the circumstances proved. See i d. This court does not give
deference to the jury’s choice among reasonable inferences at this step. Loving v. State,
891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
B.
The statute underlying the charged offenses provides that some persons, including
persons previously convicted of certain crimes, are prohibited from possessing ammunition
or a firearm. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1, 1(2). To establish a violation of the statute,
the state must prove that a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition while
prohibited by law from doing so. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601.
The state may establish a violation of the statute by proving either actual possession
or constructive possession. State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. 2015). Actual
possession means “actual or physical possession at the time of arrest.” State v. Florine,
226 N.W.2d 609, 610 ( Minn. 1975). A person may be convicted of unlawful possession
of a firearm or ammunition even in the absence of actual possession. See id. Under the
constructive-possession doctrine, a person may be convicted of a possession offense if “the
inference is strong that the defendant at one time physically possessed the substance and
did not abandon his possessory interest in the substance but rather continued to exercise
dominion and control over it up to the time of the arrest.” Id. To establish constructive
possession, the state must prove

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either (1) that the prohibited item was found “ in a place under
defendant’s exclusive control to which other people did not
normally have access,” or (2) if the prohibited item was found
“in a place to which others had access, there is a strong
probability (inferable from other evidence) that defendant was
at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over
it.”

Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 159 (quoting Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611).
In this case, the parties stipulated that Gogoi was ineligible to possess a firearm or
ammunition in November 2024. The issue at trial was whether Gogoi possessed the loaded
handgun in the locked gun case that was found under the front passenger seat of his vehicle.
C.
At the first step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis, this court must identify the
circumstances proved relevant to the question whether Gogoi possessed the loaded
handgun. See Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478. The relevant circumstances proved are as follows.
On November 30, 2024, Gogoi was driving a vehicle of which he was the registered
owner. S.G. was sitting in the front passenger seat. The license plates attached to Gogoi’s
vehicle were assigned to a different vehicle. Officer Priebe conducted a traffic stop. The
officer requested the key to Gogoi’s vehicle. Gogoi complied by providing Officer Priebe
with a carabiner that was clipped to the headrest of the front passenger seat and hanging
behind the seat. Attached to the carabiner were several keys, including the key fob to
Gogoi’s vehicle. Officers found a locked gun case under the front passenger seat. The gun
case was attached by a cable to the frame of the front passenger seat and could not be
removed without being unlocked. Officer Priebe found the key to the gun case on the
carabiner that Gogoi had provided to him. Officers opened the gun case and found a nine-

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millimeter handgun with six rounds of ammunition in the magazine. When she was
removed from the vehicle, S.G. was in possession of methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia. S.G. informed officers at the scene of the traffic stop that she was a
confidential informant with a law-enforcement task force. For her assistance as a
confidential informant, S.G. sometimes received financial compensation and credit against
criminal charges. S.G. was not assisting the task force at the time of the traffic stop.
At the second step of the analysis, this court must determine “whether the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and
not as discrete, isolated facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty.”
Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478 (quotations omitted). Gogoi does not dispute that the
circumstances proved are consistent with a rational hypothesis that he is guilty. We agree
that the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that Gogoi is guilty, either
because the loaded handgun “was found in a place under defendant’s exclusive control to
which other people did not normally have access” or because the loaded handgun “was
found in a place to which others had access” and “there is a strong probability (inferable
from other evidence) that defendant was at the time consciously exercising dominion and
control over it.” See Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 159 (quotations omitted).
At the second part of the second step of the analysis, this court must determine
whether there are reasonable inferences from the circumstances proved that are
“inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. ” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478
(quotations omitted). Gogoi contends that the circumstances proved allow two reasonable
inferences that are consistent with his being not guilty. The first is that S.G. planted the

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gun in Gogoi’s vehicle so that she could receive financial compensation or credit against
pending criminal charges and also attached a different vehicle’s license plates to Gogoi’s
vehicle so that his vehicle would be stopped by a law-enforcement officer. The second
alternative theory is that the handgun simply belonged to S.G., who placed it under her seat
and was in exclusive possession of it.
Gogoi’s hypotheses of innocence are not rational. Gogoi’s first alternative theory
is not rational because one circumstance proved, based on the Willmar officer’s testimony,
is that S.G. was not working as a confidential informant at the time of the traffic stop. If a
person who sometimes serves as a confidential informant is not participating in an
authorized operation, it would not be rational for that person to cause a traffic stop while
carrying methamphetamine on her person. Gogoi’s second alternative theory is not rational
because it does not account for an important circumstance proved: the gun-case key was
found on a carabiner that also held the key fob to Gogoi’s vehicle. To overcome this
circumstance proved, Gogoi suggests that the gun-case key belonged to S.G. but she was
“savvy enough” to put it on Gogoi’s carabiner. But an appellant “must . . . point to evidence
in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than guilt.” State v. Segura, 2
N.W.3d 142, 158 (Minn. 2024) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). An appellant “may
not rely on mere conjecture to argue that the circumstances proved, as a whole, are
consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of [his] innocence.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Gogoi’s second alternative theory fails because it relies on speculation, not the
circumstances proved.

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Gogoi compares this case to Harris and to State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825 (Minn.
App. 2015), two cases in which appellate courts reversed convictions of unlawful
possession of a firearm in a vehicle. But both of those cases are distinguishable. In Harris,
the defendant did not own the vehicle he was driving, and the firearm was found in a place
where a lay person might not have seen it. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 602-03. In Sam as well,
the defendant did not own the vehicle. 859 N.W.2d at 828. In addition, the passenger
made furtive movements during the traffic stop, which allowed for a reasonable inference
that either the vehicle’s owner or the passenger possessed the firearm without the
defendant’s knowledge. Id. at 834-36. In this case, however, Gogoi owned the vehicle,
officers saw the locked gun case in plain view, and there is no evidence of furtive
movements by S.G. In addition, the existence of a well-secured gun case and the presence
of the gun-case key on Gogoi’s carabiner precludes a reasonable inference that Gogoi did
not knowingly possess the handgun in the locked gun case.
Thus, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Gogoi constructively possessed the loaded handgun.
II. Hearsay Evidence
Gogoi also argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the district
court erred by excluding evidence he sought to admit in support of his alternative-
perpetrator defense. He argues that the district court’s rulings violated both the rules of
evidence and his constitutional right to present a complete defense.
Before trial, Gogoi attempted to serve a subpoena on S.G. to compel her attendance
at trial, but he could not find her. At trial, Gogoi sought to introduce statements S.G. made

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to officers at the scene of the traffic stop, both while standing next to Gogoi’s vehicle and
while sitting in a squad vehicle after receiving a Miranda warning. Specifically, Gogoi
proffered evidence that S.G. stated that there was a gun under her seat and made other
statements concerning Gogoi’s responsibility for the gun, his possession of drugs, and her
work as a confidential informant.
The state consistently objected to Gogoi’s attempts to introduce S.G.’s statements
based on the rule against hearsay. Gogoi argued in response to the objections that S.G.’s
statements should be admitted under the hearsay exceptions for recorded recollections and
statements against interest. See Minn. R. Evid. 803(5), 804(b)(3). The district court
sustained the state’s objections.
On appeal, Gogoi makes two different hearsay-related arguments. He argues for
the first time that S.G.’s statements are not hearsay because they were not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted. See Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). He also argues for the first time
that, if the statements were offered for the truth of the matter asserted, they are admissible
under the hearsay exception for then-existing state of mind. See Minn. R. Evid. 803(3). In
response, the state argues that Gogoi did not preserve his appellate arguments because he
objected on different grounds in the district court. We agree. Accordingly, we review only
for plain error. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02.
Under the plain-error test, an appellant is entitled to relief on an issue for which no
objection was made at trial only if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the
error affected the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740
(Minn. 1998). “An error is plain if it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ which is typically established

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‘if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.’” State v. Webster, 894
N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quoting State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn.
2006)). If these three requirements are satisfied, the appellant also must satisfy a fourth
requirement, that the error “seriously affects the fairness and integrity of the judicial
proceedings.” State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 884 (Minn. 2014).
The plain-error rule applies with special force to hearsay evidence. The supreme
court has explained the rationale for that approach:
The number and variety of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion
make objections to such testimony particularly important to the
creation of a record of the trial court’s decision-making process
in either admitting or excluding a given statement. The
complexity and subtlety of the operation of the hearsay rule
and its exceptions make it particularly important that a full
discussion of admissibility be conducted at trial.

State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006). The supreme court concluded in
Manthey that the statements at issue were not “clearly or obviously inadmissible hearsay”
because, “[i]n the absence of an objection, the state was not given the opportunity to
establish that some or all of the statements were admissible under one of the numerous
exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Id.
This case is similar to Manthey in that the state was not given an opportunity in the
district court to make counter-arguments to Gogoi’s arguments concerning rules 801(c)
and 803(3), and the district court was not given an opportunity to determine whether the
proffered evidence was admissible under those rules. This is especially so with respect to
Gogoi’s argument that S.G.’s statements were not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. See Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). That argument is directly contrary to the arguments

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Gogoi presented to the district court, which were based on the premise that S.G.’s
statements were offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Having made such arguments,
Gogoi cannot establish on appeal that the district court plainly erred by not admitting his
proffered evidence for a reason completely different from and inconsistent with his
arguments for their admission.
In addition, Gogoi’s argument that S.G.’s statements are plainly admissible under
the hearsay exception for then-existing state of mind is without merit. The applicable rule
provides:
A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent,
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health),
but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution,
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant’s will.

Minn. R. Evid. 803(3). A statement is admissible under this exception only if there are “no
suspicious circumstances suggesting a motive for the declarant to fabricate or misrepresent
his or her thoughts.” State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 104 (Minn. 2005). Gogoi cannot
satisfy this criterion because his appellate argument is based on the premise that S.G.’s
statements were intentionally untruthful and made for the purpose of misleading police
officers into suspecting Gogoi, not herself, of possessing contraband. This is a sufficient
basis for concluding that Gogoi’s evidence was not “clearly or obviously” admissible. See
Manthey, 711 N.W.2d at 504. Thus, the district did not plainly err by not admitting S.G.’s
statements under either rule 801(c) or rule 803(3).

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Before concluding, we note Gogoi’s references to his constitutional right to present
a complete defense. The United States Supreme Court has held that the right “yields to the
application of an evidentiary rule unless the rule ‘infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the
accused and [is] arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes [the rule is] designed to
serve.’” State v. Pass , 832 N.W.2d 836, 841-42 (Minn. 2013) (alterations in original)
(quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324- 25 (2006)). But the constitutional
right to present a complete defense does not disturb a state trial court’ s “ordinary
evidentiary rulings,” so long as “the application of evidentiary rules . . . serve[s] the
interests of fairness and reliability.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1986).
Gogoi does not argue that any particular evidentiary rule is arbitrary or disproportionate to
its purpose or that its application does not serve the interests of fairness and reliability.
Rather, his arguments appear to assume the validity of the rules of evidence governing
hearsay. Thus, Gogoi cannot establish a violation of his constitutional right to present a
complete defense. See State v. Tillman, 33 N.W.3d 221, 246 (Minn. 2026) (concluding
that district court’s exclusion of defendant’s proffered evidence on hearsay grounds did not
violate constitutional right to present a complete defense); State v. Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d
82, 102-03 (Minn. 2011) (same).
Affirmed.