Michelle A. Krawczyk, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1865

Michelle A. Krawczyk,
Respondent,

vs.

Gregory Scott Aberle, f/k/a Gregory Scott Peterson,
Appellant.

Filed July 13, 2026
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-16-6400

Ryan P. Supple, Carl E. Christensen, Aaron D. Sampsel, Christensen Sampsel PLLC,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

John G. Westrick, Savage Westrick, PLLP, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross , Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s postjudgment order to compel that awarded
respondent attorney fees and attached some of appellant’s property. We affirm.
2
FACTS
In 2020, respondent Michelle A. Krawczyk obtained a $187,792.18 judgment
against appellant Gregory S cott Aberle, f/k/a Gregory Scott Peterson. We affirmed on
direct appeal. See Krawczyk v. Aberle , No. A20-1401, 2021 WL 3136459 (Minn. App.
July 26, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 2021). Aberle did not pay the judgment.
In 2022, Krawczyk served postjudgment discovery requests on Aberle. Aberle
responded, disclosed several income sources, noted that he had “some income” from his
business Midwest Charters and Tours (d/b/a Dolphin Water Taxi1), and also disclosed that
he possessed two bank accounts, two vehicles, and a boat.
In 2023, Krawczyk served Aberle with additional discovery requests. Aberle
responded with a completed financial disclosure form. In later responses, Aberle identified
a bank account that he had not previously disclosed and two additional vehicles. Aberle
disclosed that the ownership to one vehicle was transferred, and the second vehicle was
“sold to a private party for $10,000, earlier in 2023.” Aberle also disclosed that, in 2021,
he transferred his ownership in Midwest Tours to his girlfriend, J.K.
Krawczyk’s counsel sent a letter to Aberle’s counsel outlining deficiencies in
Aberle’s discovery responses. Krawczyk’s counsel also attempted to set a meet-and-confer
conference for several dates in October. Aberle’s counsel responded to some aspects in an
email but never responded to the proposed meet-and-confer dates.

1 Dolphin Water Taxi is a boat-taxi service located in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Several
businesses operate under the company, including: Dolphin Water Shuttle; Dolphin Land
and Sea Transport, LLC; Dolphin Charters; Midwest Charters and Tours LLC; and
Midwest Charter E-Tours.
3
After the parties agreed to a date for a deposition, Krawczyk’s counsel served Aberle
with a notice of deposition on a date in June 2024. But n either Aberle nor his attorney
appeared for the scheduled deposition. Krawczyk also served J.K. with a subpoena to
produce documents and to appear for a deposition. J.K. did not produce documents and
did not appear for the scheduled deposition.
Krawczyk moved the district court for an order to show cause and to compel
discovery responses from Aberle and J.K. The district court issued an order to show cause
and set a hearing at which Aberle and J.K. were required to appear. Two weeks before the
scheduled hearing, Aberle produced 1,002 pages of new documents, including more
previously undisclosed financial accounts. But Aberle did not produce any information
about transferred assets.
After the show-cause hearing, the district court granted Krawczyk’s motion to
compel and awarded attorney fees incurred while attempting to force production of
documents and information.
J.K. Deposition
In April 2025, Krawczyk’s counsel deposed J.K. During the deposition, J.K. stated
that she and Aberle do not share finances or own assets together. J.K. testified that she is
an employee at Dolphin Water Taxi, which she said was owned by Aberle, even though he
receives no income for managing and owning the company. J.K. testified that Aberle
transferred Midwest Tours to her because he “wanted stuff out of his name.” J.K. denied
that any ownership interest in Midwest Tours was transferred to her.
4
J.K. produced billing statements for three financial accounts: one personal account
and two business accounts for Dolphin Water Taxi with Wells Fargo and CapitalOne.2 J.K.
testified that Aberle had been named on the accounts for Dolphin Water Taxi and its related
companies, but he asked J.K. to put her name on the two accounts instead of his name. J.K.
testified that she was uncertain whether Aberle was an authorized user of the accounts, but
he had J.K.’s password and could gain access to the accounts. J.K. also noted that Aberle
controlled and used both accounts even though they were under her name.
The Wells Fargo business account showed that Aberle used the account for personal
expenses in Minnesota, including payments to his attorney, home mortgage, and auto loan.
The CapitalOne business account was also used by J.K. and Aberle for personal expenses.
Aberle produced account statements for Merchants Commercial Bank under the
name “Dolphin Land & Sea Transport LLC,” which J.K. stated was a business account of
which Aberle was the only authorized user. The account was used for business expenses
in the U.S. Virgin Islands but was also used to pay a CapitalOne account, other bank cards
and credit cards, and to make purchases in other places in the United States.
While Aberle was not on the payroll or reporting income for owning and managing
Dolphin Water Taxi or its related companies, he controled and used the financial
accounts— which were under J.K.’s name—for his own personal expenses.

2 The Wells Fargo account was under the name “[J.K.] dba Dolphin Water Shuttle” and the
CapitalOne account was under the name “[J.K.] Dolphin Land and Sea Transport.” J.K.
testified that she did not know why her name was on the accounts with co-accountholders
“Dolphin Water Shuttle” and “Dolphin Land and Sea Transport” because she was not
familiar with those entities.
5
J.K. stated that she owned two vehicles. But records show that there are ten vehicles
registered in Minnesota under J.K.’s license number. J.K. admitted that she also holds title
to two of Aberle’s vehicles and that Aberle asked to put the titles in her name even though
he owns them. Aberle previously held title to all of the vehicles, and the titles were
transferred after the 2020 judgment. J.K. and Aberle did not pay each other money for the
transfers of any vehicle titles. Aberle did not disclose the vehicles in his discovery
responses, nor did he provide any information about where they were stored or any
purported sales or transfers of the vehicles to J.K. or anyone else.
Preliminary Attachment Order
After discovering evidence that Aberle may have transferred, hidden, or disposed
of assets, Krawczyk applied for an ex parte preliminary attachment order to prevent
additional transfers. The district court granted the application in May 2025.
Current Litigation
Krawczyk moved for permission to file a supplemental complaint that would seek
to void Aberle’s fraudulent transfers and prevent additional transfers. Krawczyk also
moved for a permanent attachment order, which attached certain assets owned or controlled
by Aberle that would be sufficient to satisfy Krawczyk’s 2020 judgment against Aberle.
The district court granted Krawczyk’s motions. Several assets were subject to the
attachment order, including the business accounts and vehicles titled under J.K. ’s name.
The district court also awarded Krawczyk $21,355.58 for attorney fees and costs that she
incurred while trying to obtain and review Aberle’s discovery responses.
Aberle appeals.
6
DECISION
Aberle argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) determining that
Krawczyk satisfied her meet-and-confer obligation; (2) granting Krawczyk’s motion to
compel after undue delay; (3) attempting to attach certain assets; and (4) making certain
factual findings. We apply an abuse-of -discretion standard of review to these issues.
Carlson v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 331 (Minn. App. 2007) (attorney
fees), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007); Energy Transfer LP v. Greenpeace Int’l,
23 N.W.3d 554, 563 (Minn. 2025) (discovery orders); Carroll v. Carroll, No. C8-97-1566,
1998 WL 113947, at *2 (Minn. App. Mar. 17, 1998) (attachment).3
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Krawczyk satisfied her meet-and-confer obligation.

Aberle first argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting
Krawczyk’s motion because she failed to satisfy her obligation to meet-and-confer before
filing her motion to compel. The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure require a movant to
confer, or attempt to confer, “in good faith . . . with the person or party failing to make the
discovery.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.01(b); see also Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.10 (requiring
parties to confer or to provide “reasons for not complying, including lack of availability or
cooperation of opposing counsel” ). Satisfying the meet-and-confer obligation “is
a condition precedent to filing a motion to compel.” Tamburino v. Freeman,
24 N.W.3d 318, 324 (Minn. App. 2025).

3 We cite this case for its persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
7
The record shows that Krawczyk sent a letter and multiple emails to Aberle and his
counsel before filing her motion to compel. Krawczyk’s counsel sent Aberle’s counsel
dates to meet and confer, but Aberle’s counsel never responded to the proposed dates.
Krawczyk’s counsel also served Aberle notice of a deposition scheduled on a date to which
both parties agreed, but neither Aberle nor his attorney appeared for the deposition. When
faced with Aberle’s lack of cooperation, Krawczyk attempted to pursue discovery through
Aberle’s girlfriend, when some disclosures identified her as a transferee of some of
Aberle’s assets. J.K. was similarly uncooperative and also did not appear for her scheduled
deposition. Once it was clear that Aberle would not engage or comply without court
intervention, Krawczyk moved the district court for show-cause orders against Aberle and
J.K. The record demonstrates that Krawczyk attempted, in good faith, to contact Aberle
multiple times—through different mediums —about the discovery deficiencies. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Krawczyk satisfied her meet-
and-confer obligation.
B. Abele’s undue delay argument is forfeited.
Aberle next argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting
Krawczyk’s motion to compel because of the undue delay in filing the motion. But Aberle
failed to raise this issue before the district court and it is, therefore, forfeited.
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (appellate courts may consider only
issues presented to and considered by the district court).
8
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by attaching certain assets.

Aberle challenges the district court’s decision to attach certain assets. Attachment
is a proceeding “ancillary to a civil action for the recovery of money[.]” Minn. Stat.
§ 570.01 (2024). The attachment statute provides, “[a]ll property not exempt from
execution under the judgment demanded in the civil action is subject to attachment.” Id.
Attachment may be granted if the moving party shows a probability of success on the
merits, and the existence of at least one of the six statutory grounds for attachment. Minn.
Stat. § 570.026, subd. 3 (2024); Minn. Stat. § 570.02 (2024) (outlining statutory criteria).
Aberle contends that the district court abused its discretion by attaching (1) property
outside of Minnesota and (2) a credit card. We address each argument in turn.
1. Aberle’s argument related to attaching property outside of
Minnesota fails.

Aberle argues that the district court erred by attaching assets outside of Minnesota
because caselaw prohibits attaching “assets located outside the state.” Allstate Sales &
Leasing Co., v. Geis, 412 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn. App. 1987). Aberle argues that the district
court abused its discretion because it attached assets located in the U.S. Virgin Islands (a
bank account) and in North Carolina (vehicles). Aberle ’s argument fails because he did
not provide the district court with facts to demonstrate that these assets were located outside
of Minnesota before the district court issued the attachment order. Because the location of
the assets was not presented to the district court, we discern no erro r in the record before
us. Thiele , 425 N.W.2d at 582 (appellate courts only address matters presented to and
9
considered by the district court). See also Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn.
App. 2022) (“Appellate courts cannot presume error by the district court.”).
We also reject Aberle’s contention that a district court can never attach property
outside of Minnesota. The statute contemplates attaching property that has been removed
from Minnesota. The statute provides that an order of attachment for the satisfaction of a
judgment may be issued “when the respondent has removed . . . any of the respondent’s
nonexempt property from this state, with intent to delay or defraud the respondent’s
creditors.” Minn. Stat. § 570.02, subd. (1)(2) (emphasis added). The word “has” before
the word “removed” means that the property is already located outside of Minnesota. Id.
Thus, the statute anticipated the exact scenario that Aberle argues is prohibited: attaching
property that was removed from Minnesota in an attempt to delay or defraud creditors. Id.
We also conclude that Aberle’s argument fails because the district court determined
that Krawczyk satisfied three statutory grounds for attachment. See id., subd. 1(1)-(3). The
district court found that Aberle “assigned, secreted, or disposed of . . . nonexempt
property[] with intent to delay or defraud ” his creditors, including Krawczyk (id. ,
subd. 1(1)); he “removed” some of his nonexempt assets from Minnesota with the “intent
to delay or defraud” his creditors, including Krawczyk (id., subd. (1)(2)); and he
“converted” some of his nonexempt assets “into money or credits, for the purpose of
placing” those assets beyond the reach of his creditors, including Krawczyk (id., subd.
(1)(3)). These findings are supported by facts in the record.
The record supports the district court’s findings that Aberle maintained control of
his business accounts held under the names of third parties, used funds from those accounts
10
for his personal expenses, and made transfers from the accounts. Aberle also sold business
interests and vehicles after judgment was entered against him but failed to disclose who
made the purchases and what he received in exchange for the property.
The district court also determined that Aberle had notice of the hearing, had an
opportunity to identify exempt property, but “has not identified any applicable exemption.”
Thus, the district court acted within its discretion in issuing the attachment order.
2. Aberle’s credit-card arguments are forfeited.
Aberle argues that the district court erred by attempting to attach a credit card
account, but his argument is forfeited because he failed to raise it to the district court.
Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. He also fails to adequately support his claim with argument or
citation to legal authority. State v. Bartylla , 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008). Since
“prejudicial error” is not “obvious on mere inspection[,]” the argument is forfeited.
Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).
D. The district court’s findings are supported by the record.
Aberle argues that the district court made several findings that were not supported
by the record. Aberle does not, however, cite the specific findings he is challenging or
identify what evidence presented to the district court demonstrates clear error. 4 The issue
is, therefore, forfeited. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582.
Affirmed.

4 Aberle cites to a February-2026 affidavit, but the affidavit was not in the record before
the district court when it issued the September-2025 attachment order.