In re the Marriage of: Marianne Michele Thayer v. Larry Frank Thayer

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1870

In re the Marriage of:

Marianne Michele Thayer, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Larry Frank Thayer,
Appellant.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-24-43

Marianne Michele Thayer, Bloomington, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Matthew J. Gilbert, Gilbert Alden PLLC, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
On appeal from a judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, appellant-husband
argues that the district court erred by (I) adopting wholesale respondent-wife’s proposed

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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order; (II) dividing the marital property; (III) improperly analyzing each of the spousal
maintenance factors; (IV) awarding conduct-based attorney fees despite respondent-wife’s
conduct; and (V) failing to grant a new trial. Because the district court independently
considered the issues and acted within its discretion to allocate marital property, awarding
respondent spousal maintenance, awarding respondent conduct-based attorney fees and in
denying appellant a new trial, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-husband Larry Frank Thayer and respondent-wife Marianne Michele
Thayer married in 1991 and separated in 2024. Near the time of separation, husband was
served with an e x parte order for protection (OFP) on wife’s behalf. Husband ultimately
consented to issuance of the OFP. In relevant part, the OFP required husband to
(1) maintain current insurance policies and (2) continue to pay all mortgage payments on
the parties’ Bloomington home.
A dissolution proceeding commenced and, following a stipulation by the parties
resolving all other issues, the district court referee conducted a one-day court trial in April
2025, to address financial and property issues.
1 Following the trial, the district court asked
each party to submit a proposed judgment and decree, which they did. The final judgment
and decree was dated October 29, 2025. The district court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law relevant to the issues in this appeal are highlighted below.

1 This opinion refers to the fact-finder/decision-maker as the district court because the
district court signed the referee’s order and “[ t]he findings of a referee, to the extent
adopted by the [district] court, shall be considered as findings of the [district] court.” Minn.
R. Civ. P. 52.01.

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The district court found that husband possessed three snowmobiles as of the
valuation date, that they were marital property, and awarded their value to husband on the
property schedule.
The parties’ marital property includes a Florida home, which the district court
awarded to husband subject to a marital lien in favor of wife. The Florida home also
sustained damage in a hurricane, and the parties received a settlement payment from their
homeowners’ insurance company. The district court determined that husband used a
portion of those insurance proceeds for his own personal purposes , which included living
expenses. The home is for sale, and the district court used the listing price to determine
the home’s value for purposes of the property division.
The parties’ Bloomington home is also included as a marital asset which had been
sold before the trial with the sale proceeds held in a trust account by a receiver appointed
by the district court. The net sale proceeds were awarded equally to the parties. However,
the district court determined that “due to husband’s failure to pay the mortgages as required
by the [OFP],” these costs will be attributed solely to husband on the property schedule.
The district court determined that husband dissipated marital assets of $6,071.94 for
an extramarital affair and included wife’s dissipation of assets claim on the husband’s side
of the property schedule. As to allocation of other assets, the district court found that
husband sold the parties’ hot tub without wife’s permission and that he kept the sale
proceeds for his own benefit; that amount was added to his awarded assets on the property
schedule. The district court awarded all of husband’s Pipe Trades Services of MN
Supplemental Plan to wife. Other pension plans owned by husband were divided equally.

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As part of its allocation of marital debt, the district court determined that the $6,315.09
wife borrowed to pay a veterinary bill for the parties’ dog was marital debt attributed to
wife on the property schedule. Finally, the district court ordered that husband pay wife an
equalizer amount of $126,152.90.
After considering the spousal maintenance factors, the district court awarded wife
indefinite spousal maintenance in the monthly amount of $3,225.
The district court also awarded wife $25,000 from husband as conduct-based
attorney fees.
Husband moved for a new trial, which the district court denied.
Husband appeals.
DECISION2
I. The district court independently examined the evidence in making its findings
of fact.

Husband contends that the district court erred “by its wholesale adoption of wife’s
proposed order.”
When the district court largely adopts a proposed order for judgment and decree, it
“raises the question of whether the trial court independently evaluated each party’s
testimony and evidence.” Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d 583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992),
rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993). But “the verbatim adoption of a party’s proposed
findings and conclusions of law is not reversible error per se.” Id. And a reviewing court

2 Wife did not file a brief. We nevertheless review the appeal on the merits under
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.

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examines the findings to determine whether they are clearly erroneous.
Schallinger v. Schallinger, 699 N.W.2d 15, 23 (Minn. App. 2005) (determining that the
district court evaluated the evidence independently “[b]ased on a review of the record and
the district court’s extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law) , rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 28, 2005).
We note that the district court made significant changes to the wife’s proposed order
including: the court changed the analysis of “orders for protection,” made multiple
credibility determinations not in wife’s proposed order, removed various citations and
quotes of statutes, reworked the proposed “spousal maintenance” section, added analysis
of the reasonableness of wife’ s budget, and provided more reasoning for why it was
relevant that husband never attended anger management courses.
More importantly, upon review of the record, it supports the district court’s findings
of fact, which support the conclusions of law and, therefore, the district court did
independently evaluate the proposed ruling and did not clearly err.
II. The district court did not clearly err in its findings about the division of marital
property.

Husband contends that the district court erred (A) “in finding that the parties owned
three snowmobiles,” (B) in its valuation of the Florida home, (C) in its finding husband
dissipated marital assets, (D) in its division of the Pipe Trade Services of MN Supplemental
Plan, and (E) in its division of marital debt.
“Appellate [courts] set aside a district court’s findings of fact only if clearly
erroneous, giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness

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credibility. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous [when] an appellate court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Goldman v. Greenwood , 748
N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (quotation and citations omitted). “When determining
whether findings are clearly erroneous, the appellate court views the record in the light
most favorable to the [district] court’s findings.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d
468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000). Appellate courts do not disturb findings of fact based on
conflicting evidence unless the findings are “manifestly and palpably contrary to the
evidence as a whole.” In re S.G., 828 N.W.2d 118, 127 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
“A [district] court has broad discretion in evaluating and dividing property in a
marital dissolution and will not be overturned except for abuse of discretion.”
Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). “[Appellate courts] will affirm the
trial court’s division of property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle even
though we might have taken a different approach.” Id.
The district court’s valuation of an asset is a finding of fact which “shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous on the record as a whole.” Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d
604, 606 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). “[V]aluation is necessarily an approximation
in many cases.” Hertz v. Hertz, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1975). Accordingly, valuations
that fall within a “reasonable range of figures,” as identified by “competent witnesses,”
must be sustained. See id.
Whether a party dissipated marital assets under subdivision 1a is a question of fact,
which this court reviews for clear error. See Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (2024) (stating
that the district court shall compensate a party if it “finds” that the other party has violated

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the statute and that “[t]he burden of proof under this subdivision is on the party claiming”
dissipation); Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating that findings of fact “shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous”).
Appellate courts defer to district court credibility determinations.
In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021); see also
Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that, on appeal, appellate
courts “neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor decide issues of witness credibility,
which are exclusively the province of the fact[-]finder”).
We address husband’s claims in turn.
A. Three Snowmobiles

The district court found that the parties’ owned three snowmobiles as of the
valuation date. Husband claims the district court clearly erred because, as he testified, he
pawned the two snowmobiles to pay for repair to the roof of the Florida home and that he
did not have the money to buy them back. As to the third snowmobile, husband argues
that no evidence supports its existence.
As for the two snowmobiles, the district court found that, though husband testified
that he pawned two snowmobiles and could not afford to buy them back, a snowmobile
purchase receipt from the pawnshop identified “Larry Thayer,” husband, as the purchasing
customer, and payment was in cash. The district court determined that, therefore,
documentation from the pawnshop revealed that husband re-purchased the snowmobiles
from the pawnshop and it did not find husband’s contrary testimony credible. The district
court determined that husband owned these two snowmobiles and we defer to the district

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court’s credibility findings. See Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284 (stating that appellate courts
give “deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness credibility”)
The district court also found that husband bought a third snowmobile in late 2023.
Evidence was presented that husband was given a citation for “Snowmobile – Fail to give
notice of transfer/ownership/abandonment or destruction,” and husband told the police
officer that he “did not have any registration for the snowmobile displayed because he
bought the machine in late 2023 from a racing company but had not transferred the
ownership to his name.” Husband pleaded guilty to the charge. The district court added
the value of the three snowmobiles to the list of husband’s assets on the property schedule.
The district court’s factual finding about three snowmobiles is therefore supported
by the record. See In re S.G., 828 N.W.2d at 127 (determining that appellate courts do not
disturb findings of fact based on conflicting evidence unless the findings are “manifestly
and palpably contrary to the evidence as a whole” (quotation omitted)). Husband has failed
to demonstrate the district court clearly erred in finding the existence of three snowmobiles.
B. Florida Property

Husband argues that the district court “abused its discretion by assuming husband
had a 100% interest in the property.” He also argues that the district court “erred in
speculating [by basing its finding of] the [Florida] property” on the property’s sale listing
price.
We disagree with husband’s characterizations of the district court’s factual findings
and legal conclusions about the Florida property because it nowhere determines that
husband has a 100% interest in the property. Instead, the district found otherwise before it

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determined that the home will be sold and awarded to husband, subject to a marital lien in
favor of wife, to secure payment of the equalizer by husband. The district court, several
times, found that the Florida property title includes husband and the parties’ two adult
children whom, at the parties’ request, were identified as the purchasers because “the
parties did not have sufficient credit to obtain a mortgage for the purchase of the property.”
As such, husband has not established clear error in the district court’s finding regarding the
allocation of the Florida home.
In challenging the district court’s valuation of the Florida property, husband
essentially challenges the district court’s decision to credit the evidence of the property’s
sale listing price over the testimony of the husband. The district court relied on the sale
listing price that the parties agreed to, $375,000. This finding is supported by the record
because the home is currently listed for sale with a realtor chosen by husband over wife’s
objections. This court will also defer to the district court determination that husband’s
testimony that the listing price was an inaccurate estimate was less credible.
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (“Deference must be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”). The district court
did not clearly err in valuing the Florida property.
C. Dissipation of Marital Assets

Husband argues that the district court clearly erred when it found that husband
dissipated assets related to the insurance proceeds from the Florida home, snowmobile
proceeds, mortgage payments, extramarital expenses, and hot tub proceeds because such
findings were not supported by the record.

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Husband has not established that the district court clearly erred because, other than
expenses incurred by husband regarding an extramarital affair, the district court made no
findings of dissipation as to the other items identified by husband. Instead, the district
court made detailed findings about its allocation of those items.
As to the Florida home insurance proceeds, the district court found that husband had
not used all of the insurance proceeds to pay for repairs but, instead, for his personal
purposes. The amount used for personal purposes was added to his column on the property
schedule and husband has not identified error by the district court in doing so.
As to the snowmobile proceeds, the district court did not find husband’s testimony
credible that he used the proceeds of their sale to pay for roof repairs. We defer to the
credibility determinations of the district court. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 221-22.
As to the mortgage payments that the district court found the HRO required him to
make, husband contends “[t]he OFP order did not include any provision” that he “would
be responsible for the mortgage payments.” The district court determined that “the
additional $39,493.09 in mortgage costs paid from the home sale proceeds are due to
husband’s violation of a court order and those additional costs shall be attributed solely to
husband on the [p] roperty schedule.” Husband does not contest this finding nor the
amount. The district court allocated the unpaid payments to husband’s part of the property
schedule. This finding is not clearly erroneous because it is supported by the record.
As to the sale of the parties’ hot tub by husband, the district court found that husband
“kept the sale proceeds for his own benefit and that [this] asset will be included on

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husband’s side of the property schedule.” Husband identifies nothing in the record to
suggest that this finding is clearly erroneous.
Finally, as to the one item for which the district court found husband dissipated
marital assets, husband argues that the district court erred in calculating the amount of
money dissipated because of an extramarital affair because a part of the calculation
involves expenses that occurred after the valuation date. The statute establishes a four-
element test for determining whether dissipation has occurred: (1) a transfer or disposition
of marital assets; (2) without the other party’s consent; (3) “in contemplation of
commencing, or during the pendency of, the current dissolution . . . proceeding”; and
(4) the transfer or disposition “was not in the usual course of business or for the necessities
of life.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a. Husband identifies nothing in the record to
establish that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous. To the contrary, the district
court stated that wife proved husband had spent $6,071.94 on trips and gifts for his
girlfriend, that he did this without her consent, that it occurred during the pendency of the
dissolution, and that this transfer was not for necessities of life. The district court did not
clearly err.
D. Award to Wife of Husband’s Pipe Trade Services of MN Supplemental
Plan

Husband contends that the district court erred “by awarding wife the entirety of
husband’s Pipe Trade Services of MN S upplemental Plan.” See Antone, 645 N.W.2d at
100 (stating that “[a] trial court has broad discretion in evaluating and dividing property in

12
a marital dissolution” and that appellate courts “will affirm the trial court’s division of
property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle”).
After the allocation of all debts, assets, and equalizer payment from husband to wife,
the district court awarded each $205,535.59. Hence, though the law does not obligate the
district court to divide property mathematically equal, that is what the district court did.
As a result, the district court did not clearly err.
E. Allocation of Marital Debt

Husband contends that the district court clearly erred by finding that there is a
marital loan to a third party for payment of the veterinary bill involving the parties’ dog.
Husband contends there is insufficient evidence to support this finding. The district court
found that during the summer of 2024, the parties’ dog became ill and that wife borrowed
$6,315.09 from a friend to pay for the dog’s veterinary care. The district court determined
this was a marital debt. Husband identifies nothing in the record to suggest that the district
court clearly erred when it found that wife borrowed money to pay for their dog’s medical
care. Husband’s assertion that there is no promissory note does not establish that the
district court clearly erred. Wife testified that she borrowed money from her friend and
there is no formal documentation. The district court based its finding on wife’s testimony.
See Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284. Because husband cannot establish that the district court
clearly erred, there is no “definite and firm conviction” the district court made a mistake.
See id. (quotation omitted). As such, we determine that the district court’s findings were
not clearly erroneous .

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III. The district court acted within its discretion in its spousal maintenance award
to wife.

Husband argues that “the trial court erred by imputing income to h usband based
upon his past ability to work,” contending that “[a]ppellate courts have repeatedly reversed
imputation determinations [when] the district court failed to tie potential income to present,
concrete job opportunities” and that “the trial court erred by improperly analyzing the
spousal maintenance factors.”
“A district court generally has broad discretion in its decisions regarding spousal
maintenance.” Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing
Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982)). “The standard of review in
spousal-maintenance determinations is whether the district court abused its discretion by
improperly applying the law or making findings unsupported by the evidence.” Id. (citing
Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997)). “A district court’s determination
of income for maintenance purposes is a finding of fact and is not set aside unless clearly
erroneous.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“A court may consider an obligor’s earning capacity in determining the obligor’s
ability to comply with an order for . . . spousal maintenance.” Id. (citing Hopp v. Hopp,
156 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. 1968)). But a district court must make a finding of bad faith
or unjustifiable self-limitation of income to permit the computation of the amount of
spousal maintenance to be based on the obligor’s earning capacity. Id. at 416.
“District courts have broad discretion regarding spousal maintenance and an award
will only be reversed on appeal if the court abused its discretion.” Honke v. Honke, 960

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N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs when
a district court makes findings unsupported by the evidence or when it improperly appl[ies]
the law.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Under Minnesota Statutes section 518.552, subdivision 2 (2024), the district court
must consider all relevant factors including (a) “the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance”; (b) “the time necessary to acquire sufficient education . . . to find
appropriate employment”; (c) “the standard of living established during the marriage and
the extent to which the standard of living was funded by debt” ; (d) “the duration of the
marriage . . . and other employment opportunities forgone by the spouse seeking
maintenance . . . and the length of absence from employment . . . ”; (e) “the age, and
physical, mental, or chemical health of both spouses”; (f) “the ability of the spouse from
whom maintenance is sought to meet needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance”; (g) “the contribution of a spouse in furtherance of the other party’s
employment or business”; and (h) “the need and ability of each spouse to prepare for
retirement and the anticipated time of retirement.” Husband contests the first six factors
and we address those in turn.
Financial Resources of Wife
As for factor (a), the district court found wife’s annual income to be $45,000 and
found that “no other resources or marital property apportioned to her . . . would provide
her with additional income.” Though husband contends that wife can invest her division
of the marital estate and use it to generate income, he cites no caselaw that failing to do so
is an error and so his argument is unavailing. See also Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249,

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253-57 (Minn. 2016) (determining that whether a district court should assume a
maintenance recipient will derive income from their share of a property settlement is a
discretionary decision by the district court).
Time for Wife to Acquire Sufficient Education
As for factor (b), the district court determined “that wife is unlikely to find more
lucrative employment.” Husband argues that the “record does not support that wife is
appropriately employed.” But the evidence presented at trial supports the district court’s
finding that w ife is appropriately employed. Though husband’s expert performed a
vocational evaluation of wife and testified that wife was underemployed, the district court
reduced the weight it might otherwise assign to his testimony because the alternative work
that was being proposed included only a slight increase in salary of $2,840 per year, with
an inconsistent schedule that may be unable to pay up to 40 hours per week. Additionally,
through wife’s current job, she is eligible for medical and dental insurance at no cost to
her, but this is a benefit that may not be available to her in the alternative work. Because
the district court’s finding is supported by the evidence, it did not abuse its discretion when
analyzing this factor.
Standard of Living
As for factor (c), the district court found that the parties “enjoyed an upper middle-
class standard of living,” which was not funded through incurring debt. However, husband
contends that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous. Husband identifies nothing
in the record that would establish, as he claims, that their marital standard of living was

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funded by debt. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion with its analysis of this
factor.
Length of Marriage and Employment Opportunities Forgone
As for factor (d), husband contends that the parties’ marriage lasted about 32 years
and 6 months rather than the district court’s finding of 34 years. Husband makes no legal
argument about how this purported error is more than harmless. Any harmless errors must
be ignored and the district court did not abuse its discretion with its analysis of this factor.
See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61.
Age and Health of the Spouses
As for factor (e), husband contends that the district court ignored his testimony that
he was having nosebleeds that prevented him from working as much as he previously did.
But the district court specifically considered this and found that husband presented no
evidence of the condition which he maintains has resulted in severe nosebleeds or that it
prevented him from the work he previously did. And on appeal husband identifies no
evidence in the record to support his argument.
Ability of Husband to Meet His Needs and Wife’s Needs
As for factor (f), the court determined that husband could have met both his needs
and wife’s needs. Husband contends that the district court should not have calculated his
income using self-employment income in addition to his full-time employment income.
The district court found that husband had an annual salary of $118,000 and
additional self- employment income based on a three-year average of approximately
$150,000 per year. The district court found “that husband’s historical self-employment

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income should be included in his gross income for calculation of spousal maintenance”
though husband derives this income in excess of husband’s 40-hour work week. The
district court reasoned that, because the income did “not reflect an increase in the work
schedule or hours worked over that of the two years immediately preceding the filing of
the petition.” The district court determined that wife demonstrated by a preponderance of
the evidence that husband reduced his self-employment since the commencement of the
dissolution to affect a potential spousal maintenance obligation.
Husband argues that his income calculation should be limited to one full-time job
and cited to Minnesota Statutes section 518A.29 (a), (b) to argue the district court therefore
erred. However, husband did not raise this argument in district court. On appeal, an
appellant can neither argue an issue that was not presented to and considered by the district
court, nor argue an issue that was presented to the district court but on a different theory
than the theory on which appellant argued the issue to the district court. Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Further, because the question was not addressed by
the district court, there are no findings for this court to review. Id. (holding that appellate
courts generally review only “those issues that the record shows were presented to and
considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it”).
IV. The district court acted within its discretion when awarding wife conduct-
based attorney fees.

The district court ordered husband to pay wife $25,000 in conduct- based attorney
fees. Husband contends that the district court abused its discretion “in awarding wife

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conduct-based attorney fees when it was wife’s conduct that contributed to both the length
and expense of this proceeding.”
Conduct-based fee awards “are discretionary with the district court.”
Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007). “In proceedings under
chapter 518, a district court may, in its discretion, award attorney fees against a party who
unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Brodsky v. Brodsky,
733 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted) (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.14,
subd. 1 (2006)). “An award of conduct -based attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” Id. at 476.
The district court found “that husband’s unreasonable conduct ha[d] led to the
unnecessary increase of the costs and length of these proceedings.” The district court
reasoned that husband failed to abide by court orders, such as the OFP which required him
to maintain wife’s insurance and make mortgage payments on the parties’ Bloomington
home; that he delayed responding to reasonable discovery requests; that he failed to
produce document requests that should have been produced in discovery; that he failed to
provide the court with an accounting of hurricane insurance proceeds for the parties’
Florida home; that he attempted to hide assets and income; that he sold marital assets during
the pendency of this proceeding without wife’s knowledge; and that he unilaterally selected
a realtor for the Florida and Bloomington home. Husband has not identified how the
district court’s findings are not supported by the record.
The district court is familiar with the underlying litigation and the discovery process
and it is therefore in the best position to evaluate the extent to which husband’s and wife’s

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conduct unreasonably contributed to the length and expense of the proceeding.
See Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472 (noting that “the [district] court has the feel of the trial”
(quotation omitted)). The district court concluded that an award of conduct-based attorney
fees was appropriate because of husband’s conduct during discovery and throughout the
litigation. The district court acted within its discretion in awarding conduct-based attorney
fees based on husband’s conduct.3
V. The district court acted within its discretion in denying husband’s motion for
a new trial.

Husband argues that the district court “erred by failing to order a new trial” because
husband “ha[s] produced indisputable material evidence there were only two
snowmobiles” and because the district court “made credibility determinations that were
based upon factual findings that were clearly erroneous.”
A district court may grant a motion for a new trial on any of seven grounds, one of
which appellant raises: “The . . . decision, . . . is not justified by the evidence, or is
contrary to law . . . .” Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(g). Appellate courts “review a district court’s
decision to grant or deny a new trial for an abuse of discretion.” Christie v. Est. of Christie,
911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018).

3 Husband separately argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering,
among the reasons to award conduct-based attorney fees, that he failed to comply with the
OFP provision which required him to maintain the Bloomington house mortgage payments.
But husband cites no authority which prohibits such consideration and, as we explain, that
was one of many factors the district court considered. See Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890
N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017) (“An assignment of error on mere assertion,
unsupported by argument or authority, is forfeited and need not be considered unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017).

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After a motion hearing for amended findings, the district court issued an order which
provided that “[a]ll motions not expressly granted are hereby denied,” which included
husband’s motion for a new trial.
For the reasons we have already explained in rejecting husband’s claims of error,
the district court acted within its discretion when it did not grant a new trial because the
record supports the district court’s findings of fact and it acted within its discretion in
reaching its legal conclusions.
Affirmed.