State of Minnesota v. Tathony Maudell Brown

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1871

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tathony Maudell Brown,
Appellant.

Filed September 8, 2026
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-25-1109

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Lola Brown (certified law student practitioner), Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Greg Scanl an, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bentley, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Hennepin County jury found Tathony Maudell Brown guilty of fleeing a peace
officer in a motor vehicle based on evidence that he sped away from a traffic stop before a
state trooper had concluded an investigation. We conclude that Brown’s pre-trial waiver

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of his right to counsel is constitutionally valid. We also conclude that the district court did
not prevent Brown from asserting the defense of self-defense. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On January 2, 2025, a state trooper saw a vehicle moving at 91 miles per hour in a
60-mile-per-hour zone on interstate highway 94 in Minneapolis. The trooper initiated a
traffic stop. The vehicle pulled over to the side of the highway. The trooper approached
the vehicle’s passenger-side window and observed what he described at trial as an
“obviously illegal window tint.” The trooper twice asked the driver and sole occupant of
the vehicle, later identified as Brown, to lower the passenger- side window. After Brown
lowered the window a few inches, the trooper asked him for his driver’s license and proof
of insurance and also asked him to lower the window further so he could test the window
tint. Brown did not immediately comply. Brown eventually showed the trooper his
driver’s license by holding it in his own hand, which required the trooper to view it through
the tinted window.
During the traffic stop , the trooper and Brown engaged in a contentious verbal
exchange. Brown stated that he would not answer any questions or exit his vehicle or “do
anything until a lieutenant is here.” At one point, he stated, “For my safety, I will request
a lieutenant.” Brown accused the trooper of yelling and being aggressive. When Brown
failed to produce proof of insurance, the trooper ordered Brown to exit the vehicle and said,
“If you don’t get out of the car, I’m going to break your window.” Brown then drove away.
Two weeks later, the state charged Brown with fleeing a peace officer in a motor
vehicle, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2024). At his first appearance on

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February 18, 2025, Brown declined representation by a public defender. When asked by
the district court whether he was “sure about that,” Brown responded, “Yeah. I’m pro se.
I represent myself.”
At the omnibus hearing on April 10, 2025, the district court asked Brown whether
he wished to apply for representation by a public defender. Brown responded by saying
that he did not wish to apply, had not applied, and “never will” apply. After the district
court inquired further, Brown confirmed that he wished to represent himself. The district
court warned Brown of the hazards of self-representation:
That’s a really big decision. It’s very, very advantageous to
have an attorney. And you have the right to represent yourself,
but it’s really – you’ll be at a significant disadvantage if you
do so. I’m not telling you that because I want you to not
exercise your rights. I’m telling you that because there are so
many things that an attorney knows and goes to school for,
knows the rules of evidence, and you’ll be held to have to know
all of those and do all of that in your own case. And I have the
pro se petition here that goes over a number of these things, but
I understand that you did not fill this out. If you want to go
forward representing yourself, you’re going to have to fill this
out so that I have a record that you understand what you’re
doing.

The district court then reviewed a pro se petition, which Brown had refused to sign, and
questioned Brown about each paragraph of the petition, on the record.
The case was scheduled for trial on May 19, 2025. Brown did not appear for trial
on that date. He was arrested the next day and brought before the district court. When the
district court asked whether Brown wished to be represented by an attorney, he stated that
he “would like to proceed on with pro se, speaking for myself.” On the following day,

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Brown had a first appearance on three new charges. He again expressed a desire to
represent himself, saying, “I will speak for myself.”
Brown appeared for a pre-trial hearing on June 24, 2025. He again was told that he
had the right to be represented by an attorney , and he again stated that he did not want to
be represented by a public defender. The district court again reviewed an unsigned pro se
petition, on the record, in the same manner as at the April 10, 2025 hearing. At the
conclusion of that colloquy, the district court asked Brown whether he wished to be
represented by an attorney or to represent himself. Brown responded by stating, “ I don’t
wish. I demand.” The district court made handwritten notes on the petition that Brown
“acknowledged comprehension of” the petition and “makes the demand” that he represent
himself. (Emphasis in original.)
On July 9, 2025, Brown filed a handwritten, one-page motion to dismiss in which
he asked the district court to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. He stated
that he did not “flee,” as that term is defined by statute, and that the trooper was not “acting
in the lawful discharge of an official duty,” see Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 1 (2024),
because the officer “ was aggressive, yelling, intentionally mishandling me [and] used
unreasonable . . . force.”
Brown presented oral argument on his motion at a pre-trial hearing on July 14, 2025,
one day before trial began. During the hearing, the district court commented that Brown’s
motion “isn’t really a motion to dismiss” but, rather, “sounds like argument for the trial.”
Brown responded by saying, “No, this is probable cause.” The district court replied that
the issue of probable cause was not implicated, by questioning whether Brown had a reason

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for not complying with the officer’s orders, and by stating that the matter is “something
that the jury’s going to have to sort out.”
At the same hearing, the district court addressed a pending motion filed by the state
to preclude Brown from presenting defenses that had not been properly noticed. The
district court stated its understanding that Brown had not given notice of any defenses.
Brown responded by stating that he had filed a motion to dismiss that included his defense.
Brown later stated to the district court, “You do know that it’s a self-defense of retreating.”
The district court responded by stating that Brown had not given notice of “anything like
that.” Brown replied, “That’s law. I shouldn’t have to say. You all should know the
law. . . . It’s in my motion.” The district court reminded Brown that he was representing
himself and was responsible for complying with the applicable rules.
The case was tried to a jury over two days. In his opening statement, Brown stated
that he intended to prove that he left the traffic stop because he was in fear due to the
officer’s actions. The state called only one witness: the trooper who conducted the traffic
stop. The state also introduced and played for the jury two videorecordings of the traffic
stop. Brown cross-examined the trooper and, in doing so, elicited evidence about their
interactions during the traffic stop. The trooper confirmed that he said that he would break
a window of Brown’s vehicle if Brown did not get out of the vehicle. When Brown asked
the trooper whether he would have removed Brown from his vehicle with force, the trooper
stated, “If I would have broken your window and unlocked your car and opened the door,
I would have asked you to step out of the vehicle, and if you did not do such, I would have
removed you with force, yes.” In his closing argument, Brown argued that he requested

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the presence of another officer during the traffic stop because he “was not feeling safe on
the side of a highway with just me and one other officer that’s being overaggressive.”
During its deliberations, the jury sent the district court a note with a question: “Is
there any legally permissible reason to leave without the officer’s permission?” During a
conference conducted outside the jury’s presence, Brown asked the district court to “give
them the answer to their question.” The district court stated its intention to respond by
stating, “You’ve been provided with the applicable law and the instructions you need to
decide this matter.” Brown reiterated that the district court should answer the jury’s
question by instructing the jury that a person has “a right in self-defense to retreat.” After
jurors returned to the courtroom, the district court responded to their question in the manner
previously indicated. After the jury had exited the courtroom, the district court commented
on the positions of both parties concerning the jury’s question. With respect to Brown’s
position, the district court stated that Mr. Brown’s self-defense theory “is not the correct
state of the law.”
The jury found Brown guilty. The district court imposed a sentence of 19 months
of imprisonment. Brown appeals, with the assistance of an appellate public defender.
DECISION
I. Waiver of Right to Counsel
Brown argues that his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing, intelligent
and voluntary and, thus, not constitutionally valid.
The law applicable to Brown’s argument is summarized in a recent supreme court
opinion:

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Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to
counsel. A defendant may waive the constitutional right to
counsel if that waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Indeed, when a defendant makes an informed choice to
proceed without counsel, he has a constitutional right to do so;
a state may not constitutionally hale a person into its criminal
courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists
that he wants to conduct his own defense.

A district court judge has the serious and weighty
responsibility of ensuring that a defendant’s waiver of counsel
is constitutionally valid. In determining whether a defendant’s
waiver is constitutionally valid, the district court should
examine the facts and circumstances of the case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Specifically, the district court must investigate as long and as
thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him
demand.

State v. Turner, 32 N.W.3d 546, 552-53 (Minn. 2026) (citations and quotations omitted).
To the extent that the validity of a defendant’s waiver of counsel depends on factual
findings concerning “the facts and circumstances of the case,” an appellate court applies a
clear-error standard of review. Id. at 554. To the extent that the relevant facts are
undisputed or given, the validity of the waiver is a question of law, to which an appellate
court applies a de novo standard of review. Id.
In this case, Brown first contends that his waiver was not knowing, intelligent and
voluntary on the ground that he “was not informed of the consequences of not satisfying
his notice and burden of production requirements for his defense to the charges.” He bases
this contention on a rule of criminal procedure, which provides that, if a defendant wishes
to represent himself, the district court “must advise the defendant of,” among other things,
the “nature of the charges,” the “range of allowable punishments,” the fact that “there may

8
be defenses,” and “all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the consequences
of the waiver of the right to counsel, including the advantages and disadvantages of the
decision to waive counsel.” See Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4)(a), (c), (d), (f). Brown
specifically contends that the district court did not advise him that “there may be defenses.”
See Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4)(d). The state agrees that the district court omitted
some items when orally giving Brown the advisory required by the rule, including the fact
that “there may be defenses.” But the state argues that Brown’s waiver is not per se invalid
merely because the district court omitted some items from its advisory.
The state’s argument is supported by T urner, in which the defendant made a very
similar argument based on a district court’s failure to give some of the advisories required
by rule 5.04, subdivision 1(4). Turner, 32 N.W.3d at 554. The supreme court rejected the
argument, stating, “A district court’s failure to follow required procedures does not
automatically invalidate a defendant’s waiver of counsel.” Id. at 555. The supreme court
resolved the defendant’s argument by focusing on the facts and circumstances of the case,
including the appellant’s background, experience, and conduct. Id. The supreme court
reasoned that “the district court engaged Turner in a lengthy discussion of the
responsibilities and implications of self-representation,” that “the district court’s
uncontested factual findings regarding Turner ’s demeanor and comprehension during the
hearing suggest that Turner’s waiver was knowing and intelligent, ” and that Turner’s
agreement to a pro se petition “demonstrates that his choice to represent himself was
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. at 555-56.

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In light of Turner, the validity of Brown ’s waiver of counsel depends on the facts
and circumstances of this case, including his background, experience, and conduct. See id.
Brown’s brief concedes that he is an experienced litigant in criminal cases and “he rarely,
if ever, has been represented by counsel. ” To be specific, the record reveals that he has
seven prior convictions. In this case, he filed a written motion to dismiss and argued it to
the district court before trial. At trial, Brown gave an opening statement, cross-examined
the state’s witness, and made a closing argument. These facts strongly suggest that Brown
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
In addition, Brown was specifically informed by the district court of the
consequences of waiving counsel and representing himself. Twice the district court read
through an unsigned pro se petition. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). On one
occasion, a judge gave him an extensive warning about the issue, stating that it is “a really
big decision” and that he would be at a disadvantage without an attorney. On another
occasion, a different judge told him that “it’s extremely difficult to represent yourself at
trial, especially when you’re in custody.” Nonetheless, Brown repeatedly, emphatically,
and unequivocally expressed a desire to represent himself. The record contains ample
support for the conclusion that Brown knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
right to counsel.
Thus, the facts and circumstances of the case , including Brown’s prior experience
with self- representation and his clearly expressed preference to represent himself,
establishes that Brown’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent and, thus, constitutionally valid.

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II. Self-Defense Defense
Brown argues that the district court erred by prohibiting him from asserting the
defense of self- defense. Brown’s brief does not clearly state when and how the district
court prohibited him from asserting a self-defense defense. He does not identify any
evidentiary rulings that prevented him from introducing evidence supporting the defense.
He also does not identify any rejection of a proffered jury instruction before the case was
submitted. It appears that Brown’s argument is based on the district court’s on-the-record
statements on two specific occasions.
First, Brown identifies a statement made by the district court during a pre-trial
hearing on the state’s motions in limine. The state had moved to preclude Brown from
presenting any defenses of which he had not given notice. T he district court stated that it
appeared that Brown had not given notice of any affirmative defense. Brown disputed the
district court’s statement, stating that he had given notice of a defense by filing a motion
to dismiss. On appeal, however, Brown disputes the district court’s statement on a different
ground: he argues that he did not fail to give notice of his self-defense defense because the
state did not serve him with a demand for disclosures. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02,
subd. 1(5).
Assuming without deciding that the district court plainly erred by stating that Brown
had failed to comply with an obligation to disclose his self-defense defense, such error did
not affect his substantial rights. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02. The district court’s statement
at the pre-trial hearing appears to have been inconsequential. As the state notes, the district
court did not expressly rule on the state’s motion to preclude presentation of a defense.

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Brown was allowed to elicit evidence relevant to his self-defense theory in his cross-
examination of the trooper. The state did not object to Brown’s cross-examination on the
ground that he had not given notice of a self-defense defense, and the district court did not
exclude any evidence relevant to Brown’s self-defense theory. Accordingly, the district
court did not commit reversible error by stating during a pre-trial hearing that Brown had
not given notice of any defenses.
Second, Brown identifies statements made by the district court in a conference
concerning the jury’s question during its deliberations. The district court stated that Brown
did not have a right of self-defense at the time of the traffic stop and that his self-defense
theory is “not the correct state of the law.”
Brown contends that the district court’s statement of the applicable law is incorrect.
He cites State v. Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. 1984), in which the defendant was
charged with third- degree assault and fleeing a peace officer based on evidence that he
“seriously beat” a police officer during a traffic stop and then fled. Id. at 925. At trial, the
district court gave the jury a self-defense instruction with respect to the assault charge but
not the fleeing charge. Id. at 927. On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things,
that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that the defense of self-defense also
could apply to the fleeing charge. Id. at 926. The supreme court stated that a person may
“‘resist an officer in order to defend himself or another against unjustified bodily attack’”
but not “‘ solely on the ground that the officers are violating the defendant’s fourth
amendment rights.’” Id. at 927 (quoting State v. Wick, 331 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn. 1983)).
The supreme court also stated, “If a defendant is free to use reasonable force to resist an

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offense against his person by a police officer, he also is free to flee the officer.” Id. The
supreme court resolved the defendant’s argument about the applicability of self-defense to
the fleeing charge by reasoning that, even if such an instruction had been given, the jury
would not have acquitted the defendant of the fleeing charge because the jury rejected the
self-defense defense when it convicted him of the assault charge. Id.
Assuming without deciding that Brown’s self -defense theory has a proper legal
basis, the district court’s statement to the contrary was inconsequential. The case had been
submitted, and the jury’s question had been answered. If we were to construe Brown’s
argument as a challenge to the district court’s answer to the jury’s question, we would
conclude that the district court did not err by not giving the jury a supplemental jury
instruction on Brown’s theory. A district court has broad discretion in formulating a
response to a jury’s question. State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 772 (Minn. 1986); State
v. Harlin, 771 N.W.2d 46, 51-52 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 2009).
A district court’s refusal to give a supplemental jury instruction must be viewed in light of
the jury instructions that previously were given to the jury. Before the case was submitted,
Brown did not request a self-defense instruction, and the district court did not give one .
The district court did not plainly err by not giving such an instruction without a request.
See State v. Cross, 577 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Minn. 1998) (stating that defendant’s failure to
request instruction constitutes waiver of argument, resulting in review for plain error); State
v. O’Meara, 755 N.W.2d 29, 36 (Minn. App. 2008) (similar). Because the jury was not
instructed on Brown’s self-defense theory before the case was submitted, the district court

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did not abuse its discretion by not instructing the jury on the theory in a supplemental jury
instruction. See Murphy, 380 N.W.2d at 772; Harlin, 771 N.W.2d at 51-52.
Thus, the district court did not commit reversible error with respect to Brown ’s
interest in presenting a self-defense defense.
Affirmed.