State of Minnesota v. Lawrence Sepan Wilson

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1874

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lawrence Sepan Wilson,
Appellant.

Filed September 21, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion granted
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-4087

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and
Rasmusson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of first -degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC
1), kidnapping, simple robbery, and vi olation of a domestic -abuse no -contact order
(DANCO), arguing that the district court erred by: (1) failing to ask appellant to renew his

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waiver of counsel following the addition of the kidnapping charge; (2) improperly
instructing the jury on the necessary relationship between personal injury and sexual
penetration for the CSC 1 offense, (3) failing to instruct the jury as to which alleged act
supported the “sexual element” of the CSC 1 offense, and (4) ordering appellant to pay
restitution in the absence of a request for restitution or any information about economic
loss. Appellant also filed a motion to strike from the addendum to respondent’s brief a
restitution claim and orders for various items that were not part of the record . We affirm
the conviction, reverse the restitution order and remand it, and grant the motion to strike.
FACTS
In September 2022, appellant Lawrence Sepan Wilson and B.L. had a daughter.
They were no longer living together by February 2023; appellant was then in an apartment
that he had been ordered to vacate. On February 19, 2023, he said he wanted to see B.L.
and the baby, so they came to the apartment.
He refused to let B.L. leave , demanded that she have sex with him , and threatened
her by saying she would not get very far it she attempted to leave. He forced B.L. to
perform oral sex for an hour, then drove her and the baby around for four hours in
appellant’s car, during which he sexually assaulted her several times. B.L. texted a female
friend, A.M., who came to appellant’s apartment. Appellant took the friend’s two phones
and left. A.M. located appellant and the phones in a casino and notified the police, who
arrested appellant.
He was initially charged with simple robbery and misdemeanor DANCO; the
complaint was amended to include charges of CSC 1 and third -degree criminal sexual

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conduct (CSC 3). In March 2023, A.M. claimed $856.51 in restitution for lost or stolen
property. In April 2023, appellant’s public defender (PD) asked for a competency
evaluation of appellant. In May 2023, appellant was found incompetent to proceed . The
prosecution was suspended while appellant remained in treatment until April 2025.
Then, at a hearing, appellant’s PD moved to have appellant released to a treatment
facility. The prosecutor objected, saying that: (1) appellant was charged with first -degree
CSC, simple robbery, and third -degree CSC; (2) the prosecution intended to amend the
complaint with kidnapping charges, and (3) when appellant was previously released, he
violated the terms and conditions of release. After the hearing, appellant was found
competent to proceed.
In May 2025, appellant said he wanted to fire his two public defenders and hire
private counsel. He did not do this, but he did sign a petition to proceed pro se. On May
22, 2025, appellant went through the petition with the public defender s, stating he
understood the consequences of representing himself and that the maximum sentence for
CSC 1 was 30 years. The prosecutor explained that appellant’s most serious offense, CSC
1, exposed him to a 144 -month sentence; the kidnapping charge could result in a
consecutive 48 months, and having a separate victim, A.M., could result in a consecutive
33 months, for a total of 225 months. Appellant assured the district court that he heard
everything the prosecutor had been saying. The state’s offer w as for appellant to plead
guilty to CSC 3 for a sentence of 57 months, receive credit for time served on the
misdemeanor DANCO violation in the 23-4087 file and on a misdemeanor DWI in another
file, and have all other charges dismissed, leaving him with about 18 months in prison left

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to serve. He was given until May 30 to consider the state’s offer, but he did not accept the
offer.
In July 2025, a jury trial was held; appellant cross -examined B.L. and A.M. The
jury found appellant guilty of CSC 1, kidnaping, simple robbery, and the DANCO
violation. In August 2025, appellant received a copy of the pre -sentence investigation
(PSI), which included the request for restitution. He was sentenced to 219 months in prison
and ordered to pay A.M. $856.51 in restitution. He did not challenge the restitution order
in the 30 days allowed for doing so, but appealed directly from the judgment of conviction.
After respondent filed its brief, appellant filed a motion to strike items in respondent’s
addendum; the decision on the motion to strike was deferred to the panel.
Appellant now argues that the district court erred by (I) not repeating questions
about his decision to proceed pro se at the beginning of trial, (II) giving the jury an
erroneous instruction on CSC 1, (III) refusing to give the specific -unanimity instruction
requested by appellant, and (IV) ordering restitution for which there was no factual basis;1
he also (V) moves to strike portions of the addendum to respondent’s brief.
DECISION
I. Appellant’s Waiver of the Right to Counsel

This court reviews a district court’s findings on a defendant’s decision to waive the
right to counsel for clear error. State v. Turner, 32 N.W.3d 546, 553 (Minn. 2026). Once
the defendant has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to counsel, the
defendant need not renew the waiver of counsel at later proceedings. State v. Rhoads, 813

1 Respondent contends that the challenge to the restitution order is not properly before us.

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N.W.2d 880, 88 5 (Minn. 2012). But a renewed waiver may be required “when an
intervening event substantially changes the circumstances existing at the time of the initial
waiver of counsel.” Turner, 32 N.W.3d at 553. A district court can “reasonably presume”
that a defendant who has consulted with counsel before waiving counsel had all the
information necessary for a valid waiver. Id. at 556.
Appellant argues that the addition of the kidnapping charge, with the possibility of
a 48-month consecutive sentence, was an “intervening event” that occurred after his waiver
of counsel. But the transcript shows that: (1) appellant heard about the kidnapping charges
on April 15, more than a month before he signed the petition to waive counsel on May 21;
(2) he discussed the petition with his attorneys on May 22; and (3), when he said “I just
heard it for the first time,” in response to a question as to whether he needed more time to
consider the state’s offer , the “it” was the plea offer, not the kidnapping charge. Also,
before the trial began, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the kidnaping charge, so he knew
about it then. There was no “intervening event” that would have required another waiver
of counsel.
Appellant relies on Rhoads, asserting that his case “calls for a straightforward
application” of that case. But Rhoads is distinguishable. It involved two waivers of
counsel: the first at a pretrial hearing and the second after the complaint had been amended
“to include a count of first -degree burglary that roughly doubled the maximum possible
punishment.”2 Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 882. “Because the record does not support an

2 In contrast to Rhoads, in which the penalty was “roughly doubled” by the additional
charge, the penalty here was increased by about 20 percent; 48 months in prison were added
to 177 months in prison for a total of 225 months in prison.

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inference that when Rhoads renewed his waiver -of-counsel he understood the maximum
possible punishment he faced had doubled, we conclude that the renewed waiver -of-
counsel was not knowing and intelligent.” Id. Here, after appellant was told of the possible
penalty, he asked for more time to consider the state’s offer and for the prosecutor’s phone
number, so he could discuss the offer with the prosecutor. The district court ensured that
appellant understood the possible penalty, including the kidnapping charge penalty, by
having the prosecutor read it into the record. Thus, the district court “reasonably
presume[d]” that appellant had all the information necessary for a valid waiver of counsel.
See Turner, 32 N.W.3d at 556.
The district court did not err by not having appellant repeat his waiver of counsel.
II. The Jury Instruction on CSC 1

Because there was no objection to the jury instruction, it is reviewed for plain error.
State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012). Appellant must show that there was
an error, that the error was plain, and that the error affected appellant’s substantial rights;
he also “has the heavy burden of proving that there is a reasonable likelihood that giving
the instruction in question had a significant effect on the jury verdict.” State v. Kelley, 885
N.W.2d 269, 283 (Minn. 2014).
Minnesota Statute § 609.342, subd. 1(c)(i) (2022), provides that “ [a] person who
engages in sexual penetration with another person is guilty of [CSC 1] if any of the
following circumstances exists . . . the actor causes personal injury to the complainant, and
. . . the actor uses coercion to accomplish the act.” At the state’s request, the jury was
instructed that “[i]t is not necessary that the personal injury must be caused in the process

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of accomplishing sexual penetration. A victim’s injuries do not have to be simultaneous
with the actual sexual penetration, as long as they are sufficiently related to the act.” This
instruction was taken from State v. Sollman, 402 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Minn. App. 1987).
But on July 9, 2025, the day before the instruction was given, the supreme court
released State v. Letourneau , holding that “If the actor’s use of force in section 609.342,
subdivision 1(d), is an ‘event accompanying, conditioning or determining’ the sexual
penetration, the plain language of the statute penalizes the use of force both before
(‘conditioning or determining’) and during (‘accompanying’) the sexual penetration.” 23
N.W.3d 386, 394 (Minn. 2025). Appellant was accused and convicted of violating Minn.
Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c) ( pertaining to causing personal injury by using coercion to
accomplish sexual penetration), not subd. 1(d) (involving the use of force to accomplish
sexual penetration). Thus, Letourneau is not really on point.
In any event, the state show ed that the personal injury appellant caused B.L.
accompanied, conditioned, or determined his sexual penetration of her. Appellant’s
argument that he inflicted violence on B.L. to force her to give him her phone, not to force
her into sexual contact, is contradicted by the transcript. When he asked B.L., “You were
assaulted for sex or were you assaulted for the phone?” she answered, “I was assaulted
before the phone ever came into the picture, when I was forced to perform oral sex for over
an hour” and “I was forced to [perform oral sex] so strongly that I threw up two or three
times.”
Finally, appellant has not shown that any error in not using the language of
Letourneau in the jury instruction had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict, because the

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jury heard extensive evidence that the personal injuries appellant inflicted on B.L.
“accompany[ied], condition[ed], or determine[ed]” his sexual penetrations of her. There
was no error in the district court’s failure to use the language of Letourneau in the jury
instruction.3
III. Omission of an Instruction on Unanimity
Again, there was no objection to the jury instruction that was given, so the standard
of review is plain error. See Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 805.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that it had to
agree which act (oral sex in the car, vaginal sex in the apartment, or vaginal sex the next
morning) satisfied the “sexual penetration” element of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1 (c)(i).
He relies on State v. Stempf, 627 N.W.2d 352, 358 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding in a drug -
possession case that a defendant’s unanimous -verdict right was violated because the
prosecutor did not indicate whether the drugs found in the defendant’s workplace or the
drugs found in his truck were the basis for the conviction , and the district court did not
instruct the jury that it had to agree on which drugs it relied). But such an instruction was
not necessary here because appellant did not deny that any of the sexual acts occurred: his
only defense was that B.L. had consented to all of them.
Even if the omission of the unanimity instruction had been plain error, relief for
plain error requires the error to affect the defendant’s substantial rights. See Kelley, 855

3Appellant concedes that the prosecutor may not have known about the day-old Letourneau
case, but states that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” and cites Underwood v. State, 25
N.W.3d 26, 34 (Minn. 2025) for the proposition that prosecutors, like other members of
society, are presumed “at least, to have acquainted themselves with those laws that are
likely to affect their usual activities.”

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N.W.2d at 273-74. An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if it “was prejudicial
and affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998).
“[A] district court’s failure to provide a specific -unanimity instruction [is] prejudicial if it
is ‘reasonably likely ’ that the lack of instruction resulted in a non -unanimous verdict.”
State v. Yang, 38 N.W.3d 74, 87 (Minn. 2026) (quoting State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293,
300-01 (Minn. 2015)).
In Wenthe, the jurors had been instructed that they must unanimously agree that
Wenthe violated the clergy sexual conduct statute, but not on the specific meeting at which
the statute was violated. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 299. But this “alleged error did not affect
Wenthe’s substantial rights.” Id.
[The omission of] the unanimity instruction was prejudicial
only if it is reasonably likely that (i) some jurors believed that
both sexual penetration and spiritual counsel occurred at the
November 13 meeting, but not at subsequent meetings; while
(ii) other jurors believed that sexual penetration and spiritual
counsel occurred at a later meeting but not at the November 13
meeting. See Scarborough v. United States , 522 A . 2d 869,
873-74 (D.C. 1987) (concluding that the lack of a specific
unanimity instruction was harmless error).
Jurors could have reasonably concluded that Wenthe
violated the single-meeting statute at the November 13 meeting
but not at later meetings. . . .
There is no reasonable possibility, however, that some
jurors concluded that both sexual penetration and spiritual
counsel occurred at a later meeting but not at the November 13
meeting. . . . [The victim’s] testimony does not support this
scenario. . . . Neither does the scenario comport with Wenthe’s
theory of the case, as he argued that spiritual counsel ceased
before the relationship became sexual in nature. Further,
Wenthe and [the victim] undisputedly engaged in sexual
conduct at the November 13 meeting, but the record is unclear
on other dates. . . . [N]either Wenthe nor [the victim] could
remember the exact dates of later sexual encounters. . . . [I]t is

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not reasonably likely that any juror relied on a later meeting
but not the November 13 meeting to find Wenthe guilty.

. . . .

Because it is not reasonably likely that the district
court’s failure to provide a specific -unanimity jury instruction
significantly affected the verdict, we conclude that any error
did not affect Wenthe’s substantial rights.

Id. at 300-301; compare Yang, 38 N.W.3d at 87 (“Given the multiple acts alleged and the
vagueness of [the victim’s] allegations, it is reasonably possible that the jurors were split
on the acts that they believed had been proven”); State v. Keyes, 38 N.W.3d 21, 25 (Minn.
2026) (“Because it is reasonably likely that some jurors believed that appellant sexually
penetrated the victim in the bedroom but not the living room , while other jurors believed
that appellant sexually penetrated the victim [in the living room] but not the bedroom, the
district court’s error [in omitting the unanimity instruction] was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt”).
Here, the jury could not have had more than one view on whether appellant engaged
in sexual penetration, since neither he nor B.L. denied it, and it could not have had more
than one view as to whether B.L. consented, because she repeatedly and extensively
testified that she did not consent. Thus, because it is not reasonably likely that the lack of
a specific-unanimity instruction resulted in a non-unanimous jury verdict, the omission of
the instruction did not affect appellant’s substantial rights.
IV. Restitution

This court reviews de novo whether a district court had the authority to order
restitution. State v. Anderson, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015).

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The information that A.M. had claimed $8 65.51 was forwarded to the probation
officer, who included it in appellant’s PSI , states: “Loss Data: . . . “Victim 2 [A.M.]
submitted a restitution claim in the amount of $865.51.” The claim for restitution states
that A.M.’s “property stolen or damaged” was $800.00 in cash and $65.51 in phone cases,
screen protectors, and phone rings, and provides orders for these items that list the amounts
paid. But the claim and the orders were n ot before the district court and therefore are not
part of the record.
Because there was no factual basis for the restitution award in the record, we reverse
the order and remand. See State v. Fader , 358 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn. 1984) (vacating
restitution order for $10,000 because “the record [did] not provide a factual basis for the
restitution award” and remanding for reconsideration so the parties could “present evidence
bearing on the issue of economic loss to the victim and her family”).
V. The Motion to Strike
Appellant moves to strike the copy of the restitution claim and the orders, arguing
that the claim “accuses [him] of stealing cash from a complaining witness: an accusation
neither the government nor the complainant had ever made .” Here, the state has not filed
a response opposing the motion to strike. We grant the motion.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded; motion granted.