Abdiel Josadac Aguilar-Pineda, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1876

Abdiel Josadac Aguilar-Pineda, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 22, 2026
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-3105

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his postconviction petition
seeking withdrawal of his guilty plea based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
Appellant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because his attorney failed
to inform him that the conviction would make his deportation presumptively mandatory.
2
Because the record supports the district court’s finding that counsel informed appellant that
his plea would make him presumptively subject to mandatory deportation, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts derive from the plea and sentencing hearings, and the
postconviction record.
Underlying Offense
Appellant Abdiel Josadac Aguilar-Pineda tried to take several items from a
department store in May 2022 without paying for them. As Aguilar-Pineda was leaving the
store, he was confronted by an employee and dropped some of the items he was holding.
After that confrontation, Aguilar -Pineda left the store, went to a car nearby, and grabbed
an axe. He then ran back towards the employee with the axe raised over his head. The
employee ran inside the store and Aguilar- Pineda picked up some of the items he had
dropped and left with them. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Aguilar-Pineda with
first-degree aggravated robbery under Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2020).
Plea Hearing
The district court took Aguilar-Pineda’s plea in December 2022. Before addressing
the facts of the underlying crime, both parties and the district court discussed the agreement
that Aguilar-Pineda would plead guilty to the sole count of aggravated robbery and, in
exchange, the prosecutor would argue for the lower end of the presumptive sentencing
guideline range and the defense could argue for dispositional and durational departures.
Aguilar-Pineda answered in the affirmative when asked by the court if he “had enough time
to talk to [his] lawyer about this decision.”
3
After Aguilar-Pineda entered a guilty plea, his attorney conducted the waiver-of-
rights inquiry. During the inquiry, Aguilar-Pineda was shown the “Petition to Enter a Plea
of Guilty” and agreed with his attorney that they previously went through all the
information in the document together “line by line.” Most relevant for purposes of this
appeal, the petition contains the following language: “My attorney has told me and I
understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States, my plea of guilty may result in
deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization as a
United States citizen.” Aguilar-Pineda’s attorney asked him if he believed he understood
everything in the petition document, and Aguilar-Pineda answered in the affirmative. He
was also asked if he had sufficient time to discuss the case with his counsel and if he felt
that his counsel was fully informed of the facts of the case, to which he responded, “Yes.”
The two went through a waiver of trial rights, then counsel asked, “[F]inally, we did discuss
that if you were not a citizen of the United States, there could be collateral consequences?”
Aguilar-Pineda replied, “Yes.” The court reserved acceptance of the plea and adjudication
of guilt until sentencing.
Sentencing
Before the sentencing hearing, a presentence investigation report was completed.
1
The report stated that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had been contacted

1 Some documents in the record are not accessible to the public. See Minn. R. Pub. Access
to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4, subd. 1(f)(1). But “we are not precluded ‘from mentioning the
contents’ of confidential or sealed documents when the information is ‘relevant to the
particular issues or legal argument being addressed in the proceeding.’” Life Time, Inc. v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 25 N.W.3d 901, 904 n.1 (Minn. App. 2025) (quoting Minn. R. Pub.
Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4, subd. 4), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2025). We also are
4
and mentioned that a conviction “would strengthen any possibility of removal but would
not guarantee it.” (Quotation omitted.)
At the sentencing hearing, Aguilar-Pineda’s attorney argued for downward
durational and dispositional departures. When discussing the possibility of probation or
supervised release, the prosecutor stated that, “[i]f [Aguilar-Pineda] is not a United States
citizen, he will be facing immigration consequences. Under immigration law, first-degree
aggravated robbery is considered an aggravated felony.” The prosecutor further explained
that “[a]ggravated felonies trigger mandatory deportation” as well as “mandatory detention
without possibility of bond. And once [Aguilar-Pineda] is deported, he will be permanently
barred from returning to the United States. . . . And it’s a near certainty that once [he] is
released from state custody, that ICE will take [him into] custody directly.”
The court then formally accepted Aguilar-Pineda’s plea and adjudicated him guilty.
It did not find that a departure was appropriate and sentenced him to 41 months in prison.
Postconviction Proceedings
Almost two years later, Aguilar-Pineda submitted a petition for postconviction relief
seeking withdrawal of his guilty plea. At the time, Aguilar-Pineda had served his period of
imprisonment but was being held in ICE custody. Relevant to this appeal, Aguilar-Pineda
argued that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because he received ineffective

not “constrained from disclosing information contained in the publicly filed briefs.” Id.
Any reference to confidential documents herein is based on the parties’ publicly filed
briefs, other public records, or is relevant to our determination of the issues on appeal.
5
assistance of counsel, rendering his plea unintelligent and involuntary. 2 With his petition,
Aguilar-Pineda submitted an affidavit in which he alleged that his attorney told him a
conviction for aggravated robbery “could lead to [his] deportation” but that he was never
told deportation would be mandatory.
Aguilar-Pineda subsequently filed an additional affidavit by his previous counsel.
In the affidavit, counsel confirmed that he knew that Aguilar-Pineda was a noncitizen and
had been a legal permanent resident for less than five years. He also made the following
sworn statements:
Prior to my representation of [Aguilar-Pineda], I had
consulted . . . the public defender’s immigration consultant, on
a case with a number of similarities to [Aguilar-Pineda’s]
situation. . . .
That case also involved an Aggravated Robbery and a
defendant who was here a legal permanent resident for less
than 5 years. . . .
I was advised that Robbery was classified as a crime of
moral turpitude and would make that defendant a presumptive
mandatory deportation. Furthermore, were he to be sentenced
to a period of greater than 365 days, it would be considered an
aggravated felony that would severely limit his defenses to
deportation and that he would become a priority
deportation. . . .
It is my practice to both show and explain the
consultation emails to my clients. My notes indicate I did
explain potential consequences to him prior to his plea on
December 13, 2022. . . .
Due to the number of years that have passed, as well as
the hundreds of cases I have subsequently been appointed to as
a public defender, I do not recall the exact details of the
conversation, though it is my practice to be very thorough on

2 Before the district court, Aguilar-Pineda also argued that his guilty plea was inaccurate.
However, Aguilar-Pineda has not challenged the district court’s ruling on that basis on
appeal.
6
potential outcomes and to not make any promises that are not
guaranteed by the plea agreement itself. . . .
It is unlikely I would have only said that it was a
“mandatory” deportation as opposed to a “presumptive
mandatory” as indicated by [the immigration consultant] in her
consultation with me. This may have led to confusion as to the
likelihood of deportation as a consequence of this conviction.

Aguilar-Pineda requested that the district court decide his petition based on his
filings, declining an evidentiary hearing. Relying on the filings, the district court denied
Aguilar-Pineda’s petition. Reaching Aguilar-Pineda’s argument that his plea was
unintelligent and involuntary, the district court determined that his plea was valid. The
district court noted, among other factors, that his prior counsel “affirmed that [Aguilar-
Pineda] was advised that presumptive deportation was a consequence of a conviction for
the charged crime.” The district court also concluded that Aguilar-Pineda’s plea was
voluntary based on his statement at the plea hearing “that no one had forced him to enter
his guilty plea” and because “[n]othing in the record suggests coercion.”
The district court also determined that Aguilar-Pineda did not show that his prior
counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Explaining
its reasoning, the district court stated that “[t]he record demonstrates that [Aguilar-
Pineda’s] attorney both knew and advised [Aguilar-Pineda] of the collateral consequences
of the plea, including his presumptive deportation if he was not a United States citizen.”
The district court based this determination primarily on prior counsel’s affidavit, asserting
that the “affidavit establishes that [prior counsel] had been advised by the public defender’s
immigration consultant that a conviction for first-degree aggravated robbery would subject
a defendant to presumptively mandatory deportation, and that a sentence over one year
7
would further limit deportation defenses.” The court also credited counsel’s statement “that
it is his practice to both show and explain the consultation emails to his clients, and that
his notes indicate he did explain potential consequences to [Aguilar -Pineda] prior to his
plea on December 13, 2022.” (Quotation omitted.) The district court further expressed that
it specifically found counsel’s description of “his practice of being very thorough on
potential outcomes” to be “particularly credible.” (Quotation omitted.) Finally, the district
court explained that it did not find that the less definitive language used on the record and
in the petition—that Aguilar-Pineda could face immigration consequences—negated its
conclusion because “the language is not nearly as compelling as counsel’s assurance that
[Aguilar-Pineda] received particularized pre-plea advice regarding his presumptive
deportation.”
Aguilar-Pineda appeals.
DECISION
Aguilar-Pineda maintains that his guilty plea was unintelligent and involuntary
because his counsel failed to inform him that his plea would subject him to presumptively
mandatory deportation.
A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea at any time if “withdrawal is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice exists
if a guilty plea is not valid. State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). To be
constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary and intelligent.” State v.
Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). A defendant’s guilty plea is constitutionally
8
invalid if the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, which renders the plea
involuntary. Id. at 718.
Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are reviewed under the two-prong test from
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561
(Minn. 1987). Under the first prong of the test, this court determines “whether counsel ’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Bobo, 770
N.W.2d 129, 137 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). For the second prong, appellate courts
analyze “whether a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been
different but for counsel’s errors.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a conviction that carries
a presumption of regularity.” Hummel v. State, 617 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn. 2000).
Appellate courts review a district court’s postconviction decision for an abuse of discretion.
Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). In the context of a postconviction
petition asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellate courts consider
whether the district court’s factual findings are sufficiently supported in the record. State
v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503-04 (Minn. 2013). The district court’s factual findings should
“not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 503. Appellate courts then
“conduct a de novo review of the legal implication of those facts on the ineffective
assistance claim, and either affirm the court’s decision or conclude that the court abused
its discretion because postconviction relief is warranted.” Id. at 504. On review of an
ineffective-assistance claim, “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance
was reasonable.” Boitnott v. State, 631 N.W.2d 362, 370 (Minn. 2001). The validity of a
9
guilty plea is also a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).
Aguilar-Pineda’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim relies on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Padilla established
that, under the Sixth Amendment, defendant’s counsel must provide advice regarding the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea. 559 U.S. at 366. The nature of that required
advice varies depending on the clarity of the applicable law. Id. at 369. “When the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea are ‘truly clear,’ defense counsel must
affirmatively advise a defendant that the plea will ‘subject [the defendant] to automatic
deportation.’” Sanchez v. State, 890 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. 2017) (quoting Padilla, 559
U.S. at 360, 369). Here, both parties and the district court agree that it was clear that a
conviction for aggravated robbery would make Aguilar-Pineda presumptively mandatorily
deportable and, therefore, that counsel was required to convey to Aguilar-Pineda that
deportation would be presumptively mandatory. Fa ilure to advise consistent with these
requirements amounts to conduct which falls “below an objective standard of
reasonableness,” and satisfies the first prong of Strickland. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366-
70, 374.
Having established the standard to which Aguilar-Pineda’s counsel needed to
adhere, we turn back to the district court’s order in this matter. The district court made
several findings of fact that are central to our review. Specifically, the district court made
the following findings: prior counsel “both knew and advised [Aguilar-Pineda] of the
collateral consequences of the plea, including his presumptive deportation if he was not a
10
United States citizen”; counsel “had been advised by the public defender’s immigration
consultant that a conviction for first-degree aggravated robbery would subject a defendant
to presumptively mandatory deportation, and that a sentence over one year would further
limit deportation defenses”; it was counsel’s “practice to both show and explain the
consultation emails to his clients”; counsel’s “notes indicate he did explain potential
consequences to [Aguilar-Pineda] prior to his plea” hearing; and counsel’s assertion that it
was his practice to be “very thorough on potential outcomes” was “particularly credible.”
(Quotations omitted.) Essentially, the district court inferred from prior counsel’s affidavit,
that counsel did, in fact, inform Aguilar -Pineda that his guilty plea would subject him to
presumptively mandatory deportation.
On review, this court’s role is to ensure that the district court’s factual findings are
sufficiently supported in the record. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d at 503. Looking at the record, we
conclude that all of the above factual findings are adequately supported. The district court
found prior counsel’s affidavit credible, and the affidavit directly supports the district
court’s factual findings.
Aguilar-Pineda takes issue with the district court’s interpretation of prior counsel’s
affidavit and argues that it at most implies, but does not “affirmatively aver[] that he
informed [Aguilar-Pineda] that deportation was presumptively mandatory as a result of the
plea.” It is true that prior counsel’s affidavit does not explain with precision what he told
Aguilar-Pineda because counsel did not remember the exact conversations. That said, the
district court may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence when acting as a fact-
finder. See Thake v. Backhauls, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 745, 748 (Minn. 1984) (“Where
11
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions based upon inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the determination of the factfinder is conclusive.”
(quotation omitted)). This court must treat such inferences with the traditional deference
owed to findings of fact. Sommers v. City of St. Paul, 237 N.W. 427, 430 (Minn. 1931)
(“The presumption that the trial court has properly determined questions of fact applies not
only to its conclusions from disputed facts, but also to its inferences reasonably drawn from
undisputed facts.”). The district court drew a reasonable inference from prior counsel’s
affidavit that counsel relayed to Aguilar-Pineda that a conviction of first-degree aggravated
robbery would subject him to presumptively mandatory deportation. And Aguilar-Pineda’s
concession that prior counsel’s affidavit implied as much further supports our
determination.
Aguilar-Pineda also argues that the district court erred because it relied only on prior
counsel’s affidavit and did not consider other evidence, including the plea colloquy, the
presentence investigation report, and his personal affidavit. In other words, Aguilar-Pineda
asks this court to reweigh the evidence which this court cannot do under clear-error review.
In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn. 2021) (“In sum, the role of an
appellate court is not to weigh, reweigh, or inherently reweigh the evidence when applying
a clear -error review; that task is best suited to, and therefore is reserved for, the
factfinder.”). None of the evidence Aguilar-Pineda identifies establishes that the district
court’s findings are clearly erroneous.
3

3 The only evidence that directly contradicts prior counsel’s affidavit is Aguilar-Pineda’s
affidavit, which asserts that he was never told he would be subject to mandatory
12
Having concluded that the district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous,
this court must next “conduct a de novo review of the legal implication of those facts.” Id.
Assuming that the deportation consequences of Aguilar- Pineda’s plea are as clear as the
parties acknowledge, his counsel was required to tell him that the plea would subject him
to presumptively mandatory deportation to avoid counsel’s conduct falling below and
objective standard of reasonableness. See Sanchez, 890 N.W.2d at 720 (quoting Padilla,
559 U.S. at 360). The district court found that Aguilar-Pineada’s prior counsel informed
him of that consequence. Therefore, counsel fulfilled his obligation under the law, id., and
his representation did not fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Bobo, 770
N.W.2d at 137 (quotation omitted).
To convince us otherwise, Aguilar-Pineda cites three nonprecedential cases from
this court in which we concluded that counsel fell short of their duties under Padilla. See
Guevara v. State, No. A15-0295, 2016 WL 208222 (Minn. App. Jan. 19, 2016), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 18, 2017); Cortes v. State, No. A14-0628, 2015 WL 2456750 (Minn. App.
May 26, 2015); Simonovich v. State, No. A11-0821, 2011 WL 6141661 (Minn. App.
Dec. 12, 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2012). These cases are nonbinding, see Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), and they are also materially different from this case. In

deportation. The district court did not make a specific finding with respect to Aguilar-
Pineda’s credibility, but we read its order to have found counsel’s affidavit more credible
than Aguilar-Pineda’s. The district court may make such credibility determinations, and
appellate courts defer to those determinations. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222-23. We also
note that the district court offered Aguilar-Pineda the opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing, at which prior counsel and Aguilar-Pineda could have testified, but Aguilar-Pineda
declined and asked for the district court to make a determination on the written record, as
submitted by the parties.
13
all three cases, plea counsel specifically acknowledged, either by live testimony at an
evidentiary hearing or by affidavit, that they did not tell their client s that the guilty plea
would definitively result in deportation and instead only indicated that the client could or
may be deported. Guevara, 2016 WL 208222, at *1; Cortes, 2015 WL 2456750, at *1;
Simonovich, 2011 WL 6141661, at *2. Here, in contrast, plea counsel’s affidavit supports
the reasonable inference that he explained to Aguilar-Pineda that a plea would result in
presumptively mandatory deportation. These cases, therefore, do not persuade us that
Aguilar-Pineda is entitled to relief.
Aguilar-Pineda has not met his burden under the first prong of Strickland, so his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim cannot succeed . Bobo, 770 N.W.2d at 138; see
Sanchez, 890 N.W.2d at 720 (stating that appellate courts “need not analyze both elements
of the Strickland test if one or the other is determinative”). The district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.