Helen Resong v. Mark Blaisdell, et al., John Doe, et al

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1877

Helen Resong,
Respondent,

vs.

Mark Blaisdell, et al.,
Appellants,

John Doe, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed August 10, 2026
Reversed
Rasmusson, Judge
Concurring specially, Harris, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-25-5692

Chad D. Lemmons, Kelly and Lemmons, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Ryan R. Dreyer, Zachary L. Hennen, Fafinski Mark & Johnson, P.A., Eden Prairie,
Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Harris , Judge; and
Rasmusson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RASMUSSON, Judge
In this appeal from a judgment for recovery of the premises, appellants-tenants Mark
Blaisdell and Michelle Kuss argue that the district court erred by : (1) concluding that

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appellants’ affirmative defenses failed as untimely, (2) concluding that appellants’
affirmative defenses failed on their merits, and (3) failing to make necessary findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Because the district court erred by concluding that appellants’
affirmative defenses were untimely and that the affirmative defense of postnotice conduct
failed on the merits, we reverse.
FACTS
Respondent Helen Resong acquired a home in A fton in 2019. Prior to her
acquisition, appellants resided in the home for over a decade. Appellants are Resong’s
daughter and son-in-law. At some point after her acquisition, Resong moved into the home
with appellants.
Upon Resong’s purchase of the property, Resong and appellants entered into an oral
month-to-month lease for appellants’ continued occupation of the home. Under the terms
of this oral lease, appellants were to pay Resong $3,000 in monthly rent between the first
and the third of each month.
Starting in January 2025, the parties began discussing Resong’s concerns regarding
unpaid rent. On May 30, 2025, Resong mailed a notice to quit to each appellant. Between
June 1 and 3, Resong met with Blaisdell to discuss living arrangement s and terms of the
oral lease. They came to an agreement that appellants would pay Resong $2,200 in
monthly rent plus electricity. Resong did not receive any payments pursuant to the new
agreement.
On September 19, Resong filed an eviction complaint. On October 9, the district
court held the initial hearing. During the hearing, appellants explained that they planned

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to retain counsel but had not yet done so. The district court acknowledged that the trial
issues remained unidentified, but that appellants retained “the right to have the trial ,
whether they [had] a legitimate issue at this point or not.” Appellants did not make any
legal arguments during the initial appearance; specifically, they did not raise any
affirmative defenses. The district court set the matter for trial on the “next available date,”
which was November 3.
1
The district court held the eviction trial on November 3. Resong and both appellants
were present and testified.
In presenting their argument to the district court, appellants raised various
affirmative defenses. One of these affirmative defenses was waiver by postnotice conduct.
Relying on Arcade Inv. Co. v. Gieriet , 109 N.W. 250, 250- 51 (Minn. 1906) , appellants
argued that Resong had waived the notices to quit by subsequently agreeing with them that
they could continue to possess the home.
The district court concluded that appellants “[would have had] to answer on October
9th, so to the extent that any of [their] affirmative defenses relied upon had any merit, they
would be untimely.” The court also concluded “that they fail on their merits.” In ruling
on appellants’ affirmative defense of waiver by postnotice conduct, the district court
determined that there was “no evidence that there was any acceptance by way of
compliance or otherwise with any alleged modifi cation to the original oral lease.” The

1 After retaining counsel on October 31, 2025, appellants requested a continuance of the
November 3 eviction trial. Resong opposed the request for a continuance, and the district
court denied it.

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district court did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding appellants’ other
affirmative defenses. The district court concluded that Resong had “by a preponderance
of the evidence and by [appellants’] own admissions during their testimony provided notice
to vacate properly, and [appellants] have failed to so vacate.” Pursuant to this ruling, the
district court entered judgment in favor of Resong.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
“[A]n eviction is a summary proceeding to determine an individual ’s possessory
rights to real property.” Nationwide Hous. Corp. v. Skoglund, 906 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn.
App. 2018) (citing Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2016)), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2018). “On review of a district court order in an eviction action, we defer to the district
court’s findings of fact, and those findings will be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous.” Cuate v. Cuate -Dominguez, 12 N.W.3d 742, 746 (Minn. App. 2024)
(quotation omitted). “In applying the clear-error standard, [an appellate court] view[s] the
evidence in a light favorable to the findings” and “will not conclude that a factfinder clearly
erred unless, on the entire evidence, [the court is] left with a definite and firm convi ction
that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214,
221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations and citations omitted); see also NY Props., LLC v. Schuette,
977 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn. App. 2022) (quoting this aspect of Kenney in an eviction
context). “As for mixed questions of fact and law, we correct erroneous applications of
law but defer to the district court’ s ultimate conclusions, which we review for abuse of
discretion.” Schuette, 977 N.W.2d at 865.

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I. The district court err ed by concluding that appellants’ affirmative defenses
were untimely and thus waived.
Appellants first argue that the district court erred by ruling that appellants offered
untimely affirmative defenses because they failed to assert them by the initial appearance.
This issue requires both statutory interpretation and application of the rules. We turn first
to the statutes.
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de
novo.” Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016); see also Hous. &
Redevelopment Auth. of St. Cloud v. Royston , 990 N.W.2d 730, 735 (Minn. App. 2023)
(quoting this aspect of Cocchiarella in an eviction appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 22,
2023). When interpreting a statute, appellate courts first assess “whether the statute’s
language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.” Am. Fam. Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d
273, 277 (Minn. 2000). Appellate courts “begin with the plain language, and, if there is
only one reasonable interpretation of that language, [they] adopt that meaning.” In re Est.
of Ecklund , 20 N.W.3d 351, 355 (Minn. 2025). “If, however, there is more than one
reasonable interpretation, then the statute is considered ambiguous and [appellate courts]
may apply additional canons of construction to determine its meaning.” Id.
Minnesota Statutes chapter 504B (2024 & Supp. 2025) governs landlord and tenant
relationships generally. Minn esota Statutes section 504B.335(a) (2024) addresses the
initial appearance in an eviction action and trial scheduling, specifically:
At the court appearance specified in the summons, the
defendant may answer the complaint. When scheduling a trial
date, the court must select a date that allows for a fair,
thorough, and timely adjudication of the merits of the case,

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including the complexity of the matter, the need for the parties
to obtain discovery, the need for the parties to ensure the
presence of witnesses, the opportunity for the defendant to seek
legal counsel and raise affirmative defenses, and any
extenuating factors enumerated under section 504B.171.

We must first determine whether the language of Minn esota Statutes section
504B.335(a) is ambiguous. It is a “fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute
is to be read and construed as a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts.”
Scheurer v. Shrewsbury, 24 N.W.3d 670, 676 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted). The first
sentence provides that “the defendant may answer the complaint.” Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.335(a) (emphasis added). “[T]he word ‘may’ is generally permissive.” Jundt v.
Jundt, 12 N.W.3d 201, 205 (Minn. App. 2024), r ev. denied (Minn. Dec. 31, 2024); accord
Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2024). Because the first sentence of section 504B.335(a)
includes permissive language, it allows a party to decide whether to answer the complaint
at the initial hearing. The second sentence provides that, when scheduling a trial date, the
district court “must select a date that allows for a fair, thorough, and timely adjudication of
the merits of the case,” including “the opportunity for the defendant to seek legal counsel
and raise affirmative defenses.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.335(a) (emphasis added). If the statute
required defendants to raise affirmative defenses during the initial appearance, the district
court would have no reason to consider the defendant’s need to “raise affirmative defenses”
when scheduling a trial date. Thus, the first sentence of section 504B.335(a), when read in
harmony with its second sentence, leaves only one reasonable interpretation of the
statute—that affirmative defenses are not waived when a defendant does not raise them at

7
the initial appearance. The statute is therefore unambiguous, and we need not apply
additional canons of construction to determine its meaning.
In this case, appellants did not answer the complaint or raise affirmative defenses at
the initial hearing. Based on the unambiguous meaning of the statute , the district court
misapplied the statute by ruling that appellants were required to raise affirmative defenses
at the initial hearing , and that error prevented proper consideration of appellants’
affirmative defenses.
Resong counters that, under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02, appellants forfeited their
affirmative defenses by failing to raise them at the initial appearance. Rule 12.02 provides
that defenses “shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required.” 2
Critically, rule 12.02 refers to “responsive pleading[s]” and contains no reference to initial
appearances. As explained above, section 504B.335(a) does not require a responsive
pleading at the initial appearance.
II. The district court erred by denying appellants’ affirmative defense of waiver
by postnotice conduct.

Having concluded that appellants did not waive their affirmative defenses, we next
consider whether the district court erred by denying their affirmative defenses on the
merits. We focus our attention on postnotice conduct.
During the eviction proceedings, appellants argued that Resong waived the notice
to quit by her postnotice conduct, namely by coming to a revised agreement with appellants
to continue the tenancy. In ruling specifically on appellants’ affirmative defense of waiver

2 This rule provides that certain defenses may also be made by motion.

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by postnotice conduct, the district court determined that there was “no evidence that there
was any acceptance by way of compliance or otherwise with any alleged modification to
the original oral lease.”
Waiver by postnotice conduct is a well-recognized affirmative defense in Minnesota
eviction actions. See, e.g., Arcade, 109 N.W. at 250-51; Oak Glen of Edina v. Brewington,
642 N.W.2d 481, 486-87 (Minn. App. 2002). The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that
“[a] notice to quit, given by the landlord to a tenant, may be waived by the landlord .”
Arcade, 109 N.W. at 250. Although a “landlord may evidence his intention to waive the
termination of the tenancy . . . by any conduct sufficiently manifesting such intention,” the
supreme court has identified examples of such conduct. Id. Relevant to this appeal, “if,
after the landlord has given notice to a tenant to quit, he subsequently agrees with that
tenant for a continuance of the possession of the premises, he thereby waives the effect of
the notice.” Id. at 251. Once waived, “the notice is inoperative.” Id. at 250.
Here, the district court required “acceptance by way of compliance” for appellants’
affirmative defense of postnotice conduct to succeed. This heightened requirement runs
afoul of Arcade’s waiver standard, which only requires that the landlord, following a notice
to quit, enter into an agreement for the tenant’s continued possession of the residence. Id.
at 251. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law when
it determined that appellants’ affirmative defense of waiver by postnotice conduct failed
on the merits. Schuette, 977 N.W.2d at 865.
The record establishes that the parties made an oral agreement to extend the tenancy.
Resong herself testified that the parties made their original lease agreement in 2019, she

9
delivered the notices to quit on May 30, 2025, and she met with Blaisdell in early June and
agreed to new lease terms. She affirmatively stated that their revised “verbal agreement
was from June 1st.” To the extent that the district court made a factual finding that Resong
and appellants did not make a postnotice agreement that appellants would continue their
possession of the premises, this finding is clearly erroneous. Because appellants timely
asserted their affirmative defenses and Resong waived the notice to quit by her postnotice
conduct, we reverse.
3
Reversed.

3 Appellants also argue that the district court erred by failing to issue detailed findings of
fact and conclusions of law and by denying the affirmative defenses of lack of personal
jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process, failure to provide required statutory
notice, and an insufficient summons and complaint. Because we reverse on other grounds,
we do not reach these arguments.

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HARRIS, Judge (concurring specially)
I concur with the majority’s analysis and result. I write separately to address the
continuing tension between the expedited structure of Minnesota’s housing -calendar
program and the broader framework of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Housing-
court cases often involve self-represented litigants and matters of immediate importance,
including the possession of one’s home, making procedural clarity, uniformity, and
predictability essential to the fair administration of justice. Yet, because the rules have not
evolved, similarly situated parties may be subject to different procedural expectations
depending solely on where in Minnesota their case is filed. The statewide expansion of
consolidated housing -court calendars therefore raises important questions about the
continued geographic limitation of the housing-court rules, the proper relationship between
those rules and the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, and the need for a uniform
procedural framework that promotes efficiency, fairness, and equal access to justice.
In 1989, the Minnesota Legislature established specialized housing courts in
Ramsey and Hennepin Counties for the purpose of consolidating the hearing and
determination of matters related to residential rental housing and ensuring continuity and
consistency in the disposition of those matters. See 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 328, art. 2,
§§ 17-19, at 2370 -72. The legislation reflected recognition that housing disputes often
require prompt resolution while also demanding judicial expertise in a highly specialized
area of law.
1

1 The interaction between the housing-court rules, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the governing statutes is significant. Rule 601 does not simply incorporate the r ules

CS-2
Following the creation of the housing-calendar program, procedural rules governing
those proceedings were adopted in 1991 as rules 601 through 612 of the Minnesota Rules
of General Practice. Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 601, 1991 task force cmt. These rules were
expressly limited in application to Hennepin and Ramsey Counties. Id. In recommending
adoption of the rules, the task force observed that the housing-calendar program created by
the legislature existed only in those two counties and further acknowledged that the rules
should be revised if similar housing-calendar programs were later implemented elsewhere
in the state. Id.
That circumstance has now come to pass. Although many judicial districts do not
employ housing -court referees or maintain formally designated housing courts, several
districts have adopted consolidated housing -court calendars that function in substantially
the same manner as the original housing courts contemplated by rules 601 through 612.
These calendars routinely address eviction actions, rent-escrow actions, emergency tenant
remedies, and related housing disputes under accelerated timelines and specialized
procedures.
This case illustrates the tension between the expedited structure of Minnesota’s
eviction actions and the broader framework of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.

of civil procedure into housing-court practice. Rather, it provides that the h ousing-court
rules govern, that the rules of civil procedure apply only “where not inconsistent,” and that
both yield to “applicable statutes.” Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 601. The statutory scheme reflects
the same hierarchy. Section 504B.335(c) provides that eviction actions proceed “the same
as in other civil actions, except as provided in sections 504B.281 to 504B.371.” Minn.
Stat. § 504B.335(c). Together, these provisions establish that the rules of civil procedure
furnish the default procedural framework for eviction actions, but only if they are not
displaced by a contrary statutory provision or a governing housing-court rule.

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Minnesota Statutes section 504B.321, subdivision 1(c) (2024), requires that the initial
appearance in an eviction action occur “not less than seven nor more than 14 days from the
day of issuing the summons, except [in limited circumstances].” Although the statute does
not expressly require that the eviction trial itself occur within that same period, many
eviction matters are heard and resolved within days of the action being brought. This
accelerated timeline contrasts with Rule 12 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure,
which generally affords a defendant 21 days to serve an answer. The compressed schedule
that governs eviction proceedings therefore creates an inherent procedural tension with the
ordinary timelines contemplated by the civil rules.
This inherent procedural tension with the ordinary timelines contemplated by the
rules of civil procedure and the accelerated timelines is addressed by the housing -court
rules. For example, Rule 610 of the Minnesota Rules of General Practice, which governs
motion practice in housing court. Rule 610 establishes an expedited procedure for the
presentation and hearing of motions that deviates from the timelines otherw ise required
under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. In doing so, the rule recognizes the practical
realities of housing-court litigation and the legislature’s directive that such matters should
proceed promptly. The adoption of Rule 610 reflects an acknowledgment that strict
adherence to ordinary civil -motion timelines is often incompatible with the accelerated
nature of eviction proceedings. At the same time, the existence of a specialized motion
rule underscores the broader pro cedural inconsistency between expedited housing -court
proceedings and the general civil rules —an inconsistency that has become increasingly

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significant as consolidated housing -court calendars have expanded statewide and all
districts process eviction actions.
In my view, the expansion of consolidated housing- court calendars throughout
Minnesota, and the use of remote -hearing technology that makes these hearings more
accelerated, warrants renewed review and expansion of the h ousing-court rules by the
supreme court. The current rules remain geographically limited despite the statewide
evolution of housing- court practice. Moreover, the expedited nature of housing -court
proceedings increasingly creates tension with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure in
areas including pleading standards, motion practice, discovery, amendment of claims and
defenses, scheduling, and evidentiary development where the housing-court rules do not
apply.
Additionally, the continued restriction of rules 601 through 612 to Ramsey and
Hennepin Counties presents not only an issue of procedural efficiency but one of
fundamental fairness. Consolidated housing -court calendars now exist throughout
Minnesota, yet the specialized procedural rules designed to accommodate the expedited
nature of housing- court litigation remain available only in two counties. Consequently,
parties litigating the same statutory causes of action may encounter materially different
procedural frameworks depending solely on where the case is filed. Geographic disparities
in procedure may affect litigants’ ability to assert defenses, present evidence, obtain
discovery, and receive adequate notice of issues to be decided. Particularly in a forum
where many parties appear without counsel, the absence of a uniform statewide framework
risks inconsistent treatment of similarly situated litigants and creates unnecessary barriers

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to equal access to justice. The fair administration of Minnesota’s landlord -tenant laws
would be better served by rules that apply uniformly.
While the need for prompt adjudication in housing -court matters is undeniable,
efficiency cannot come at the expense of procedural clarity or uniformity. But, more
importantly, efficiency cannot come at the expense of fairness. Litigants, practitioners,
and district courts would benefit from a procedural framework that recognizes the realities
of statewide housing-court dockets while delineating when, and to what extent, departures
from ordinary civil practice are appropriate. When consolidated housing -court calendars
were limited to Ramsey and Hennepin Counties, it was reasonable for the housing-court
rules to apply only to those counties. But because consolidated housing-court calendars
have since been expanded statewide, the rationale for county -specific rules no longer
exists, and the rules should likewise be applied statewide.
Accordingly, I believe the time has come for the supreme court to direct the
Advisory Committee on the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts to review and
revise the housing -court rules (rules 601 –612). Such review should consider whether to
apply the rules statewide to consolidated housing -court calendars or any eviction action
and should address those areas in which the expedited nature of housing-court proceedings
directly conflict with, or create uncertainty under, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
or any other rules . A uniform statewide framework would promote procedural clarity,
ensure the consistent administration of Minnesota’s housing laws, and reduce the risk that
litigants’ rights and obligations turn on the coincidence of geography. As consolidated

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housing-court calendars have evolved from a two -county experiment into a statewide
reality, the rules governing those proceedings should evolve as well.