State of Minnesota v. Donzeal Marqette Epps

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1892

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Donzeal Marqette Epps,
Appellant.

Filed August 31, 2026
Affirmed; motion denied
Frisch, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-9750

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jilian Frueh, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and

Harris, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

FRISCH, Chief Judge

In this direct appeal from judgments of conviction on two counts of theft by false

representation, appellant Donzeal Marqette Epps argues that the evidence is insufficient to

sustain his convictions. Because the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain

Epps’s convictions, and none of the arguments raised in Epps’s supplemental brief warrant

relief, we affirm.

FACTS

On an amended complaint in January 2025, respondent State of Minnesota charged

Epps with two counts of aiding and abetting theft by false representation and one count of

financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.52, subd. 2(a)(3)(iii)

(theft by false representation), .2335, subd. 1(1)(ii) (financial exploitation of a vulnerable

adult) (2020). 1 In the amended complaint, the state valued the stolen property in count one

at over $5,000 and in count two at over $1,000. 2

A jury trial commenced on July 16, 2025. The following facts are derived from the

evidence presented at trial.

Epps’s mother, C.E., was authorized to receive Medicaid-funded services from a

personal care assistant (PCA) and homemaking services due to C.E.’s brain injury.

Generally, a PCA provides at-home services to individuals needing assistance with

activities of daily living. Healthcare agencies receive reimbursement through the

1
The complaint references Minn. Stat. § 609.05 (2020), which provides that “[a] person is
criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises,
hires, counsels, conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.”
2
The value of the stolen property does not affect the elements of the offense and is relevant
only for sentencing purposes. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.52, subds. 3(2) (providing if value
of stolen property or services exceeds $5,000, the sentence may not exceed ten years in
prison or payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both), 3(3)(a) (providing if value
of stolen property exceeds $1,000 but is not more than $5,000, the sentence may not exceed
five years in prison or payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both) (2020).

2

Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) for covered PCA and homemaking

services.

In January 2021, Epps’s sister, D.E., moved in with Epps and C.E., and she shortly

thereafter began providing PCA and homemaking services for C.E. 3 D.E. was employed

as a PCA through Ultimate Home Healthcare (Ultimate). To be paid by Ultimate, D.E.

was required to complete time sheets recording the hours she worked.

Before receiving PCA services through Ultimate, C.E. underwent an assessment to

determine her daily needs. Ultimate developed a care plan based on this assessment. C.E.’s

assessment indicated that C.E. “has an increased vulnerability due to cognitive deficit due

to brain injury as a result of multiple strokes” and that she needed a responsible party. A

responsible party is “someone who witnesses a PCA working for the [recipient] and signs

off on the [time] sheets.” Generally, a responsible party is needed when a recipient is

deemed unable to make decisions for themselves. Epps served as the responsible party for

C.E.

Epps signed a responsible-party agreement and plan with Ultimate. The agreement

provides that one of the duties of the responsible party is to “[s]ign the PCA time sheets

after services are provided to verify the services.” Once the PCA fills out the time sheet,

the responsible party signs the time sheet and submits it to Ultimate. Ultimate then submits

the time sheet to DHS for reimbursement. DHS will not grant reimbursement requests for

3
D.E. also provided homemaking services through Axis Home. Homemaking services are
services having to do with the home that are also reimbursable through the Medicaid
program.

3

PCA services without a signed time sheet. The following acknowledgment appears above

the PCA’s and responsible party’s signatures on the Ultimate time sheets:

After the PCA has documented his/her time and activity, the
recipient must draw a line through any dates/times he/she did
not receive services from the PCA. Review the completed time
sheet for accuracy before signing. It is a federal crime to
provide false information on PCA billings for Medical
Assistance payment. Your signature verifies the time and
services entered above are accurate and that the services were
performed as specified in the PCA Care Plan.

Epps also served as the responsible party for the homemaking services that C.E.

received through Axis. The same acknowledgment appears on the Axis time sheets.

At trial, D.E. testified that she typically provided four to five hours of services to

C.E. per day. D.E. learned how to complete time sheets from Epps. D.E. would fill out

the time sheets, and Epps would submit them. The state asked D.E. about signatures on

PCA time sheets dated between March and June 2021. D.E. testified that the signatures on

six Ultimate time sheets did not belong to her and that the signatures on three Ultimate

time sheets belonged to her or “look[ed] like” hers, but she did not provide the services

listed. D.E. also testified that, of the signatures appearing to be hers on three homemaking

time sheets, the signatures on two time sheets belonged to her, but one of the signatures

was not hers. The following exchange occurred during D.E.’s testimony:

THE STATE: And you also testified that it was your brother
[Epps] who told you how to complete the time sheets?
D.E.: Yes, because I don’t know how to do it.
THE STATE: Okay. So can you clarify whether or not did
your brother know that you were filling out the time sheets—
D.E.: Yes, he was sitting right at the table with me and filling
it out.

4

THE STATE: And did he know that you did not provide those
services?
D.E. Yes.
THE STATE: Yes, he did not—
D.E. Yes, he did not know.

The state also introduced six PCA time sheets signed by Epps and someone named

Y.M., reflecting that Y.M. provided overnight services to C.E. in January, February, and

March 2021. D.E. did not witness anyone named Y.M. providing services to C.E. D.E.

testified that she would be aware if someone came into the house to provide PCA services.

D.E. and her son flew from Minneapolis to Chicago on February 12, 2021. D.E. did

not provide PCA services to C.E. while in Chicago. D.E. testified that Epps told her to fill

out a time sheet when she returned from Chicago “so that the times would not seem off.”

A time sheet signed by D.E. and Epps provides that D.E. provided PCA services to C.E.

on February 12 between 7:00 a.m. and 3:45 p.m.

The evidence at trial also included nine checks dated between February and

September 2021. Eight checks are addressed to D.E., and one is addressed to Y.M. The

back of each check contains varying forms of the written notation “pay to” the “order of

Donzeal Epps,” as well as the signature of both Epps and the original recipient of the check.

When asked whether she signed her checks over to Epps, D.E. said, “I had to . . . [b]ecause

he told me you sign a check over, I’ll go cash it, and then I will give you some of the

payment.” When asked whether Epps gave her payment, D.E. said, “He bought me a

phone. He bought food to put in the house. I got [$]20, $25 from it, and that’s pretty much

it.” D.E. and Epps shared a bank account, but D.E. testified that she did not have access to

the money in the account.

5

An investigator in the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Attorney General’s Office

created a charging spreadsheet based on her investigation into Epps. The investigator

attributed to Epps $18,541.24 in stolen funds.

B.E., the brother of Epps and D.E., also testified. B.E. testified that he moved in

with Epps, C.E., and D.E. in early summer 2021, and that during this time, he witnessed

D.E. caring for C.E. B.E. also testified that he had heard of but did not know whether he

had met Y.M.

Epps admitted to acting as the responsible party for C.E. and to signing the time

sheets. Epps testified that he had already submitted the time sheet for February 12, 2021,

when he found out D.E. was going to Chicago and that he called Ultimate to tell them not

to bill for this period. Epps testified that he used the checks signed over to him to support

D.E. and their household. Epps admitted that he cashed some of the checks and that he

deposited some of the checks into the bank account that he shared with D.E.

Before the case was submitted to the jury, the district court expressed concern about

instructing the jury on accomplice liability given that the evidence at trial did not establish

that Epps had acted as an accomplice. As to the elements of theft by false representation,

the district court provided the following instruction:

[F]irst, the defendant obtained for himself the
possession of Medicaid funds from the Minnesota Department
of Human Services.

Second, the defendant intentionally deceived the
Minnesota Department of Human Services with a false
representation. Intentionally means that the defendant either
had the purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or

6

believed that the act performed by the defendant, if successful,
would cause that result.

In addition, the defendant must have knowledge of
those facts that are necessary to make the defendant’s conduct
criminal and that are set forth after the word “intentionally.”

False representation includes the preparation or filing of
a claim for reimbursement used to establish a claim for
payment for medical care provided to a recipient of medical
assistance which intentionally falsely states the costs of or
actual services provided by a vendor of medical care.

Third, the defendant knew or believed that the
representation was false.

Fourth, the defendant made the false representation with
intent to defraud the Minnesota Department of Human
Services.

With intent to defraud means the defendant either had a
purpose to deceive another person to gain some material
advantage or believed that the defendant’s act, if successful,
would cause that result.

Fifth, the Minnesota Department of Human Services
believe that the false representation was true and in reliance
o[n] such false representation gave up possession of Medicaid
funds.

Sixth, the defendant’s act took place on or between
[dates relevant to count].

The jury found Epps guilty of both counts of theft by false representation. The jury found

that, for each count, the total value of stolen property was not more than $500. The district

court sentenced Epps to 90 days in jail for each count, to be served concurrently, but stayed

the sentence for one year, and ordered restitution of $499 on each count.

Epps appeals.

7

DECISION

Epps argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to sustain his

convictions for theft by false representation. Epps also raises several arguments in a pro se

supplemental brief.

I. The evidence at trial is sufficient to sustain the convictions.

To prove that Epps committed theft by false representation, the state was required

to prove that Epps obtained “for the actor or another the possession, custody, or title to

property of . . . a third person by intentionally deceiving the third person with a false

representation which is known to be false, made with intent to defraud, and which does

defraud the person to whom it is made.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(3) (2020). Epps

argues that the state failed to prove that he (1) obtained for himself the possession of

Medicaid funds and (2) knowingly made false representations with the intent to deceive

and the intent to defraud. We address each challenge in turn.

Epps first argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

obtained for himself the possession of Medicaid funds, and that the jury instructions

precluded the state from proving that Epps obtained the funds for “another.” The state

responds that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Epps obtained for himself or for

another the possession of Medicaid funds. 4

4
The state describes the jury instruction as including “or another.” That is not accurate.
The jury was instructed as to the first element: “the defendant obtained for himself the
possession of Medicaid funds from the Minnesota Department of Human Services.”

8

When considering a claim of insufficient evidence where a disputed element is

proven by direct evidence, we apply the traditional standard of review. State v. Bonnell,

31 N.W.3d 527, 551 (Minn. 2026). “Under the traditional standard, we limit our review to

a ‘painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a

light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the

verdict which they did.’” Id. (quoting State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989)).

We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Epps obtained for himself

the possession of Medicaid funds within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(3).

The state presented evidence at trial that nine checks, issued by Ultimate and endorsed by

either D.E. or Y.M., were signed over to Epps; that Epps cashed some of the checks and

deposited some of the checks into the bank account he shared with D.E.; and that Ultimate

is a provider of PCA services that pays individual PCA providers and then receives

reimbursement through DHS with Medicaid funds. 5

To convince us otherwise, Epps contends that the evidence does not support the

conclusion that he obtained the money for himself because the evidence demonstrates that

he used that money for the benefit of his household. But the statute describes that a person

is guilty of theft by false representation who “obtains” for himself or another the

5
Epps argues that the state failed to produce evidence that Epps obtained funds for the
week of February 11, 2021. But the evidence shows that Epps obtained Medicaid funds
during the time periods relevant to each count. Specifically, eight of the nine checks
admitted at trial were dated during the time period relevant to count one (April 13 through
September 28, 2021), and one of the checks was dated during the time period relevant to
count two (February 17 through March 16, 2021).

9

“possession . . . [of] property of . . . a third person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(3)

(emphasis added). And, as described above, the evidence at trial established that Epps

obtained the funds for himself, notwithstanding the manner in which he eventually used

the funds. 6

Epps next argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intentionally

deceived DHS with a false representation that he knew was false and with intent to defraud

DHS. The state submitted circumstantial evidence to prove these elements of the crime.

We apply a two-step test to assess the sufficiency of such evidence. State v. Firkus, 31

N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026). The first step requires us to “winnow down the evidence

presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict, which

results in a subset of facts that constitute circumstances proved.” Id. (quotation omitted).

The second step requires us to consider “whether the reasonable inferences that can be

drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated

facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any

rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted). In so doing, we do not give

deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences. State v. Hassan, 977 N.W.2d

633, 640 (Minn. 2022). “The State’s circumstantial evidence is sufficient when the

6
Epps appears to argue that the state did not prove the crime as instructed. However, “the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is not reviewed in the context of the
instructions that the jury receives but about the actual elements of the offense.” State v.
Metcalfe, 13 N.W.3d 704, 713 n.4 (Minn. App. 2024) (citing Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 242-43 (2016) (holding that sufficiency challenge is assessed against actual
elements of charged crime)).

10

reasonable inferences are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and

inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id.

The statute, in relevant part, provides that an actor is guilty of theft by false

representation who obtains for himself or another the possession of a third party’s property

“by intentionally deceiving the third person with a false representation which is known to

be false.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(3). Minnesota law provides that “intentionally”

means that the actor either (1) “has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified”

or (2) “believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful, will cause that result.”

Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2020). Additionally, “the actor must have knowledge of

those facts which are necessary to make the actor’s conduct criminal and which are set

forth after the word ‘intentionally.’” Id.

The statute also requires the state to prove that Epps acted “with intent to defraud.”

Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(3). Under Minnesota law, “with intent to” means either

(1) the actor “has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified” or (2) the actor

“believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4)

(2020).

The following circumstances were proved at trial:

• Epps, C.E., and D.E. lived together during the relevant time period.

• C.E. was a vulnerable adult who was qualified to receive Medicaid-funded
PCA and homemaking services through Ultimate and Axis, respectively.

• Ultimate and Axis receive reimbursement through DHS for covered PCA and
homemaking services.

11

• Epps was the responsible party for C.E.

• D.E. provided PCA and homemaking services to C.E.

• D.E. learned how to complete time sheets from Epps.

• Epps signed a responsible-party agreement with Ultimate wherein he agreed
to “[s]ign the PCA time sheets after services are provided to verify the
services.”

• Both the PCA and the responsible party are required to sign off on the PCA
time sheets. The following acknowledgment is printed above the signatures
of the responsible party and the PCA: “Your signature verifies the time and
services entered above are accurate and that the services were performed as
specified in the PCA Care Plan.”

• D.E. testified that she typically provided four to five hours of services per
day to C.E. D.E. never provided overnight services to C.E.

• Six PCA time sheets signed by Y.M. and Epps show that Y.M. provided
overnight PCA services to C.E. in January, February, and March 2021.

• D.E. did not know Y.M., nor did she witness Y.M. providing services to C.E.
D.E. would be aware if someone came to the house to provide services for
C.E.

• On February 12, 2021, D.E. and D.E.’s son flew from Minneapolis to
Chicago. D.E. did not provide any services to C.E. while she was in Chicago.
Epps told D.E. to fill out a time sheet when she returned from Chicago “so
that the time would not seem off.” Epps and D.E. signed a time sheet
representing that D.E. provided services to C.E. on February 12, which Epps
knew was inaccurate.

• The signatures on six Ultimate time sheets ranging between March and June
2021 did not belong to D.E. The signatures on three Ultimate time sheets
belonged to her or “look[ed] like” hers, but she did not provide the services
listed. Eight of these nine time sheets show services beginning at 3:00 or
4:00 a.m.

• Signatures appearing to be from D.E. on two Axis time sheets belonged to
her, but one signature on an Axis time sheet did not appear to belong to her.

12

• D.E. never turned in her own time sheets. Epps sat with D.E. while she filled
out her time sheets. D.E. gave her time sheets to Epps, who then submitted
them to Ultimate or Axis.

• D.E. believed that Epps knew that she did not complete the services listed on
the time sheets.

• D.E. and Epps shared a bank account. D.E. possessed a debit card for the
account but never accessed it.

• Nine checks issued by Ultimate and dated between February and September
2021 were signed over to D.E. Eight of these checks were addressed to D.E.,
and one was addressed to Y.M. The back of each check contains a variation
of the written notation, “pay to” the “order of Donzeal Epps” along with the
signature of both Epps and the original recipient of the check. Epps cashed
the checks or deposited the checks into the bank account that he shared with
D.E.

Epps does not dispute that the reasonable inferences from these circumstances

proved are consistent with a hypothesis of guilt. He instead argues that the evidence is

insufficient because the reasonable inferences from the circumstances proved are also

consistent with a rational hypothesis other than guilt, namely that Epps did not knowingly

make a false representation with the intent to deceive and defraud DHS because he “had

no way to know” that D.E.’s time sheets were inaccurate. We disagree.

The circumstances proved at trial include that Epps sat with D.E. while she filled

out the time sheets, and she believed that he knew that she did not complete the hours

listed; that Epps signed a responsible-party agreement agreeing to “verify the [PCA]

services” provided; that Epps was informed that signing time sheets amounted to his

verification that time and services entered are accurate and that the services were performed

as specified in the PCA Care Plan; that Epps signed time sheets dated between March and

June 2021 verifying that D.E. provided PCA services that D.E. did not provide; that Epps

13

signed a time sheet representing that D.E. provided PCA services to C.E. on February 12,

2021, while D.E. was in Chicago and that Epps knew was inaccurate; and that Epps directed

D.E. to complete a time sheet when she returned from Chicago “so that the time would not

seem off.” Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, we cannot conclude

that the circumstances proved are consistent with a rational hypothesis that Epps did not

know that he made a false representation.

Epps also argues that the circumstances proved are consistent with a rational

hypothesis that he did not know he was making a false representation because he testified

to reporting the time sheet that he knew was inaccurate. Epps does not dispute that his

submission of the time sheets for PCA services constitutes a false representation pursuant

to Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(3)(iii). But resolving questions of fact in favor of the

jury’s verdict on appeal requires us to conclude that Epps’s testimony to this effect is not

a circumstance proved. See Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478 (providing that the first step of the

circumstantial-evidence analysis “requires us to winnow down the evidence presented at

trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict” (quotation omitted)).

Epps further appears to argue that the circumstances proved are consistent with the

rational hypothesis that he did not act with intent to deceive or defraud DHS because any

errors he made “may have been oversights which stemmed from his lack of training and

supervision.” But this argument is based on pure speculation, and “we do not set aside

verdicts based on speculation.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 480 (Minn. 2010).

Even so, the circumstances proved establish that Epps sat with D.E. while she filled out

her time sheets; that D.E. believed that Epps knew she did not provide all of the services

14

listed on her time sheets; that D.E. filled out the time sheets at Epps’s direction; that seven

of the time sheets purporting to be signed by D.E. were not signed by her; and that Epps

knew that submission of the time sheets would result in payment from DHS. Accordingly,

the circumstances proved are not consistent with a hypothesis that Epps did not know that

his actions would result in DHS paying out funds for services that were not provided.

Finally, Epps contends that “the jury could not have found credible or accepted all

of the state’s evidence because it disagreed with the state on the amount that had been

proven stolen by a significant amount.” This argument refers to the jury’s finding that the

amount at issue was not more than $500 for each count. But, as Epps concedes, the value

of the stolen property is not an element of the offense. Thus, the value of the property

obtained is not relevant to our determination as to whether the evidence is sufficient to

sustain the conviction. See State v Marth, 25 N.W.3d 911, 923, 925-26 (Minn. App. 2025)

(concluding that value of the property obtained is not an element of theft by swindle and,

accordingly, is not relevant in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis), rev. denied (Minn.

Oct. 29, 2025). 7

7
Epps also conclusively asserts that “the state’s confusion about its own theory of the case
and its changing theory of liability shed light on the problems with the circumstantial
evidence” in this case. This general assignment of error does not advance Epps’s argument.
See Horodenski v. Lyndale Green Townhome Ass’n, 804 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. App.
2011) (“[E]rror is not presumed on appeal, and the burden of showing error rests on the
party asserting it.”).

15

II. Epps is not entitled to relief based on the additional arguments set forth in his
pro se supplemental brief.

In a pro se supplemental brief, Epps argues additionally that his convictions must

be reversed because a search warrant was invalid and he received ineffective assistance of

counsel. We do not discern a basis for relief based on these arguments.

First, Epps did not challenge the validity of a search warrant at the district court and

has therefore forfeited such a challenge on appeal. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354,

357 (Minn. 1996) (explaining that appellate courts “generally will not decide issues which

were not raised before the district court, including constitutional questions of criminal

procedure”).

Second, we reject Epps’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Epps appears to

argue that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel (1) “when the judge instructed

me that I could not verbally communicate with my attorney and told me I had to write my

questions down if I wanted to communicate with counsel,” and (2) because his attorney

“failed to properly investigate, explain, argue, or present critical DHS regulations,

Qualified Professional duties, PCA supervision requirements, multiple-provider

authorization procedures, and statutory defenses directly related to the State’s theory of

overlapping services and alleged theft-by-false-representation.” Because Epps presents

these arguments as conclusory statements without citation to applicable authority, we deem

these arguments to be forfeited. See State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 476-77 (Minn.

App. 2019) (“Arguments are forfeited if they are presented in a summary and conclusory

16

form, do not cite to applicable law, and fail to analyze the law when claiming that errors of

law occurred.” (quotation omitted)). 8

Affirmed; motion denied.

8
After the close of briefing, the state moved to strike portions of Epps’s pro se
supplemental brief and addendum that refer to material outside the record. We do not
consider matters outside the record. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (stating that the
record on appeal consists only of documents filed in the district court, offered exhibits, and
any transcript of the proceedings); ALL, Inc. v. Hagen, 970 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn. App.
2021) (explaining that we are precluded from considering matters outside the appellate
record). Because we do not rely on any of the materials identified in the state’s motion to
strike, we deny the motion to strike as moot. ALL, Inc., 970 N.W.2d at 688 (citing Drewitz
v. Motorwerks, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 231, 233 n.2 (Minn. 2007) (denying motion to strike as
moot when court did not rely on challenged materials)).

17