In the Matter of: Jamie Leigh Nendza v. Jason Nendza

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1896

In the Matter of:

Jamie Leigh Nendza, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Jason Nendza,
Appellant.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-FA-23-1976

Jacob Erickson, Smith, Paulson, O’Donnell & Erickson, P.L.C., Monticello, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Jennifer M. Nixon, Henningson & Snoxell, Ltd., Maple Grove, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s extension of an order for protection (OFP)
prohibiting appellant from having any contact with respondent—who is appellant’s former
spouse—or going to respondent’s home or workplace for two years. Appellant argues that

2
the district court abused its discretion by extending the OFP without finding that appellant
committed the conduct that respondent testified caused her to be fearful of appellant.
Because the record supports the district court’s determination that respondent was
reasonably in fear of physical harm from appellant, and because we discern no legal error
in the district court’s decision, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jason Nendza and respondent Jamie Leigh Nendza were married and have
three joint minor children.1 In April 2023, Jamie petitioned for an OFP on behalf of herself
and the children against Jason. 2 The district court granted an ex parte OFP , determining
that the verified petition alleged “an immediate danger of domestic abuse” of Jamie and
the children.
In June 2023, Jamie petitioned for dissolution of the parties’ marriage.
After a July 2023 hearing on the OFP, the parties stipulated to the district court
(1) filing an OFP for the benefit of Jamie without factual findings and (2) dismissing the
OFP as to the children. The stipulated OFP as to Jamie included the following provision:
[Jason] denies the allegations in the Petition for Order for
Protection. [Jason] does not object to an Order for Protection
as to [Jamie] and understands that the order will be enforced
as if there was an admission or finding of domestic abuse.

(Emphasis added.) The stipulated OFP prohibited Jason from having any contact with
Jamie, including going to or entering the marital home in Montrose, and ordered Jason to

1 Because the parties share a last name, we refer to them by their first names.

2 The children were ages 1, 3, and 5 years at the time of the OFP.

3
“stay a reasonable distance away from any future residence of [Jamie].” The district court
entered the stipulated OFP on July 27, 2023, with an expiration date of July 27, 2025.
In November 2023, Jamie moved from Montrose to Waverly. In August 2024, Jason
purchased a home in Waverly.
On July 17, 2025, Jamie applied to extend the OFP, attesting that Jason harassed or
stalked her and that she is reasonably in fear of physical harm from Jason. In her attached
affidavit, Jamie averred, among other things, that Jason was “monitoring” her with drones.
Jamie submitted police reports, correspondence with the Federal Aviation Administration,
and photographs to support her application.
On September 11, 2025, the district court conducted a hearing at Jason’s request.
The district court heard testimony by Jamie, two neighbors, Jamie’s parents and sister, a
law-enforcement detective, and Jason.
Jamie testified that, when she petitioned to dissolve their marriage, she was afraid
for her safety. Jason had “threatened to take [her] life” multiple times, had told her that she
“would end up like the missing Winona woman,” and had “kicked down” the door while
she was locked inside their bedroom.
In response to questions, Jamie agreed that she “started seeing drones” at her
Montrose home in May 2023. The drones flew around her home during the day and night.
Jamie moved to Waverly because she was afraid for her own and the children’s safety and
“needed a new place to be.” Around April 2024, Jamie saw a drone hover over her new
home. Jamie believed that Jason was using drones to monitor her.

4
Jamie also testified that she believed (1) Jason was in her backyard at night and left
cigarette butts in her yard; (2) Jason ducked “behind a car” near her home while she and
the children were out trick-or-treating on Halloween; (3) Jason sat outside of her home
while “leaning back” in a car; and (4) Jason tampered with her car brakes. Jamie also
believed that Jason converted to Catholicism and started attending her childhood church—
the same church in which they were married. She installed a security system in her home,
kept her curtains or windows closed, and locked her garage door “[e]very night.” Jamie
testified that she is “fearful” for her life and safety. When asked of whom she is afraid,
Jamie replied, “Jason.”
Jamie’s neighbor from Montrose testified that, after Jason moved out of the marital
home, “there were drones everywhere.” The drone activity stopped after Jamie moved out
of the neighborhood. Jamie’s neighbor from Waverly testified that she saw drones flying
above Jamie’s new home.
Jamie’s parents testified that they moved in with Jamie in Montrose shortly after the
ex parte OFP was granted because Jamie was “terrified” of Jason. Jamie’s parents agreed
that they saw drones flying around both of Jamie’s homes. Jamie’s mother testified that
she saw Jason in the backyard one night and that Jamie’s father built a “safe room” so
Jamie “could get in there with the kids and lock it up” if someone broke into the home.
Jamie’s sister testified that, during a video call with Jamie, Jamie pointed the camera to
face a window. Jamie’s sister saw “a person in a mask” outside the window of Jamie’s
home.

5
A law-enforcement detective testified that he investigated Jamie’s allegations about
the drones and found no evidence linking the drones to Jason. The detective added that
Jason was not charged with violating the stipulated OFP.
Jason testified that he moved to Waverly “to be involved as much as possible” with
the children, “their activities,” and “the community where their friends are at.” In response
to questions, Jason denied the allegations made “both in [Jamie’s] testimony and in the
application” for an extension of the OFP. Jason denied flying drones around Jamie’s
homes, looking into her home window, or tampering with her car brakes. Jason testified
that he joined the Catholic church in which they were married because the church provided
him “a lot of support and guidance.” He also liked how the church presented the Catholic
faith. Jason testified that he did not believe Jamie was reasonably afraid of him because he
did not do “any of this.”
At the end of the hearing, the district court granted Jamie’s application to extend the
OFP and ordered Jason to stay one-half mile away from Jamie’s current home and two
miles away from any future home. On September 12, 2025, the district court amended the
order, extending the OFP for two years. The district court determined that Jamie was
“reasonably in fear of physical harm from” Jason.
The district court’s amended order included findings that Jamie’s parents “credibly
testified” about the drone activity. The district court also found Jamie’s testimony “to be
credible,” stating that her “demeanor was consistent with her testimony while on the
witness stand and while seated next to her attorney.” The district court found that Jamie’s
“eyes and face exuded fear while describing [Jason’s] behavior” and that Jamie “avoided

6
looking at [Jason] while he was on the witness stand and she appeared guarded.” The
district court determined that Jamie’s “demeanor demonstrated that she is in fear for her
physical safety, and that her fear is reasonable.”
Jason appeals.
DECISION
Jason argues that the district court abused its discretion when it granted the
extension. Specifically, Jason contends that the district court erred in applying the
Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (2024). He maintains that, to
extend an OFP under the domestic-abuse a ct, the district court must find “some nexus
between an act of a respondent and the petitioner’s fear.”
Appellate courts review a district court’s order extending an OFP for abuse of
discretion. McIntosh v. McIntosh, 740 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. App. 2007). A district court
abuses its discretion if its factual findings are unsupported by the record or if it misapplies
the law. Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. App. 2009). Appellate courts
review a district court’s findings for clear error, and in doing so, they do not reweigh
evidence or witness credibility. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 223
(Minn. 2021); see also Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 871- 72 (Minn. App. 2022)
(applying Kenney in an OFP appeal).
Jason contends that we must interpret relevant parts of the domestic-abuse act to
resolve this appeal. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review
de novo. Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Minn. 2018). “The goal of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” In re

7
Civ. Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711, 715 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted); see
also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024). When interpreting a statute, appellate courts “first
determine whether the language is ambiguous.” Scheurer v. Shrewsbury, 24 N.W.3d 670,
674 (Minn. 2025). If there is only one reasonable interpretation of the text, then the statute
is unambiguous and appellate courts apply its plain meaning. Id.
The domestic-abuse act states that a district court may extend an existing OFP under
any one of four circumstances:
(1) the respondent has violated a prior or existing order
for protection;
(2) the petitioner is reasonably in fear of physical harm
from the respondent;
(3) the respondent has engaged in the act of
harassment . . . ; or
(4) the respondent is incarcerated and about to be
released, or has recently been released from incarceration.

Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a(b). A petitioner need show only one of the four
circumstances to obtain an extension; they need not show an “intent to do present harm”
or that “physical harm is imminent.” Braend v. Braend, 721 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. App.
2006) (quoting section 518B.01, subdivision 6a(b)). And the domestic-abuse act “does not
require a district court to make a finding of ‘domestic abuse’ before it extends an OFP.”
Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 775-76 (Minn. 2014).3

3 The purpose of the domestic-abuse act is “to provide speedy, effective relief to victims of
domestic abuse” through OFP proceedings. Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206,
213 (Minn. 2001); see also State v. Errington, 310 N.W.2d 681, 682 (Minn. 1981)
(explaining that the domestic-abuse act “was enacted in 1979 to provide an efficient
remedy for victims of abuse as an alternative to other available legal remedies”). As a
remedial statute, the domestic-abuse act “receives liberal construction in favor of the
injured party.” Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 98-99 (quotation omitted).

8
The district court extended the OFP to protect Jamie based on the second
circumstance set out in subdivision 6a(b)—that Jamie was reasonably in fear of physical
harm from Jason. The district court credited Jamie’s testimony that she believed (1) she
had been harassed by drones that Jason controlled; (2) Jason was in Jamie’s yard, sat
outside her home in a car, and was near her home on Halloween; and (3) Jason damaged
Jamie’s car brakes. Finally, the district court credited Jamie’s testimony that she fears for
her life and her safety based on Jason’s conduct.
During the hearing, the district court explicitly declined to determine whether Jason
had committed the acts about which Jamie testified, explaining that the domestic-abuse act
did not require such a finding.
The statute, sir, which I rely upon, does not mandate that
I make a finding that you violated the previous [OFP]. It does
not require that I find that you’re doing these acts.
Instead, the statute says I must make a decision about
whether [Jamie] is reasonably in fear of physical harm from
you.
And based upon the testimony, and especially [Jamie’s]
Exhibit 1, which shows pictures of drones, and consistent
testimony from the witnesses that saw the drones, all of this put
together, plus my observations, bring me to the position of
finding that [Jamie] has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that she is reasonably in fear.
And again, that’s different from whether you’ve done
these things. These are her observations. They’re reasonable
observations, especially in light of the history that brought her
to court for the first time for the initial [OFP].

Jason does not argue that subdivision 6a(b) is ambiguous. He contends that this
court must decide “whether a finding of reasonable fear of physical harm from the
respondent can be made without any findings regarding any contact or behavior by the

9
respondent to support petitioner’s fear.” Based on the definition of “reasonable,” Jason
argues that the domestic-abuse act’s unambiguous language requires “a reason” for Jamie
to “be in fear of” Jason and that the district court “must find as much.” See Black’s Law
Dictionary 1520 (12th ed. 2024) (defining “reasonable” as, among other things,
“[a]ccording to reason” or “plausible”). Jason urges that “reasonable fear means more than
sincere or genuine fear . . . it must be based upon some nexus to the [OFP] respondent’s
actions, whether prior domestic abuse, violations of an OFP, or some other action that
occurred during the OFP.”
4 Jason argues that Jamie presented no evidence “as to prior acts
of domestic abuse [by Jason], and any statements made [by Jamie] were not relied upon by
the [district] court in making its determination that [Jamie] remained in fear.” He
emphasizes that the stipulated OFP “included no findings of domestic abuse.”
Jason’s argument is unavailing for three reasons. First, Jason attempts to distinguish
between an OFP and the stipulated OFP in his case, contending it does not include findings
of domestic abuse. But the stipulated OFP specifically provides that Jason understood it
would “be enforced as if there was an admission or finding of domestic abuse.” Caselaw
also contradicts Jason’s assertion that a person who is protected by a stipulated OFP must
provide additional evidence of domestic abuse or some other act by respondent to obtain

4 Jason relies on nonprecedential opinions that have affirmed the district court’s denial of
an OFP extension based on findings that the petitioner was not reasonably in fear of the
respondent. Nonprecedential cases may be cited as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). But the caselaw cited by Jason has limited persuasive value
because it does not involve a district court exercising its discretion to grant the extension
of an OFP, as is the case here.

10
an extension. See Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 775-76 (stating that subdivision 6a does not require
a finding of domestic abuse to extend a stipulated OFP).
Second, the relevant language for the second circumstance in subdivision 6a(b) is
unambiguous and allows the district court to extend an OFP upon the determination that
the applicant “is reasonably in fear of physical harm from the respondent.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 6a(b)(2). This is different from the other three circumstances set out in
subdivision 6a(b) of the domestic-abuse act, which require a district court to find specific
acts by the respondent before extending an OFP . Id., subd. 6a(b)(1), (3)-(4) (authorizing
the extension of an existing OFP upon a finding that respondent “violated a prior or existing
[OFP],” “engaged in the act of harassment,” or “is incarcerated and about to be released,
or has recently been released from incarceration”). In short, Jason asks us to add words to
the second circumstance in subdivision 6a(b), which we cannot do. See Great River Energy
v. Swedzinski, 860 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Minn. 2015) (stating that courts “cannot add words
to a statute that the Legislature intentionally or inadvertently left out” (quotation omitted)).
Third, the record supports the district court’s determination that Jamie is in
reasonable fear of physical harm from Jason. Jamie testified that, before she was granted
the ex parte OFP, Jason threatened to kill her multiple times and had “kicked down” their
bedroom door. The month after the district court entered the ex parte OFP and Jason moved
out of the marital home, Jamie saw drones flying around the home in Montrose. When
Jamie left Montrose for Waverly, the drone activity stopped. But a few months before Jason
purchased a home in Waverly, Jamie saw drones at her new home. Jamie believed that
Jason was “following” her by controlling the drones because he “threatened [her] life

11
before [she] left” him and he was now angry that she “got away.” Jamie’s testimony was
corroborated in significant respects by testimony from her family and neighbors.
Jamie also saw “someone” in her backyard, and this person had the same hair and
build as Jason. Jamie found cigarette butts in the backyard that “matched the brand of
cigarette that Jason smoked.” When Jamie took the children trick-or-treating on Halloween,
Jamie saw Jason near her home. On three occasions, Jamie also saw a man “leaning back”
inside a car that followed her as she left her home. And Jamie believed that Jason “tried to
kill [her] by tampering with” her car brakes. Also, even though Jason “was not Catholic,”
he started attending Jamie’s Catholic church after they separated. 5 Thus, the record
evidence supports the district court’s determination that Jamie is reasonably in fear of
physical harm from Jason.6

5 In his brief, Jason appears to challenge only one factual finding as clearly erroneous.
Jason argues that the district court’s “finding that this is [Jamie’s] church is not supported
by the record.” Jason acknowledges that Jamie “testified that she attended this church all
through adulthood,” including “shortly after college.” He appears to argue that, because
Jamie testified that she did not attend service during the marriage, it was no longer her
church. Thus, according to Jason, his attendance at the church “does not support a finding
that [Jamie] is in reasonable fear.” We conclude that the record supports the district court’s
finding. Jamie testified that Jason “became Catholic in [her] childhood church” after she
moved to Waverly. She agreed that she believed Jason joined the church “as a way to
harass” her. This evidence supports the district court’s finding that Jason “started to attend
[Jamie’s] church, which is new behavior.”

6 This court’s nonprecedential opinion in Lewis v. Lewis affirmed the extension of an OFP
on similar facts. No. A22-0975, 2023 WL 2847324, at *1, *3 (Minn. App. Apr. 10, 2023).
In Lewis, sister petitioned for an OFP against brother, received an OFP, then applied for an
extension, which was granted. Id. at *1. Brother appealed. Id. We concluded that “the
record supports the district court’s finding that sister reasonably feared brother would harm
her.” Id. at *2. We noted that the “original OFP was based in part on the fear and physical
harm brother caused sister,” which brother did not contest. Id. And to support her
application for an extension, “sister submitted an affidavit and testified that she still feared

12
Jason also argues that a district court cannot rely on averments in the original OFP
petition or affidavits supporting the extension “without testimony,” citing Andrasko v.
Andrasko, 443 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Minn. App. 1989). Because the evidence presented at the
hearing on Jamie’s extension application supports the district court’s decision here, we
need not consider this argument. But we also observe that Andrasko does not support
Jason’s assertion. In Andrasko, this court reversed the district court’s grant of an OFP based
on a now-overruled definition of “domestic abuse” and the lack of any finding of domestic
abuse by the district court. 443 N.W.2d at 230 (requiring a showing of present harm or
intent to do present harm to grant an OFP). But unlike Andrasko, this case involves the
grant of an extension of an OFP, which does not require a finding of domestic abuse. See
Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 775-76.
In sum, to extend the OFP, the domestic-abuse act does not require the district court
to find that Jason committed prior domestic abuse, violated an OFP, or committed other
acts after the filing of the original OFP. Instead, it requires the district court’s determination
that Jamie is reasonably in fear of physical harm from Jason. Because the record supports
the district court’s determination on this point and we discern no legal error, we conclude

brother.” Id. We emphasized that we could “neither reweigh the evidence nor second-guess
the district court’s implicit credibility determinations” regarding the reasonableness of
sister’s fear of brother. Id. We specifically rejected brother’s argument that, for sister’s fear
to be reasonable, “additional threats or acts” must have occurred since the original OFP
was filed. Id. at *3. We determined that, “[w]hile evidence of such acts could support an
extension, the [domestic-abuse act] provides that evidence of current reasonable fear of
harm is, in and of itself, sufficient to extend an OFP.” Id. (emphasis added).

13
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Jamie’s application for an
extension of the OFP.
Affirmed.