In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: K.A.S. and P.D.Y., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1903

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of:
K.A.S. and P.D.Y., Parents.

Filed April 20, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-JV-25-4622

Kimberly Stommes, Jeddeloh Snyder Stommes, St. Cloud, Minnesota (attorney for
appellant-mother K.A.S.)

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Gayle A. Borchert, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent Stearns County Human Services)

Stephanie Schwegel, Sauk Rapids, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Beane, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm because the district court acted within its discretion (1) in ruling that
appellant failed to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement; (2) by

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
determining that termination was in the best interests of the child; and (3) by ruling that the
county made reasonable efforts towards reunification.
FACTS
In October 2025, the district court filed an order terminating appellant-mother
K.A.S.’s (mother) parental rights to the child, G.Y., born in 2020. The following stems
from the district court’s findings of fact in its order terminating mother’s parental rights
with the procedural history supplemented by the record as necessary to understand the
issues on appeal.
In March 2024, respondent Stearns County Human Services (the county) first
became involved with mother and child due to a report of child “being exposed to a meth-
related environment” and alleged neglect. The county made several unsuccessful attempts
to meet with mother and mother refused to submit to urinalysis (UA) testing. Because of
this, the county filed a child-in-need-of-protection (CHIPS) petition in May 2024.
In June 2024, mother dropped child off with father. Mother “characterized the
handoff as an agreement the parties had come to [and] that [father] would take care of the
child so she could have a break after solo parenting for the six months [father] was
incarcerated.”
In July 2024, the county petitioned for an ex parte order for emergency protective
care (EPC) of the child because the county suspected that mother was using a controlled
substance and remained unresponsive to the county’s and father’s contact attempts. The
same day that the county petitioned the district court, the court granted the order and
3
formally placed the child with father. Soon after, the district court granted father temporary
custody and granted the county protective supervision.
In September 2024, the district court placed a CHIPS hold on the child because he
had injuries that appeared infected. Following this hold, the district court held another EPC
hearing in which the CHIPS hold was released and father was granted continued temporary
custody.
On December 17, 2024, the county petitioned the court for EPC of the child because
father had been intermittently compliant with UA testing, was intermittently responsive to
his case worker, and had tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines on
December 11, 2024.
The child was placed in foster care on December 24, 2024. Following this, the
district court conducted another EPC hearing on December 26, 2024. At this hearing, the
district court transferred custody of the child to the county.
In March 2025, the district court adjudicated the child as CHIPS. At this hearing,
mother admitted to the CHIPS petition and the district court ordered disposition
recommendations for mother. The district court ordered that mother:
• comply with mental health evaluation and follow
recommendations;
• complete a chemical-dependency assessment;
• [complete] random [UA] testing;
• maintain regular communication with the county;
• cooperate with parenting education programs;
• attend appointments, evaluations and all other services
for the child;
• [maintain] appropriate health and safe living conditions;
• [complete a] safety plan;
4
• [receive] approval of roommates or significant others
residing in home; and
• be forthright, honest, cooperative and follow all
recommendations of service providers.

In June 2025, the county petitioned the district court to terminate both mother’s and
father’s parental rights to the child. The county asserted that the parents’ rights should be
terminated pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivisions 1(b)(4), (7)
(2024).
At a pretrial hearing in August 2025, the district court relieved the county of
reasonable efforts of reunification towards mother and the child. This was due to reports
that mother had not been in contact with the county since May 2025 and declined to inform
the county where “she participated or was participating in chemical dependency
treatment.”
The district court held a two-day termination-of-parental-rights trial in September
2025, and heard testimony from several witnesses. Several exhibits, including an out- of-
home-placement plan, were admitted into evidence; however, no written case plan for
mother was admitted. Relevant here, mother, the social worker, and the guardian ad litem
(GAL) provided testimony.
During mother’s testimony, she stated: that she did not finish a chemical-
dependency treatment program because she was told that the program did not meet her
criteria for treatment; that she attended an in-patient treatment program but left against staff
advice; and she denied that she tested positive for controlled substances when she was
testing. The district court did not find mother’s testimony credible because she failed to
5
take responsibility in adhering to her disposition recommendations, and because she denied
her chemical use despite the record containing positive UAs for controlled substances.
The social worker testified that she offered mother several “resources for securing
a diagnostic assessment, individual therapy, a chemical- dependency assessment, random
UAs, transportation, and supervised visitation with the child.” The social worker recalled
that mother had not completed any of the programing nor did mother comply with any of
the other assistance provided to her.
The GAL testified that, when considering the ten best-interests factors, she believed
that mother has failed to correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home
placement. The GAL reached this conclusion based on “both parents’ history of and
continued drug and/or alcohol use, the improved behavioral changes noted in the child
since his adjustment to the foster home, and her perception of the parents’ lack of
compliance with their case plans.”
In October 2025, the district court filed an order and memorandum terminating
mother’s and father’s parental rights. It concluded that the termination of mother’s parental
rights was in the best interests of the child; that there was clear and convincing evidence
supporting the termination of mother’s parental rights because reasonable efforts had failed
to correct the conditions leading to the child ’s out-of-home placement; and that the child
was in foster care and neglected.
DECISION
Mother asserts that the district court abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that
appellant failed to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement; (2) by
6
determining that termination was in the best interests of the child; and (3) by ruling that the
county made reasonable efforts towards reunification. Below, each of mother’s contentions
will be addressed. Mother also contends that the district court improperly relieved the
county of its duty to provide reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunite the family. This
argument will be addressed in section III.
A district court may terminate parental rights when “(1) at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence [or reasonable efforts are
not required], (2) the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and
(3) termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d
593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021); see also
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2024). “[T]ermination of parental rights is always discretionary
with the [district] court.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn.
2014). “[W]e review the underlying findings of fact for clear error” and “the district court’s
determinations of whether a statutory ground for termination exists and whether
termination is in the child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d at
600; see also In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008)
(explaining that “[appellate courts] review the termination of parental rights to determine
whether the district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district
court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous”). “A
finding is clearly erroneous if it is either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence
or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R.,
750 N.W.2d 656, 660- 61 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “A district court abuses its
7
discretion if it makes findings of fact that lack evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or
resolves discretionary matters in a manner contrary to logic and the facts on record.”
In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024).
Appellate courts “give considerable deference to the district court’s decision to
terminate parental rights.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. “In reviewing termination of
parental rights, we determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support
the district court’s decision, given that the burden of proof in the district court is clear and
convincing evidence.” In re Welfare of D.T.J. , 554 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Minn. App. 1996)
(quotation omitted); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a) (“[I]n a termination
of parental rights matter involving a non -Indian child, the standard of proof is clear and
convincing evidence.”).
I. The district court acted within its discretion in ruling that mother failed to
correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement.

Mother maintains that the district court improperly terminated her parental rights
because there are no statutory grounds for termination supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Mother also asserts that the district court improperly terminated her parental
rights because clear and convincing evidence does not support that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite her with her child on the basis that there was no case plan.
Mother more specifically claims that this is because no case plan was ever filed with the
district court. This argument will be addressed in section III due to the overlap in the issues
asserted. The county contends that the district court properly terminated mother’s parental
8
rights and that a failure to file a case plan is not automatically fatal to termination of
parental rights. We agree with the county.
Parental rights may be terminated when: “following the child’s placement out of
the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the
conditions leading to the child ’s placemen t.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4).
Reasonable efforts are presumed to have failed upon a showing that:
a child has resided out of the parental home under court order
for a cumulative period of 12 months within the preceding 22
months. In the case of a child under age eight at the time the
petition was filed alleging the child to be in need of protection
or services, the presumption arises when the child has resided
out of the parental home under court order for six months
unless the parent has maintained regular contact with the child
and the parent is complying with the out-of -home placement
plan.

Id., subd. 1(b)(4)(i). “ It is presumed that conditions leading to a child’s out-of-home
placement have not been corrected upon a showing that the parent or parents have not
substantially complied with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan.” Id.,
subd. 1(b)(4)(iii).
The district court, by clear and convincing evidence, found that the county
established that a statutory basis exists to terminate mother’s parental rights under
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4). In particular, the district court
pointed out that the county has the burden to establish that mother continued to struggle
with chemical use at the time of trial and that the present conditions were likely to continue.
Clear and convincing evidence supports the fact that mother continued to struggle
with chemical use at the time of trial and that the present condition was likely to continue
9
for the reasonably foreseeable future. The district court made a credibility determination
as to the social worker’s testimony and mother’s testimony. Because the district court was
in the best position to assess the witnesses’ demeanor, we defer to its credibility
determination. See In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996) (deferring
to the district court’s credibility determinations).
The district court’s conclusion that mother failed to correct the conditions leading
to the child’s out-of-home placement is supported by its finding of fact, which, in turn are
supported by the social worker’s testimony: that mother has not complied with her
previous diagnostic assessment; that mother never successfully completed chemical-
dependency treatment; and that mother never resumed UA testing upon leaving treatment.
Mother also knew that she was ordered to comply with random testing since July 2024,
and the record established that mother had not completed chemical treatment successfully.
The fact that mother began treatment multiple times but did not complete the program
supports the fact that mother knew she was supposed to complete chemical-health
treatment. Mother also consistently tested positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamines since July of 2024, and regularly missed tests, which are presumptively
positive results. In addition, the GAL testified that mother had not provided a negative UA
test throughout the duration of the case.
The district court found that mother “to date has not complied with the disposition
recommendations adopted by this court in its adjudication order from April 1, 2025. She
has not followed the recommendations of her chemical-dependency assessment, diagnostic
assessment or engaged in random urinary analysis testing.”
10
Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in finding that clear and convincing
evidence supports its finding that mother continued to struggle with chemical use at the
time of trial and that the present conditions were likely to continue. And this means the
district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that mother failed to correct the
conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home placement.
II. The district court acted within its discretion by determining that termination
was in the best interests of the child.

Mother challenges the district court determination that termination of her parental
rights was not in the best interests of the child. Mother argues that the GAL never
specifically stated termination was in the child’s best interests; she was the child’s primary
parent until she dropped him off at father’s home; she has a strong bond with the child; she
has shown she can participate in chemical- dependency treatment; and she has stable
housing and a stable network. We do not agree.
“If a district court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it must
also determine that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Welfare of Child of
R.V.M., 8 N.W.3d 680, 696 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2024); see also
In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 668 (Minn. App. 2012) (“Even if a
statutory ground for termination exists, the district court must still find that termination of
parental rights or of the parent-child relationship is in the best interests of the child.” (citing
In re Welfare of Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn. 2005))). Indeed, “in any
proceeding to terminate parental rights, the best interests of the child must be the paramount
consideration.” In re Welfare of Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Minn. App. 2003),
11
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2003); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2024).
“[Appellate courts] review a district court’s conclusion that termination of parental rights
is in a child’s best interests for an abuse of discretion.” R.V.M., 8 N.W.3d at 696. And as
such “[w]e give considerable deference to the district court’s findings because the analysis
requires credibility determinations.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“In considering the child’s best interests, the district court must balance the
preservation of the parent-child relationship against any competing interests of the child.
Competing interests include such things as a stable environment, health considerations and
the child’s preferences.” K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d at 668 (citation and quotations omitted);
see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (providing that, before a district court may
order termination of parental rights, the court must “make a specific finding that
termination is in the best interests of the child” and must address: (1) “the child’s interests
in preserving the parent-child relationship”; (2) “the parent’s interests in preserving the
parent-child relationship”; and (3) “any competing interests of the child”). When “the
interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are paramount” if a statutory
basis to terminate parental rights exists. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7.
The district court concluded that “clear and convincing evidence exist[ed] [that
established] it is in the best interest of the child . . . to involuntarily terminate the parental
rights of [mother].” Additionally, the district court concluded that “[t]he child has an
interest in maintaining the parent -child relationship with both of his parents” but “[t]he
child also has an interest in having his basic needs met, in being raised in a safe and sober
12
environment, and in being raised in an environment free from the influence of controlled
substances on his caretakers.”
There is substantial evidence that mother’s inability to demonstrate her sobriety and
to attend treatment directly conflicts with the child’s needs and best interests. Regarding
mother and her chemical health, mother has failed to “maintain sobriety for any real length
of time” and failed to “complete chemical dependency treatment.” The district court also
reasoned that mother’s “choice to not complete parenting education, complete chemical
dependency treatment, engage in individual therapy, or demonstrate a length of sobriety
through the random UA testing conducted during the life of this case is notable.”
Moreover, the district court’s best interests findings were supported by the record
and by testimony provided by mother, the social worker, and the GAL.
The testimony from mother, the social worker, and the GAL establish that mother
cannot maintain sobriety and that she cannot complete chemical-health programing. While
she may have parented the child for the first years of his life, the district court weighed the
importance of the bond, but because of mother’s struggle with chemical health , it
appropriately found that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of
the child. And mother may have also testified that she has stable housing and a stable
network, but she still has not established her ability to maintain sobriety. Therefore, these
facts support the district court’s discretionary ruling that the child’s best interests is “in
being raised in a safe and sober environment, and in being raised in an environment free
from the influence of controlled substances on his caretakers.”
13
III. The district court acted within its discretion by ruling that the county made
reasonable efforts towards reunification.

Mother also asserts that the district court improperly terminated her parental rights
because clear and convincing evidence does not support that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunite her with her child on the basis that there was no case plan. We do not
agree.
We apply a clear-error standard of review to a district court’s findings of underlying
facts about whether a county has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with a child.
See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 387; see also In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315,
321-23 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015);
In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 899-902 (Minn. App. 2011),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). In reviewing a district court’s ultimate reasonable-efforts
determination of whether the reunification-related facts it found show that the county’s
efforts were reasonable, we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard. See D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d
at 321-23 (citing J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 900-01).
What reasonable efforts are required of a county depends on the individual facts of
a particular case. See T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d at 709; see also In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C.,
920 N.W.2d 648, 663 (Minn. App. 2018). In proceedings under section 260C.301, the
district court “shall make findings and conclusions as to the provision of reasonable
efforts.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). “The district court must also consider how long
the county was involved and the quality of its efforts.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601.
“Reasonable efforts at rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of form so
14
as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144,
150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007).
No such case plan for mother was admitted into evidence for the district court to
consider, but “a lack of a filed case plan is not dispositive.” R.V.M., 8 N.W.3d at 696. “A
failure to provide a timely written plan is reversible error however, if parents have not been
informed of, or do not understand, the conditions they must satisfy to achieve
reunification.” Id. Because there was no case plan for the district court to review, the district
court’s determination of whether reasonable efforts were provided had to be based on
testimony and the exhibits provided in the record.
1 See In re Welfare of Child of M.E.P., 4
N.W.3d 152, 161 n.2 (Minn. App. 2024) (“As a general rule, an appellate court will
consider and resolve ‘only those issues that the record shows were presented and
considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.’” (quoting Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988))).
Here, mother’s testimony establishes that she was informed of the case plan. She
was “enrolled in and went to in-patient treatment . . . on April 30, 2025,” but “[s]he left
against staff advice on May 6, 2025, and was discharged unsuccessfully.” In addition,
mother “agreed she was ordered to comply with random testing since July 2024, and stated

1 The county did not file a case plan with the district court, but we are mindful that when
an agency has petitioned the court, such “agency shall file with the court and provide to
the parties and foster parent a case plan or out-of-home placement plan for the child and
the parents or legal custodians, as appropriate.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 26.01; see also
Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2024) (stating that “‘[s]hall’ is mandatory”). Case plans are
required to “be prepared according to the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 245.4871, subd. 19
or 21; § 245.492, subd . 16; § 256B.092; or § 260C.212, subd. 1.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
26.01.
15
that upon leaving . . . treatment on or about May 6, 2025, she [had not submitted a UA] at
Minnesota Monitoring since.” Certified copies of records from Minnesota Monitoring
indicate that, since July 2024, mother regularly tested positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamines. The records from Minnesota Monitoring also indicated that she
regularly missed tests, which are, therefore, presumptively considered positive.
The social worker also testified that she offered mother “resources for securing a
diagnostic assessment, individual therapy, a chemical-dependency assessment, random
UAs, transportation, and supervised visitation with the child.” The social worker also
testified about mother’s noncompliance with the case plan and explained that mother did
not: communicate with the social worker on a regular basis or engage in individual therapy;
complete her chemical-dependency treatment; comply with UA testing; complete
parenting classes; or regularly engage in visitation with the child. In conclusion, based on
mother’s knowledge about the case plan, the district court’s credibility determinations, and
the social worker’s testimony about the case plan, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it found that clear and convincing evidence supports that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite mother and child.
In addition, mother did not raise this issue with the district court. R.V.M., 8 N.W.3d
at 696 (stating that appellate courts generally address only those questions previously
presented to and considered by the district court) (citing Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582)).

16
In conclusion, based on the record, the district court’s findings of fact regarding the
efforts made by the county are not clearly erroneous. Relatedly, its associated discretionary
ruling that the efforts the county made were, in circumstances of this case, reasonable, was
not an abuse of its discretion. Nor, on this record, did the county’s failure to file the case
plan require reversal.2
Affirmed.

2 Mother asserts that the district court erred in relieving the county of the duty to provide
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunite the family. This occurred at a pretrial hearing
held on August 18, 2025. Because no such transcript was provided, our review of this issue
is limited. See Fischer v. Simon, 980 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Minn. 2022) (“It is elementary that
a party seeking review has a duty to see that the appellate court is presented with a record
which is sufficient to show the alleged errors and all matters necessary to consider the
questions presented.” (quotation omitted)); Custom Farm Servs., Inc. v. Collins, 238
N.W.2d 608, 609 (Minn. 1976) (“An appellant has the burden of providing an adequate
record for appeal.”). Without a fully developed record, “we are limited to determining
whether the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law.” Am. Family Life
Ins. Co. v. Noruk , 528 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 27,
1995).