In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: D. M. D., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1917

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: D. M. D., Parent.

Filed May 4, 2026
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-25-730

Brooke Beskau Warg, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant mother D.M.D.)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Kyle Payne, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services Department)

Andrew Small, Colich & Associates, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent father
J.E.W.)

Michelle Lee Overby Chalstrom, Hennepin County Public Defender’s Office,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for Child 1)

Janell Trocke, Minneapolis, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Mother challenges the transfer of permanent physical and legal custody of her child,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify mother and child with respect to (1) housing and (2) sobriety.
We affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant-mother D.M.D. is the sole custodial parent of a child born in 2010.
Mother signed a recognition of parentage form with a person who is considered the
adjudicated father of child. Only mother challenges the custody decision underlying this
appeal.
March 2021 Child-Protection Action
A different child-protection action, beginning in March 2021, involved the same
mother and the same child. Reports of mother’s educational neglect and failure to provide
food for child led to child’s out- of-home placement with child’s paternal aunt (aunt).
Mother entered civil commitment and received mental-health treatment. By March 2022,
mother was actively engaging in her case plan, maintaining her sobriety, and remaining
compliant with her medications. Mother reunified with child that month, and the case was
closed.
March 2024 Reports
In March 2024, mother and child lived with child’s great-grandmother. On March
6, 2024, respondent Hennepin County Human Services (the county) received a report of
mental injury of child by mother. The report explained that mother “had been going to
[child’s] school multiple times in the day to request [child] be pulled from class or pulling
[child] from school for the rest of the day due to [mother’s] belief that [child] is leaving
the building, that someone is out to get their family, and that [child] is experiencing sexual
abuse and sex trafficking by school staff.”
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On March 9, 2024, the county received a second report of mental injury of child by
mother based on incidents that occurred the prior day. According to a police report, child
called police after exiting the shower and discovering mother attempting to record a video
of them. The report explained that child “does not feel safe staying with [ mother] based
on that behavior.” Police advised child that they could not remove mother from the home
because she “was not an immediate danger to herself or others.” Child and great-
grandmother left the home, but after mother reported child as a “runaway,” police returned
child to mother’s care.
CHIPS Adjudication
On March 15, 2024, the county filed a petition alleging that child was in need of
protection or services (CHIPS) under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.007, subdivision
6(3), (8), and (9) (2024). The petition alleged that mother’s behavior led to child missing
“over 50 days of school” and only getting “two to three hours” of sleep every night.
Three days later, the district court removed c hild from mother’s care and placed
child with aunt. The district court held a hearing and adjudicated child CHIPS in June
2024.
The district court ordered a case plan for mother. As relevant to this appeal, the
case plan required mother to “complete a psychological evaluation . . . and follow all
recommendations, including medication management,” “maintain her mental health and
follow all recommendations from mental-health providers,” “ maintain safe and suitable
housing,” and “cooperate with the [county] and guardian ad litem, including . . . notifying
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the [county] of any changes in residence.” The district court later added a sobriety
component to the case plan, requiring that mother “compl[y] with random [urinalyses].”
Petition to Transfer Permanent Legal and Physical Custody
In March 2025, the county petitioned to transfer permanent legal and physical
custody of child to aunt. The transfer petition explained: “Reasonable efforts were made
by the [county] to facilitate reunification, but the parent failed to correct the conditions
requiring out of home placement.”
The district court held a two-day court trial on the transfer petition, during which it
heard testimony from mother, father, aunt, and child, as well as mother’s county social
worker and child’s guardian ad litem. The district court thereafter filed an order
transferring permanent legal and physical custody of child to aunt, as a fit and willing
relative.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting the transfer
petition because the county failed to prove that it made reasonable efforts to assist mother
with “obtaining safe and suitable housing” and “abstaining from alcohol and illicit
substances.” We disagree.
In permanency proceedings, a district court may “order a transfer of permanent legal
and physical custody to . . . a fit and willing relative.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd.
4(a)(2) (2024). Except under circumstances not applicable here, permanent placement of
a child outside of a parent’s home may occur only if the county made reasonable efforts to
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reunify the family. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2024). The county must prove that it made
these efforts by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 1
(providing that “[i]n a permanency matter other than a termination of parental rights matter,
the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence”); see also In re Welfare of Child.
of J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. May 12, 2021).
When evaluating the county’s reasonable efforts, the district court must consider
whether services provided were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and,
if appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and
child’s family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well -being of
the child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the
child and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). Ultimately, “what constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’
depends on the facts of each case” and “the problem presented.” In re Welfare of Child of
J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021); In re
Welfare of Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). In an
order transferring permanent legal and physical custody , the district court must make
detailed findings on “the nature and extent” of the county’s reasonable efforts “to reunify
the child with the parent.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(2) (2024).

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I. Mother failed to preserve her arguments for appellate review because she did
not raise them before the district court.

Mother’s argument on appeal focuses on whether the county made reasonable
reunification efforts related to her housing and sobriety.
Generally, a reviewing court may consider only those issues that were presented to
and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988);
see also Smith v. Kessen, 996 N.W.2d 581, 590 (Minn. App. 2023) (applying this aspect of
Thiele to family law case), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 31, 2024). A party may not “obtain
review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a different theory.”
Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582.
Mother argued in district court that the county did not demonstrate reasonable
reunification efforts sufficient to support the transfer petition. But she specifically
contended that the county “missed dozens of scheduled meetings,” did not initiate therapy
for child, allowed visitation to be at child’s discretion, and denied mother’s requests for
“family therapy and group counseling.” Mother did not mention the county’s efforts
regarding housing or sobriety, let alone dispute their reasonableness.
Because mother did not present these arguments to the district court, she failed to
preserve them for appellate review. See id. We nonetheless address the merits of mother’s
appeal because, even if she had preserved her arguments, we would still affirm.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county
made reasonable reunification efforts.

Mother contends that the district court abused its discretion by transferring custody
because the county failed to make reasonable reunification efforts related to the housing
and sobriety elements of her case plan. We are not persuaded.
We review a district court’s determination that the county made reasonable
reunification efforts for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865
N.W.2d 315, 321-22 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). “A district
court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that lack evidentiary support,
misapplies the law, or resolves discretionary matters in a manner contrary to logic and the
facts on record.” In re Welfare of Child of T. M. A., 11 N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024)
(citing Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022)). We afford great deference
to the district court’s credibility determinations. See In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814
N.W.2d 76, 90 (Minn. App. 2012).
We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error. D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at
321. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment
of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quoting Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima,
372 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Minn. 1985)).
Housing
The district court found that the county “provided [mother] with case-management
services . . . so [mother] could work toward reunification.” These case-management
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services included weekly phone calls in the summer of 2024. Mother’s county social
worker worked on this case from its beginning in March 2024. The district court credited
the county social worker’s testimony that mother refused to tell the county where she lived
for months. Eventually, mother disclosed to the county that she was staying at a
Minneapolis shelter, a location where child could not reside. The district court found that
mother “never established housing safe or suitable for [child].”
According to the record, mother moved twice after child’s removal: first she moved
out of great-grandmother’s home and in with someone she identified as a “mother figure,”
and then she moved into a shelter in December 2024. In January 2025, mother refused to
share her new address with the county, claiming that she was “safe harboring” and not
comfortable sharing her location. The county indicated that it could provide mother “with
housing resources, if needed.” In March 2025, when filing the transfer petition, the county
still did not know where mother lived. In a virtual meeting later that month, mother told
the county that she “had not left where she is staying or the floor [she was] on in 35 days.”
The county reported that it “was unable to ask follow up questions.”
Mother refused to share the location of her residence with the county for
approximately five months. By May 2025, the county learned that mother was staying in
a shelter, and it noted that “this is not a location that [child] could reunify with [mother].”
At trial, mother testified that she had moved to the shelter before the transfer petition
and continued to reside there through trial. She conceded that she never reached out to the
county for housing assistance. Mother testified that she joined a housing list with the help
of shelter staff, and she expressed confidence that she would find alternative housing “in
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the reasonably foreseeable future.” We conclude that the record reasonably supports the
district court’s findings regarding housing.
Sobriety
The district court found that the county “scheduled appointments for [mother],
offered transportation assistance, . . . and made referrals to . . . sobriety . . . service
providers so [mother] could work toward reunification.” The district court found that
mother “rarely demonstrated sobriety.” It found that mother’s “first sweat patch was
positive for methamphetamine,” her “second [sweat] patch was tampered with and could
not be tested,” and her third sweat patch “was never removed from [her] arm and was not
tested.” The district court also found that mother “refused offers for transport . . . to get
patches removed and have new patches put on” and “missed appointments [the county] set
up for a new patch to be placed.”
The record reflects that mother initially requested that her sobriety testing not
involve urinalysis. The county worked with mother to set up substance-use testing via a
breathalyzer and sweat patches. After beginning testing in October 2024, mother never
returned a positive test on the breathalyzer. Although some tests were missed or
inconclusive, the county decided that mother no longer needed to demonstrate sobriety
from alcohol and ended breathalyzer testing in March 2025.
In October 2024, mother received her first sweat patch. Upon its removal for testing
a few weeks later, the patch tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother told the county
that the test result was inaccurate, and the suggestion that she would use methamphetamine
was “offensive.” Mother received a second patch but, when she returned for its removal,
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monitoring staff discovered that it had detached slightly and bec ome “compromised.”
Monitoring staff did not test it and instead placed a third patch. Mother missed two
appointments to have the third patch removed for testing and then failed to schedule a
subsequent appointment.
The county met with mother several times to discuss the sweat-patch testing and
confirm that mother had the information she needed to continue testing. The county offered
to assist mother with scheduling and transportation. Mother consistently denied having
any substance-use problems or need for testing. In March 2025, pursuant to a court order,
mother submitted to a urinalysis that tested negative for all substances.
The county noted in April 2025 that mother “has not been receptive” to its
substance-use concerns and, to its knowledge, “has not obtained a comprehensive
[substance-use] assessment.” The county explained that it would “continue to encourage”
mother to engage in testing and explore a comprehensive assessment. The county
reiterated these notes in its May, August, and September 2025 prehearing reports. The
county worked to set up urinalysis with a local hospital and , in July 2025, mother agreed
to submit to the testing. Mother failed to provide a photo to complete the urinalysis referral
until late August 2025. Mother then submitted to a urinalysis in early September 2025, but
the results were not in the record at trial.
The county social worker testified that mother has a history of substance use and
has not maintained sobriety through the current child-protection action. The district court
found the social worker’s testimony credible. We conclude that the record reasonably
supports the district court’s findings regarding sobriety.
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Finally, we note that the district court determined that mother’s “primary problem
was her mental health.” Mother does not dispute this finding on appeal. We view the
question of whether the county made reasonable reunification efforts in the context of this
primary problem. See J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 601; T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664. We have
carefully reviewed the record, and we conclude that it reasonably supports the district
court’s determination that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify mother and child.
Affirmed.