In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential, except as provided by
Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 136.01, subdivision 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1919

In the Marriage of:

Michaela Dojcinovic Bachmayer, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Kyle Dalke Bachmayer,
Appellant.

Filed June 22, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-18-4040

Susan A. Cragg, Lynn Klicker Uthe, Lynn Klicker Uthe, Ltd., Minnetonka, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Kyle Dalke Bachmayer, Minneapolis, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Appellant father challenges an order by the district court that (1) denied his motion
to modify custody and (2) granted respondent mother’s motion to relocate their child to
mother’s country of origin. Father asserts that the district court abused its discretion in its
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decision on both motions by ruling (A) without an evidentiary hearing and (B) based on
misapplications of the law. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Kyle Dalke Bachmayer (father) and respondent Michaela Dojcinovic
Bachmayer (mother) were married in 2016 and had a child in 2017. In October 2019, the
district court entered a judgment (J&D) dissolving the parties’ marriage. The district court
awarded mother sole legal and sole physical custody of the child. In the J&D, the district
court made a finding of domestic abuse perpetrated by father against mother, ordered that
father receive limited, supervised parenting time, and noted that father could request a
change in parenting time after completing one year of therapy. Father appealed, and we
affirmed. Bachmayer v. Bachmayer, No. A19-1929, 2020 WL 4434557, at *1 (Minn. App.
Aug. 3, 2020).
In December 2020, mother moved the district court to permit her to relocate the
child to her country of origin, Slovakia, and to require that father’s parenting time be
supervised. In a responsive motion, father requested that the district court grant him sole
legal and sole physical custody, with equal parenting time, and that the court hold mother
in contempt for, inter alia, her failure to facilitate his compensatory parenting time. After a
January 2021 hearing, the court limited father’s in-person parenting time to supervised
contact and reduced his parenting time to one-half hour per week. In March 2021, the
district court filed an order denying mother’s relocation motion, ordering that father’s
weekly parenting time be supervised, and denying all of father’s motions. Father moved
the district court to amend its findings in April 2021, and the court denied his motion. He
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appealed, and we affirmed. Bachmayer v. Bachmayer, No. A21-1346, 2022 WL 1531733,
at *1 (Minn. App. May 16, 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 9, 2022).
In May 2025, mother again moved the district court to allow her to relocate the child
to Slovakia, to order that father’s parenting time continue to be supervised unless he
complied with all recommendations set forth in the J&D, and to amend his parenting time
if the court granted her relocation request. Father thereafter moved to modify custody. He
requested that the district court set an evidentiary hearing on his motion, find that the child
was endangered in mother’s care, and grant him “full custody” of the child. In support of
his motion, father asserted “that modification of custody [was] necessary to serve [the
child’s] best interests.” Mother filed a responsive motion requesting that the district court
deny father’s motion.
At a June 2025 hearing, the district court considered the parties’ motions, granted
mother’s request to relocate the child and to amend father’s parenting time, and denied
father’s motion to modify custody. In September 2025, the district court filed writt en
findings and an order setting forth its earlier rulings. Among other things, the order explains
the district court’s finding that relocation is in the best interests of the child under
Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 3 (2024).
This appeal follows.
1

1 Before filing this appeal, father petitioned for discretionary review, which we denied.
Bachmayer v. Bachmayer, No. A25-1756 (Minn. App. Nov. 7, 2025) (order).
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DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s order (1) denying his motion to modify custody
and (2) granting mother’s motion to relocate the child to Slovakia. He asserts that the
district court abused its discretion in its decision on both motions by ruling (A) without an
evidentiary hearing and (B) based on misapplications of the law. 2 We address each
argument in turn.
I. The district court acted within its discretion in denying father’s motion to
modify custody.

A. Because father did not allege a prima facie case for custody modification,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that he was
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Father maintains that the district court “fail[ed] to consider [his] allegations as true
and [to] disregard [mother’s] contrary allegations in [the court’s] conclusions against the
other aspects of [father’s] prima facie case of custody modification.” Mother counters that

2 Father also contends that the district court’s “orders rely on false evidence obtained
through warrants repugnant to the Fourth Amendment,” that a “custody evaluation order
was . . . [a] grievous and oppressive ‘general warrant,’” and that the “2019 [J&D’s] basis
is . . . [a] falsified custody evaluation report, obtained via illegal warrant.” As much as
father challenges the district court’s “custody evaluation order” that predates the J&D, as
well as the J&D itself, his contentions fall outside the scope of this appeal from the court’s
September 2025 order denying his motion to modify custody and granting mother’s motion
to relocate the child. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (explaining
that appellate courts “must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were
presented [to] and considered by the [district] court in deciding the matter before it”
(quotation omitted)); see also Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co., 147 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Minn.
1966) (stating that, “[e]ven though the decision of the [district] court . . . may have been
wrong, if it is an appealable order it is still final after the time for appeal has expired”);
Dailey v. Chermak, 709 N.W.2d 626, 631 (Minn. App. 2006) (applying this aspect of
Dieseth in a family-law appeal), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2006). Accordingly, we do
not consider father’s argument as to the Fourth Amendment.
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father failed to make a prima facie case of endangerment under Minnesota Statutes section
518.18(d)(iv) (2024). We agree with mother.
In general, appellate courts review the “district court’s decision to deny a motion to
modify custody without an evidentiary hearing under an abuse-of- discretion standard.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). We apply a three-step process in
reviewing an order denying a custody-modification motion without an evidentiary hearing:
First, we review de novo whether the district court properly
treated the allegations in the moving party’s affidavits as true,
disregarded the contrary allegations in the nonmoving party ’s
affidavits, and considered only the explanatory allegations in
the nonmoving party’s affidavits. Second, we review for an
abuse of discretion the district court’s determination as to the
existence of a prima facie case for the modification or
restriction. Finally, we review de novo whether the district
court properly determined the need for an evidentiary hearing.

Amarreh v. Amarreh, 918 N.W.2d 228, 230 –31 (Minn. App. 2018) (quoting Boland v.
Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. App. 2011)).
As to the first step, we conclude that the district court did not err by failing to
consider father’s allegations as true. The district court stated that its decision was “[b]ased
upon all the files, proceedings, and records in this matter .” Moreover, the district court
referenced father’s endangerment allegations and reasoned that his “motion to change
custody is a regurgitation of past arguments and allegations.” We see no error in this
reasoning because father presented no new information in his supporting affidavit and his
allegations are either premised on prior proceedings or consist of vague assertions about
mother. See Szarzynski v. Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. App. 2007) (noting that
a movant does not allege a prima facie case if the allegations are merely conclusory, are
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“too vague to support a finding of endangerment,” or are “devoid of allegations supported
by any specific, credible evidence” (quotations omitted)). The district court’s order does
not reflect that the court failed to consider father’s allegations as true.
At the second step, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in
determining that father did not allege a prima facie case to support his custody-modification
request. In considering the endangerment standard, the district court acknowledged father’s
claim that “mother is the child’s ‘abusive jailor’” and found that “father fail[ed] to show
any endangerment.” The district court determined that father had neither seen nor contacted
the child in over two years. After supervised parenting-time services were terminated
following father’s accusation that the supervisor was violating his civil liberties and
operating illegally, father neither returned to court to seek a modification nor attempted to
find a different supervisor. Because father did not sufficiently allege either a change in
circumstances or endangerment by mother, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s determination that father did not set forth a prima facie case to support his custody-
modification request.
Turning to the third step, we have explained: “Whether a party makes a prima facie
case to modify custody is dispositive of whether an evidentiary hearing will occur on the
motion.” Id.; see also Morey v. Peppin, 375 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Minn. 1985) (stating that “an
evidentiary hearing shall be scheduled” if a moving party makes a prima facie case to
modify custody); Nice -Petersen v. Nice-Petersen, 310 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. 1981)
(explaining that, if a moving party fails to make a prima facie case, the district court “[is]
require[d] . . . to deny [the] motion”). Because we conclude that the district court acted
7
within its discretion in determining that father did not allege a prima facie case for custody
modification, we likewise decide that the court correctly denied his motion without an
evidentiary hearing.
B. The district court correctly applied Minnesota Statutes
section 518.18(d) (2024) in denying father’s motion to modify custody.

Father argues that the district court did not apply the appropriate legal standard in
denying his motion to modify custody. He asserts that “the district court erred as a matter
of law by reviewing [father’s] motion to modify custody under the standard for removal in
Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 3.” Mother responds that the district court
properly reviewed father’s motion to modify custody under Minnesota Statutes section
518.18(d). We are persuaded by mother’s argument.
“Determining the proper legal standard to be applied to a child-custody modification
motion presents a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” Woolsey, 975
N.W.2d at 506. “A modification of custody or a change of the child’s primary residence
requires that the district court utilize the procedures set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)
[(2012)] and associated caselaw.” Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 334–35 (Minn. App.
2014). Under Minnesota Statutes section 518.18(d), “the [district] court shall not modify a
prior custody order . . . which specifies the child’s primary residence unless it finds, upon
the basis of facts” arising since the prior order, or based on facts that were unknown to the
court at the time of the prior order, “that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the
child or the parties and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the
child.” And the district court must “retain the custody arrangement or the parenting plan
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provision specifying the child’s primary residence that was established by the prior order
unless,” among other circumstances:
(i) the court finds that a change in the custody
arrangement . . . is in the best interests of the child and the
parties previously agreed, in a writing approved by a court, to
apply the best interests standard in section
518.17[,] . . . and . . . both parties were represented by counsel
when the agreement was approved or the court found the
parties were fully informed, the agreement was voluntary, and
the parties were aware of its implications; [or]
. . . .
(iv) the child’s present environment endangers the
child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s
emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a
change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a
change to the child . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(i), (iv).
Here, the district court determined that father had not sufficiently alleged that there
had been a change in circumstances that warranted a custody modification. The district
court ruled that father failed to assert why such a significant change would be in the child’s
best interests or whether the potential harm outweighed the potential benefits. In addition,
the district court decided that father articulated no endangerment. And contrary to father’s
argument, the district court did not cite Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 3,
in denying his motion to modify custody without an evidentiary hearing.
The district court’s analysis reflects that it correctly applied Minnesota Statutes
section 518.18(d) in denying father’s motion. We therefore see no error in the district
court’s order.

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II. The district court acted within its discretion in granting mother’s motion to
relocate the child.

A. Under the broad discretion afforded it by law, the district court
appropriately decided mother’s motion to relocate the child without an
evidentiary hearing.

Father asserts that “the district court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of
law by granting [mother’s] removal motion without an evidentiary hearing.” Mother
counters that “the district court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by
granting [her] removal motion without an evidentiary hearing.” We conclude that the
district court acted within its discretion.
“Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion generally is a discretionary
decision of the district court, which we review for an abuse of discretion.” Anh Phuong Le
v. Holter, 838 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
Dec. 31, 2013). “The statutory section governing removal motions does not impose a
requirement on district courts to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 3 (2012)). “[T]he Rules of Family Court Procedure set out in the
Minnesota Rules of General Practice govern matters involving child custody.” Id. (citing
Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 301.01(a), (b)(1), (2), (8)). “Under those rules, it is presumed that non-
contempt motions will be submitted on affidavits, exhibits, subpoenaed documents,
memoranda, and arguments of counsel.” Id. (citing Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 303.03(d)(1)).
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Based on the above principles, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s decision to rule on mother’s motion to relocate the child without an evidentiary
hearing.3
B. The district court did not err by applying Minnesota Statutes section
518.175, subdivision 3, in granting mother’s motion to relocate the child.

Father contends that the district court misapplied the law in granting mother’s
motion to relocate the child to Slovakia. Mother responds that the district court applied the
correct legal standard in ruling that relocation is in the best interests of the child. We are
convinced by mother’s argument.
As mentioned previously: “Determination of the applicable statutory standard, and
the interpretation of statutes, are questions of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.”
Anh Phuong Le, 838 N.W.2d at 801 (quoting Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 282). But we review
a district court’s decision on a motion to relocate a child by “considering whether

3 On top of the foregoing arguments, father maintains that the district court violated his
due-process rights by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing as to its denial of his motion
to modify custody and its grant of mother’s motion to relocate the child. But “due process
does not always require a full evidentiary hearing.” In re Welfare of Child of B.D.D., 25
N.W.3d 707, 715 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted). Indeed, “a district court may resolve a
motion to modify custody based on affidavits submitted by the parties.” Id. “A district court
is required under section 518.18(d) to conduct an evidentiary hearing only if the party
seeking to modify a custody order makes a prima facie case for modification.” Goldman v.
Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008). We reject father’s due-process contention
because, as discussed earlier, he did not allege a prima facie case of endangerment, as
required by Minnesota Statutes section 518.18(d), and he has not otherwise established that
due process requires an evidentiary hearing as to either his motion to modify custody or
mother’s motion to relocate the child. See Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949)
(instructing that “on appeal error is never presumed,” that “[i]t must be made to appear
affirmatively before there can be reversal [,]” and that “the burden of showing error rests
upon the one who relies upon it” (quotation omitted)).
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the . . . court abused its discretion in making findings unsupported by the evidence or by
improperly applying the law.” Id. at 802 (citing Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284). “A district
court’s findings of fact are only set aside if clearly erroneous[.]” Id. “Findings of fact are
clearly erroneous where an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made.” Id. (quoting Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 284).4
“In ruling on a motion for removal, a district court must apply the ‘best interests
standard,’ outlined in the removal statute. ” Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(b)).
“The best-interests standard for removal motions directs a district court to evaluate a non -
exclusive list of eight factors to determine whether removal is in the best interests of the
child.” Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(b)). Those factors are:
(1) the nature, quality, extent of involvement, and
duration of the child’s relationship with the person proposing
to relocate and with the nonrelocating person, siblings, and
other significant persons in the child’s life;
(2) the age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and
the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s
physical, educational, and emotional development, taking into
consideration special needs of the child;
(3) the feasibility of preserving the relationship between
the nonrelocating person and the child through suitable

4 Father asserts that “the clearly erroneous standard of review is unconstitutional” under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This argument is unavailing because
we are bound by Minnesota Supreme Court precedent—e.g., Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at
284—that establishes the applicability of the clearly erroneous standard of review here.
See Pizarro-Rios v. State, 23 N.W.3d 626, 636 n.18 (Minn. App. 2025) (citing State v.
Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (“The court of appeals is bound by supreme
court precedent, as it has repeatedly acknowledged.”)); see also Jensen v. 1985 Ferrari,
949 N.W.2d 729, 742 n.21 (Minn. App. 2020) (explainin g that, “as an error-correcting
court, we apply existing precedent” (citing Lake George Park, L.L.C. v. IBM Mid-Am.
Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 576 N.W.2d 463, 466 (Minn. App. 1998) (stating that “[t]his
court, as an error correcting court, is without authority to change the law”), rev. denied
(Minn. June 17, 1998))).
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parenting time arrangements, considering the logistics and
financial circumstances of the parties;
(4) the child’s preference, taking into consideration the
age and maturity of the child;
(5) whether there is an established pattern of conduct of
the person seeking the relocation either to promote or thwart
the relationship of the child and the nonrelocating person;
(6) whether the relocation of the child will enhance the
general quality of the life for both the custodial parent seeking
the relocation and the child including, but not limited to,
financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity;
(7) the reasons of each person for seeking or opposing
the relocation; and
(8) the effect on the safety and welfare of the child, or
of the parent requesting to move the child’s residence, of
domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01.

Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3( b). “[I]f the court finds that the person requesting
permission to move has been a victim of domestic abuse by the other parent, the burden of
proof is upon the parent opposing the move.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(c).
In its order, the district court stated: “Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3 governs
requests of a custodial parent to move out of state.” Based on the authority discussed above,
we see no error in the district court’s determination that Minnesota Statutes section
518.175, subdivision 3, applies to mother’s motion to relocate the child.
Nor do we discern any abuse of discretion by the district court, insofar as we
conclude that the court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous and that the court acted
within its discretion in balancing those findings and granting mother’s motion to relocate
the child. In particular, based on our careful review of the underlying record and the district
court’s detailed findings on each of the eight, non-exclusive best-interests factors, there is
sufficient evidence to reasonably support the court’s determinations. See Wilson v. Moline,
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47 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Minn. 1951) (explaining that an appellate court’s “function . . . does
not require [the appellate court] to discuss and review in detail the evidence for the purpose
of demonstrating that it supports the [district] court’s findings” and that the appellate
court’s “duty is performed when [the appellate court] consider[s] all the evidence . . . and
determine[s] that it reasonably supports the findings”); see also Vangsness v. Vangsness,
607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (citing Wilson, 47 N.W.2d at 870, observing that
“[t]here is sufficient evidence of record to support the [district] court’s findings that
numerous best-interests factors favor neither party[,]” and concluding that, “[b]ecause the
court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, it is unnecessary for us to further address
appellant’s discussion of [the] evidence” (footnote omitted) ); accord In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 2021). And father has not shown
that the district court abused its discretion in balancing its findings of fact and ruling in
mother’s favor.
In short, the district court properly analyzed each of the eight, non-exclusive best-
interests factors and made relevant factual findings that are reasonably supported by the
record. “The law leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the district
court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.” Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212,
217 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotation omitted). Consequently, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in granting mother’s motion to relocate the child.
Affirmed.