State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1930

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Clayton Robert Kessler,
Appellant.

Filed June 29, 2026
Affirmed
Rasmusson, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-24-3488

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Jennifer Buske, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RASMUSSON, Judge
After appellant Clayton Robert Kessler pleaded guilty to attempted burglary, the
district court ordered him to pay $6,450 in restitution. On appeal, Kessler argues that the
district court erred by failing to properly consider his ability to pay. We affirm.
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FACTS
On March 23, 2024, law enforcement responded to a report of an individual
attempting to break into a house and vehicle and eventually identified the individual as
Kessler. The victim found “pry marks” on the rear sliding door of the house and three
screwdrivers stuck into the door frame.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Kessler with (1) attempted second -degree
burglary of a dwelling in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, subd. 1, .582, subd. 2(a)(1)
(2022); (2) first-degree criminal damage to property in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.595,
subd. 1(4) (2022); (3) motor vehicle tampering in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.546(2)
(2022); and (4) theft in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2022).
After the incident, a restitution affidavit was filed on behalf of the victim seeking
$6,450 to replace the damaged back door .1 The affidavit was accompanied by an estimate
from a construction company that confirmed the claimed amount.
In May 2025, Kessler entered an Alford plea to attempted burglary in exchange for
a 24-month sentence and dismissal of the remaining counts. 2 The district court accepted

1 As Kessler notes in his brief, the affidavits related to restitution are confidential
documents. The court may discuss the contents of the affidavits, however, because they
were openly discussed at the contested restitution hearing. See Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 11.03
(stating that nonpublic documents submitted as such “are not accessible to the public except
to the extent that they are admitted into evidence in a testimonial hearing or trial”).

2 An Alford plea is a guilty plea in which the defendant pleads guilty to a charge based on
the belief that the evidence would be sufficient for a jury to convict him but maintains his
actual innocence. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2007) (citing North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970)).
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the plea, sentenced Kessler according to the plea agreement, and ordered him to pay $6,450
in restitution.
Kessler timely filed a request for a hearing to challenge restitution. In his supporting
affidavit, he challenged the restitution award , asserting that the claim inadequately
described the items or elements lost and failed to specify the reasons justifying the amount
claimed. The day before the scheduled contested restitution hearing, Kessler filed a second
affidavit. 3 This affidavit added the following additional reasons for the challenge: the
claim does not adequately itemize the total dollar amounts; the issue of restitution was not
reserved or continued at the sentencing or dispositional hearing; and “other ,” without any
additional explanation provided by Kessler. Attached to the affidavit was an unsigned
document entitled “Notice of Motion and Motion for Restitution Hearing,” which
requested that the district court consider Kessler’s income, resources, and obligations and
the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense .
At the contested restitution hearing Kessler narrowed the basis for his challenge to
(1) whether the sliding door was damaged to the point that it needed to be replaced and
(2) his ability to pay restitution. Despite some disagreement among the parties about
whether the second issue was properly before the court, the district court decided to proceed
with both questions.
4 The district court reviewed seven exhibits which showed the

3 The second affidavit was untimely. A “detailed sworn affidavit of the offender setting
forth all challenges to the restitution . . . must be served on the prosecuting attorney and
the court at least five business days before the hearing.” Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd.
3(a) (2024). The issue of timeliness is not before us , so we do not address it further.

4 The district court’s decision to proceed with the second issue was not appealed.
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screwdrivers and damage to the back door. The district court then heard testimony from
the victim about the type and amount of damage to the door , which included an estimate
of the replacement cost. The victim also testified that replacing the door was his only
option. Kessler argued that the evidence was insufficient to show the door needed to be
replaced instead of repaired. Kessler testified that he could not afford a restitution
obligation because he had been in custody for nine months, had never be en employed, did
not have outstanding debts, did not know the amount of fees he would incur when released
from prison, and did not have anywhere to live after his release. Kessler asked the court to
consider his inability to pay and vacate the order for restitution.
The district court denied Kessler’s request to vacate or modify its restitution order.
It found the victim’s testimony credible and sufficient to support the restitution amount.
The district court also expressly considered Kessler’s ability to pay. It stated:
In regard to the ability to pay a restitution amount, one,
Mr. Kessler’s in prison by his own conduct, this conduct for
the restitution that he ’s now been ordered to pay. He’s been
ordered to pay $6,450. It is not such an amount of money that
he can ’t pay when he is released from prison or it can be
reduced to civil judgment. So I’m going to deny the motion to
modify or otherwise vacate the restitution order. The
restitution ordered at sentencing in the amount of $6,450 will
remain in place.
Kessler now appeals, requesting that we reverse the restitution award because the
district court failed to properly consider his ability to pay.
DECISION
Appellate courts “generally review a restitution order for an abuse of the district
court’s broad discretion.” State v. Wigham, 967 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Minn. 2021) (quotation
5
omitted). Appellate courts review de novo whether the district court fulfilled its statutory
obligation to consider a defendant’s ability to pay when it ordered restitution. Id. (citing
State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015) (stating that questions concerning
the authority of the court to order restitution are questions of law subject to de novo
review)).
A district court must comply with the requirements set forth in Minn. Stat.
§ 611A.045 (2024) when ordering restitution. Wigham, 967 N.W.2d at 662. Under section
611A.045, subdivision 1(a), a district court must consider “the income, resources, and
obligations of the defendant” in determining whether restitution is appropriate. “A district
court fulfills its statutory duty . . . when it expressly states, either orally or in writing, that
it considered the defendant’s ability to pay.” Id. at 664.
The court is not required to “make specific findings about the defendant’s income,
resources, and obligations to support a court’s express statement that it considered the
defendant’s ability to pay” to fulfill its statutory duty. Id. at 665. However, “the record
must include sufficient evidence about the defendant’s income, resources, and obligations
to allow a district court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay the amount of restitution
ordered.” Id. Such evidence may include “specific, concrete evidence of the defendant’s
income, resources, and obligations ”; information from a presentence investigation;
“express concession” by the defendant that they are able to pay the amount of restitution
awarded; or the inclusion of a restitution-payment schedule or structure reflecting the
defendant’s “ability to make the periodic payments.” Id. at 665- 66. “Although the
statutory requirement mandates that [district] courts consider a defendant’s ability to pay,
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it does not require [district] courts to limit a restitution award amount to only what the
defendant can afford.” Id. at 664 n.4 (citing State v. Lindsey , 632 N.W.2d 652, 663- 64
(Minn. 2001)).
Kessler concedes that the district court expressly stated that it considered his ability
to pay during the contested restitution hearing. H owever, he argues that the district court
committed reversible error under Wigham because it focused on the “wrong things” —
“[i]nstead of truly considering [his] income, resources, and obligation[s], the district court
focused on circumstances not relevant to the question of [his] ability to pay.” Kessler
contends that the district court erred because “it really just st ated facts that apply to most
people challenging restitution and recounted the law of restitution” —namely, that he was
“in prison by his own conduct, this conduct for the restitution that he’s now been ordered
to pay” and “it [could] be reduced to civil judgment” after he is released from prison. He
asserts that the district court should have relied on his testimony in which he stated he had
“no money, no job, and no home to go to once he would be released from prison.” He
therefore asks us to reverse the restitution award and remand for reconsideration of the
restitution request.
Because the district court is not required to make specific findings to support its
statement, the question before us is whether the record includes sufficient evidence about
Kessler’s income, resources , and obligations to allow the district court to consider his
ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered. See id. at 665. Under Wigham, our review
is not limited to the district court’s express reasoning or findings, but rather it may look at
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all evidence before the district court at the time of the contested restitution hearing. See id.
at 664 n.5, 665.
Here, Kessler testified about his ability to pay. He testified that, at the time of the
contested restitution hearing, he had been incarcerated at Lino Lakes prison for nine
months, was not (and had never in his life been) employed, did not have any outst anding
debts, was unsure whether he would have to pay any fees once he was released from prison,
and did not have anywhere to live upon his release. This testimony constitutes “specific,
concrete evidence of the defendant’s income, resources, and obligati ons” which Wigham
identifies as a “type of ability-to-pay evidence that meaningfully informs a district court’s
decision to order restitution.” Id. at 665 (citing State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662, 667-68
(Minn. 2007) (affirming a restitution award and noting that it was “established” at the
restitution hearing that the defendant had no assets and earned only $1.25 per hour working
at a prison job) ), id. at 665-66 (“The defendant, of course, may assist the district court in
fulfilling its duty to consider the defendant’s ability to pay by providing information about
his or her income, resources, and obligations.”).
Although it is true that Kessler’s testimony suggests that he may not have the income
and resources to presently afford the restitution amount, that is not the question before us.
The question before us is w hether the district court fulfilled its statutory obligation to
consider the defendant’s ability to pay restitution. “[T]he statutory requirement mandates
that [district] courts consider a defendant’s ability to pay, it does not require [district] courts
to limit a restitution award amount to only what the defendant can afford.” Id. at 664 n.4
(citing Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d at 663-64); see also State v. Davis , 907 N.W.2d 220, 228
8
(Minn. App. 2018) (“[Although] an offender’s ability to pay is relevant and appropriate for
a court’s consideration when ordering restitution, an offender’s inability to pay cannot
extinguish a victim’s right to restitution when that victim has experienced economic loss
from that offender’s crime.”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018).
Additionally, a defendant’s ability to pay restitution is not limited to the defendant’s
present income and resources; a district court may consider the defendant’s ability to pay
restitution in the future. See State v. Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285- 86 (Minn. 1995). Here,
the district court noted that the restitution amount was “not such an amount of money that
[Kessler couldn’t] pay when he is release d from prison,” which was in the near future at
the time of the restitution hearing.
Because the district court expressly considered Kessler’s ability to pay during the
contested restitution hearing and the record includes sufficient evidence about his income,
resources, and obligations to allow the district court to do so , the district court satisfied its
statutory obligation. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Kessler’s request to vacate or modify restitution.
Affirmed.