In re the Estate of Stephen Singer, Deceased.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1933

In re the Estate of Stephen Singer, Deceased.

Filed July 13, 2026
Reversed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-PR-22-625, 62-TR-CV-22-41

B. Steven Messick, Bethany J. Rubis, Messick Law, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant Suzanne Singer)

Steven C. Moore, Charles M. Austinson, Smith Jadin Johnson, PLLC, Bloomington,
Minnesota (for respondent Irvin Singer)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and
Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this probate dispute following the death of her father, appellant Suzanne Singer1
challenges the district court’s show-cause order directing Suzanne 2 to pay her brother,
respondent Irvin Singer, half of the funds in a bank account on which she was listed as a

1 Appellant also refers to herself as Suzanne Singer-Summer.

2 Because the decedent and both parties share a last name, we refer to Stephen, Suzanne,
and Irvin by their first names.

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joint owner with her father. Suzanne argues that the district court erred because the relief
in that order was not contained in the district court’s original findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and order following trial. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion
because the challenged order exceeds the scope of the original order and affects Suzanne’s
substantive rights. We therefore reverse.
FACTS3
At issue in this case is the distribution of decedent Stephen Singer’s bank account
at Cherokee Bank. Suzanne and Irvin are two of Stephen and Betty Singer’s children. 4 In
2006, Suzanne became a co-owner with her father of the Cherokee account. At some point
before 2022, Suzanne’s son Stephen Glancey (Glancey) and Irvin were named the pay-on-
death beneficiaries on the account.
In 2014, Stephen and Betty executed the Stephen and Betty Singer Living Trust. At
the same time, Stephen executed his last will and testament—a “pour -over” will directing
his assets into the trust should Betty predecease him. Stephen’s will identified Suzanne and
Irvin as co-personal representatives of his estate should Betty predecease him. Betty died
the next day.
In 2017, Stephen suffered a heart attack and Suzanne became his primary caregiver.
Around 2018, Stephen began showing signs of dementia. In June 2021, Stephen authorized

3 These background facts are derived from the district court’s order and trial exhibits. The
trial transcript is not in the record.

4 A third child, Steven Singer, was disinherited in Stephen’s 2014 will.

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Suzanne as a joint owner on a second bank account, at Premier Bank. At the same time,
the pay-on-death beneficiaries on the Premier account were changed from Suzanne and
Irvin to Glancey and Irvin.
In December 2021, Suzanne and Stephen met with attorneys at Safe Harbor law
firm. Stephen expressed a desire to disinherit Irvin but was unable to clearly explain why
he wished to do so. Stephen confirmed to two Safe Harbor attorneys, including Attorney
Baum, that he wanted to disinherit Irvin. At a later meeting Stephen changed his mind and
opted not to totally disinherit Irvin. In early 2022, Stephen executed an updated last will
and testament and a restated trust. Stephen also had assets outside of the trust, including
the Cherokee account.
On January 5, 2022, t he day after Stephen executed the updated will and trust,
Suzanne and Stephen removed Irvin as a pay-on-death beneficiary on the Cherokee
account, which had a balance of about $898,000. Glancey remained the sole pay-on-death
beneficiary on the Cherokee account.
Stephen died in April 2022. Eight days after Stephen’s death, Suzanne made
changes to the Premier account, which had a balance $467,000. She removed Irvin as a
pay-on-death beneficiary, added her daughter as a beneficiary, and removed Glancey as a
beneficiary but made him a joint owner of the Premier account.
Suzanne filed a petition to probate Stephen’s 2022 will and sought appointment as
the personal representative of his estate. Irvin objected to the petition and filed a petition
to probate Stephen’s 2014 will and sought appointment as the personal representative. The
matter proceeded to trial.
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According to the district court, Attorney Baum testified that he believed that, at the
time of the updated will’s execution, Stephen had testamentary capacity but not contractual
capacity. Also according to the district court, “[Stephen] apparently told Baum he did not
want to change the pay-on-death beneficiaries on these accounts. . . . And Suzanne Singer
confirmed that these assets were divided between she and Irvin Singer.” At trial, both
parties’ experts opined that by January 2022 Stephen was suffering from moderate
dementia.
In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order following trial (the trial order),
the district court determined that Stephen lacked testamentary capacity to execute the 2022
trust and will and that he was unduly influenced by Suzanne in executing them. As a result,
the district court concluded that the 2014 trust and will were in full force and effect. The
district court also found that the January 5, 2022 beneficiary change to the Cherokee
account was void, though the order did not explicitly direct Suzanne to do anything with
respect to the account. The district court found that Irvin failed to demonstrate that he was
entitled to proceeds from the Premier account, noting that, “[w]hile the court finds Suzanne
Singer’s actions suspect, Irvin Singer fails to persuade the court by clear and convincing
evidence that she unduly influenced Stephen Singer to make her a co-owner of the
account.”
The parties began to administer Stephen’s trust and estate. Irvin requested that
Suzanne pay him 50% of the Cherokee account, claiming that the trial order required such
a payment. Suzanne maintained that the trial order did not require her to pay Irvin any part
of the Cherokee account. Irvin filed a motion for an order to show cause and an
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accompanying affidavit, asking the district court to enter an order requiring Suzanne to
appear and show cause as to why she was not in contempt for failing to pay Irvin 50% of
the Cherokee account. Following briefing and a hearing, the district court filed its findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and order (the show-cause order) directing Suzanne to distribute
50% of the Cherokee account to Irvin. The district court declined to hold Suzanne in
contempt for her previous failure to pay Irvin, noting that the trial order had ordered
changes to the beneficiaries but had “failed to order [Suzanne] to relinquish half of the
proceeds to Irvin.”
Suzanne appeals.
DECISION
As an initial matter, the parties disagree on the standard of review. Suzanne contends
that this case presents a question of law that we should review de novo. Irvin contends that
we should review the district court’s determination that Suzanne had, and breached, a
fiduciary dut y for an abuse of discretion. We conclude that the case presents a mixed
question of law and fact. See In re Est. of Sullivan, 868 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. App.
2015) (applying mixed-question- of-law-and-fact standard to district court’s decision in
probate matter). “When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, we correct erroneous
applications of law, but accord the district court discretion in its ultimate conclusions and
review such conclusions under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Appellate courts give “great weight” to the district court’s “construction of its own
judgment.” Ladwig v. Chatters, 623 N.W.2d 266, 267 (Minn. App. 2001). “ Where the
terms of a judgment are ambiguous or indefinite, the court that ordered the judgment may
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clarify or interpret it.” Id. And appellate courts “will not disturb an appropriate order to
clarify, implement, or enforce terms of a decree, absent an abuse of discretion.” Nelson v.
Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Minn. App. 2011). But, absent an appropriate order, a
district court has no authority to grant relief on an issue unrelated to matters contained in
the original judgment. See Beugen v. Beugen, 352 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. App. 1984).
Drawing from the family-law realm, we observe that, “[w]hile a district court may not
modify a final property division, it may issue orders to implement, enforce, or clarify the
provisions of a decree, so long as it does not change the parties’ substantive rights.” Nelson,
806 N.W.2d at 871 (quotation omitted).
Suzanne argues that the trial order, which voided the pay-on -death-beneficiary
change to the Cherokee account, had no effect on her ownership of the account and that, as
a result, the show-cause order was an improper modification of the district court’s trial
order. Irvin argues that the show-cause order merely clarified and enforced the trial order,
which “contemplated and suggested” that Suzanne pay Irvin 50% of the Cherokee account.
We conclude that the district court exceeded the scope of the trial order by ordering
Suzanne to pay Irvin half of the proceeds of the account and, in doing so, affected her
substantive rights. As we explain in more detail below, we reach this conclusion for three
reasons. First, as the district court acknowledged, the trial order did not state that the
Cherokee account should be split between Suzanne and Irvin. Second, the trial order did
not find that Suzanne’s presumption of ownership as the surviving co-owner of the joint
account was rebutted. Third, the breach of fiduciary duty found by the district court in the
show-cause order regarding the January 5, 2022 beneficiary change is addressed by the
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trial order’s declaration that the changes are void and do not affect the ownership of the
account.
Trial Order’s Instruction
In the show-cause order, the district court acknowledged the lack of a specific
instruction in the trial order that Suzanne split the Cherokee account with Irvin and declined
to hold Suzanne in contempt for failing to do so earlier. Yet it concluded that Irvin was
entitled to half of the account:
Finally, the [district] court suggested in its order that
Irvin[] Singer was entitled to half of the account proceeds
because Suzanne Singer unduly influenced her father to
remove him as a pay- on-death beneficiary. The court merely
ordered, however, that the “beneficiary changes to the
Cherokee Bank Money Market account, dated January 5, 2022
are void.” It failed to order Suzanne Singer to relinquish half
of the proceeds to Irvin Singer. Thus, it has no basis to hold her
in contempt. Nevertheless, the preceding discussion clarifies
that Irvin Singer is entitled to receive half of the proceeds of
the Cherokee account.
(Record citations omitted.)
At the hearing on Irvin’s motion to show cause, Suzanne argued that the beneficiary
designations had no effect on account ownership. She asserted that Irvin’s removal as a
pay-on-death beneficiary due to undue influence in 2022 did not deprive Irvin of a right to
half of the account. She explained that, as a pay-on-death beneficiary, “[Irvin] would only
have received money if both Stephen and Suzanne were deceased, and he would have had
to split half of that with Stephen Glancey, who is the other payable-on-death beneficiary.”
We agree with Suzanne. As the district court acknowledged, the trial order does not
explicitly require Suzanne to pay Irvin half of the money in the Cherokee account. The trial
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order simply voids the 2022 beneficiary change. The legal effect of voiding the beneficiary
change while a joint owner is still alive is not that the funds are dispersed to the pay-on-
death beneficiaries. Rather, by Minnesota statute, the “[s]ums remaining on deposit at the
death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties.” Minn. Stat.
§ 524.6-204(a) (2024). Thus, the restoration of a person’s pay-on-death beneficiary status
on a joint account does not grant the person the right to funds in the joint account when
there is a surviving co-owner of the account.
Applicability of Minnesota Statutes Section 524.6-204
Irvin argues, however, that the statute providing that a joint account belongs to the
surviving party contains an exception that applies here and that the show-cause order
requiring Suzanne to split the account with him is therefore valid.
The statute provides that the sums in a joint account belong to the surviving party
when a co-owner dies “unless: (1) there is clear and convincing evidence of a different
intention; or (2) there is a different disposition made by a valid will specifically referring
to such account.” Id.
The problem with Irvin’s argument is that the trial order does not address an
exception to the rule of the right of survivorship. Irvin asserts that the first exception—
clear and convincing evidence of a different intention— applies, but he did not raise that
issue or cite section 524.6-204 in his pleadings before trial. 5 In its trial order, the district

5 Because the trial transcript is not in the record, it is unclear whether the parties made
additional arguments during trial that are not reflected in the district court briefing.

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court did not cite this statutory provision nor did it explicitly analyze whether Stephen had
a different intention in setting up the joint account with Suzanne. Section 524.6-204 was
mentioned for the first time by Suzanne when she cited it in her response to Irvin’s motion
for an order to show cause.
Irvin contends that the district court nevertheless implicitly considered section
524.6-204 in its trial order and “found clear and convincing evidence of a different
intention of the [ Cherokee account] remaining with Suzanne after Stephen’s death,
specifically, that Suzanne admitted that upon Stephen’s death the [Cherokee account] was
to be divided equally between herself and Irvin.” 6 But the district court’s findings in the
trial order as to Stephen’s intentions focus solely on Stephen’s intentions regarding the
beneficiaries of the Cherokee account—not his intentions regarding co-ownership with
Suzanne. The district court found that Suzanne exercised undue influence in getting
Stephen to remove Irvin as a beneficiary in 2022, and it declared that change void. Even in
the show-cause order, the district court found only that clear and convincing evidence
established that Suzanne breached a fiduciary duty when she unduly influenced her father
to remove Irvin as beneficiary in 2022. It did not find that there was clear and convincing
evidence that Stephen had a different intention regarding co-ownership of the account and

6 The parties disagree as to whether Suzanne admitted that Stephen intended the account
to be distributed equally between them. As previously noted, the full trial transcript is not
in the record. Regardless, while it is theoretically possible that Stephen did not understand
that Suzanne’s co-ownership entitled her to a right of survivorship, the district court made
no such findings about Stephen’s intent.
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that, pursuant to section 524.6-204, Suzanne did not own the account as the surviving co-
owner.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Irvin also argues that the district court in its trial order implicitly found “that
Suzanne had a fiduciary duty to Stephen, breached it with her undue influence, and as a
result severed her ownership of the [Cherokee account].” Suzanne counters that the trial
order includes no findings whatsoever about her having or breaching a fiduciary duty at
any time and that the finding in the show-cause order that “she breached her fiduciary duty
to act as a responsible steward of [Stephen’s] assets and to honor his testamentary
intentions” exceeds the scope of the trial order.
In the show- cause order, the district court cited Carlson v. Carlson, 363 N.W.2d
803 (Minn. App. 1985) , for the proposition that, because Suzanne breached her fiduciary
duty, her statutory presumption of ownership is void. In Carlson, a mother and daughter
had three joint bank accounts to which the mother contributed all the funds. 363 N.W.2d
at 804. Without mother’s knowledge, daughter and mother’s son moved the accounts to a
different bank and add ed son as a third joint owner. Id. After mother died, daughter sued
brother and the bank, claiming that she was entitled to the full accounts because son was
listed as a co-owner only for the purpose of paying mother’s bills. Id. at 805. The district
court rejected daughter’s claim and ordered the bank to divide the money equally between
daughter and son. Id. We reversed. Id. at 806. We explained that, before a presumption of
joint ownership could arise for son, the joint accounts first had to have been validly created.
Id. We remanded for findings on whether mother authorized the son to act as her agent and,
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if so, whether he had fulfilled his fiduciary duty when he added his name to the joint
account without her permission. Id. We instructed that, if the son was not authorized to act
as mother’s agent or breached his fiduciary duty, the ownership of the funds must be
determined based on the accounts before the changes were made— that is, the accounts as
they were held by mother and daughter. Id.7
Carlson is not applicable here. Neither in the trial order nor in the show-cause order
did the district court find that Suzanne had, and breached, a fiduciary duty to Stephen with
respect to the creation of the joint account in 2006, which was well before the decline of
Stephen’s health. The district court did find, only in the show-cause order, that Suzanne
had, and breached, a fiduciary duty on January 5, 2022, when she unduly influenced
Stephen to change the pay-on-death beneficiaries on the account to remove Irvin.8 But the
district court provided a remedy for that breach in the trial order when it declared the
January 5, 2022 beneficiary change void. Irvin’s argument—that the breach of fiduciary
duty relating to the January 5, 2022 beneficiary change severed the presumption of joint

7 Notably, we did not direct the district court to determine whether daughter, who was a
co-owner of the account, either had or breached a fiduciary duty. See Carlson, 363 N.W.2d
at 806.

8 We note that the district court found that Irvin did not show by clear and convincing
evidence that Stephen was unduly influenced by Suzanne in 2021 when Stephen made
Suzanne a co -owner of Premier account. If there was not enough evidence to establish
undue influence in 2021 with respect to the Premier account, it is difficult to see how there
would be enough evidence to establish undue influence in 2006 with respect to the
establishment of joint ownership of the Cherokee account.

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ownership—fails because the district court did not find a breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with the creation of the joint account.9
Even assuming that the district court could properly make a finding of a breach of
fiduciary duty in the show-cause order, the finding that Suzanne breached her fiduciary
duty by unduly influencing Stephen to change the beneficiaries on the account has no effect
on Suzanne’s ownership of the Cherokee account. 10 The district court’s instruction in the
show-cause order that Suzanne split the Cherokee account with Irvin thus extends beyond
the scope of the trial order and affects Suzanne’s substantive rights. See Nelson, 806
N.W.2d at 87. The district court abused its discretion by granting that relief.
Reversed.

9 For the same reason, our decision in In re Estate of Nordorf, 364 N.W.2d 877 (Minn.
App. 1985)—also cited in the show-cause order—is inapposite. In Nordorf, the decedent
signed two bank forms just before her death granting her cousin joint tenancy over her bank
accounts to allow cousin to pay the decedent’s bills. 364 N.W.2d at 879. We affirmed the
district court’s decision that the presumption of joint ownership was rebutted because the
joint accounts were not validly created. Id. at 880. We held that cousin had a fiduciary duty
at the time the joint accounts were created and that she breached it by not disclosing to
decedent that the funds in the joint account would go to cousin upon decedent’s death;
therefore, the joint accounts were not validly created. Id. at 879-80. We cited Carlson for
the proposition that “[t]he presumption of ownership by surviving parties to a joint account
does not arise . . . if the account was created through the violation of a fiduciary duty.” Id.
at 879 (emphasis added).

10 The district court also seems to suggest that Suzanne breached her fiduciary duty as a
co-personal representative by changing the beneficiaries on the Cherokee account, but we
agree with Suzanne that she could not have breached her fiduciary duty as a co-personal
representative because, at the time of the beneficiary change, Stephen was alive and there
was no estate.