Brian Richard Domeier, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1942

Brian Richard Domeier,
Appellant,

vs.

Andrea L. Lynn,
Respondent.

Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Brown County District Court
File No. 08-CV-25-378

Brian R. Domeier, New Ulm, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Valerie Sims, Heley, Duncan & Melander, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
Appellant challenges a district court order granting respondent’s motion for special
expedited relief seeking dismissal of his defamation claims under the Minnesota Uniform
Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 554.07 -.20 (2024), and for
dismissal under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim on
2
which relief can be granted. Appellant also argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to amend the complaint. Because the district court did
not err by dismissing appellant’s claims on rule 12.02(e) grounds and or abuse its discretion
by denying appellant’s motion to amend the complaint, we affirm.1
FACTS
Between November 2023 and October 2024, respondent Andrea L. Lynn petitioned
for three harassment restraining order s (HROs) against appellant Brian Richard Domeier
on behalf of herself and her three minor children. Lynn’s HRO petitions alleged that
Domeier engaged in multiple instances of stalking, harassment, and defamation. The
district court granted two ex parte HROs but later dismissed them at Lynn’s request. In a
separate criminal proceeding, Domeier pleaded guilty to violating one of the ex parte HROs
while it was still in effect by speaking with Lynn’s minor daughter.
2 The district court
denied Lynn’s third HRO petition after a hearing.

1 Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal under rule 12.02(e), we do not consider
the applicability of UPEPA to this case or Domeier’s assertions of error based on UPEPA.
See Myers Through Myers v. Price, 463 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Minn. App. 1990) (stating that
an appellate court will affirm the judgment if it can be sustained on any grounds), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 4, 1991). We also do not include facts related to the UPEPA issue in
this opinion. We note that Lynn sought attorney fees and costs as part of her special
expedited motion to dismiss under UPEPA, see Minn. Stat. § 554.16(a), but the record does
not reflect that the district court awarded attorney fees, and neither party addresses attorney
fees on appeal.

2 Lynn was subpoenaed as a witness in the criminal case but she did not ultimately testify
because Domeier pleaded guilty before trial.
3
Shortly after the HRO proceedings, Domeier commenced this action against Lynn,
asserting claims of defamation and defamation per se. The complaint alleged the following
instances of defamation:
[1] Specifically, [Lynn] made a published false
statement in a police report that [Domeier] was cutting brush
on her land and had torn up some of her drain tile, which was
false and defamatory, and done with malice.

[2] That [Lynn] falsely told one of [Domeier]’s
customers that he was banned from attending [an
organization’s] fundraising event because he was dangerous
and a threat. This was false as [Domeier] was never banned
from that event, and the organizer of the event testified to this
fact at a court hearing with [Lynn].

[3] That [Lynn] told [Domeier]’s friends and neighbors
that [Domeier] was dangerous and a “stalker,” which were
false statements made by [Lynn] intentionally, and with
malice.

[4] That [Lynn] has made numerous other statements to
others regarding [Domeier], that he is a bad person and
dangerous, and a stalker, all of which are false statements.[
3]

The complaint alleged that Lynn published these statements by making them in
court and in the community.
Lynn moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e),
arguing that Domeier failed to plead the alleged defamatory statements with sufficient
particularity. Lynn also argued that the alleged defamatory statements were nonactionable

3 Domeier also set forth a standalone negligence claim on identical grounds, alleging that
Lynn was “negligent in making [her] false, defamatory statements regarding [Domeier].”
Because Domeier does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his negligence claim,
we do not address it. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (stating that
issues not argued in appellant’s brief are waived).
4
opinions and privileged because they were made during judicial proceedings. Following a
motion hearing at which both parties appeared with counsel, the district court entered
judgment on an order dismissing Domeier’s complaint with prejudice. Relevant here, the
district court determined that Domeier’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted under rule 12.02(e) because Domeier did not plead the alleged defamatory
statements with sufficient specificity and because some of the statements were privileged
or nonactionable statements of opinion.
Domeier appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by dismissing Domeier’s defamation claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under rule 12.02(e).

Domeier challenges the district court’s dismissal of his defamation claims. A
district court may grant a motion to dismiss if a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). We review a district court’s grant
of a motion to dismiss de novo.4 Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010).
In doing so, we “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as
true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.
(quotation omitted).

4 Because our review is de novo, meaning that we conduct an independent legal analysis
without deferring to the district court, we do not address Domeier’s argument that the
district court improperly applied heightened federal pleading standards rather than
Minnesota notice-pleading standards. See In re Est. of Tomczik, 992 N.W.2d 691, 695
(Minn. 2023) (“Under the de novo standard, we do not defer to the analysis of the courts
below, but instead we exercise independent review.” (quotation omitted)).
5
To prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove that
(1) the defamatory statement was communicated to someone
other than the plaintiff; (2) the statement is false; (3) the
statement tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and to lower
the plaintiff in the estimation of the community; and (4) the
recipient of the false statement reasonably understands it to
refer to a specific individual.

Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 130 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).
Minnesota’s general rules of pleading require only “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. The primary
purpose of a complaint is to “put the defendant on notice of the claims against him.” Mumm
v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Minn. 2006).
Defamation claims, though, require greater specificity in the pleadings and typically
require a plaintiff to set out the alleged defamatory statements verbatim. See Moreno v.
Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Minn. 2000) (“Minnesota law has
generally required that in defamation suits, the defamatory matter be set out verbatim.” ).
Accordingly, a plaintiff sufficiently pleads a defamation claim if they quote “the allegedly
defamatory language” and identify the person responsible for speaking or publishing it.
See DeRosa v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019). Failure to recite the
defamatory statements verbatim is not necessarily fatal if the complaint identifies the
speaker of the statements and the context in which the statements were made. Schibursky
v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 820 F. Supp. 1169, 1181 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding that, under
Minnesota’s requirements for pleading a defamation claim, a complaint must allege who
made the alleged defamatory statement, to whom they made the statement, and where they
6
made the statement);5 see also Scheffler v. Franzen, No. A25-1209, 2026 WL 1130266, at
*3-4 (Minn. App. Apr. 27, 2026) (concluding that allegations were sufficiently specific to
survive a rule 12.02(e) motion whe n the complaint outlined the speakers, audience, time
frame, and context in which the alleged defamatory statements were made). 6 To be
actionable, the statement must be one of fact, not opinion; the First Amendment generally
protects statements of opinion from defamation liability. McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d
725, 733 (Minn. 2013).
The district court determined that Domeier failed to plead defamation with sufficient
specificity because the complaint did not allege the audience of the alleged defamatory
statements and provided “no information about the time and place of the alleged statements
(with the exception of noting that statements were made ‘ in court,’ though without
reference to which court).” Domeier argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
complaint for lack of specificity because the allegations in the complaint put Lynn on
notice of the claims against her, which is all that is required to survive a rule 12.02(e)
motion. We consider the alleged defamatory statements in turn.

5 “Though they do not bind us, we consider federal court opinions for their persuasive value
and afford those opinions due deference.” Laliberte v. Dollar Tree, Inc., 987 N.W.2d 590,
594 n.4 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted).

6 We cite to nonprecedential opinions of this court for persuasive value only. See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions . . . are not binding authority
. . . but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
7
A. First Statement
Domeier’s complaint alleges that Lynn “made a published false statement in a police
report that [Domeier] was cutting brush on her land and had torn up some of her drain tile,
which was false and defamatory, and done with malice.” This allegation describes the
content of the alleged defamatory statement and its speaker, but it does not contain a
verbatim recitation of the alleged defamatory statement. While the lack of a verbatim
recitation is not necessarily fatal, see Schibursky, 820 F. Supp. at 1181, Domeier’s claim
does not allege when Lynn made the statement, where she made the statement, or to whom
she made the statement. The complaint references “a police report,” but it does not identify
the police department or police officer to whom Lynn spoke. Because this allegation fails
to describe a time frame, location, or identifiable audience of the alleged defamatory
statement, it is insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Cf. Scheffler,
2026 WL 1130266, at 3-*4 (concluding that allegations were sufficiently specific to
survive a rule 12.02(e) motion whe n the complaint outlined the speakers, audience, time
frame, and context in which the alleged defamatory statements were made).
B. Second Statement
Domeier’s complaint alleges that Lynn “falsely told one of [Domeier’s] customers
that he was banned from attending a . . . fundraising event because he was dangerous and
a threat.” While the allegation states that Lynn spoke to “one of [Domeier’s] customers,”
it does not include the identity of that customer. Nor does the allegation specify where or
when Lynn made the statement. See Swartwood v. Fodness , No. A18-0649, 2018 WL
6596281, at *2 ( Minn. App. Dec. 17, 2018) (reversing a district court’s dismissal of a
8
defamation claim under rule 12.02(e) because the complaint named the speaker of the
alleged defamatory statement, “an identifiable and readily ascertainable audience” of the
statement, the substance of the statement, and a month during which the statement was
said). Therefore, this allegation lacks sufficient specificity to survive a motion to dismiss.
C. Third and Fourth Statements
We consider Domeier’s third and fourth alleged defamatory statements together.
The third alleged defamatory statement is that Lynn “told [Domeier’s] friends and
neighbors that [Domeier] was dangerous and a ‘stalker.’” As to the fourth statement,
Domeier’s complaint alleges that Lynn “made numerous other statements to others
regarding [Domeier], that he is a bad person and dangerous, and a stalker, all of which are
false statements.”
We readily conclude that these allegations lack the specificity necessary for a
defamation claim. They do not identify the friends, neighbors, or “others” Lynn allegedly
spoke to, nor do they allege any details about the place, time, or context in which the
statements were made. Thus, the third and fourth allegations lack the requisite specificity
needed to survive a rule 12.02(e) motion to dismiss. Cf. Hunter v. Coughlin,
No. A20-1137, 2021 WL 1962905, at *5 (Minn. App. May 17, 2021) (concluding that an
allegation was specific enough to survive a rule 12.02(e) motion because it identified the
speaker of the alleged defamatory statement, the audience of the statement, and a
“relatively narrow time frame” during which the statement was said).
9
In sum, the district court did not err by dismissing Domeier’s complaint because it
failed to adequately plead a claim of defamation. See DeRosa, 936 N.W.2d at 346. 7
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Domeier’s motion to
amend the complaint.

Domeier contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to amend the complaint. Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of a motion to
amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union
Co-op. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 714 (Minn. 2012).
A district court shall freely give leave to amend pleadings “when justice so
requires.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. But when proposed amendments “will accomplish
nothing, such as when the amendment does not state a cognizable legal claim, ” a district
court may deny a motion to amend the complaint. Envall v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 704, 399
N.W.2d 593, 597 (Minn. App. 1987) , rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 1987); see U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n v. RBP Realty, LLC, 888 N.W.2d 699, 705 (Minn. App. 2016) (“A plaintiff
may not amend the complaint if the proposed amendment would be futile because it would
serve no useful purpose.”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2017).

7 Domeier relies on Black v. Snyder to argue that the allegations in the complaint are
sufficiently specific despite failing to identify the time and place at which Lynn published
the defamatory statements. 471 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. App. 1991) (stating that under
Minnesota’s pleadings standards, “averments of time and place” are not affirmatively
required), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 29, 1991) . But our decision in Black was based on
federal constitutional prohibitions on excessive entanglement with internal church affairs
and did not turn on the specificity of the pleadings. Id. at 720-21. Black therefore does not
control our analysis here.
10
Here, the proposed amendments sought to remove claims that Domeier
acknowledged “could be found to be precluded by law.” The district court denied
Domeier’s motion to amend the complaint, reasoning that “the amendments or redactions
d[id] not change the outcome” that Domeier’s complaint “fail[ed] to assert a claim for
which relief can be granted.” We agree with the district court. Because the amended
complaint did not add any details that would be necessary for Domeier’s complaint to
survive a rule 12.02(e) motion , the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Domeier’s motion to amend the complaint as futile. See id. ; see also Stead-Bowers v.
Langley, 636 N.W.2d 334, 342 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request to amend the complaint to include a
defamation claim where appellant “failed to specifically plead the alleged defamatory
statements”), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2002).
Affirmed.