In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Gustry Lashawn Sailee AKA Gustry Leshan Sailee.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1943

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Gustry Lashawn Sailee AKA Gustry Leshan Sailee.

Filed May 26, 2026
Affirmed
Beane, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-24-596

Gustry Lashawn Sailee, Anoka, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Attorney’s
Office)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BEANE, Judge
Appellant Gustry Lashawn Sailee challenges the district court’s order committing
him for an indeterminate period as mentally ill and dangerous. Sailee, who is
self-represented in this appeal, appears to argue that (1) he does not have a mental illness,
(2) the county presented false information at trial, (3) he was not asked about his medical
history during the commitment hearing, and (4) he was not provided effective assistance
of counsel. We affirm.

2
FACTS
Sailee’s extensive criminal, medical, and commitment history spans nearly 30 years.
But, as relevant here, he was charged with two counts of fourth-degree assault arising from
an incident that occurred in April 2024. The district court ordered Sailee to undergo a
competency evaluation under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, after which Sailee
was determined to be incompetent to proceed. Hennepin County (the county) screened
Sailee for mental-health commitment and determined that he met the statutory criteria for
a civil-commitment petition. The county then petitioned to have Sailee civilly committed.
The district court appointed an attorney for Sailee and appointed two examiners,
each of whom examined Sailee and submitted a report. Each examiner independently
concluded that Sailee is mentally ill, presents a danger to the safety of others due to his
mental illness, and poses an elevated risk of violence. The examiners opined that, on those
grounds, Sailee satisfies the statutory requirements for commitment as a person who is
mentally ill and dangerous.
At the commitment hearing, the two court -appointed examiners, the medical
director at a secure treatment facility, Sailee, and Sailee’s mother testified. The district court
also considered more than 40 exhibits, including police reports and criminal complaints
from criminal matters involving Sailee , Sailee’s rule 20 evaluation, the county screening
report, and the reports from both court-appointed examiners. The district court found that
Sailee has “a substantial psychiatric disorder of his thought, mood, perception, orientation,
and memory, that grossly impairs his judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, and
ability to reason or understand” and that his “mental illness is manifested by instances of
3
grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions.” The district court also found that because
of his mental illness, Sailee “presents a clear danger to the safety of others,” “has engaged
in overt acts capable of causing serious physical harm to another,” and that there “is a
substantial likelihood that [he] will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical
harm on another.” Based on those findings, the district court concluded that clear and
convincing evidence establishes that Sailee “is a person mentally ill and dangerous to the
public,” as defined by statute, and that he should be committed to the Minnesota Security
Hospital.
At a July 2025 hearing to determine whether Sailee should be indeterminately
committed, the district court considered Sailee’s 60-day report, his treatment plan, progress
notes, and other records. A court-appointed examiner testified that Sailee met the statutory
criteria for continued commitment as mentally ill and dangerous . The district court
concluded that Sailee “continues to be a person mentally ill and dangerous to the public”
and that he “should be committed for an indeterminate period.”
Sailee appeals.
DECISION
We review de novo “whether there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to
support the district court’s conclusion that appellant meets the standards for commitment.”
In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003). A district court’s civil-commitment
determination “must be justified by findings based upon evidence at the hearing.” In re
Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). We review the district court’s findings of fact
4
for clear error, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings
and deferring to the district court’s credibility determinations. Id.
To order Sailee’s judicial commitment, the district court had to find by clear and
convincing evidence that Sailee “poses a risk of harm due to mental illness” and that there
is “no suitable alternative” to commitment. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2024). A
“person who poses a risk of harm due to a mental illness” includes
any person who has an organic disorder of the brain or a
substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception,
orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or
understand, that is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed
behavior or faulty perceptions and who, due to this impairment,
poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others
as demonstrated by:

. . . .

(3) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or
others.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17a (2024).
On appeal, Sailee seems to argue that this statutory standard was not met because
he does not have a mental illness. But t he record includes clear and convincing evidence
that Sailee is a person with a mental illness as defined by statute. The evidence includes
evaluations from two court-appointed examiners. Each of those examiners independently
concluded that Sailee is a person with a mental illness—mainly schizophrenia—who poses
a substantial likelihood of physical harm to himself or others, and they each testified
consistent with their evaluation reports. The evidence also includes Sailee’s past criminal,
medical, and commitment history as detailed in rule 20 evaluations, various orders,
5
treatment notes, and court files spanning nearly 30 years. At the commitment hearing,
Sailee acknowledged that he “suffer[s] from schizophrenia” to “a certain degree,” but
stated that he does not experience all the symptoms of schizophrenia. This record contains
clear and convincing evidence supporting the district court’s findings that Sailee has a
substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception, or orientation and that he
poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to himself or others. Thus, because Sailee
does not challenge the district court’s determination that there is no suitable alternative to
commitment, he has not shown that the district court erred in ordering him committed for
an indeterminate period as mentally ill and dangerous.
Sailee also raises three other issues related to the commitment hearing. He argue s
that the county presented false information, that he was not asked about his medical history,
and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We address each of these arguments
in turn.
Sailee asserts generally that the county presented false information at the
commitment hearing. Sailee claims that the examiners and the county provided false
testimony, that the county falsified all 42 of its exhibits, and that a witness was manipulated
into testifying falsely against him. This argument is unavailing. First, Sailee did not raise
this issue in the district court. Sailee’s attorney did not object to any of the county’s
exhibits. And when Sailee was asked directly during his testimony whether there was
anything else he wanted the district court to know, he did not mention any errors in the
testimony presented by the county. We may not consider arguments not raised in the district
court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Second, even if th is issue
6
were properly before us, Sailee has not identified any specific exhibits or testimony
presented by the county that he believes was false, and he has not offered any support for
his allegations that the county presented false information or manipulated witnesses.
Accordingly, we see no basis to conclude that the county presented false information to the
district court. See Louden v. Louden, 22 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Minn. 1946) (“An assignment
of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in
appellant’s brief . . . will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on
mere inspection.”).
Sailee next contend s that he was never asked about his medical history. The
commitment hearing transcript shows that Sailee was not asked about his medical history.
But Sailee has not shown how the absence of his testimony about his medical history was
erroneous or prejudicial. See Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (stating that
an appellant bears the burden on appeal to show error and resulting prejudice). Again,
Sailee’s attorney gave him an open-ended opportunity to address anything else he wanted
the court to know. Sailee could have provided any additional information about his medical
history that he believed was important for the district court to consider, but he did not. And
Sailee does not point to anything specific about the extensive information the county
provided to the district court regarding his medical or commitment history that he believes
is incomplete or inaccurate. We therefore cannot conclude that Sailee was prejudiced by
the fact that the record did not include his own testimony about his medical history.
Finally, Sailee argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney did not file certain exhibits, and that he never waived the right to admit evidence
7
or to confront witnesses. In commitment matters, we review claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo, using the same standard that applies in criminal cases. In re
Civ. Commitment of Johnson, 931 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 17, 2019). That is, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant bears
the burden to show that counsel’ s representation “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,” and that “but for counsel’ s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,
694 (1984); see also Johnson, 931 N.W.2d at 657. We may address the “prongs in either
order and may dispose of a claim on one without analyzing the other.” Martin v. State, 825
N.W.2d 734, 744 (Minn. 2013). “Appellate courts apply a strong presumption that an
attorney’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
General assertions of error without evidentiary support are inadequate to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, a reviewing court generally will not review
attacks on counsel’s trial strategy.” Johnson, 931 N.W.2d at 657 (quotations and citations
omitted).
As to Sailee’s assertion that his counsel failed to file certain exhibits, Sailee does
not specify what those exhibits were, aside from body-worn camera footage from his April
2024 arrest, nor does he explain how their omission prejudiced him at the commitment
hearing. Sailee contends that the body-worn camera footage from his April 2024 arrest
would prove that he was innocent of the criminal charges. But the district court did not rely
solely on the April 2024 arrest in ordering Sailee’s commitment as mentally ill and
dangerous. Instead, the district court relied on an extensive record documenting Sailee’s
8
criminal, mental-health, and commitment history over many years. Given these
circumstances, Sailee has not established that his attorney’s failure to present the body-
worn camera footage from his April 2024 arrest or any other unidentified exhibit was
prejudicial. See id. (“General assertions of error without evidentiary support are inadequate
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
As to Sailee’s contention that he never waived the right to admit evidence or to
confront witnesses, 1 Sailee also has not established that his counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable or prejudiced the outcome of the commitment proceeding. Sailee
had a full opportunity to rebut the county’s evidence and to present his own evidence.
Sailee’s counsel at the commitment hearing stipulated to the county’s exhibits, cross-
examined the county’s witnesses, and presented witnesses on Sailee’s behalf. And nothing
in the record reflects that Sailee sought to introduce exhibits beyond those presented by the
county or to examine other witnesses.
In sum, Sailee does not identify—and our independent review of the record has not
revealed—any aspect of counsel’s performance that fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Sailee also has not demonstrated that any purported error by his counsel
prejudiced the outcome of the commitment hearing. Thus, we cannot conclude that Sailee
received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.

1 The right to confront witnesses that exists in criminal cases does not apply in a civil
proceeding. See In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 373 (Minn. App. 1995) (explaining that
commitment proceedings are civil in nature and that the Confrontation Clause applies only
in criminal cases), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1995).
9