State of Minnesota v. James Tyrone Woods

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1946

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Tyrone Woods,
Appellant.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Rasmusson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-24-3168

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Hannah B. Laub, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RASMUSSON, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence for possession of theft tools,
arguing that the statute underlying his conviction is unconstitutionally vague and that the

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district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a downward dispositional
departure. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 15, 2024, appellant James Tyrone Woods was at a retail store in St. Paul.
An employee who was monitoring the store’s security cameras saw Woods conceal some
of the store’s clothing merchandise. This employee saw Woods go to a different part of
the store where he grabbed a pair of scissors, removed them from their package, and used
them to cut security tags off the clothing. Law enforcement apprehended Woods at the
store after he walked past all points of sale.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Woods with one count of possession of
theft tools in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.59 (2022). The matter proceeded to a jury trial
in June 2025, and the jury found Woods guilty.
The district court held a sentencing hearing in August 2025. At the hearing, Woods
moved for a downward dispositional departure. The state did not take a position on the
departure motion. The presentence investigation report (PSI ) recommended a downward
dispositional departure. Woods argued that he would be a “good candidate for probation”
because he did not have violations while out on conditional release, he did not have a recent
alcohol or drug addiction, he could benefit from a cognitive -skills class, and he did not
present a public-safety risk.
Ultimately, the district court denied Woods’s request for a downward dispositional
departure, stating that it was “shocked” to see that Woods had over 40 prior convictions.
The district court added that it could not say that Woods was particularly amenable to

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probation given his extensive criminal history. It further explained that, when it evaluates
whether someone is an appropriate candidate for a dispositional departure, it considers
whether the person is “struggling because of chemical . . . use” or “struggling [with] some
other situation” such that the person could benefit from programming . Because Woods ,
who was not struggling with chemical use , could not benefit from chemical -use
programming or other programming, and had not shown that he was willing to change his
trajectory, the district court determined that he was not suitable for probation.
The district court sentenced Woods to 19 months in prison, a downward durational
departure from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines , which provide s for a presumptive
executed sentence of 20 to 27 months . Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A , 5.A (Supp. 2023).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court stated that “[e]verything in that
neighborhood [was] shutting down because [of] people doing stuff like [Woods was]
doing.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. Woods has forfeited his challenge that the offense statute is unconstitutionally
vague.

Woods first argues that the statute underlying the theft -tools offense is
unconstitutionally vague. He concedes that he did not present this argument to the district
court.
Appellate courts “ordinarily do not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal, even when those issues are constitutional questions of criminal procedure or are

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challenges to the constitutionality of a statute.” State v. Williams , 794 N.W.2d 867, 874
(Minn. 2011); see also State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn. 2014) (“The law is clear
in Minnesota that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be challenged for the first time
on appeal.” (quotation omitted)). There is, however, an exception to this rule in which
appellate courts “may choose to address constitutional and other issues that were not raised
at the district court, when the interests of justice require their consideration and when doing
so would not work an unfair surprise on a par ty.” Williams , 794 N.W.2d at 874. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has considered issues for the first time on appeal in the interests
of justice when, for example, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision that could
have plausibly affected the scope of the criminal defendant’s available relief. State v.
Henderson, 706 N.W.2d 758, 759-60 (Minn. 2005).
Woods contends that we should address the vagueness argument because it is purely
a legal issue, the interests of justice require consideration because the statute lacks proper
safeguards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and there is no unfair
surprise to the state. The state counters that Woods does not meet the significant criteria
necessary to meet this exception.
The interests of justice do not require us to address Woods’s vagueness argument.
Nothing prevented Woods from asserting, in the district court, his claim that the relevant
statute is unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, there is no applicable chang e in the law,
like in Henderson, that warrants the use of this exception. Id. (addressing a constitutional
issue not raised below because Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296 (2004), had been
decided while the appellant’s case was pending on appeal ). Because Woods fails to

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persuade us that the circumstances warrant applying this narrow exception , we do not
consider his constitutional challenge.
II. The district court acted within its discretion in sentencing Woods.
Woods argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
a downward dispositional departure because the circumstances support a departure, it failed
to evaluate all relevant information, it based its decision on an erroneous view of the law,
and it considered impermissible factors.
District courts have significant discretion in their sentencing decisions. State v.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2014). We review a district court’s sentencing decision
for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 307-08. “[A] [district] court abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law.” Id. at 308 n.1 (quotation omitted).
Appellate courts will affirm a “[district] court’s exercise of discretion, as long as the record
shows [that] the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information
presented before making a determination.” State v. Pegel , 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn.
App. 2011) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “generally will not interfere with a
[district] court’s decision to impose a term within the presumptive sentence range,” State
v. Kangbateh, 868 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 2015), and will reverse a district court’s refusal
to depart only in a “rare case,” State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
The sentences prescribed by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines are “presumed
to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and offense severity
characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (Supp. 2023). A district court’s decision
to depart from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines must be based on “identifiable,

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substantial, and compelling circumstances.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn.
2016) (quoting Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2012)). One factor that a district court may
use to justify a departure is “particular[] amenab[ility] to probation.” Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7) (Supp. 2023). Factors relevant to whether an individual is
particularly amenable to probation include “the defendant ’s age, his prior record, his
remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or
family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (the Trog factors). But a district
court is not required to depart even if a defendant is particularly amenable to probation.
State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009).
Here, Woods requested a downward dispositional departure from the presumptive
guidelines sentence, which in this case is an executed sentence of 20 to 27 months. Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 4.A, 5.A. A downward dispositional departure “places the offender in a
different setting than that called for by the presumptive guidelines sentence,” such as a stay
of execution of a sentence. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623.
Woods first argues that the Trog factors support departure because of his age (at
least 60 years old), remorse, cooperation, respectful attitude, and support from family and
friends. The district court disagreed, noting that Woods had over 40 prior convictions and
that his criminal history was “prolific” and “shocking.” Woods relatedly argues that
departure is appropriate because substantial grounds exist to mitigate his culpability, such
as his advanced age, housing insecurity, limited income, and lack of use of a weapon. See
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3 (Supp. 2023) (listing mitigating factors that can be used as
reasons for departure). Even so, the presence of mitigating factors does not compel a

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sentencing departure. Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 18, 2014). And this court will not interfere with the district court’s refusal to
depart on the basis that a mitigating factor is present. State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660,
668 (Minn. 2006).
Woods next argues that the district court did not carefully evaluate all the
information in the record before denying his departure motion, such as the fact that he was
experiencing economic difficulties and the PSI’s recommendation in favor of a downward
dispositional departure. The record , however, reflects that the district court did evaluate
all this information through its review of the PSI and consideration of Woods’s arguments
in favor of departure. See Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255.
Woods additionally argues that the district court based its sentencing decision on an
erroneous view of the law by deciding that he is less amenable to probation on the ground
that he is not chemically dependent. He relies upon the following statement from the
district court:
When I ’m looking at somebody who’ s an appropriate
candidate for a dispositional departure, I’m looking at are you
struggling because of chemical health use? You’re not. Are
you struggling for some other situation that I can put some
programming in place on probation that’s going to change your
trajectory, your path? You’ve shown us that you are not
willing to make that change.

When considered in its full context, this statement reflects that the district court broadly
considered whether Woods could benefit from some type of programming while on
probation to address issues related to his criminal conduct , which could contribute to his
amenability to probation. The district court used chemical-health treatment as an example

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of potential programming . Woods accordingly fails to show that the district court
misapplied the law.
Woods last argues that the district court considered impermissible factors in its
sentencing decision. After the district court imposed its sentence, it stated, “Everything in
that neighborhood is shutting down because people doing stuff like you ’re
doing . . . . [Y]ou can ’t act like this and not expect to have the consequences that the
legislature has set for it.” We are unconvinced that this statement reflects consideration of
impermissible factors. The district court made the challenged statement only after
imposing its sentence. Additionally, “a district court may consider both offender- and
offense-related factors” when addressing a motion for a downward dispositional departure.
State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018). W hen read in its full context,
the district court’s statement demonstrates that it was discussing the practical effects of
Woods’s conduct in explaining the rationale behind the law’s presumption of incarceration
for this offense. The record accordingly does not reflect that the district court considered
impermissible factors in imposing its sentence.
In sum, t he district court ’s denial of Woods’s downward-dispositional-departure
motion is supported by the record, which reflects that the district court “carefully
considered circumstances for and against” a departure. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255. Woods
has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in its sentencing decision.
Affirmed.