Jenna Flick Susko v. Jacob Lee Wilson

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1951

Jenna Flick Susko,
Respondent,

vs.

Jacob Lee Wilson,
Appellant.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-CV-25-2429

Jenna Flick Susko, Northfield, Minnesota (attorney pro se)

Jacob Lee Wilson, Lakeville, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge;
and Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s issuance of a harassment restraining order
(HRO), arguing that the record does not show that he engaged in harassment. Because the
district court’s determination that appellant engaged in harassment is supported by

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evidence in the record and appellant otherwise fails to establish that the district court
abused its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Jenna Flick Susko is an attorney who represents appellant Jacob Lee
Wilson’s ex-wife in a contentious custody dispute that commenced in September 2024. In
August 2025, Susko petitioned the district court for an HRO against Wilson. According to
the petition, after the custody case began, Wilson (1) made uninvited and unannounced
visits to Susko’s workplace, which frightened Susko and resulted in Wilson’s picture being
posted at the office ; (2) sent “voluminous emails” to Susko containing “manipulative,
harassing, repet[i]tive, and intimidating language and threats,” despite Susko’s requests
that Wilson not contact her “unless it was vital to the case”; and (3) threatened to file and
filed motions for sanctions and professional ethics complaints against Susko “in an effort
to intimidate [her].”
The district court issued an ex parte HRO, finding “reasonable grounds to believe
that [Wilson] has engaged in harassment which has or is intended to have a substantial
adverse effect on safety, security, or privacy of [Susko].” The district court prohibited
Wilson from having contact with Susko, with exceptions related to compliance with court
rules and court orders. The district court ordered that the HRO remain in effect until
August 8, 2027, unless changed by a later court order.
Wilson denied harassing Susko and requested an evidentiary hearing. At the
hearing, both parties appeared and were self-represented. In addition to receiving

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testimony from both parties, the district court received testimony from Wilson’s ex-wife
(Susko’s client) and Susko’s former boss.
Susko testified and provided details about the incidents set forth in her petition. She
testified that she has been “bombarded with long, duplicative, repetitive, aggressive,
hostile, and threatening communications” from Wilson, usually via email. Susko
submitted an exhibit containing 17 pages of emails between the parties, which she
described as “not all of the communications [the parties] had,” but rather was what she had
“deemed as the harassing, hostile, and threatening communications.” She testified that
these emails “display a pattern” of Wilson continuing to email Susko, court staff, and
Susko’s former boss “long after he’s been told to stop.” Susko also testified that Wilson
“insisted on continuing to hand-deliver [Susko] documents instead of mailing or e-mailing
them after [Susko’s former boss] told him to stop coming to the office,” resulting in a
picture of Wilson being posted in the office as a security measure. Susko testified that
“[n]ot only was [she] in fear for [her] personal safety,” but that “the entire office feared
Mr. Wilson’s intimidating practices.” Finally, Susko testified that Wilson “consistently”
threatens to file sanctions and ethics complaints against her, and that he had filed two ethics
complaints against Susko “stating bad-faith litigation and tactics, both of which were
summarily denied without investigation.”
Susko’s former boss also testified, stating that it was “alarming” that Wilson
contacted and visited the office as often as he did, particularly given his “disregard” of
requests to limit his communications and not show up at the office unannounced. She
confirmed that Wilson ’s photo was posted in the office as a “safety protocol” given

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concerns about Wilson’s behavior “to alert other people if he comes through that door,
exercise some caution when you’re interacting with this person.”
Wilson testified that he did not harass Susko. He acknowledged that he had been
“persistent and at times frustrated,” but testified that he had “never threatened, never sworn
at, [and] never personally attacked” Susko. He testified that “[e]very communication was
about [his] children and [his] rights as their father,” and asserted that “[k]ey sections of
e-mails were cut out to reframe this harassment.” He also asserted that he “didn’t break
the law by stopping at [Susko’s] office and dropping off court documents.”
At the end of the hearing, the district court ruled that Susko had proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that Wilson’s behavior amounted to harassment and that it
would issue the requested HRO. In reaching this conclusion, the district court stated that
it believed Wilson’s testimony that his “intention is to be an advocate for [his] children,”
but noted that Wilson’s intention to harass “is not what the definition of harassment
includes only,” and Susko “has proven both through witness testimony and her own
testimony that she has experienced a substantial adverse impact on her sense of safety,
security, and privacy.” The district court stated that Susko “communicated to [Wilson]
how she would want to be treated so that this is not going to be experienced as harassing,”
and Wilson has “refused to do that.” And the district court expressly found that Susko’s
testimony regarding the substantial adverse effect of Wilson’s conduct on her sense of
safety, security, and privacy was credible. On the same day, the district court filed a written
order granting the HRO, to remain in effect until September 19, 2027.
Wilson appeals.

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DECISION
Wilson argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting an HRO
because the evidence in the record does not establish that he engaged in harassment. 1 We
disagree.
We review a district court’s issuance of an HRO for an abuse of discretion. Borth
v. Borth, 970 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Minn. App. 2022). “A district court abuses its discretion
if it makes findings of fact that are not supported by the record, misapplies the law, or
resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record.” Id.
(quotation omitted). We will not set aside a district court’s findings in support of an HRO
unless they are clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the district court’s credibility
determinations. Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Minn. App. 2004), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
findings and do not find our own facts, reweigh the evidence, or reconcile conflicting
evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021).
A district court may grant an HRO if, in part, “the court finds at the hearing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2024). “Harassment” is defined to include “repeated
incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse
effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy

1 Susko did not file a brief on appeal, so we ordered that the appeal proceed pursuant
to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03 (providing that if respondent fails to file a brief, the case
shall be determined on the merits).

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of another.” Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2024). Harassment is conduct that “goes beyond an
acceptable expression of outrage and civilized conduct.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 846. A
party seeking an HRO must show (1) “objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the
part of the harasser” and (2) an objectively reasonable belief by the object of the harassing
conduct that he or she was being “subject[ed] to harassing conduct.” Dunham v. Roer, 708
N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006).
The district court determined that Susko’s petition, exhibits, and testimony, as well
as the testimony of her client and former boss, provided “reasonable grounds to believe
that [Wilson] has engaged in harassment which has or is intended to have a substantial
adverse effect on safety, security, or privacy of [Susko].” The district court found Susko’s
testimony credible and considered the context of the parties’ relationship when determining
whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that Wilson engaged in harassment. The
district court relied on the following incidents as evidence of harassment: (1) Wilson’s
repeated unannounced visits to Susko’s office; (2) the volume , tone, and substance of
Wilson’s emails to Susko; and (3) Wilson’s threats to file motions for sanctions and ethics
complaints against Susko.
The record supports the district court’s determination that there were reasonable
grounds to believe that Wilson engaged in harassment because the volume, tone, and
substance of Wilson’s communications— combined with Wilson’s repeated, unannounced
visits to Susko’s office—were objectively unreasonable and had a substantial adverse

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effect on Susko’s safety, security, and privacy.2 Both Susko and her former boss testified
about Wilson’s “alarming” behavior of unannounced visits to Susko’s workplace and that
Wilson continued to send Susko voluminous emails in a hostile tone. Wilson was not
deterred by requests for him to stop this behavior or engage in alternative communication
channels. The district court received evidence of the complete email threads that Susko
had identified as hostile and threatening communications. And both Susko and her former
boss testified about the adverse effects Wilson’s conduct had on Susko’s sense of safety
and security, which the district court expressly determined to be credible. Viewing this
evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings, and giving due regard
to the district court’s credibility determinations, we conclude the district court’s
determination that Wilson engaged in harassment is supported by the record and thus
discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s issuance of an HRO.
To persuade us otherwise, Wilson seems to argue that his conduct does not
constitute harassment under Minn. Stat. § 609.748 (2024) because (1) communications
related to active litigation cannot constitute harassment as a matter of law; (2) the district
court’s “own findings on intent and context are incompatible with a conclusion that
[Wilson’s] conduct was objectively unreasonable harassment”; and (3) there is insufficient

2 Because we conclude that the evidence of Wilson’s unwelcome emails and visits to
Susko’s office adequately support the district court’s determination that there were
reasonable grounds to believe Wilson engaged in harassment, we do not consider whether
evidence of Wilson’s threats to file motions for sanctions and ethics complaints against
Susko also support the district court’s issuance of an HRO.

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evidence in the record to support the district court’s conclusion that Wilson’s behavior had
a substantial adverse effect on Susko’s safety, security, or privacy. We are not persuaded.
First, Wilson does not identify any applicable authority supporting his contention
that communications cannot constitute harassment under section 609.748 if they are related
to active litigation. The plain language of the statute establishes no such limitation. See
State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2023) (“We will not read into the statute
any modifying or limiting language.”). That the communications occurred in the context
of active litigation does not immunize Wilson from his conduct constituting harassment
under section 609.748, particularly given that the volume and abusive tone of the
communications continued after Wilson was told to stop and to use available alternative
channels for communication.3
Second, Wilson’s argument that it is inconsistent to find that he acted without intent
to harass and to conclude that his actions were objectively unreasonable is legally flawed.
Under Minnesota law, a party seeking an HRO must show either “objectively unreasonable

3 Wilson asserts that Susko “was not a private citizen free to opt out of all contact; she was
the designated professional point of contact in ongoing litigation.” Wilson’s argument
mischaracterizes Susko’s request. The record shows that Susko attempted to place
boundaries on Wilson’s communications with her, not preclude him from contacting her
when vital to the case. The district court recognized Wilson’s disregard for such
boundaries, stating: “[Susko] has communicated to you how she would want to be treated
so that this is not going to be experienced as harassing and you have refused to do that.”
Even so, the district court concluded that Wilson followed Susko and frightened her by
making repeated uninvited, unannounced visits to her office. This unchallenged finding
by the district court is an independent basis for us to affirm the district court’s issuance of
the HRO. Cf. Hunter v. Anchor Bank, N.A. , 842 N.W.2d 10, 17 (Minn. App. 2013)
(affirming entry of summary judgment when appellant’s brief on appeal did not challenge
independent and sufficient ground for judgment), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2014).

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conduct” or “intent on the part of the harasser.” Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758,
764 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotations omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1)
(defining “harassment” to include words and acts “that have a substantial adverse effect or
are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of
another” (emphasis added)). That the district court may have determined that Wilson did
not intend to harass Susko does not mean that the district court must necessarily conclude
that his conduct was not of a nature to justify issuance of the HRO.4
Third, Wilson argues that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that his behavior
had a substantial adverse effect on Susko’s safety, security, or privacy because Susko did
not present evidence that she “altered her routines, installed security measures, moved,
changed phone numbers, sought law enforcement based on any specific threat, had private
information accessed outside the litigation, or experienced any material impairment of her
ability to practice law or conduct daily life.” But Wilson does not identify any authority
providing that such evidence is necessary to establish harassment under section 609.748.
See State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 476 -77 (Minn. App. 2019) (“Although some
accommodations may be made for [self-represented] litigants, we generally hold them to

4 Wilson also argues that the district court abused its discretion by “relying heavily” on
exhibits that contained excerpted portions of email threads and “effectively discounting”
exhibits that contained the complete versions of those threads. He asserts that “[t]he
complete threads show that the emails were tethered to litigation issues, not independent
harassment.” But the district court received the complete email threads, so Wilson appears
to be asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
221-22. Wilson has not identified any abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary
decisions or analysis, and we decline to further consider this argument. See Horodenski v.
Lyndale Green Townhome Ass’n, 804 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. App. 2011) (“[E]rror is not
presumed on appeal, and the burden of showing error rests on the party asserting it.”).

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the same standards as attorneys. . . . Arguments are forfeited if they are presented in a
summary and conclusory form, do not cite to applicable law, and fail to analyze the law
when claiming that errors of law occurred.” (quotation omitted)). We give due regard to
the district court’s determination that Susko provided credible testimony regarding the
impacts on her sense of safety, security, and privacy from Wilson’s behavior. Kush, 683
N.W.2d at 843-44.
Finally, Wilson appears to advance an as-applied constitutional challenge to section
609.748, arguing that the HRO statute unconstitutionally burdens his First Amendment
rights to complain about Susko’s professional conduct. Wilson did not present this
constitutional challenge to the district court. Because constitutional questions cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal, we decline to consider Wilson’s argument. See In re
Welfare of C.L.L., 310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (stating that an “appellant cannot
now for the first time raise constitutional issues that were not raised in the [district] court”).
We observe, in any event, that the record adequately supports the district court’s
determination independent of complaints related to Wilson’s professional conduct.
Affirmed.