All In Sober Living, LLC, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1952

All In Sober Living, LLC,
Respondent,

vs.

Stephen Beaulieu,
Appellant.

Filed June 8, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HG-CV-25-3479

Andrew T. Dibble, Generations Law Firm, PLLC, Plymouth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Stephen Beaulieu, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of respondent in
an eviction action. Appellant argues that the district court violated his procedural-due-

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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process rights and erred by entering the eviction judgment because respondent did not
attach the lease to the eviction complaint. Because we discern no violation of appellant’s
procedural-due-process rights and conclude that the district court did not err in concluding
that the complaint was proper, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 18, 2025, respondent-landlord All In Sober Living, LLC initiated an
eviction action against appellant Stephen Beaulieu, alleging that Beaulieu failed to pay rent
in July, August, and September 2025. The complaint alleged that landlord mailed a 14-day
notice of nonpayment of rent to Beaulieu.
Approximately two weeks later, landlord filed an amended complaint. The
amended complaint also alleged that Beaulieu was “given” a 60-day notice of non-renewal
of lease on July 25, 2025. The notice of non- renewal was dated October 6, 2025, and its
salutation was addressed to “Culver Nile.” Landlord did not attach a lease to the original
or amended complaints.
The district court held an initial hearing on October 23, 2025.
1 During the hearing,
Beaulieu argued that the complaint was deficient because landlord did not attach the lease.
The district court reserved ruling on this issue and scheduled a court trial for November 3.

1 We observe that Beaulieu did not order transcripts of the district court proceedings. An
appellant bears “the burden to provide an adequate record.” Mesenbourg v. Mesenbourg,
538 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn. App. 1995). As part of that burden, it is the appellant’s duty
to order “a transcript of those parts of the proceedings not already part of the record which
are deemed necessary for inclusion in the record.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.02,
subd. 1(a). If no transcript is ordered for a hearing, we are unable to review a party’s
argument that the other party did or did not prove its claims. Fischer v. Simon, 980 N.W.2d
142, 144 (Minn. 2022). Accordingly, our review of what occurred during the district court
3
At the virtual hearing on November 3, the district court again heard arguments
related to landlord’s failure to attach a copy of the lease to the complaint. At the end of the
hearing, the district court judge thanked the parties and logged off. As the hearing was
shutting down, Beaulieu began to speak. When the district court judge logged back into
the virtual hearing, the parties had left. In an order filed the same day, the district court
stated that it was keeping the record open for ten additional days to allow Be aulieu time
“to file any additional argument he wants to make with the court for its consideration” in
order “to ensure that every party is heard.”
On November 13, Beaulieu filed a motion to dismiss the eviction action, arguing—
as relevant here —that the action must be dismissed because landlord failed to attach the
lease to the complaint. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.321, subd s. 3(1) (stating in relevant part
that person bringing eviction action must attach to the complaint “the current written lease,
if any, or most recent written lease in existence”), 5 (“The court must dismiss and expunge
the record of any action if the person bringing the action fails to comply with this section.”)
(2024). Beaulieu also argued that the 60-day notice of non-renewal was invalid because it
was addressed to Culver Nile instead of Beaulieu and dated October 6, 2025.
Landlord replied to Beaulieu’s motion to dismiss, asserting that the lease was not
attached to the complaint because landlord did not have a copy of the lease in its possession.
Landlord argued that Beaulieu suffered no prejudice as a result of landlord’s failure to
attach the lease to the complaint because Beaulieu possessed a copy of the lease. In

proceedings is limited to the district court’s summary of the proceedings in its November 3
and November 17 orders.
4
response to Beaulieu’s argument that the notice of non-renewal is defective, landlord
asserted that the “minor clerical error” in the notice “does not negate or obscure the clear
intent and content of the notice,” which, in landlord’s view, adequately provided notice to
Beaulieu under Minnesota law.
On November 17, the district court filed an order in which it concluded that, based
on Beaulieu’s failure to pay rent in July, August, and September 2025, landlord is entitled
to possession of the property. The district court based its undisputed finding that Beaulieu
did not pay rent on Beaulieu’s failure to “file any proof of payment or receipt stubs as
exhibits” or to “orally state that he had, in fact, paid his monthly rent.” In response to
Beaulieu’s contention that the action should be dismissed because the lease was not
attached to the complaint, the district court concluded that landlord complied with Minn.
Stat. § 504B.321, subd. 3(1), despite landlord’s failure to attach the lease to the complaint,
because the lease requirement “is not absolute.” Finally, the district court concluded that
Beaulieu suffered no prejudice related to the lease not being attached to the complaint
because Beaulieu “had in his possession a copy of the lease entered between himself
and . . . the former owner.” The district court subsequently entered judgment in favor of
landlord. Beaulieu appeals.

5
DECISION
I. The district court did not err in concluding that the complaint was proper
under Minn. Stat. § 504B.321, subd. 3(1).

Beaulieu argues that the district court erred in concluding that landlord’s complaint
was proper under Minn. Stat. § 504B. 321, subd. 3(1), and thus erred in denying his motion
to dismiss on this basis.
Beaulieu’s argument requires us to interpret Minn. Stat. § 504B.321, subd. 3(1) ,
which presents a question of law that we review de novo. Nationwide Hous. Corp. v.
Skoglund, 906 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2018).
“The plain language of the statute controls when the meaning of the statute is
unambiguous.” Snell v. Walz, 6 N.W.3d 458, 467 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
Minn. Stat. § 504B.321, subd. 3(1), provides that a “person bringing a complaint
under this section must . . . attach the current written lease, if any, or most recent written
lease in existence, and any relevant lease addenda.” (Emphasis added.) Beaulieu argues
that, under subdivision 3(1), a plaintiff in an eviction action must attach a written lease to
the complaint, and that failure to comply with this section mandates dismissal of the
complaint. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.321, subd. 5.
Beaulieu’s argument is not supported by the plain language of Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.321, subd. 3(1). The district court accepted evidence in the record that the landlord
did not have in its possession a copy of the lease because that lease was lost during a
transfer of ownership. The district court also found that Beaulieu’s lease expired in July
2022 and, as a result, Beaulieu’s tenancy was a month-to-month tenancy at the time
6
landlord initiated the eviction action. 2 Because the plain language of Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.321, subd. 3(1), does not impose an absolute requirement that the landlord attach a
lease to the eviction complaint, and because, in any event, the lease had expired, we reject
Beaulieu’s argument that the district court erred in concluding that the complaint was
proper.3
II. The district court did not deprive Beaulieu of procedural due process.

Beaulieu argues that the district court violated his right to procedural due process
by entering judgment without allowing him a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
“Whether the government has violated a person’s procedural due process rights is a
question of law that we review de novo.” State v. Rey, 905 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Minn. 2018)
(quotation omitted). The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to
due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. Procedural due
process requires that a person have notice and “an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful

2 Even if Beaulieu challenged these findings on appeal, we cannot review the district
court’s findings of fact because Beaulieu did not order transcripts of the hearings in this
case. See Am. Fam. Life Ins. Co. v. Noruk, 528 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. App. 1995)
(stating that when a transcript is not provided on appeal, this court’s task is “limited to
determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law”), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1995).

3 Beaulieu’s reliance on our decision in Koski v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. App.
2013), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2013), is misplaced. Beaulieu asserts that Koski stands
for the proposition that the eviction statutes require strict compliance. But in Koski, we
concluded that a now-repealed statute governing service in an eviction action on an out-of-
county defendant required strict compliance. 837 N.W.2d at 744. Because Koski pertains
to service requirements—which impact the essential question of a court’s personal
jurisdiction and are not at issue in this appeal—Koski is inapposite.
7
time and in a meaningful manner.” Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632
(Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Beaulieu’s argument focuses on the district court’s termination of the November 3
hearing, which he argues prevented him from testifying and offering exhibits in his defense
in violation of his right to procedural due process. We discern no such violation. The
district court conducted a hearing, and, following the hearing and on that same day, the
district court informed the parties that it would keep the record open to allow Beaulieu “to
file any additional argument he wants to make with the court for its consideration,”
affording Beaulieu a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Thereafter, Beaulieu filed a
motion to dismiss the eviction complaint, in which he repeated his arguments that the action
must be dismissed because landlord failed to attach the lease to the complaint and because
the 60-day notice of non-renewal was invalid. On this record, we cannot conclude that the
district court denied Beaulieu a meaningful opportunity to be heard.4
Beaulieu argues that the district court’s termination of the November 3 hearing
prevented him from testifying and offering exhibits in his defense. But “[g]enerally the

4 Typically, we conduct a two-step analysis when reviewing a procedural-due- process
claim. Sawh, 823 N.W.2d at 632. First, we identify “whether the government has deprived
the individual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest.” Id. Second, we “determine
‘whether the procedures followed by the [government] were constitutionally sufficient.’”
Id. (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011)). To determine the adequacy
of specific procedures, we apply the three-factor balancing test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See id. at 633-35 (applying “the three-factor balancing
test from Mathews” in considering a procedural-due-process claim). But here, Beaulieu
did not engage in the two-step analysis, nor did he raise any argument regarding the
Mathews factors.

8
only issue for trial [in an eviction action] is whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
true.” NY Props., LLC v. Schuette, 977 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn. App. 202 2) (quotation
omitted). “If a court or jury finds that the allegations are true, then the plaintiff is entitled
to ‘a writ of recovery of premises and [an] order to vacate.’” Id. (quoting Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.345, subd. 1(a) (2020)). Here, landlord alleged that it was entitled to a judgment
for possession because Beaulieu failed to pay rent. According to the district court, this fact
was undisputed. Beaulieu does not cite any authority in support of his contention that the
district court was required to conduct a more fulsome evidentiary hearing under these
circumstances.
5 And in those cases where we have concluded that a district court erred in
entering judgment for landlord without holding a trial, material facts were in dispute. See
id. at 866 (concluding that district court erred in entering judgment for landlord without
conducting trial where tenant denied claims that they failed to pay rent, failed to vacate,
and violated rental agreement). No such disputed facts exist here. Accordingly, we discern
no procedural-due-process violation.
Affirmed.

5 Beaulieu cites only Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 33 9 (Minn. 1973), in support of his
argument. Beaulieu asserts that Fritz stands for the proposition that a tenant has a right to
litigate defenses within an eviction action. But the Minnesota Supreme Court in Fritz held
that a tenant may assert breach of the statutory covenant of habitability as a defense in an
eviction action. 213 N.W.2d at 342. Here, Beaulieu did not assert breach of the covenant
of habitability as a defense. Accordingly, Fritz does not advance Beaulieu’s argument.