In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: L. B., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1954

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: L. B., Parent.

Filed May 11, 2026
Affirmed
Beane, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-25-923

Brooke Beskau Warg, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant-mother L.B.)

Andrew Small, Colich & Associates, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent-father
C.G.M.)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services
Department)

David Yates, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Christine Brick-Contreras)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Beane , Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BEANE, Judge
Appellant-mother L.B. challenges the district court’s order transferring permanent
legal and physical custody of mother’s two children to respondent-father C.G.M. Mother
argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Because we discern no abuse of discretion, we
affirm.
FACTS
Mother and father have two young children. Mother and father lived together with
the children for several years, but their relationship was tumultuous and mutually violent.
Mother was also violent toward the children. During an incident in early January 2024,
mother bit one of the children, hit him in the face, and threw him across the room, causing
a black eye. Respondent Hennepin County Human Services Department (the county )
received a report of the incident and investigated. Mother admitted to the early January
incident and another incident later the same month in which she slapped the same child in
the face. She also reported having several mental-health diagnoses, including borderline
personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and depression.
In mid-February, the county filed a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS)
petition. The district court issued an emergency hold and ordered that the children remain
in father’s care. After an emergency protective-care hearing, the district court found that
the CHIPS petition made a prima facie showing that the children would be endangered if
returned to mother’s care and approved a voluntary case plan for mother. In relevant part,
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the case plan called for mother to address her mental health and “learn to better regulate
[her] emotions” so she can “safely parent” the children by (1) attending anger-management
classes, engaging in individual therapy, and completing any other program “deemed
necessary” to satisfy this objective; and (2) attending domestic-violence programming and
following recommendations.
For the remainder of 2024, mother exhibited inconsistent compliance with her case
plan. That April, mother obtained a diagnostic assessment, which indicated diagnoses of
PTSD, borderline personality disorder, and mild recurrent major depressive disorder. But
she did not consistently participate in mental-health and domestic-violence programming.
She switched providers repeatedly and quit or rejected services offered to her by the county,
saying only that they were “not a good fit.” She also repeatedly refused to sign releases of
information to allow the county access to therapy records to confirm her engagement and
progress.
A trial on the CHIPS petition occurred over five days between December 2024 and
February 2025. In late February, the district court adjudicated the children CHIPS based
on findings that mother physically abused the children and is unable to properly and safely
care for the children because of her unmanaged mental-health challenges. In its CHIPS
order, the district court modified mother’s case plan. Regarding her mental health, the court
ordered:
Mother shall complete a psychological evaluation and
follow the recommendations from that evaluation. The
evaluation must include testing (including an MMPI and/or
MCMI), a review of collateral information (e.g., medical and
mental health records, [county] information), and be conducted
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by a licensed PhD-level professional, trained and certified in
the delivery and interpretation of such tests.

The district court also ordered mother to complete a certified dialectical behavioral therapy
(DBT) program, take medication as prescribed, and work with the county to “address the
level of information provided from the therapist to the [county].”
In April 2025, the county filed a petition to transfer permanent legal and physical
custody to father. Around that time, mother signed releases of information to authorize the
county social worker to access some of her therapy records, including the diagnostic
assessment completed in April 2024. The social worker planned to use the diagnostic
assessment and work with mother’s chosen therapist to ensure mother was receiving the
mental-health services required by mother’s case plan. But while mother communicated
regularly with the social worker and self-reported about her therapy, the social worker
consistently encountered difficulty obtaining information from mother’s therapist to
confirm mother’s engagement and progress. Meanwhile, mother continued to struggle with
her mental health.
The social worker also tried to support mother’s progress with DBT but had limited
success. Mother told the social worker at the end of April 2025 that she wanted to complete
DBT intake “herself.” But the following month, mother reported that the DBT provider
was “not a good fit” so she would just continue therapy with her existing provider. The
social worker offer ed a referral to a different DBT provider, but mother declined. At the
end of July, mother told the social worker that she completed an intake for DBT, to begin
the following month. Mother reported that it “was a good connection” and signed a release
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for the social worker to contact the provider, but again the provider did not respond to the
social worker’s request for information.
In August, mother’s mental health started to deteriorate, which negatively affected
her visits with the children. Late that month, at the social worker’s request, the district court
suspended mother’s visitation with the children and ordered her to complete an updated
mental-health assessment. The social worker tried to work with mother to facilitate the
assessment but was unable to contact mother or her therapist. Mother later reported that
she would obtain an updated mental-health assessment from her current therapist but could
not get an appointment before the end of September.
Trial on the custody-transfer petition took place over two days in late September. In
opposing the petition, mother emphasized that the county never provided her a referral for
the psychological evaluation required under her case plan and argued that this omission
shows that the county failed to make reasonable efforts to address the key reason for the
children’s out-of-home placement —her mental-health challenges. The district court
rejected this argument, explaining that various factors made it reasonable for the county
not to provide a referral for a psychological evaluation. The district court also found that
mother had failed to use the services provided to correct the conditions that led to the
children’s out-of-home placement and that transferring custody is in their best interests.
Based on those findings, the district court ordered the transfer of permanent legal and
physical custody to father.
Mother appeals.

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DECISION
On appeal from an order permanently transferring custody of a child, we review the
district court’s “factual findings for clear error and its finding of a statutory basis for the
order for abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d 346, 354 (Minn.
App. 2024). “A district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that lack
evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or resolves discretionary matters in a manner
contrary to logic and the facts on record.” Id. at 355.
As a permanency disposition when a child is not returned home, a district court may
order a transfer of “permanent legal and physical custody” to a parent or “a fit and willing
relative.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subds. 1, 4(a) (2024). In doing so, the district court must
make detailed findings about:
(1) how the child’s best interests are served by the order;
(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social
service agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child
with the parent or guardian where reasonable efforts are
required;
(3) the parent’s or parents’ efforts and abilit y to use
services to correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home
placement; and
(4) that the conditions which led to the out- of-home
placement have not been corrected so that the child can safely
return home.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a) (2024). When evaluating the reasonable ness of reunification
efforts, a district court must consider various factors, including whether provided services
are relevant, adequate, consistent, and realistic. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). “[W]hat
constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ depends on the facts of each case.” In re Welfare of Child
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of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 (Minn. App. 2021) (addressing reasonable efforts before
termination of parental rights), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021).
Mother contends the district court abused its discretion by determining that the
county made reasonable efforts because the county undisputedly failed to provide a referral
for a psychological evaluation. She contends this omission precludes a determination that
the county’s reunification efforts were reasonable because the evaluation was required
under her 2025 case plan and the county could not unilaterally decide not to provide the
referral because “[t]he requirement that the parties follow the case plan is a two -way
street.” See In re Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 665-66 (Minn. 2008). We are not
persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the county’s
reunification efforts were reasonable under the circumstances presented here.
Mother does not dispute that the county’s reunification efforts were reasonable in
all other respects, 1 and she identifies no authority for the proposition that reunification
efforts that are otherwise reasonable are rendered unreasonable if the county fails to
provide a single service, even if the service is required under the case plan. To the contrary,
the reasonableness of reunification efforts depends on the facts of the case. J.H., 968
N.W.2d at 601. And a parent’s input and engagement necessarily influence which efforts

1 The district court recounted the county’s reunification efforts that it concluded were
reasonable in the context of this case. Those efforts included the social worker’s regular
communication with mother to discuss her case plan, meeting with father, visits with the
children, and repeated (if unsuccessful) attempts to contact mother’s therapist regarding
mother’s mental-health needs. The county also provided housing resources, parenting-
education resources, transportation assistance, referrals to multiple supervised visitation
providers, and offers of referrals to mental- health providers (which mother repeatedly
rebuffed).
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are reasonable because the county must provide services that are “selected in collaboration
with” the family and “realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h)(1), (8).
Consistent with these principles, the district court identified various facts supporting
its conclusion that the county’s failure to provide a referral for a psychological evaluation
did not render its reunification efforts unreasonable: (1) mother demonstrated she was
unwilling to accept the county’s mental-health referrals; (2) mother previously completed
a diagnostic assessment and, before trial, neither mother nor the county objected to the
assessment or “argued that it was insufficient”; (3) the purpose of a psychological
evaluation is to provide a diagnosis and recommended treatment, but mother’s diagnoses
are well documented and not disputed; and (4) even without the psychological evaluation,
the county tried to coordinate with mother’s therapist to support her in therapy and
encouraged mother to engage in DBT. The district court found that the county did not need
to “make a referral” for a psychological evaluation “in view of these facts,” and
“accept[ed]” the diagnostic assessment as satisfying that case-plan requirement.
Mother contends it was improper for the district court to treat the diagnostic
assessment as a substitute for the more rigorous psychological evaluation. In doing so, she
relies on the county social worker’s testimony that a diagnostic assessment is only a
sufficient tool for providing appropriate mental-health support services when the county
can work directly with the parent’s therapist, which did not occur here. Mother also argues
that the county should have recognized that a more rigorous psychological evaluation and
additional mental-health support were required because her mental health deteriorated as
the case went on. Although mother’s mental health did not improve during the pendency
9
of this case and it is possible that additional mental-health support could have helped her,
we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the
county’s efforts to provide mental-health services to mother were reasonable. The district
court considered its objectives in ordering a psychological evaluation—obtaining a
diagnosis and treatment recommendations— and determined that those objectives were
satisfied by the diagnostic assessment. The district court observed that mother’s mental-
health diagnoses are not in dispute and that she participated in therapy throughout the case
to address those diagnoses. The district court also explained that the county made
persistent, even if not always successful, efforts to support mother’s access to mental-
health services, including referrals for court -ordered DBT . These conclusions by the
district court are supported by logic and evidence in the record and therefore are not an
abuse of discretion.
Mother also challenges the district court’s finding that she likely would not have
complied with a referral for a psychological evaluation because she refused to comply with
other mental-health referrals from the county. She asserts that this finding lacks support in
the evidentiary record and amounts to an improper posttrial determination that reasonable
efforts would be futile. This argument is unavailing in both respects.
First, the record supports the district court’s findings as to mother’s unwillingness
to accept referrals. The CHIPS order recounts mother’s resistance to referrals and other
offers of services throughout 2024, and the social worker’s testimony and reports describe
similar resistance in 2025. For example, mother declined a May 2025 referral for a DBT
provider even though her initial effort to find one on her own proved unsuccessful and her
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case plan required DBT. And after the district court ordered mother to complete an updated
mental-health assessment in August 2025, she declined the social worker’s offers to
facilitate that process even though working with her chosen therapist meant she was unable
to get the assessment before the September 2025 custody- transfer trial. The district court
did not clearly err by finding that mother refused mental-health referrals.
Second, mother mischaracterizes the district court’s finding about referral resistance
as an improper posttrial determination that reasonable efforts would be futile. She is correct
that the county could not unilaterally decide that reunification efforts would be futile and
that the district court could not retroactively approve an abdication of reunification efforts
based on futility. In re Welfare of Child. of A.D.B., 970 N.W.2d 725, 732 (Minn. App.
2022) (citing T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664). But that is not what happened here. Instead, the
district court determined that the county’s efforts to reunify mother with her children were
reasonable and that its failure to provide one service —a referral for a psychological
evaluation—did not undermine the reasonableness of the county’s efforts, considering all
the circumstances. Mother has not demonstrated that the district court made unsupported
factual findings, misapplied the law, or otherwise abused its discretion in reaching that
conclusion.
Affirmed.