Carsten James Quinlan, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1960

Carsten James Quinlan,
Appellant,

vs.

Fraser, et al.,
Respondents,

Alissa Puls,
Respondent.

Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-24-5866

Carsten J. Quinlan, Woodbury, Minnesota (self -represented appellant)

William L. Davidson, Ryan C. Ellis, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan & Peterson, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents Fraser, et al.)

Alan P. King, Natalie R. Cote, Goetz & Eckland P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent Alissa Puls)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bentley ,
Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
This appeal requires us to review the district court’s application of Minnesota’s
Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, which allows district courts to dismiss recently
filed civil suits that target the defendants’ constitutionally protected speech and to award
attorney fees. The district court dismissed Carsten Quinlan’s multicount lawsuit against his
former spouse, a healthcare provider, and the healthcare provider’s employees, all of whom
he accused of collud ing to defame him after the former spouse reported that Quinlan had
sexually abused their children and the healthcare provider began providing therapy to
family members. On appeal from that dismissal, Quinlan argues that the district court
erroneously failed to apply the act’s goods-and-services exclusion, failed to allow adequate
discovery, ordered him to pay an unreasonable amount of attorney fees, and denied his
request to amend his civil complaint. Because the arguments lack legal merit , we affirm.
FACTS
We base our review on the record construed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party on the special motion for expedited relief under the Uniform Public
Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) , Minn. Stat. §§ 554.07-.20 (2024) . J&D Dental v.
Hou, 26 N.W.3d 491, 494 n.1 (Minn. App. 2025). We summarize the facts here.
Appellant Carsten Quinlan and respondent Alissa Puls ’s 2022 Wisconsin divorce
resulted in a judgment that afforded them joint legal custody, placed their minor children
in Puls’s primary care, and gave Puls decision-making authority over the ir healthcare. Puls
resided with the children in Washington County, where she reported in January 2023 that
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Quinlan had sexually abused their daughter. We will call this daughter “ Ella,” a name we
have randomly chosen to protect her privacy . Washington County investigators
forensically interviewed Ella, after which the state charged Quinlan with multiple counts
of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. A jury acquitted Quinlan of the charges in April
2024, but he voluntarily forfeited his custody of the children to resolve a termination- of-
parental-rights action by the county.
Quinlan filed an eight-count civil complaint in this case against Puls, Fraser, which
is a mental-healthcare service provider, and two Fraser employees —clinical social worker
Kallie Uner and clinical counselor Sara Haubrich (the respondent “Fraser defendants”).
His complaint accuses Puls of civil conspiracy and, purportedly on behalf of Ella,
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint accuses Fraser alone or at least
one of the Fraser defendants of the same claims and six others: defamation, negligence,
failure to report child abuse, negligent infliction of emotional distress, vicarious liability,
and “ratification.” The complaint in essence all eges that Puls coached the children to
fabricate abuse reports against him and that the Fraser defendants conspired with Puls to
defame and emotionally harm him.
Puls and the Fraser defendants separately moved the district court to dismiss
Quinlan’s complaint on several grounds. Puls moved to dismiss under rule 12.02(e) of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that Quinlan had failed to state a claim
against her on which relief could be granted. The Fraser defendants moved to dismiss on
three grounds. They maintained that Quinlan’s claims were subject to dismissal under
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UPEPA, rule 12.02(e), or Minnesota Statutes section 145.682 (2024), which requires
expert testimony to support a claim of error against a healthcare provider.
The district court applied UPEPA and dismissed the defamation and civil -
conspiracy claims against the Fraser defendants, along with the contingent claims of
vicarious liability and “ratification.” It recognized that the negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims rested principally on the Fraser defendants ’
communications related to the custody and parental -rights litigation and dismissed those
claims on immunity grounds. It also granted the Fraser defendants’ dismissal motion based
on Minnesota Statutes section 145.682 and rule 12.02(e). The district court granted Puls’s
motion to dismiss under rule 12.02(e), dismissing the claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress pur portedly on Ella’s behalf because Quinlan lacked legal custody of
her and could not maintain an action on her behalf. It dismissed the civil- conspiracy claim
against Puls because it had dismissed the underlying defamation claim against the Fraser
defendants, and that claim was the only basis for the civil -conspiracy claim. The district
court then awarded the Fraser defendants $21,771.20 in attorney fees under UPEPA.
Quinlan appeals from the resulting final judgment .
DECISION
Quinlan challenges the district court ’s dismissal of his civil complaint, except he
does not contest dismissal of his vicarious liability and “ratification” claims. He maintains
first that UPEPA’s goods -and-services exclusion applies, second that he was denied
adequate discovery, third that he was ordered to pay an unreasonable amount of attorney
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fees, fourth that his claims did not require expert support, and fifth that he was wrongly
denied the opportunity to amend his complaint. The arguments all fail.
I
The district court did not erroneously apply UPEPA. In relevant part, under UPEPA,
a party may file a special motion for expedited relief to dismiss a civil action that is based
on that party’s “communication in . . . judicial . . . or other government al proceeding.”
Minn. Stat. §§ 554.08(b)(1), 554.09. Quinlan’s civil complaint alleges defamation and civil
conspiracy based on the Fraser defendants’ reports that were “communicated
to . . . individuals involved in the family court proceedings.” Given that stated basis for his
claim, we are unpersuaded by his contention on appeal that, because the Fraser defendants’
report of Ella’s evaluation was produced before, but not during, a judicial or governmental
proceeding, it falls outside UPEPA. We believe he reads the statute too narrowly. Evidence
gathered outside the court and communicated to the court in judicial proceedings is the sort
of material the statute may cover. That the Fraser defendants interviewed Ella and created
the report to inform prosecutors, the parties, and the court in Quinlan’s custody, parental -
rights, or criminal cases meets the statutory element that the communication occur red in a
judicial proceeding.
After applying UPEPA to the contested communication, the district court
appropriately dismissed Quinlan’s action against the Fraser defendants. The district court
must dismiss a civil claim if, as here, the moving party establishes that UPEPA applies and
Quinlan in responding then fails to establish that a statutory exception also applies. Minn.
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Stat. §§ 554.13(a), 554.08(c) . Quinlan unconvincingly maintains that one of those
exceptions applies here.
The applicable statutory exception, argues Quinlan, is the one that allows litigation
“against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services.”
See Minn. Stat. § 554.08(c) (3). It is true that the Fraser defendants are primarily engaged
in the business of providing services, but the statute excepts litigation against defendants
so characterized only “ if the cause of action arises out of a communication related to the
person’s sale or lease of the goods or services.” Id. It is therefore not enough that the Fraser
defendants gathered the communicated information during paid therapy sessions.
Quinlan’s claims of defamation and conspiracy must also relate to the sale of Fraser’s
services. They do not. They instead relate only to the substance of the resulting
communication to the district court. Because Quinlan’s “cause of action” does not “arise[]
out of a communication related to the [Fraser defendants’] sale or lease of the goods or
services” that they are in the business of providing, id., the exception does not apply.
II
We will not consider the merits of Quinlan’s contention that he was wrongly denie d
discovery during the UPEPA proceedings. It is true that UPEPA generally stays discovery
but allows the district court to grant limited discovery. Minn. Stat. § 554.10(a), (d). But we
do not consider issues that were neither raised to nor decided by the district court. Thiele
v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1998). Quinlan never moved the district court to
grant limited discovery, and he therefore forfeited the issue on appeal.

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III
We are unconvinced by Quinlan’s argument that the district court awarded the
Fraser defendants unreasonable attorney fees as prevailing parties in their UPEPA
dismissal motion. The prevailing party on a UPEPA motion is entitled to reasonable
attorney fees, court costs, and litigation expenses . Minn. Stat. § 554.16. We review the
reasonableness of an attorney-fee award for an abuse of discretion, examin ing all relevant
circumstances, including the complexity of the matter, the hours expended on it, and
comparable billing rates. Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC , 826 N.W.2d 530, 536–37 (Minn.
2013). Quinlan identifies no specific error, requesting only that we vacate or remand the
award for “recalculation.” We do not presume errors on appeal, as the appellant bears the
burden of asserting them. Horodenski v. Lyndale Green Townhome Ass’n, Inc ., 804
N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. App. 2011) . Because Quinlan identifies no error and none is
apparent on the face of the order, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
evidentially supported, $21,771.20 award.
Quinlan relatedly raises an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of UPEPA’s
attorney-fee provision. A party challenges a statute’s constitutionality by raising the issue
in the district court, Laliberte v. Dollar Tree, Inc., 987 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. App.
2023), and by noticing the state attorney general, Minn. R. Civ. P. 5A (2). The party must
again notice the attorney general before raising his constitutional challenge on appeal .
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 144. Quinlan did not comply with rule 5A’s notice requirements ,
and he also failed to preserve the issue for appeal by asking the district court only that the
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record reflect a “constitutional objection” without presenting a specific argument or
requesting the district court to rule on it.
IV
Quinlan argues that the district court improperly disregarded his related medical -
malpractice allegations for having failed to provide an affidavit of expert review. A
claimant alleging error by a healthcare provider must demonstrate expert support by
attaching to his civil complaint an affidavit certifying that an expert reviewed his claim and
observed a deviation from the applicable standard of care. Minn. Stat. § 145.682, subds. 2,
3. Failure to include this expert support requires dismissal. Id., subd. 6. Quinlan contends
that his allegations were excepted from this affidavit requirement because they were within
“common knowledge .” We review de novo whether a claim requires expert -witness
testimony to establish a prima facie malpractice case. Tousignant v. St. Louis County, 615
N.W.2d 53, 58 (Minn. 2000). We hold that Quinlan’s alleged medical errors required a
supporting expert affidavit.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Quinlan’s assertion that his claims were not
founded on medical malpractice. His complaint alleges that the Fraser defendants
misdiagnosed Puls, ignored supposed signs of her alleged abuse of the children, and applied
dubious therapy care. Quinlan’s assertion that the Fraser defendants negligently failed to
properly assess Puls as having abused the children by coercing them to make unfounded
allegations against him rest s on the premise that they breached the standard of care for
psychological diagnos es and proper treatment. These are quintessential malpractice
allegations. See id. at 59. Quinlan’s contrary argument fails.
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V
Quinlan maintains last that the district court erroneously failed to allow him leave
to amend his complaint. We review challenges to the district court’s refusal to allow a
plaintiff to amend his complaint for an abuse of discretion. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d
758, 761 (Minn. 1993). A district court generally should freely grant a party leave to amend
his pleading if justice requires it , Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01, but it may nevertheless deny the
request if the amended claim would not survive a motion to dismiss, see Hunter v. Anchor
Bank, N.A., 842 N.W.2d 10, 17–18 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2014).
Quinlan contends that his proposed amendment to allege intentional infliction of emotional
distress regarding himself rather than on Ella’s behalf was merely a “clarifying”
amendment and not a “wholly new ” claim. Given this characterization and the
corresponding fact that Quinlan has not alleged any new or different facts, w e are satisfied
that the proposed amended claim would also fail to survive a motion under rule 12.02(e).
The claims as alleged would fail to state an actionable legal claim. To prevail on a
theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a complainant must prove that the
defendants engaged in intentional, extreme, and outrageous conduct. Langeslag v. KYMN
Inc., 664 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Minn. 2003). The plaintiff must also prove that the defendants’
outrageous conduct caused him severe emotional distress. Id. Changing only the victim of
the original claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which alleges that the
Fraser defendants engaged in intentional, extreme, and outrageous conduct that caused Ella
severe emotional distress, dooms the proposed “clarifying” amendment to fail as a matter
of law. The extant complaint alleges that Puls and a Fraser defendant “engaged in extreme
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and outrageous conduct by working in tandem to manipulate and emotionally harm minor
[child Ella] with the purpose of intimidating her as a potential witness.” And it identifies
Ella alone as the one who allegedly suffered severe emotional trauma as a result. It alleges
no intentional conduct at all, let alone intentional conduct that is also extreme and
outrageous, directed toward Quinlan to cause him severe emotional harm. Because Quinlan
has never a sserted that any Fraser defendants engaged in this type of intentional conduct
toward him or that their intentional conduct caused him severe emotional distress , the
amended complaint would not survive dismissal under rule 12.02(e).
Affirmed.