State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1964

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justin Taylor Eschenbacher,
Appellant.

Filed July 13, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CR-24-596

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and
Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the district court’s judgment of conviction for felony
domestic assault, appellant argues that the district court (1) erred by sentencing appellant
without allowing him to exercise his right to allocution and (2) abused its discretion by
2
denying his motion for a downward dispositional sentencing departure when he had
demonstrated his particular amenability to probation. We affirm.
FACTS
In May 2024, Eschenbacher was charged with felony domestic assault under
Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision 4 (2022). In July 2025, he pleaded guilty
to the charge in exchange for dismissal of a charge in another file for violating a domestic-
abuse no-contact order. During his plea, Eschenbacher admitted to having a physical
argument with his wife in which he “grabbed [her], put her on the couch, held her down,
and then hit her.” He also admitted to having two prior domestic-assault convictions, in
2014 and 2016, which enhanced the current domestic-assault offense to a felony.
Morrison County Community Corrections prepared a presentence investigation
report (PSI). The PSI recommended a downward durational departure from the
presumptive sentence. Eschenbacher filed a motion requesting a dispositional and a
durational departure. Attached to the motion were 21 letters of support from friends and
family. The state objected to Eschenbacher’s motion.
At a sentencing hearing, Eschenbacher called four witnesses. He called two
probation officers that supervised him in 2019 and from 2023 to 2024. Both testified that
Eschenbacher did well on probation, had no violations, and would likely succeed on further
probation. Next, Eschenbacher’s mother testified that he has grown more mature, taken
responsibility for his actions, and attends therapy and domestic-violence classes. Finally,
Eschenbacher’s father—the victim of Eschenbacher’s 2014 domestic-assault conviction —
3
testified that Eschenbacher has gotten better at controlling his anger, has sincere remorse
about the past incidents, and has support from his family.
The victim in this case, Eschenbacher’s wife, also addressed the court, reading a
victim-impact statement. She described the fear and shame she felt living with
Eschenbacher. She also asserted that Eschenbacher’s attorneys had “concocted a
settlement” in which Eschenbacher would give in to her custody demands and settle
pending divorce proceedings so long as she did not testify at the sentencing hearing. She
also described numerous instances where Eschenbacher allegedly beat, strangled, and
threatened her. She concluded by asking the court to impose the sentence the state
requested.
After counsel presented arguments, the district court found that Eschenbacher was
not particularly amenable to probation and sentenced him to 28 months in prison, the top
of presumptive range under the sentencing guidelines. Neither the district court nor counsel
brought up Eschenbacher’s right of allocution, and Eschenbacher did not request to speak.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Eschenbacher challenges his sentence in two ways, arguing that the district court
erred by (1) not giving him an opportunity for allocution and (2) denying his motion for a
downward dispositional departure.1 We address each argument in turn.

1 The state elected not to file a brief on appeal. Accordingly, we decide the case on the
merits under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 142.03.
4
I. The district court erred by failing to allow allocution , but the error was
harmless.
Eschenbacher argues that the district court erred by not giving him an opportunity
for allocution.
The right to alloc ution refers to “the court’s responsibility to ask the defendant if
[the defendant] has anything to say before a sentence is imposed.” Greer v. State, 973
N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 2022). Minnesota courts have not considered whether allocution
is a constitutional right, but the United States Supreme Court has determined that it is not.
Id. (citing Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). The right of allocution,
however, is codified in rule 27.03, subdivision 3(C), of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which states: “Before pronouncing sentence, the court must allow statements
from . . . the defendant, personally.”
A district court errs by not “extending” the defendant an opportunity for allocution
before imposing a sentence. State v. Young, 610 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. App. 2000), rev.
denied (Minn. July 25, 2000); see also State ex rel. Searles v. Tahash, 136 N.W.2d 70, 74
(Minn. 1965) (stating defendant’s “right to have presented to the court all of the mitigating
factors which might reasonably justify a sentence less than the maximum”); State ex rel.
Krahn v. Tahash, 144 N.W.2d 262, 262 (Minn. 1966) (citing Searles). The right to
allocution is not discretionary and cannot be waived by a defendant’s silence. State v.
Hanson, 231 N.W.2d 104, 105 (Minn. 1975).
2

2 Rule 27.03 was amended in 2012 to remove the requirement that the district court
explicitly ask if the defendant wants to make a statement. Compare Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03
(2008) (requiring district court to “address the defendant personally and ask if the
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Eschenbacher argues that the district court erred by not explicitly offering him a
chance for allocution. The district court proceeded directly from counsel’s arguments to
sentencing, without giving Eschenbacher the opportunity to address the court personally.
And, though Eschenbacher’s counsel never objected or requested allocution, Eschenbacher
cannot waive his right “[b]y remaining mute.” Hanson, 231 N.W.2d at 105. We therefore
agree with Eschenbacher that the district court erred by violating his right to allocution.
But the violation of a defendant’s right to allocution does not constitute reversible
error if the error was not prejudicial. See Krahn, 144 N.W.2d at 262-63 (declining to
reverse for violation of right to allocution when district court took into account mitigating
information from other sources); Greer, 973 N.W.2d at 923 (holding that the harmless-
error, rather than structural-error, standard applies to the denial of right to allocution when
the district court imposed a mandatory sentence); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01
(requiring that harmless error be disregarded). Eschenbacher argues that he was prejudiced
because, had he been afforded the chance to personally show his remorse and to respond
to the allegations made in the victim impact statement, the district court might have
departed downward. The argument is unconvincing.

defendant wishes to make a statement in the defendant’s own behalf”) with Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.03 (2026) (requiring district court to “allow statements from . . . the defendant,
personally”). Nevertheless, nonprecedential decisions by this court have continued to cite
caselaw from before the rule change in cases in which the district court has failed to invite
defendant’s allocution. See, e.g., State v. Ryan, No. A17-1532, 2018 WL 3716364, at *3
(Minn. App. Aug. 6, 2018) (citing Hanson); State v. Allen, No. A16-0311, 2017 WL
163733, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan. 17, 2017) (citing Searles, Krahn, and Young).
6
A deprivation of allocution may warrant reversal if information or arguments in
favor of the defendant were not provided to the district court elsewhere. See Hanson, 231
N.W.2d at 105 (remanding for resentencing when district court did not have the benefit of
PSI or defendant’s testimony); Searles, 136 N.W.2d at 74 (remanding for resentencing
when there was no PSI and counsel failed to speak on defendant’s behalf). But reversal is
not warranted when there is “adequate assurance . . . that the [district] court took into
account the defendant’s version of the events leading to his conviction and other
background information which is normally considered in mitigation of the penalty.” Krahn,
144 N.W.2d at 263.
Here, the district court was provided with a PSI , which reported Eschenbacher’s
remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and steps toward rehabilitation, and which supported
a durational departure. In addition, Eschenbacher made a robust case for downward
dispositional and durational departures . His counsel presented written arguments in a
departure motion and a reply memorandum. Eschenbacher submitted 21 letters of support
from friends and family. At the sentencing hearing, Eschenbacher presented testimony
from four witnesses, and his counsel orally argued how the factors considered for a
departure were met. The district court repeatedly assured the parties that it had reviewed
and considered all the materials and submissions. On this record, there is “adequate
assurance” that the district court had before it and considered mitigating information, and
it is unlikely that Eschenbacher’s personal statement would have added anything more to
the evidence and argument on his behalf.
7
Specifically with respect to the Eschenbacher’s argument that he was unable to
respond to the allegations in the victim-impact statement, a review of the sentencing-
hearing transcript makes clear that, while the district court commended the victim for
“standing up and making her voice heard,” it made its sentencing decision based on other
reasons, which it outlined,3 and not on the victim’s allegations about other wrongdoing by
Eschenbacher or his counsel. Thus, this argument is unconvincing as well.
In sum, the district court erred by violating Eschenbacher’s right to allocution, but
the error was harmless.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Eschenbacher’s
motion for a downward dispositional departure.
Eschenbacher also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion for a downward dispositional departure.
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision on whether to grant a sentencing
departure for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014).
“A court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law
or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn.
2011). “A reviewing court may not interfere with the sentencing court’s exercise of
discretion, as long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the
testimony and information presented before making a determination.” State v. Pegel, 795
N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).

3 We discuss the district court’s reasoning in the next section.
8
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2022 ). Reasons to depart from the presumptive
range must be “substantial, and compelling.” Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 & cmt. 2.D.103
(Supp. 2023). Departures from sentencing guidelines “are discouraged and are intended to
apply to a small number of cases.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016).
The sentencing guidelines outline a nonexclusive list of factors that courts may consider in
deciding whether to depart from a presumptive sentence. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a
(Supp. 2023). But appellate courts “will not ordinarily interfere with a sentence falling
within the presumptive sentence range, either dispositionally or durationally, even if there
are grounds that would justify departure.” State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn.
2006) (quotation omitted). In other words, a district court’s refusal to depart from the
presumptive sentence would warrant reversal only in a “rare case.” State v. Kindem, 313
N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). And the district court need not provide explanation for imposing
the presumptive sentence so long as it “considers reasons for departure.” State v. Van Ruler,
378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985).
One mitigating factor that can warrant departure is that a person is “particularly
amenable to probation.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7). Particular amenability to
probation can be demonstrated by factors such as the defendant’s age, prior record,
remorse, cooperation, attitude in court, and the support of friends and family. State v. Trog,
323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). In deciding whether to grant a downward dispositional
departure, a district court considers “the defendant as an individual and [focuses] on
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whether the presumptive sentence would be best for [the defendant] and for society.” State
v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983).
Eschenbacher moved for a downward dispositional departure based on his particular
amenability to probation. 4 The district court determined that Eschenbacher was not
particularly amenable to probation and denied the motion to depart, imposing a sentence at
the top of the presumptive range. Eschenbacher argues that this decision was an abuse of
discretion because the record shows that he was particularly amenable to probation under
the Trog factors. The argument is unpersuasive.
Eschenbacher discusses the Trog factors of age, prior criminal record, and remorse.
Regarding his age, Eschenbacher cites State v. Donnay, 600 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Minn. App.
1999), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1999). But the defendant in Donnay was 20 years old,
whereas Eschenbacher was 29 years old at the time of his offense. 600 N.W.2d at 474. Age
is typically relied upon as a factor to show a defendant was young and immature when they
committed the offense. See, e.g., Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 30-31 (noting that defendant’s
young age supported a departure); State v. Patton, 414 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Minn. App. 1987)
(upholding a departure where the district court cited a defendant’s immaturity and young
age—19 years old—as a reason for departure). In Soto, the supreme court rejected the
district court’s determination that the fact that the defendant was “‘only’ 37 years old”
made him particularly amenable to probation on the basis that he “was young enough that
he still ‘ha[d] an opportunity to correct [his] behavior,’” noting that “if that reasoning

4 Eschenbacher also moved for a downward durational departure but does not challenge
denial of that motion on appeal.
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applies to a 37- year-old, it is difficult to see which defendants it would not reach.” 855
N.W.2d at 310. Similarly, here, Eschenbacher does not elaborate on why his age of 29
makes him particularly amenable to probation.
Eschenbacher argues that his criminal record should be considered “neutral”
because his past two offenses would have decayed in a few months and would have not
contributed to his criminal history score, leading to a presumptive stayed sentence. But the
district court’s consideration of prior offenses under this factor has never been limited to
offenses included in a criminal-history score . See id. (discussing the relevance of prior
offenses even where the defendant’s criminal history score was zero). And in its
explanation at the hearing, the district court noted Eschenbacher’s prior “violent offenses”
and the long duration of his probation.
Eschenbacher argues that he “consistently expressed remorse and regret for his
actions” and “demonstrated a commitment to change through engagement and therapy.”
He argues that his psychological evaluation after the offense was “eye-opening” and led to
“significant improvement in his ability to cope with stress and frustration.” But “whether
a defendant ’s actions express genuine remorse and how much weight to give to that
remorse” are questions for the district court. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 626. The district court
apparently found Eschenbacher’s remorse not genuine, noting that “ancillary issues” were
driving his remorse and that it took him a year to resolve the case. It also found that his
domestic-abuse classes and therapy were insufficient, noting indications that “he wasn’t
being truthful” during an assessment.
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Eschenbacher also argues that the factor of community support weighs in favor of a
dispositional departure. Eschenbacher undisputedly had a “tremendous amount of
community support,” as reflected in the numerous letters and testimony presented at the
hearing. In addition, Eschenbacher argues that he “cooperated, did not minimize his actions
and was respectful” throughout the judicial process. The district court did not comment on
this during the hearing, but, in general, cooperation and attitude in court typically weigh in
favor of departure. Although two factors may have supported departure, on this record, we
see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that Eschenbacher is not
particularly amenable to probation.
The district court repeatedly stated that it had reviewed and considered all the
materials before it. And, having done so, it concluded that Eschenbacher’s mitigation
efforts were insufficient, that his remorse was not genuine, and that he was at risk of further
domestic abuse . Because the district court “carefully evaluated all the testimony and
information presented before making a determination,” this court “may not interfere” with
the exercise of discretion to impose a presumptive sentence. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255
(quotation omitted).
Affirmed.